EFFECTS OF FDI SPILLOVERS ON THE PRODUCTIVITY OF DOMESTIC FIRMS IN SELECTED TRANSITION COUNTRIES by Orlić, Edvard
Staffordshire University  
Faculty of Business, Education and Law 
Business School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E F F E C T S  O F  F D I  S P I L L O V E R S  O N  T H E  
P R O D U C T I V I T Y  O F  D O M E S T I C  F I R M S  
I N  S E L E C T E D  T R A N S I T I O N  C O U N T R I E S  
 
 
 
 
 
Edvard Orlić 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement of 
Staffordshire University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
March 2016
 
i 
ABSTRACT 
 
The transition to a market based economy in Central and East European countries 
(CEECs) was characterised by deep structural and institutional reforms. These reforms, 
particularly the liberalisation of trade and capital flows, played a prominent role and 
enabled the entry of these countries in the “FDI market”. It was expected that the entry 
of MNCs into these countries would foster firm restructuring, change the export structure 
and above all generate knowledge spillovers and create linkages with indigenous firms. 
Therefore, CEECs started to offer various incentives to attract FDI, hoping that some of 
the technology brought by MNCs will spill over to local firms. This would enable them 
to increase their productivity and achieve higher rates of growth that would result in 
convergence with more advanced countries.  
The aim of this thesis is to investigate productivity spillovers from FDI to local firms in 
five transition countries using firm level data for the period 2002-2010. Several elements 
differentiate this study from the previous analyses. We compare the effects of horizontal 
spillovers and vertical linkages from FDI across countries and two main sectors 
(manufacturing and services) and assess the heterogeneity of MNCs. To the best of our 
knowledge this is the first study taking into account MNCs’ origin and the extent of 
foreign ownership in a group of transition economies. Given the importance of FDI in 
services we further disentangle vertical linkages according to sectoral source and 
investigate the moderating role of firms’ absorptive capacity. Semi-parametric approach 
based on control function is applied to estimate firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) 
which is then used in the estimation of horizontal and vertical spillovers from FDI along 
with other firm and industry level determinants. FDI spillovers are estimated using the 
dynamic panel econometric technique.  
Our findings indicate that local firms in the advanced stage of transition benefit from 
horizontal spillovers arising mostly in service sector and from partially owned foreign 
firms while the effects of MNCs’ origin are ambiguous. We also find that net effects of 
FDI spillovers are driven by vertical linkages. In particular, positive effect of backward 
linkages on firm productivity are found for fully owned and non-EU MNCs. However, 
for a limited set of countries, these positive effects of backward linkages are in certain 
 
ii 
cases further supported or offset by negative effects of partially owned foreign firms and 
EU MNCs. On the other hand, forward linkages when positive are limited to EU MNCs 
while non-EU MNCs and both partially and fully owned foreign firms exhibit mostly 
negative productivity effects with the exception of two countries. Furthermore, we find 
that MNCs in manufacturing and service sectors generate significant productivity 
spillovers to manufacturing firms which are further strengthened with higher levels of 
absorptive capacity. However, in most cases these spillovers occur through different 
vertical channels, namely through manufacturing backward and services forward 
spillovers thus shedding new light on the increasing importance of forward linkages and 
FDI in services. Human capital and investment in intangibles are found to be strong 
determinants of firm productivity together with increased competition, while firms’ age 
and size have U-shape and inverse U-shape effects, respectively.  
This thesis shows that the effects of FDI spillovers differ among countries suggesting 
that sectoral and MNCs’ heterogeneity play an important role in driving the overall 
results. Therefore, based on these findings we have developed a set of policy 
recommendations for policy makers and investment promotion agencies with the aim to 
maximise the benefits of MNC’s entry for indigenous firms’ productivity and their 
inclusion into Global Value Chains. 
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PREFACE 
 
Since the collapse of the communist system Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEEC) have been characterised by significant structural changes and increased 
globalisation amplified by the liberalisation of trade and capital markets. One of the most 
pertinent features of CEECs’ integration into global trade and capital flows has been a 
surge in FDI. Increased inflow of foreign investment in these countries was primarily 
motivated by the opening of new markets.  Also increased globalisation of countries 
around the world enabled MNCs to become major players in global production of 
tangible goods, technology and investment in R&D.  The opening of CEECs to 
international capital flows was closely followed by the increase in global stock of FDI 
from US$ 2.1 trillion in 1990 to US$ 26 trillion in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2015). The increased 
internalisation of firms has also had a profound impact on host economies since the share 
of foreign firms’ output in global GDP rose from 21 percent in 1990 to 47 percent in 
2014. Over the same time period the value added of foreign firms increased eightfold, 
exports fourfold and employment twofold (UNCTAD, 2015). As both theoretical 
(Helpman et al., 2004) and empirical literature (e.g. Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007) suggest, 
MNCs are more productive due to their advanced production technology, management 
and organizational know-how, marketing expertise, production networks, access to 
finance and codified and tacit knowledge giving them advantage over their domestic 
counterparts. In international technology diffusion, MNCs are seen as an important agent 
since almost two thirds of all private R&D expenditure is conducted by them (UNCTAD, 
2005). With this in mind, an investigation of the role of MNCs on the prospects of 
industrial development, increase in exports, competition and technology diffusion that 
ultimately determine economic growth is highly relevant for countries which lack 
advanced knowledge and technology. 
During the process of transition from centrally planned to market economy Central and 
East European countries (CEECs) have completely transformed their economic and 
institutional framework and relied on internationalisation of their trade and capital 
markets. Owing to a number of reasons such as obsolete capital, technological 
backwardness, lack of innovation and specialisation in industries with low value added 
the performance of these countries was lagging behind those of more advanced Western 
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economies.  The expectations were that opening to FDI would bring the necessary capital, 
technology, know-how, access to new markets and open new jobs resulting in a reduction 
in technology gap, enterprise restructuring, modernization of industries and ultimately 
economic growth. Therefore, most countries liberalised their FDI regime and started 
offering generous investment and tax incentives. The particular aim of these incentives 
was the that the entry of foreign firms will increase the productivity of indigenous firms 
through technology spillovers or the inclusion of latter in Global Value Chains (GVC). 
However, the success of CEECs in attracting FDI has been far from uniform across the 
region, depending partially on privatisation policies in early transition period and later 
on institutional progress, comparative advantages, macroeconomic policies and 
transition specific factors such as regional integration (Seric, 2011). The differences in 
determinants were also linked to FDI motives and types. Despite clear theoretical 
arguments in favour of positive effects of FDI, empirical results remain inconclusive at 
both macro and micro level.   
Notwithstanding the importance of the direct effects of FDI in terms of their contribution 
to capital accumulation, positive changes in export structure, enterprise restructuring, 
improvements in infrastructure and development of the service sector, the emphasis of 
this research is on the FDI spillover process. The issue of FDI spillovers has attracted 
considerable attention among policy makers as the existence of spillovers may be 
regarded as indicator of efficiency of policy measure (Rugraff, 2008). The process of 
transition and large influx of FDI has provided a unique opportunity to investigate the 
effects of FDI spillovers on domestic firms’ productivity.  As CEECs have established 
their institutional frameworks and well-functioning market economies, the main question 
remains how firms in these countries can become more competitive and productive. The 
answer lies in FDI spillovers, occurring horizontally through demonstration, worker 
mobility and competition or vertically through buyer-supplier linkages, which have 
become the major factors for positioning of CEECs in GVCs and for the development of 
knowledge based economy. Since technological spillovers and transfer predominantly 
occur between firms, the analysis has to be conducted at firm level using firm level data.  
The current empirical research on FDI spillovers has, by and large, neglected foreign 
affiliates in the service sector which is somewhat surprising given the large share of FDI 
in services. In addition, the existing research has focused on the characteristics of local 
firms and industries that could influence the extent and magnitude of knowledge 
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spillovers. Notwithstanding their importance, the role of foreign affiliates’ characteristics 
has received much less attention. Foreign affiliates may differ in their productivity levels, 
knowledge stock, motives, mode of entry, ownership levels, autonomy, functional scope, 
technological intensity and embeddedness in the local economy. There is also relatively 
little research on the ability of domestic firms to enter GVCs through vertical linkages 
with foreign affiliates in the service sector. Although the existing evidence points to 
positive effects of backward linkages when domestic firms act as suppliers to foreign 
affiliates in the manufacturing sector, little is known about the effects of linkages in the 
service sector.  
This research aims to fill these gaps in the literature by investigating the relationship 
between total factor productivity (TFP) and FDI spillovers differentiating between firms 
which are vertically integrated with MNCs and those in direct competition in the same 
sector. For this reason, several empirical models are being developed at the firm level 
and estimated using a rich firm level database containing firms in manufacturing and 
service industries from several CEECs. In this way we aim to address one of the empirical 
shortcomings in the FDI spillovers literature related to use of different data, 
methodologies and models applied in single country framework. By analysing 
theoretically, the reasons for MNCs’ existence and their potential benefits for the host 
country economy we are able to gain insight into the possible channels of influence on 
indigenous firms as well as their differential impact conditional on firm, sector and 
country heterogeneity. This will inform the choice of variables used to construct the 
empirical models differentiating between horizontal and vertical FDI spillover channels 
and their effects conditional on across differences in MNCs such as the level of 
ownership and their origin. It will also enable us to investigate specificities of domestic 
firms operating in different sectors, the interrelationship between different sectors, the 
moderating role of domestic firm’s absorptive capacity and to examine how these factors 
determine domestic firms’ TFP in short and long run. In addition, the investigation will 
address several firm specific factors such as the firms’ intangible assets, human capital, 
experience and size which are found to be relevant for explaining TFP. We further control 
for competition and demand effects at industry level which if not included may provide 
an upward bias in FDI spillover variables. The originality of our approach also lies in the 
estimation method and checking for robustness of several TFP estimates at industry level 
in a multi-country framework which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been 
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addressed in firm level productivity estimation in transition countries. When estimating 
the effects of FDI spillovers we emphasize the dynamic nature of TFP and control for 
the potential endogeneity between our variables of interest and TFP using instrumental 
variable methods which has rarely been addressed in empirical work on FDI spillovers. 
Bearing in mind the context outlined above, the aim of this thesis is to quantify the effects 
of FDI spillovers on productivity of domestic firms. For this purpose, several research 
objectives have been developed: 
 To provide a comprehensive and critical review of theories explaining the 
emergence of MNCs and sources of their technological advantages and identify 
potential benefits to host countries  
 To critically evaluate the theoretical and empirical literature related to FDI 
spillovers with special emphasis on potential channels and determinants of FDI 
spillovers from supply and demand sides 
 To provide a comprehensive analysis of productivity convergence and FDI 
performance in the New Member States (NMS) at country and industry level with 
special emphasis on the inclusion of NMS in GVC 
 To critically examine the methods used for the estimation of firm level 
productivity and their application in the context of NMS 
 To develop an empirical model to investigate the effects of FDI spillovers on 
domestic firms’ productivity in selected NMS, highlighting the sectoral and 
foreign affiliates heterogeneity  
 To empirically evaluate the interrelationship between FDI in services and 
downstream manufacturing productivity and examine the moderating role of 
manufacturing firms’ absorptive capacity in selected NMS 
 To discuss some policy implications and provide policy recommendations to 
governments and Investment Promotion Agencies in order to devise effective 
policies to improve productivity effects of FDI.  
The novelty of this research is reflected in: (i) the critical examination of methods 
available  for estimating firm level productivity and the application of relatively new 
econometric method applied in the context of industry and country heterogeneity 
which are theoretically more appropriate than methods employed in existing studies; 
(ii) the examination of supply side factors affecting FDI spillover process in the 
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context of European transition countries; (iii)  exploring  the effects of FDI in services 
and manufacturing  on both upstream and downstream manufacturing firms by 
examining four possible channels of vertical linkages simultaneously, thus shedding 
new light on the importance of supplier-client relationship in manufacturing firms. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 starts with defining the concept 
of FDI and continues with review of theories explaining the emergence and growth 
of MNCs. The focus is on a critical examination of different approaches explaining 
the motives for FDI. Despite being a relatively old concept, its explanation still 
generates considerable debate among scholars in international business and 
international economics literature. The purpose is to examine their suitability for the 
analysis of FDI spillover process in the context of this thesis as they rest on different 
assumptions regarding technology transfer and effects on economic development of 
host countries. The second part of this chapter is concerned with explanation of 
motives and their potential effects on host countries. In addition, we discuss other 
strategically important decisions of MNCs upon their entry into host markets. Finally, 
we examine the potential benefits associated with FDI, differentiating between direct 
and indirect effects.  
Chapter 2 examines the concept of FDI spillovers. We emphasize that term 
technology is used in its broadest sense including both codified and tacit knowledge, 
management and organizational skills, product and process technology. We also use 
the term spillovers in broad sense including pecuniary and pure technological 
externalities since it is not possible to empirically disentangle voluntary and 
involuntary knowledge transfer. We continue by explaining channels of influence of 
MNCs pointing out the differences between horizontal and vertical spillovers as well 
as heterogeneous approaches within each main channel. We distinguish between 
three strands of literature according to the way in which intra industry spillovers 
occur. The earliest neoclassical approach is based on the simple notion that the mere 
foreign presence explains the spillover benefits due to the public good nature of 
spillovers. The second strand recognizes the costs related to absorbing the spillovers 
and argues that they are endogenously determined. The most recent strand 
emphasizes worker mobility as the potential channel. Regarding vertical spillovers, 
theoretical studies distinguish between backward and forward linkages and discuss 
their impact on host country development through increased demand for intermediate 
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inputs, assistance in acquisition of new technology, knowledge diffusion and 
availability and quality effects.  
The second part of this chapter is devoted to the critical examination of factors which 
may influence the extent and intensity of spillovers with particular emphasis on 
foreign and domestic firms’ heterogeneity and methodological issues pertinent to the 
examination of FDI spillovers. The last part of the chapter identifies the shortcomings 
of the current empirical literature which, together with insights from Chapter 1, leads 
to the conceptual framework used throughout this thesis. 
Chapter 3 starts with the investigation of major features of the transition process in 
NMS and the role played by FDI. In the first part, we analyse the convergence process 
of NMS and the distribution of FDI across countries and industries. We show that 
countries which liberalised their trade and capital accounts quickly were the 
forerunners in structural and institutional reforms, and succeeded in attracting large 
amounts of FDI. In the second part of the chapter, we focus on the effects of FDI on 
structural change and the inclusion of NMS in GVCs. We also provide a comparative 
analysis of the performance of foreign and domestic firms across industries and 
countries and argue that the contribution of foreign firms to structural change in NMS 
has been substantial. For the analysis of this chapter we rely on several databases 
such as UNCTAD FDI database to gauge the size of FDI stock and its relative 
importance for each country. The Total Economy Database and the Eurostat database 
are used to gain more insight into the productivity convergence and the structure of 
FDI across industries. We also used the Eurostat Foreign Affiliates (FATS database 
and Structural Business Statistics (SBS) when measuring performance of foreign and 
domestic firms. Finally, the OECD TiVA is used to measure GVC participation of 
countries and industries. 
Chapter 4 discusses the importance of the correct measurement of productivity 
followed by a detailed review of the available methods for the estimation of firm 
level productivity. We emphasize that the choice of preferred methods depends on 
several assumptions which are critically examined. In addition, we discuss the 
potential problems (such as measurement errors in output and inputs, for example) 
when estimating TFP in a production function framework. Furthermore, several 
methodological problems related to firm level estimation of TFP such as simultaneity 
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bias, selection bias, omitted price bias and the presence of multiproduct firms are 
discussed together with potential solutions offered by different estimation methods. 
We argue that the semiparametric methods which incorporate assumptions on firms’ 
behaviour and timing of inputs are the most appropriate methods for the estimation 
of TFP at firm level. Other issues that are considered in this chapter include a detailed 
description of the Amadeus database used in this and the following empirical 
chapters, estimation of TFP using several methods in order to test their robustness as 
well as the estimation of foreign ownership premium using non-parametric and 
parametric methods to gauge the potential for FDI spillovers. 
In Chapter 5 we develop an empirical model of FDI spillovers and apply it to firms 
from the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. The construction 
of FDI spillover variables relies on a combination of firm and industry level data 
obtained from Amadeus and World Input Output Database in order to separate intra-
industry and inter-industry spillovers. A dynamic system GMM model is used in 
order to capture the dynamic nature of productivity as suggested by semi parametric 
techniques described in Chapter 4. Furthermore, by using internal instruments we 
control for possible endogeneity of FDI spillover variables. To capture the 
heterogeneity of the supply side of the spillover process the baseline model is 
augmented in order to take into account different ownership levels and the country 
of origin of foreign investors. In addition, the role of knowledge capital, other firms 
and industry characteristics are included as potential determinants of firm level 
productivity. This chapter is of particular interest as it sheds more light on the supply 
side of spillovers process including firms from the service sector which differentiate 
our study from previous analysis. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the cross-sectoral spillovers. The goal here is to establish 
whether the effects of FDI differ between manufacturing and service firms. In 
addition, we test the hypothesis that the previous findings of insignificant forward 
linkages were related to the fact that the relationship between services and 
manufacturing sectors was ignored. It is argued that the liberalisation of services has 
important implications for productivity of downstream manufacturing firms as it 
provides more variety, better quality and reduced prices of intermediate inputs than 
those available in local markets. This question is of interest for both economists and 
policy makers because of the far-reaching liberalisation of service industries in the 
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last ten years - since these countries joined the EU. The analysis follows the same 
methodological approach as in Chapter 5 and employs the same control variables. 
Due to the richness of firm level data we are able to test the moderating effects of 
local firms’ absorptive capacity on the occurrence and magnitude of FDI spillovers 
in manufacturing sector through five channels of influence, one horizontal and four 
vertical. To the best of our knowledge the empirical model based on firm level data 
and annual input output tables for NMS is the first study to disentangle vertical 
linkages according to industry source and to measure their impact on productivity of 
domestic firms in manufacturing industries which are at the same time both suppliers 
and customers. 
Chapter 7 formulates the conclusions of this thesis. Special emphasis is given to 
contributions to knowledge, limitations of the thesis and possible directions for future 
research. We also provide some policy recommendations aimed at improving the 
effectiveness of policies related to attracting the right type of foreign investor, linkage 
promotion, strengthening absorptive capacity and providing incentives in certain 
industries which would result in improving the technological competences of local 
firms. 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The increased globalization over the last two decades has led to the strong growth of 
international business activity and foreign direct investment (FDI) with the latter 
becoming one of the core features of global economic flows. A growing number of firms 
from different industries have expanded abroad through direct investment, and majority 
of countries now compete to attract multinational companies (MNCs). The inflow of FDI 
is widely thought to be an important channel for the diffusion of new knowledge, 
technologies and various skills across national borders. In addition, by complementing 
domestic savings, FDI can create new employment, transform the production structures, 
upgrade the technology of production process and help diversify the export structure 
resulting in overall economic growth (Alfaro, 2014).  
The understanding of the theories of FDI is crucial for empirical investigation of the 
effects of MNC entry on economic growth through productivity spillovers which is the 
main focus of this thesis. MNCs are often perceived as a source of direct technology 
transfer from home country to subsidiaries abroad and indirectly, through the public good 
nature of knowledge, to host country firms. Hence, in this chapter we discuss the various 
features of MNCs’ operations such as the sources of their superior advantages over host 
country firms, reasons for cross border production activities, organization of value 
adding activities across borders and their impact on economic development of host and 
home countries. In the process of internationalisation MNCs often interact with host 
country environment and thus it is expected that some of technology and knowledge 
brought will spill over to host country firms and workers and increase their efficiency.  
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to provide a theoretical background to the concept 
of FDI, its definition and measurement as defined by international organization (e.g. 
IMF, OECD) and their types. Furthermore, we aim to explain both the existence and 
growth of MNCs and the main motives of their international activities as they appear to 
be important factors in determining the spillover benefits. The main objective is to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of FDI from different theoretical perspectives and to 
pinpoint to di(similarities) of each conceptual and theoretical approaches. Although there 
are already comprehensive reviews of FDI theories there appears to be no reviews that 
critically discuss and appraise the merits of each approach. This review will help us to 
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identify the determinants and strategic objectives of MNCs which affect the size and 
scope of spillovers analysed in the next chapter and the potential benefits accruing to the 
host economy. Moreover, we cannot discuss the literature on technology spillovers from 
FDI and absorptive capacity in the next chapter without knowing what are the sources of 
superior knowledge of MNCs, their underlying motives and potential benefits it can 
bring.   
The European economies that have undergone a transformation from a centrally planned 
system towards a market system offer a rich basis for evaluation of the increasing 
importance of multinational companies (MNCs). At the macroeconomic level, the 
institutional and economic transformation process has produced a higher degree of 
openness and a stronger integration with the world economy. From a microeconomic 
perspective, the liberalisation policies have led to the emergence of private ownership 
through the entry of new firms and numerous forms of privatization in both of which FDI 
played a prominent role. Privatisation created new ownership structures and influenced 
economic performance in various ways (Estrin et al., 2009). Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) has been a particularly important element of economic integration because it has 
opened possibilities for accelerated growth through providing necessary capital for the 
much needed investment, the introduction of technological innovation, enterprise 
restructuring and changes in export structure.  
The structure of the chapter is arranged in the following manner. In section 1.2 various 
concepts and definitions are explained. Section 1.3 provides a critique of the different 
strands of theoretical models. The emphasis here is on the source of ownership 
advantages, their preservation and exploitation in different economic and institutional 
environments and the role played by the host location. Section 1.4 discusses the motives, 
ownership and investment modes of MNCs which have emerged from the review of FDI 
theories while Section 1.5 discuss the potential direct and indirect benefits of MNCs’ 
entry on host country Finally, Section 1.6 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
4 
1.2 CONCEPT OF FDI – DEFINITION, MEASUREMENT AND TYPES 
 
A multinational company can be defined as a company that owns, controls and operates 
assets in at least two countries with the purpose of generating income (Alfaro, 2014). The 
acquisition of such assets is usually conducted through two main type of investment: 
portfolio investment characterised by acquisition of securities, and foreign direct 
investment involving the construction of completely new production facilities 
(“greenfield FDI”) or acquisition of already existing firms (“brownfield FDI”) in other 
countries. The definition of FDI is related to the extent of control of host country firms. 
However, as noted by Desai (2009, p.1):  
“…it used to be the case that “production or distribution might move abroad, 
[while] the loci of critical managerial decision-making and the associated 
headquarters functions were thought to remain bundled and fixed. Now firms are 
unbundling headquarters functions and reallocating them worldwide. The 
defining characteristics of what made a firm belong to a country - where it was 
incorporated, where it was listed, the nationality of its investor base, the location 
of its headquarters, are no longer unified nor are they bound to one country”. 
 
Since control can be exercised in different ways due to fragmentation of production 
process, the measurement of FDI becomes problematic (Alfaro, 2014).  OECD (1996, 
p.7-8) states that the purpose of FDI is to “obtain a lasting interest by a resident entity 
in one economy (direct investor) in an entity resident in an economy other than that of 
the investor (direct investment enterprise)”. The lasting interest distinguishes FDI from 
portfolio investments as it implies long run strategic relationship between entities. In 
other words, FDI involves not only the transfer of financial capital, but also technology, 
know how, organizational and marketing expertise, tangible and intangible assets and 
values. Foreign direct investor can be an individual, group of individuals, incorporated 
or unincorporated private or public company which through direct investment enterprise 
controls at least 10 per cent of voting rights in another company abroad (IMF, 2009). FDI 
consists of equity capital, reinvested earnings, other long term and shot term capital 
shown in the balance of payments. The threshold of 10 per cent enables a foreign investor 
to influence or participate in the management of acquired enterprise. If foreign investor 
controls more than 50 percent of voting rights direct investment enterprise is called a 
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subsidiary which enables foreign investor to appoint or remove the management board. 
In cases when the extent of ownership ranges from 10 to 50 per cent, direct investment 
enterprise is called an associate (OECD, 1996). 
 
In the international trade literature FDI is usually classified as horizontal or vertical 
depending on the motives of investment. Horizontal FDI arises as a substitute for exports 
and the main aim is to provide host market with the same goods produced at home. The 
main motive for such investments is to circumvent high trade barriers and transportation 
costs (Markusen, 1984). Vertical FDI involves the breakup of value chain across different 
geographical locations motivated by cost differences in factor markets (Helpman, 1984).  
Both types of FDI involve substantial communication and transport costs, training costs 
of personnel, language and cultural barriers, institutional barriers. So the question arises, 
why is someone willing to invest abroad? The simplest answer is the pursuit of profit, 
but MNCs also seek to acquire new resources to improve their competitiveness, to 
diversify supplies and sales across diverse geographical locations. Finally, how can 
MNCs offset local’s firm advantages? The answer to this question is provided by 
different strands of literature on FDI which is critically reviewed below.  
 
1.3 THEORIES OF FDI 
 
The importance of, and growing interest in, the causes and consequences of FDI has led 
to the development of a number of theories that try to explain why MNCs conduct FDI, 
where they choose to locate their production and how they choose a particular entry 
mode. Theories explaining FDI have emerged from different fields such as economics, 
international business, organization and management, all trying to explain the same 
phenomena from different points of view. 
 
In general, FDI theories can be divided in several strands: 0F1 
                                                 
1 Apart from theories discussed in this section there are other theories explaining FDI such as the internal 
financing hypothesis (Froot and Stein, 1991) and the currency area hypothesis (Aliber, 1970) and theories 
based on other factors. The latter include tax policies, agglomeration economies, institutions, political and 
country risk (Hartman, 1985; Wei and Wu, 2001; Asiedu, 2002). The reason for excluding those theories 
is because they mostly deal with macroeconomic factors while we are more interested in industry and 
firms’ characteristics explaining MNCs’ advantages. In addition, some of the factors explained in other 
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 Neoclassical theory based on perfect markets 
 Industrial organization and imperfect markets 
 Macro development approaches 
 Internalisation theories 
 Evolutionary theories 
 New trade theories 
 
1.3.1 THE NEOCLASSICAL THEORY OF CAPITAL MOVEMENT 
In the neoclassical financial theory of portfolio flows, multinational companies have been 
viewed as simply an arbitrageur of capital in response to changes in interest rate 
differentials (Nurkse, 1933; Ohlin, 1933; Iversen, 1935). The rationale for this hypothesis 
is that firms investing abroad behave in such a way as to equate the marginal return and 
the marginal cost of capital. The assumption of risk neutrality implies that domestic 
investment and FDI are perfect substitutes. A somewhat different approach is taken by 
Tobin (1958) and Markowitz (1959) in their portfolio diversification theory where the 
assumption of risk neutrality is relaxed. According to them FDI occurs as a means of 
reducing the average risk of international transactions. Similar view is shared by the 
neoclassical models of international trade which extended studies based on trade to 
capital flows, such as the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model (1919; 1933) which prevailed 
before 1960s. It regarded the movement of foreign investment as part of the international 
factor movements. Based on the Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) model, international movements 
of factors of production, including foreign investment, are determined by different 
proportions of the factor endowment available in different countries. It was assumed that 
capital moves from countries where capital is abundant and marginal productivity is low 
to countries where capital is scarce and marginal productivity is high. The MacDougall–
Kemp model (MacDougall, 1960; Kemp, 1964) again assumed that capital was expected 
to move to the capital scarce countries with expected higher capital returns. However, 
capital returns could be manipulated by imposing taxes on internationally mobile capital 
                                                 
theories also appear in theories discussed in this chapter.  Finally, our review is mostly focused on 
explanation of sources of superior technological advantages of MNCs, organization and ownership of cross 
border activities and their evolution as   a response to technological change. This has important implications 
for MNCs’ embeddedness in host country and location choice and the potential for spillovers arising from 
heterogeneous nature of MNCs. 
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to enhance their welfare. Aliber (1970) claimed that difference in capital returns is due 
to a difference in capital endowments and exchange rates as interest rates include a 
premium that is charged according to the expected currency depreciation. This enables 
firms from countries with stronger currencies to borrow money more cheaply in countries 
with weak currencies, thus enabling them to finance foreign activities more cheaply.  
 
In summary, all the above approaches assume that capital flows from one country to 
another, ignoring the firms in the process. Moreover, they are based on strong 
assumptions of perfect capital markets, freely available technology, homogeneity of 
inputs and absence of transaction costs which are unlikely to hold in the real world. In 
addition, empirical studies estimating the relationship between relative rates of return in 
a number of countries and the allocation of FDI among them found no support for this 
hypothesis (Agarwal, 1980). The theory based on perfect markets is not consistent with 
the observation that countries can be both receivers and sources of FDI simultaneously 
(Hymer, 1976). This is because a rate of return differential assumes FDI flows from high 
rate to low rate countries. Furthermore, the theory disregards the fact that the objective 
of MNCs may not be only of a financial nature but rather to circumvent trade barriers 
and to transfer technology and know-how. Similarly, it cannot account for the uneven 
distribution of FDI among different types of industries (Tortian, 2007). Finally, as argued 
by Caves (1982), under perfect markets international differences in expected returns are 
not sufficient for FDI as an increase in short term profits would encourage new entry that 
would eliminate any abnormal profits. 
     
 
1.3.2 INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION THEORY 
Although FDI plays an important role in the economic growth and international trade of 
host countries, the theories explaining this phenomenon arose only in the second half of 
the 20th century and in the framework of international production theory in which the 
focus moved from the country to the firm level. In order to explain the existence of MNCs 
and their incentives to invest abroad, several important theoretical frameworks emerged. 
The market imperfection theory developed by Hymer (1976) emphasized the role of 
MNCs as global industrial organizations. In his seminal thesis on FDI he expressed 
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dissatisfaction with market perfections emphasised by the neoclassical theory and argued 
that FDI could not exist in the world of perfect competition characterised by homogenous 
products, perfect information, perfect mobility of factors of production and free entry. 
He argues that FDI exist because of the imperfect final output markets caused by 
monopolistic advantages and entry barriers.  In order to compete with indigenous firms, 
foreign entrants must possess some specific monopolistic advantages including 
intellectual property rights and intangible assets, superior marketing and distribution 
skills, access to raw materials and finance, economies of scale, management skills and 
ability for horizontal and vertical integration (Rugman et al., 2011). These firm specific 
advantages are necessary in order to overcome locational disadvantages arising from 
differences in language, culture, legal system and other inter-country differences 
(Rugman et al., 2011). FDI is seen as a means of transferring knowledge and other firm 
assets, both tangible and tacit, in order to organize production abroad for the purpose of 
making a profit and maintaining market power in oligopolistic industries. 1F2 This rent 
seeking activity of FDI and the desire to invest due to imperfect markets is the main 
contribution of Hymer in comparison to neoclassical theory which is more concerned 
with capital movements. He was concerned with the relationship between the efficiency 
with which production is organized within the firms and the extent of market power and 
collusion.  
  
Drawing upon the industrial organization theory and monopolistic competition, 
Kindelberger (1969) recognised that the existence of FDI can be explained by the 
following factors: market imperfections in the goods markets resulting from product 
differentiation, market imperfections in factor markets arising from access to proprietary 
knowledge and capital, internal or/and external economies of scale (e.g., vertical 
integration), and government interference with international production. According to 
Kindelberger (1969), the firm has to possess comparative advantages which are large 
enough to overcome locational disadvantages and must be transferable to foreign 
subsidiaries. Lall and Streeten (1977) argue that some of the firm specific advantages 
cannot be sold to other firms as they are inherent in organization or difficult to define, 
value and transfer. Intangible assets such as organizational and managerial capabilities 
                                                 
2 According to Hymer (1968), FDI is the most efficient internalisation strategy for three reasons: (i) it is 
difficult to put a price on firm’s advantage; (ii) FDI does not involve contractual costs as licencing 
agreement; (iii) oligopolistic power cannot be sold. 
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explain why firms can compete on international markets. Caves (1971) emphasized that 
FDI is more likely to occur in oligopolistic industries. He put emphasis on product 
differentiation as a necessary condition for direct investment as it stimulates rivalry 
through advertising.  
 
The above authors recognize FDI as a separate form of capital flows beyond mere 
financial capital, put firms in the centre of analysis and recognize market imperfections. 
However, Hymer’s theory was criticized for focusing on structural market imperfections 
as a reason for FDI and for neglecting the strategic objectives of MNCs (Dunning and 
Rugman, 1985). Robock and Simmonds (1983) argued that possessing firm-specific 
advantages does not necessarily imply that firms will engage in FDI as they may exploit 
their specific advantages through trade or licensing. Finally, Hymer’s theory does not 
explain where and when FDI takes place. 
 
1.3.3 MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 
While the market power approach is concerned with ownership advantages as a main 
determinant of MNCs’ activities, the work of Vernon (1966) and Kojima (1978, 1982) 
emphasized location advantages. It is worth noting that Hymer does not disregard 
location but he treats it as an exogenous factor influencing MNCs’ behaviour. The 
macroeconomic development approach draws extensively on neoclassical theory of 
geographical distribution of factor endowments. Vernon used a microeconomic concept 
based on product cycle model in order to explain the technological development 
associated with the growth of US foreign direct investment in Europe in the 1950s and 
1960s. He argued that the ability of US firms to innovate new products and processes 
was determined by home country endowments, institutions and markets.  Factors such as 
high level of income per capita and domestic demand offered unique opportunities for 
exploitation of knowledge and fostered innovation at home. This gave American firms 
an advantage to increase exports and enabled the development of US MNCs which 
engaged in import-substituting investments in Europe.  
 
Vernon argued that the internalisation strategy of MNCs varies according to which of the 
four stages of the product cycle the firms are in: innovation, growth, maturity and decline. 
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The propensity of a MNC to engage in international production changes as the product 
moves from its innovatory to its mature phase and its production techniques are finally 
standardized. The greatest part of new products is firstly manufactured in the home 
country to satisfy the local demand and to facilitate the efficient coordination between 
R&D and production units.  In a later phase of the cycle as demand increases firms start 
to export to countries with similar level of income. Later on, as the product becomes 
more and more standardized the role of R&D becomes less important while a decisive 
role is assumed by wage costs, transportation costs and higher entry barriers into 
marketing and distribution channels. The importance of location characteristics in the 
stage when a product becomes standardized and reaches maturity is critical as the firm 
decides to invest abroad to maintain its competitive position against its domestic and 
foreign rivals.   
 
Vernon’s theory provides useful insights into the importance of the absorptive capacity 
of domestic firms to imitate foreign products leading to the setting up of production 
facilities by the MNC on the local markets, thus further enhancing the potential for 
indirect effects of FDI. Cantwell (1995) questioned Vernon’s hypothesis that innovations 
are always generated in home country and that technological leaders are predominantly 
international investors. He demonstrated that innovation is dispersed within MNCs and 
that the internationalization of technological development is led by firms with the 
strongest records in innovation. Furthermore, Vernon’s theory is not able to explain FDI 
from developing to developed countries nor does it take into account other means of 
exploiting innovations abroad such as licensing. Furthermore, Clegg (1987) argues that 
Vernon’s theory explains only new FDI and has little to say about already existing 
investments from countries with already high outward FDI. 
 
Micro variables such as factor endowments and intangible assets and macro elements 
such as trade and industrial policy are combined in various works by Kojima (1978, 
1982). Kojima views the MNC as an instrument by which the comparative trading 
advantage of nations may be better advanced (Ben Hamida, 2007). He states that MNCs 
invest abroad in sectors requiring intermediate and internationally mobile products that 
fit the production process comparatively well, but that need to be combined with inputs 
in which the host country is relatively well endowed. Hence, FDI is seen as a complement 
to trade. Kojima suggested that FDI would be undertaken from a comparatively 
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disadvantaged industry in the home country to a comparatively advantaged industry in 
the host country. Thus FDI would promote an upgrading of industrial structure in both 
countries and accelerate trade between them. Kojima concluded that the lower the 
technological gap between the investing and host countries, the easier it is to transfer and 
upgrade the technology in the latter.  
 
The change in the international position of countries through different stages of 
development was also explained by the concept of “Investment Development Path” 
(IDP) introduced by Dunning (1988a, 2003) and Narula (1996) who introduced the 
dynamic approach to FDI. It is based on the Ownership Location Internalisation OLI 
paradigm described in detail in the next section. The model assumes that development 
causes structural changes within an economy and that the latter are closely related to FDI 
(Lall, 1996). It provides a concept which explains how economic development influences 
the environment which foreign and domestic firms face. This in turn has an impact on 
inward and outward FDI. It also allows for government intervention which consequently 
influences FDI flows and domestic firms’ ownership advantages. IDP identifies five 
stage of development.  
 
The first stage is characterised by very little FDI mostly oriented to resource based 
sectors and labour intensive sectors and no outward FDI. Domestic firms have not yet 
developed ownership advantages, and location advantages are insufficient due to limited 
GDP per capita, low level of human capital, inappropriate infrastructure and political 
and/or economic instability. The Government tries to improve the basic infrastructure 
and macroeconomic policies to change the structure of domestic market. 
 
The second stage is characterised by the rising levels of inward FDI due to improvement 
in locational advantages. FDI is mostly oriented towards transportation, communications 
and construction industries and vertical integration in labour intensive manufacturing is 
expected. Ownership advantages start to emerge and are mostly based on low cost 
standardised products and natural resources. As agued by Dunning (1993) improved 
locational advantages generate agglomeration economies and increase labour 
productivity. In this stage domestic firms start to enter MNC’s global network and start 
to benefit from transfer of technology and know-how which affect their ownership 
advantages. 
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The third stage is characterised by increased outward FDI and a slowdown in inward FDI 
due to increasing production costs. FDI is mostly of horizontal type associated with 
market access and efficiency concerns and in activities requiring more sophisticated 
products or high quality of labour. Competition on domestic markets is rising due to 
diffusion of ownership advantages to local firms. Ownership advantages of domestic 
firms are associated with intangible asset and limited process and product innovation. 
Location advantages result in created assets due to increased R&D expenditure and 
investment in education. Furthermore, the government’s role is still relevant and oriented 
towards a reduction in market failures and promotion of linkages with local firms with 
the aim of reducing delocalisation risks (Fonseca et al., 2007).  
 
The final two stages of IDP are characterized by outward FDI exceeding inward FDI. 
Net outward investment tends to fluctuate around zero due to similarities of economic 
structures (Narula and Dunning, 2010). Ownership advantages of local firms allow them 
to compete in foreign markets by engaging in efficiency seeking in less developed 
countries and strategic asset seeking FDI in developed countries through strategic 
alliances. Location advantages are mostly based on created assets such as qualified 
labour, technological capacity of high tech sectors, agglomeration economies (Fonseca 
et al., 2007). The role of government is to reduce transaction costs, support innovation, 
and foster economic restructuring (Narula and Dunning, 2010). 
 
A similar macro development approach is known as the “Flying Geese” model which 
explains the stages of industrial development of host countries supported by FDI (Ozawa, 
1992). It describes the link between various stages of industrial development and phases 
of FDI. As the home country of FDI moves up on the technology ladder, activities of 
lower technological level are moved abroad through FDI. However, the “flying geese” 
model is only suitable for explaining FDI in labour intensive industries, less so for high 
technology industries due to difficulties in recycling comparative advantages from the 
early stages based on low labour costs (Damijan et al., 2013b).   
 
Recently, the literature on global supply chains has offered an explanation for vertical 
and horizontal specialisation beyond labour intensive industries (Baldwin, 2012). It is 
based on the second “unbundling of globalization” which has shifted the locus of 
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globalization from sectors to stages of production. 2F3 Fractionalisation and dispersion are 
seen as the main nucleus of supply chains. The first one is concerned with functional 
unbundling of the production process into different stages and it is governed by the trade-
off between specialisation and coordination costs. The second one is concerned with 
geographical location of production stages and it is governed by dispersion and 
agglomeration forces (Damijan et al., 2013b). FDI is seen as the crucial part of supply 
chains and recent advances in information and communication technology (ICT) have 
enabled geographical dispersion of production stages at lower coordination costs. This 
in turn has led to vertical specialisation between so called “headquarters” and “factory” 
economies in which MNCs combine advanced technology with low wage costs. The 
consequence of global supply chain for host country is their fast inclusion in international 
trade and growing exports especially those arising from export of intermediate inputs. In 
addition, MNCs invest in production facilities, training and technology transfer. 
However, as noted by Baldwin (2012) “factory” economies can be easily supplanted by 
another low wage country. Furthermore, slicing of the value chain provides only limited 
gains as most of the know-how and technology is concentrated in the parent company. 
Most of the activities offshored abroad are low value added activities such as assembly 
and as Baldwin (2012) argues, the fabrication stages are not the development panacea as 
they once were.  
 
1.3.4 INTERNALISATION THEORIES 
Hymer (1976) argued that the existence of firm specific advantages is a necessary 
condition for foreign firms to invest successfully abroad, but not sufficient to explain the 
motivation for moving production abroad. A firm can exploit its advantages either 
through export or licencing without the need to set up a foreign subsidiary. Reasons for 
wishing to set up a foreign subsidiary are referred to as internalisation advantages. 
Internalisation implies the implementation and full control of production process from 
raw material inputs to sales stage rather than using the arm’s length transactions. The 
                                                 
3 Unbundling is a term introduced by Baldwin  (2011) meaning on going structural changes in the economy 
and economic progress caused firstly by industrial revolution in 19th century followed by reduction of 
transport and trade costs in the second half of 20th century.  While these factors drove the first unbundling, 
advances in information and communication technology have led to second unbundling characterised by 
reduction in coordination costs and slicing up the production process into different stages located in 
different countries.  
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choice to internalise is driven by market failures affecting the contractual relationship 
with local firms, creating difficulties and uncertainty for MNCs to fully exploit their 
ownership advantages. 
 
The internalization theory, developed by Buckley and Casson (1976), Hennart (1977) 
and Rugman (1981), explains the emergence of multinational enterprises through the 
failure of markets for intermediate products. It is closely related to transaction costs 
theory which views transaction costs as the main determinant of the existence and growth 
of productive organizations (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985), and to the resource based 
view (RBV) to explain efficiency aspect of firm specific advantages (Penrose, 1959). 
Although the views of Buckley and Casson (1976) do not differ much from those of 
transaction cost theorists, the market failure argument is somewhat different. As argued 
by Hennart (1982) the transaction cost focus is primarily on market failure arising from 
asset specificity, market power and contractual imperfections while internalisation theory 
focuses on market failure in markets for information. Transaction costs such as 
information, enforcement and bargaining costs are the result of high risk and uncertainty 
arising from markets for intermediate goods (Faeth, 2009). According to Hennart (1982) 
FDI will arise if MNCs are able to organize interdependencies of economic actors more 
efficiently than markets. These interdependencies are related to access, combination and 
management of resources such as production, marketing techniques, management skills, 
intermediate inputs and financial capital across geographical locations (Rugman et al., 
2011). 
 
Rugman (1981) argues that internalisation theory is a general theory of FDI and notes 
that although firms’ specific advantages (FSA) are necessary they are not sufficient 
condition for FDI to take place. The internal market permits MNCs to protect, transfer, 
deploy and exploit the knowledge through foreign subsidiary without incurring the risk 
of FSA dissipation as in the case of weak patent protection systems. Magee (1977) added 
public good properties of technology and argued that FDI can prevent undesired 
diffusion. In this way, the firm is able to better control the application of its knowledge 
and to prevent it from spilling over to other firms, as would be the case in international 
trade.  
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There are three sets of issues that may affect market transactions between MNCs and 
local producers in host economies (Rugman et al., 2011). First, the hold-up problem 
arises because of the presence of incomplete contracts when it is not possible to write 
contracts covering all possible contingencies affecting the relationship between the firms 
because of uncertainty (Hart and Moore, 1988). The terms of the contract can be 
renegotiated ex-post, but if the investment is specific to the relationship, then the 
supplier’s bargaining position will be weak causing the initial investment to be 
suboptimal. Hence, the wholly owned subsidiary arises as a possible solution. The second 
problem is related to the dissipation of intangible assets due to knowledge being at least 
partially non-excludable, non-rival, and non-codifiable (Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1990). As 
local firms learn the MNCs’ technology they become competitors and may threaten the 
future profits of MNCs. Furthermore, local suppliers can produce low quality products 
under high quality brands thus creating reputational risk for MNCs. The third issue is 
related to principal-agent problem arising from hidden action or hidden information 
about the local market (Akerlof, 1970; Stigler, 1961; Spence, 1973). For these reasons, 
intangible assets such as technology are costly to exchange through market-based 
transactions and internalisation emerges as a possible solution. 
 
To sum up, the internalisation theory focuses on explaining why the international 
transactions of intermediate products are organized by hierarchies rather than standard 
market transactions. In this respect the answer may be that internalising the transaction 
is an answer to market failure of intermediate goods because of asymmetric information, 
asset specificity, uncertainty and irreversible commitment and opportunistic behaviour. 
The result is the creation of MNCs which is regarded as an internal market which brings 
activities under common ownership and control and provides an answer to market failure 
for information (Rugman, 1985). 
    
The internalisation hypothesis explains why firms use FDI in preference to exporting and 
licensing. However, the major drawback of this theory is that it only considers internal 
factors of the firm, largely ignoring external factors, such as host country environment. 
Dunning (1992) argues that internalisation hypothesis is not sufficient to explain the level 
and structure of the foreign production of firms. Moreover, the hypothesis cannot be 
tested directly as much of the argument rests on the incidence of costs in external and 
internal markets whose specification and measurement is difficult to quantify (Moosa, 
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2002, Dreyhaupt, 2006). Finally, it does not explain the reason why companies choose 
to go abroad and invest in specific location.  
 
An alternative explanation offered by property rights approach sheds more light on the 
limits and costs of vertical integration i.e. governance costs disregarded by transaction 
costs approach (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995). The 
central idea of the theory is that internalisation matter because ownership of assets is a 
source of power in case of incomplete contracts. The owner of the assets holds residual 
rights of control and it can decide on the use of these assets to make threats that improve 
their bargaining power over their supplier (Grossman and Hart, 1986). However, in the 
presence of relationship specific investments vertical integration entails transaction costs 
because by reducing suppliers’ bargaining power it also creates disincentive for the latter 
to make investments that are specific.    
 
Other contributions of property right approach have formalised the prevalence of FDI 
over offshoring. For example, Antras and Helpman (2008) show that improvements in 
contractibility of manufacturing leads to prevalence of FDI rather than offshoring which 
is in contrast to transaction costs predictions. Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2007) show 
that headquarters contract with their suppliers and that internalisation decision depends 
on the technological complementarity across inputs. An extension of the previous model 
is provided by Antras and Chor (2013) who show that when production is conducted in 
sequential steps, the make or buy decision depends on the average buyer demand 
elasticity and the degree of complementarity of inputs. For instance, firms find it optimal 
to vertically integrate upstream stages and outsource downstream stages if demand 
elasticity is low relative to input substitutability in which case stage inputs are sequential 
substitutes and vice versa.     
  
1.3.5 OLI PARADIGM 
The emergence of eclectic paradigm was a response to growing role of international 
production and MNCs in the world economy. It combined several economic theories: the 
macroeconomic theories of trade, international capital movements and location, the 
theories of industrial organisation, and the microeconomic theories of the firm (Dunning 
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et al., 1986). Ownership advantages drew on theory of industrial organization while 
macroeconomic and microeconomic theories were used to elaborate the concepts of 
location advantages and internalisation advantages, respectively. The main contribution 
of eclectic paradigm is provision of framework for FDI motives and a discussion of the 
choice of market entry modes. In cases where production depends on resources and 
capabilities of firms which are not equally endowed, traditional theory of factor 
endowments and perfect markets cannot explain FDI.  As argued by Dunning and Lundan 
(2008) two types of market failures must exist in order for firms to engage in FDI. First, 
structural market failures that give rise to monopolistic advantages through barriers to 
entry. This type of market failure enables firms to control property rights and govern 
geographically dispersed activities resulting in ownership advantages.   Second, 
transactional market failure of intermediate goods markets at lower transaction cost 
compared to hierarchical mode of governance leads to internalisation advantage. 
 
According to Dunning (1977, 1979, 1980, 1988b, 2003) international activities of MNCs 
are determined by three sets of factors which must be met simultaneously: 
 Ownership advantages based on asset specificity, institutional assets and 
transaction cost minimising advantages. The first type includes managerial and 
marketing skills, intangible assets, technology. The second type is based on 
organizational systems, norms and values while the third type is related to 
common governance of specific and complimentary assets. All of the advantages 
are combined in MNC activities, thus making them impossible to sell, as they are 
closely tied to the infrastructure and culture of the firm. This is contrary to 
Hymer’s assumption that all assets are tradable. 
 Localisation advantages related to both home and cost countries. They include 
natural resources, created assets, costs, quality and productivity of factor inputs. 
Furthermore, they can be related to institutional development, government 
policies and incentives given to MNCs, cultural, language and legal similarities, 
agglomeration economies and availability of good infrastructure, proximity to 
major markets, transportation costs. 
 Internalisation advantages which determine the choice of transfer of ownership 
advantages.  Through internalisation MNCs are able to avoid transaction cost 
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arising due to risk and uncertainty and contract enforcement costs. Internalisation 
also allows MNCs to save on cost through for example transfer pricing.  
 
The eclectic paradigm further asserts that the significance of each of these advantages 
and configuration between them is likely to be context specific, and is likely to vary 
across industries (or types of value-added activities), regions or countries (the 
geographical dimension) and among firms (Dunning, 1988b). Thus there are likely to be 
differences in the ownership advantages of firms coming from different countries or even 
regions. The extent of market failures influencing the decision to internalise is likely to 
be different across industries, while the importance of comparative locational advantages 
may be different depending on the type of FDI, strategic objectives and mode of entry of 
MNCs (Faeth, 2009). 
 
According to Dunning (1981), the importance of each component in his model is 
different which determines the choice of firms whether to engage in international trade 
or international production. Of the three advantages, ownership advantages are essential. 
However, if the firm has only ownership advantages without the other two advantages, 
it will benefit from licensing rather than FDI. In the case where the firm has ownership 
and internalization but not location advantages, it will prefer to sell its products by 
exporting. 
 
Overall, eclectic paradigm provides a more comprehensive view of FDI than theories 
discussed above. It acknowledges that ownership, location and internalisation advantages 
are dynamic in nature and interdependent of one another. For example, firms’ specific 
advantages in combination with internalisation advantages give MNCs an advantage over 
domestic firms especially if local markets provide some cost savings. As argued by 
Dunning (2001) the combination of OLI variables as a whole exceeds the sum of 
individual benefits. However, one of the main criticisms of the eclectic paradigm is that 
it includes so many variables that might be different when explaining the motives of FDI. 
Dunning himself acknowledged this fact and stated that it was an inevitable consequence 
of trying to incorporate several trade theories which could satisfactorily explain cross 
border transactions. Dunning (1992) acknowledged that OLI characteristics change over 
time, hence he incorporated some additional components in order to capture the 
dynamics of MNCs’ activities and host market environment. Institutional assets are a 
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new addition to the paradigm, and cover the range of formal and informal institutions 
that govern the value-added processes within firms (Dunning and Lundan, 2010). They 
developed a theoretical framework that integrates the institutional theory (North, 1990; 
2005) with the evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982) in the context of the OLI 
paradigm. Finally, some authors argue that ownership and internalisation activities are 
jointly determined (Rugman, 1985) and former advantages are derived from latter (Itaki, 
1991). Furthermore, Itaki (1991) argues that ownership advantages are determined by 
location advantages emphasizing the lack of theoretical parsimony. However, despite 
some of the shortcomings, OLI paradigm “undoubtedly represents the most 
comprehensive framework to explain foreign entry mode choices and the economic 
efficiency implications thereof” (Rugman et al., 2011, p. 762). 
 
1.3.6 EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO THE THEORY OF MNC 
Theories explained above are based on the premise that the source of ownership 
advantages is technological innovation in the home country which allows firms to expand 
abroad. The central role in the development of technology and know-how was assumed 
to take place within the parent company. For example, product life cycle theory (Vernon, 
1966) supported the view that innovation activities exploring new competencies are 
based in parent companies within the home country. This type of subsidiaries is often 
called competence exploiting (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). They are characterised by 
cost reduction and quality improvements of existing products and exploitation of existing 
competencies transferred from the parent company. The dynamics of learning process 
and allocation of competences to foreign affiliates as well as their embeddedness in local 
environment are omitted in internalisation theories.  
 
According to resource based view, firms’ growth and competence is driven by internal 
factors such as its productive assets and intra-firm coordination of activities (Penrose, 
1959). The evolutionary perspective emphasizes organizational capabilities and routines 
which are tacit and evolve gradually (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  Based on these insights, 
Cantwell (1989) developed technological accumulation theory where development of 
technology is a cumulative process within the firm determined by product and process 
innovation with the aim to increase productivity, reduce costs and increase profits. In 
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other words, technology accumulation theory of the MNC has put emphasis on the path 
dependency of existing assets and on the accumulation of new assets. MNCs are viewed 
as a repository of knowledge and scholars have turned attention on the role of 
competition and firms’ strategies when trying to maintain and continuously upgrade their 
technological know-how. In addition, geographical dispersion is regarded as an 
important factor enabling the transfer of knowledge between foreign affiliates. In this 
context, location advantages of host country act both as a determinant of MNC’s 
activities and source of their new knowledge and are considered endogenous due to 
spillover effects.  
 
By operating in many countries, MNCs gain access to localised knowledge which can 
then be used to improve their competitive advantages. In this process subsidiaries play 
an important role as a new source of knowledge, ideas and capabilities (Zanfei, 2000). 
Several authors have demonstrated that the bulk of innovation activities is conducted 
outside of parent company (Almeida and Phene, 2004; Kenney et al., 2009). This paved 
the way to so called “double network” structure where context specific knowledge is 
transferred through internal networks between subsidiaries spread across different 
locations and external networks between subsidiaries and its suppliers, customers and 
partners in host locations (Zanfei, 2000).  
 
This led to different type of subsidiaries named competence creating whose aim is to 
benefit from localised knowledge (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). Upon the initial entry 
foreign subsidiaries are limited to adaption of products to local markets, but over time 
they start to develop their own capabilities, thus contribution to product upgrading and 
diversification of markets (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). Besides technological 
competencies, competence creating subsidiaries also cover market competencies such as 
market sales activities and supply competences evident in production, logistics and 
distribution activities (Asmussen et al., 2009; Figueiredo, 2011). These competences 
contribute to overall competitiveness of MNCs if they are successfully transferred to 
parent company and other subsidiaries in the network through revers knowledge transfer 
(Ambos et al., 2010; Frost and Zhou, 2005).  
 
The major determinants separating competence creating subsidiaries from those based 
on exploiting the existing knowledge are location and strategic interdependence. In 
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relation to first determinant, regions or countries with good infrastructure, science base 
and skilled workforce are more attractive for R&D subsidiaries.  In particular, the 
emphasis is put on agglomeration economies which lead to specialisation externalities or 
intra industry spillovers (Marshall, 1890; Jaffe et al., 1993; Almeida, 1996) and diversity 
externalities or inter industry spillovers (Jacobs, 1969; Feldman and Audreutsch, 1999). 
In order to take advantage from innovative activities arising from different locations, 
MNC must allow greater autonomy to its subsidiary as it enables the latter to improve its 
ability to form external linkages with other companies and institutions in local 
environment (Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Andersson and Forsgren 2000). It has also been 
argued that autonomy is an indicator of the subsidiary’s strategic importance over 
production and technology, hence leading to a higher local sourcing (Liu, 2010) and 
generation of independent competencies (Cantwell and Iguchi, 2005). As subsidiary 
becomes more competent MNC may transfer some of the business functions to it (Yamin 
and Otto, 2004). As a result, subsidiary can better respond to demand in local markets 
and develop more intense linkages with domestic firms (Hansen et al., 2009). 
 
Another approach to evolutionary theory of MNCs is taken by Kogut and Zander (1993) 
who focus on the role of knowledge in explaining the boundaries of the firms. They 
define MNCs or firms in general as social communities that specialise in the creation and 
internal transfer of knowledge. Moreover, Kogut and Zander argue that MNCs arise due 
to their superior efficiency as an organisation vehicle by which knowledge can be 
transferred across borders. According to this view, tacit knowledge because of its non-
codifiability, non-teachability and complex nature is the source of MNCs’ ownership 
advantages.  Non-codifiability protects knowledge against imitation while non-
teachability and complexity places constraints on the extent to which a local firm can 
imitate the MNC’s activities. The costs of extending it to more users is high, thus tacit 
knowledge is typically transferred within MNCs as it requires a complex learning-by-
experience process that cannot be organized via markets (Kogut and Zander 1993). 
 
The authors criticize internalisation theory arguing that limits to the firms are determined 
by firm’s efficiency to acquire knowledge and not by failure of the market to protect 
knowledge and transaction costs (Ietto-Gillies, 2014).  The cost of technology transfer 
varies with the degree of tacitness and therefore the decision between FDI and licensing 
depends on accumulation of learning experience about codification procedures.  
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1.3.7 NEW TRADE THEORY 
New trade theory provides an alternative framework for analysing FDI based on general 
equilibrium models. It is mainly based on industrial organization approach, 
internalisation theory and OLI framework combined with features of imperfect 
competition such as product differentiation and economies of scale. Ownership 
advantages arise from knowledge capital, location advantages from country size, trade 
costs and differences in factor endowments and internalisation advantages from joint 
input property of knowledge capital (Faeth, 2009). Within the new trade theory three 
models have been developed based on proximity and concentration advantages, 
differences in factor endowments and their integration in knowledge capital models. 
 
Horizontal model. The first set of models is related to horizontal type of FDI as an 
alternative to exports and it is based on only one factor of production and similar factor 
endowments across countries (Markusen, 1995, 2002). Markusen (1984) incorporated 
knowledge based ownership advantages such as R&D, marketing, scientific workers and 
product complexity which enable firms to engage in FDI. This enables easy transfer of 
knowledge based assets between production plants as latter has a joint input nature which 
can be used in multiple locations without diminishing in value. This in turn gives rise to 
firm economies of scale due to public good nature of knowledge which can be supplied 
to other plants at very low costs. Under these circumstances increase in cost efficiency 
gives rise to MNC. 
 
Extensions of theoretical models (Horstmann and Markusen, 1987, 1992; Brainard, 
1993) are based on trade-offs between additional fixed costs of setting up a new 
production plant and benefits arising from avoiding trade and transportation costs.  This 
is also known as “proximity concentration hypothesis” between the advantages of 
accessing the local market to avoid transportation costs (proximity) and scale economies 
in production in one plant (concentration). The models predicts that FDI will arise when 
transportation and tariff costs are larger than plant level fixed costs and when firm level 
scale effects due to knowledge capital are larger than plant level economies of scale. 
Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) extended the models to incorporate multi country 
framework to consider similarities in size of countries, technology and factor 
endowments further explaining the importance of MNCs over trade.  
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Vertical model. Vertical FDI takes place by geographical fragmentation of production in 
order to exploit difference in factor costs between countries. This type of FDI is modelled 
under assumption that different parts of production process require different inputs. 
Therefore, it becomes profitable to split production chain across several locations to 
benefit from example low labour costs. Models of vertical FDI have been developed by 
Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) by incorporating extended 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory with two factors of production and two sectors. The latter 
assumption is based on one perfectly competitive industry with constant returns to scale 
and the other producing differentiated products under increasing returns to scale. Similar 
to horizontal models, firms are assumed to possess knowledge capital called “general 
purpose input” (H) which is internalised by the firms. Products in differentiated industry 
are produced using labour and H factor with the latter being located in the headquarters. 
The driving force of the model is absence of Factor-Price-Equalisation (FPE) which 
enables firms to geographically fragment their production. 3F4 In addition, the model 
assumes no trade and transportation costs thus firms have no motivation to have plants 
in multiple countries. Hence, the focus of Helpman’s model was to show that MNC have 
an incentive to reallocate their production across geographical space if the countries 
differ in their relative factor endowments. However, vertical model has been criticised 
by Zhang and Markusen (1999) as labour abundant countries do not receive much FDI. 
They posit that notwithstanding that some of the labour intensive activities is undertaken 
abroad, MNCs still needs skilled workforce supported by good institutions and 
infrastructure in the host country. 
 
Knowledge capital model. A more sophisticated model of MNC behaviour was 
developed by Markusen et al. (1996) and Markusen (1997) that combined horizontal and 
vertical motivations of MNCs. According to Markusen (1995) knowledge capital 
consisting of intangible capital, trademarks, brand names and human capital is the 
primary source of firms’ specific advantages and provides opportunity for MNCs to go 
abroad. He argues that knowledge being partially nonexcludable, nonrival, and 
                                                 
4 The assumption states that factor prices of labour and capital in countries with different factor 
endowments will be equalised due to international trade (Samuelson, 1948).  
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noncodifiable (Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1990) generates a risk of expropriation and thus 
provides MNCs incentive to internalise and thus limit technology spillovers. 
 
The assumption of the model is two countries, two sectors and two factors of production 
which allow vertical and horizontal MNCs to emerge endogenously. Carr et al. (2001) 
construct a model which allows empirical investigation of knowledge capital model and 
motives for horizontal and vertical FDI. Studies such as Markusen and Maskus (2002) 
showed that horizontal FDI is the most prevalent type of FDI. However, firm level data 
studies showed more complex forms of FDI and only a fraction of MNCs can be purely 
classified as horizontal and vertical FDI (Hanson et al., 2001; Feinberg and Keane, 2006). 
This led to new theoretical model developed by Yeaple (2003) which shows how 
complex internalization strategies lead to complicated FDI structures which are 
determined by complementariness between host countries.  
 
Ekholm et al. (2007) extended the model into a three-region framework with two high 
cost countries and one low cost to include export-platform FDI. The latter occurs when 
a firm in a large high-cost country move a part of its production to a low cost country in 
order to supply the other high-cost country. Low cost country mainly imports 
intermediate products and assembles final goods, combining intermediates and unskilled 
labour. 
 
Firm heterogeneity. Recently, both horizontal and vertical model of FDI have been 
criticised as both assumed that firms are homogeneous in productivity. However, 
empirical evidence has pointed out that international activity is conducted mostly by 
large and most productive firms (Ramondo et al., 2015). Several authors have thus 
incorporated heterogeneous choices of firms within the sectors to be consistent with 
micro level facts. Helpman et al. (2004) developed a model in which firms display 
heterogeneous levels of productivity.  Decisions about market entry are made in several 
sequences. First, potential entrants pay sunk costs fE  in order to enter the industry upon 
which they learn about their productivity. Upon observing its productivity firm may exit 
the market incurring negative ex post profits -fE or decide to operate on domestic market 
by paying an additional costs fD. If it chooses to produce it has the option to sell its 
product variety abroad either by engaging in exporting by paying an additional fixed 
costs fx or to serve the foreign market through local production in which case it incurs an 
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additional higher fixed costs fI.  Concentration force depends on the difference between 
the last two parameters, while proximity force stems from additional iceberg-type 
transport costs of τ > 1 per unit of output sold in the export market (Arnold and Hussinger, 
2011). Production abroad does not incur these additional transport costs and goods are 
produced using the same level of firm’s efficiency as in the home country. The 
implication of the model is that internationalization mode depends on the sales volume 
on the foreign market which is a function of strictly increasing productivity levels. The 
model predicts three cut off productivity levels which explain proximity concentration 
trade off. Firms with the lowest productivity serve the home market, more productive 
firms serve foreign market through exports and only the most productive firms engage 
in FDI as their volume of sales is able to recoup higher fixed costs. 
 
Antras and Yeaple (2013) developed a one factor (labour) model similar to Helpman’s 
vertical model (1984) with the exception that cross country differences in factor prices 
emerge not from relative factor endowments, but from Ricardian technological 
differences. Firms in differentiated sector enter the market by incurring fixed costs fE 
after which they learn about their productivity and decide whether to stay on the market 
or exit. They further encounter an additional costs of FD associated with provision of 
headquarter services which are combined with manufacturing production. Since the 
assumption is that wage in foreign country is lower than home offshoring of 
manufacturing becomes a viable alternative. However, by fragmenting their production 
additional fixed costs Fi – FD > 0 arise at home country since headquarters services and 
manufacturing production are geographically separated and such fragmentation entails 
iceberg costs τ > 1. The latter are related to transportation costs from shipping 
manufacturing goods back to home country. Antras and Yeaple (2013) show that only 
the most productive firms are able to achieve high levels of profit which enable them to 
engage in vertical FDI. 
 
1.4 MOTIVES AND MODE OF MNCS’ ENTRY  
 
In the previous section a summary of literature explaining the determinants of MNCs 
activities abroad was provided. The discussion in this section is oriented towards 
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strategic objectives of MNCs and modes of entry into foreign market with the aim to 
show how different motives influence type and amount of technology transfer to host 
countries and the nature of potential FDI spillovers. Taxonomy used by Behrman (1972) 
and later on expanded by Dunning (1992) based on OLI paradigm distinguishes between 
four different motives of FDI: 
1. Resource seeking 
2. Market seeking 
3. Efficiency seeking 
4. Strategic asset seeking 
 
As noted in Narula (2003), the first three kinds of investment are related to exploitation 
of already existing firm specific advantages, while the strategic asset-seeking investment 
represents an asset augmenting activity and are closely related to technological 
accumulation hypothesis discussed in Section 1.3.6 whereby firms choose to acquire or 
purchase the assets of existing firms additional assets with the aim to strengthen their 
global competitiveness (Dunning and Lundan, 2008).   
 
The main aim of resource seeking motive is acquisition of natural resource not available 
in the home country (e.g. natural resources or raw materials) or available at lower costs 
(e.g. unskilled labour). It also includes acquisition of technological and managerial 
capabilities, skilled labour and marketing skills which are more available in developed 
countries. Market seeking motive takes place when MNCs is interested to gain direct 
access to large foreign market or one with high growth potential or indirect access where 
MNC invest in one country which serves as an export platform. It has been noted that 
this type of FDI is an alternative mode to serve foreign markets for companies which 
previously exported to host country and decided to carry out FDI due to unfavourable 
tariffs or other market restrictions (Dunning, 2008). Other reasons include proximity to 
suppliers and customers, adaptation of products to local culture and tastes of the host 
market and reduction of transportation and production costs. It can also reflect global 
marketing strategy where market seeking FDI is a response to competitor’s investment 
(Knickerbocker, 1973). In international trade models discussed in Section 1.3.7 these 
motives are known as vertical and horizontal, respectively.   
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The third motive is driven by the desire to increase efficiency by taking advantage of 
lower labour costs abroad thus being very closely related to resource seeking motive  
(Nunennkamp and Spatz, 2002) or achieving economies of scale and scope by gaining 
from common dispersed activities (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003). This type of 
investment is undertaken in countries with similar economic structure and income levels 
to contribute to risk diversification. Lastly, strategic asset seeking motive which is not 
entirely consistent with OLI paradigm is concerned with possibility to gain access to 
assets created in host countries. For example, these assets can be accessed through 
existence of agglomeration economies such as availability of specialised labour, better 
linkages with suppliers and customers and technological spillovers. In addition, this 
localized knowledge can be the result of organizational capabilities of the firms which 
are embedded in organizations and tacit making them hardly communicated and 
transferred via arm’s length transactions (Kogut and Zander, 1995). This tacitness is an 
embedded component of both individual skills and organizational routines (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982) and gives rise to the concept of knowledge based assets. Much of the 
knowledge based capital is disseminated through learning by doing and is not easily 
transferable. Therefore, technology available locally requires close contacts giving rise 
to asset seeking FDI where MNCs benefit from reverse technology spillovers (Sanna-
Randaccio and Veugelers, 2007). 
 
Apart from motives which are seen as important determinants of FDI as they influence 
both the likelihood of choosing FDI among other set of alternatives as well as the choice 
of location, MNCs face other two strategically important decisions. First, they must make 
a decision on whether they will invest in a completely new venture (greenfield) or if they 
would merge /acquire an already existing firm in the host country (M&A or brownfield). 
Second, they must make a decision about the ownership of the new company, i.e., 
whether it is a wholly owned subsidiary or joint venture with local firms. Recent 
contributions to international trade and FDI theory discussed in Section 1.3.7 have 
recognized firms’ productivity as an important factor in explaining their international 
activities. A further distinction made by Nocke and Yeaple (2007, 2008) is to sort firms 
according to their mode of entry in host markets. They recognize that firms are 
heterogeneous in several dimensions and that this heterogeneity is embodied in 
intangible asset which can be transferred across firms only through ownership. The role 
of M&A is to improve the assignment of intangible asset to firms to exploit 
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complementarities. Greenfield investment occurs when firms’ relatively immobile asset 
is highly valuable that it makes it profitable to move it abroad despite high relocation 
costs. Nocke and Yeaple (2008) show that most productive firms tend to enter foreign 
market through greenfield investment. Similar conclusions are made by Raff et al. 
(2009). An alternative explanation for M&A is provided by Neary (2007) who introduces 
an oligopolistic market structure in a general equilibrium framework and shows that 
M&A is the result of the reduction in trade costs. Firm efficiency is also an important 
determinant of ownership mode. For example, Mugele and Schnitzer (2008) showed that 
the most efficient firms will choose wholly owned subsidiaries, however if there exists 
large cultural differences the value of local partner increases. Javorcik and Wei (2009) 
find that joint venture is preferred in countries with high levels of corruption. 
 
1.5 POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF FDI 
 
The attitude towards MNCs in 1960s and 1970s was generally hostile as FDI was blamed 
for depleting scarce resources, exploiting host-country employees, and forming global 
monopolies (Ghosh, 2001). However, Caves (1974) showed that MNCs may improve 
allocative efficiency by entering into industries with high entry barriers and reducing 
monopolistic distortions, and induce higher technical efficiency if the increased 
competitive pressure or some demonstration effect spurs local firms to more efficient use 
of existing resources. This shifted the attention to studies on the FDI’s contribution at the 
macroeconomic level in terms of its impact on economic growth (e.g. Borensztein et al., 
1998; Alfaro at al. 2004, Carkovic and Levine, 2005) and at the microeconomic level in 
terms of firms’ productivity (e.g. Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Javorcik, 2004a; Blalock 
and Gertler, 2008). 4F5 
 
The characteristics of FDI discussed in previous sections provide incentive to MNCs to 
transfer technology in the form of capital goods and technological and managerial know 
how to their foreign subsidiaries. As noted by Blomström and Kokko (2002, p. 3), MNCs 
“undertake a major part of the world’s private R&D efforts and produce, own, and 
control most of the world’s advanced technology”. Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) found 
                                                 
5 It is worth noting that the entry of MNCs also have social, political, cultural and environmental effects. 
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that MNCs have better management practices and styles which can be transplanted 
abroad resulting in higher productivity, profitability, innovation and employment 
growth. Therefore, the potential for a large magnitude of technology transfer, know-how 
and management practices across countries is a major motivation for governments to 
provide fiscal and other type of incentives to attract MNCs (de Mello, 1997; Weber, 
2010). 
  
MNCs possess firm specific advantage that enables them to compete on foreign markets. 
Higher labour or total factor productivity (TFP) is associated with higher potential for 
technology transfer (UNECE, 2001). FDI is usually associated with increased 
competition in product markets leading to changes in market structure such as the 
breakup of local monopolies and factor markets by increasing the demand for highly 
qualified personnel (Blomström and Kokko, 2002). Greater competition can also lead to 
reallocation of resources from less productive to more productive foreign firms, leading 
to higher aggregate productivity. However, this may lead to crowding out of local firms. 
Recent empirical evidence points to the beneficial impact of foreign acquisition on 
productivity of acquired firms after controlling for possible cherry picking behaviour 
(Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Guadalupe et al., 2011). 
 
There is also ample empirical evidence that MNC pay higher wages than domestic firms 
(Girma et al. 1999; Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2001; Sjöholm and Lipsey, 2006; Harrison and 
Rodriguez-Clare, 2010). Besides paying higher wages, MNCs are found to undertake 
substantial investments in training of their personnel contributing to skill development 
(Fosfuri et al., 2001; Alfaro et al., 2009). Also, in addition to direct effect, the presence 
of MNCs can indirectly encourage individuals to upgrade their skills and knowledge, and 
invest in training with the aim of securing a job with MNCs. If inward FDI is oriented 
towards high technology and high skill industries it may help host countries to specialize 
in those activities and thus contribute to their international competitiveness by affecting 
the composition of exports and ultimately their balance of payments (Resmini, 2000, 
UNCTAD, 2002). The focus on industries with higher R&D content can help countries 
move up the global value chain (UNCTAD, 2002; Sohinger, 2005) which in turn can 
help them to generate more income, create high skilled jobs and pay higher wages. FDI 
is also a significant contributor to domestic employment both directly through greenfield 
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investment and indirectly through creation of backward and forward linkages, thus 
creating employment in upstream and downstream industries. 
 
The potential effects of FDI discussed above refer to direct transfers from the parent 
company to its subsidiary. However, knowledge and technology developed within MNCs 
can spill over intentionally or unintentionally to local firms through multiple channels 
thus affecting the industry in which foreign subsidiary operates or related industries in 
downstream and upstream sectors. It is generally argued that the indirect effects of FDI 
are the main reason why governments around the world offer generous incentives to 
MNCs (Buckley et al., 2007a). For this reason, the next chapter is entirely devoted to the 
theoretical discussion of FDI spillovers with the aim of identifying the exact channels of 
such spillovers and the conditions for their occurrence, and to review the findings in the 
literature which will inform our empirical model in subsequent chapters. 
 
Although the above discussion mainly pointed to the beneficial effects of MNC’s 
presence in a host economy, FDI can also have negative effects. For instance, if the level 
of technology transferred to host country is low and foreign firms operate in low value 
added industries positive direct and indirect effects on growth and international 
competitiveness may be limited or even negative. Furthermore, if MNCs source their 
intermediate inputs from abroad or buy only low value added intermediate inputs, the 
inclusion of indigenous firms in GVCs may not occur, thus limiting their potential to 
increase productivity. Besides positive competition effects which aims to increase the 
efficiency and innovativeness of incumbent firms, MNCs may crowd out local firms due 
to their larger size, higher productivity and better access to finance. Regarding the latter, 
the evidence points out that MNCs finance some of their investment from local financial 
markets and not bring scarce capital from abroad (Lipsey, 2002, Harrison et al., 2004). 
This may in turn exacerbate local firm’s financing constraints and eventually lead to exit 
from the market due to their inability to finance necessary investment. Furthermore, 
MNCs can be present in strategic industries of a host country and thus may exacerbate 
their influence to push for the policies which are beneficial for them but not necessarily 
for local firms (Golub, 2003). 
 
To summarise, the theoretical literature suggests diverse effects of FDI on host country 
which is also corroborated by empirical evidence providing mixed findings on both direct 
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and indirect effects (e.g. Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004; Smeets, 2008). The current 
consensus is that the effects of FDI are not exogenous in most cases and depend on the 
country and firms’ absorptive capacity. The most important factors moderating the 
effects of FDI are human capital (Borenzstein et al.,1998; Xu, 2000; Wang and Wong, 
2009), the technological level of host country/firms (Havranek and Irsova, 2011), 
complementarity of different policies (Rodrik and Rosenzweig, 2009; Harrison and 
Rodriguez-Clare, 2010), competitive environment (Moran, 2007), development of 
financial markets (Hermes and Lensink, 2003; Alfaro et al., 2004, Alfaro and Charlton, 
2013), the state of intellectual property rights system and general institutional quality 
(Javorcik, 2004b: Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007), the MNC heterogeneity (Neto et al., 2010; 
Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2011), sectors of operation (Alfaro, 2003) and the length of 
time since FDI entry (Merlevede et al., 2014). 
 
1.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter we have described the concept and measurement of FDI, the reasons why 
MNCs choose FDI among many other internalization alternatives, and the expected 
effects on host countries. The theoretical review identified several strands of literature 
trying to explain the sources of MNC’s ownership advantages, the reasons for 
internalisation of their activities and location characteristics of host country that 
determine the motive, entry mode and ownership structure. Some theories are based on 
perfect markets, while others are based on imperfect markets and general equilibrium 
models. However, no theory provides a unified framework explaining international 
investment, although the OLI framework tried to combine several strands of literature in 
defining ownership advantages, causes of internalisation and the role of location in 
attracting MNCs. The determinants and motives of FDI put forward by Dunning gained 
strong theoretical and empirical support in later models combining ownership and 
location advantages with technology and country characteristics in explaining both 
horizontal and vertical FDI. Recent theoretical contributions are related to the subsidiary 
being the relevant unit of analysis and source of FSA due to idiosyncratic resource base, 
strategic motives and the role within MNCs which has implications on the amount of 
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knowledge transferred through internal networks. Furthermore, FSA can be augmented 
through subsidiary autonomy and its embeddedness in host country locations.  
The heterogeneity of FDI is found to be highly important when discussing the potential 
impact of MNCs as the latter differ in terms of knowledge, technology and productivity 
which enable them to overcome the liability of foreignness. By exploiting firm specific 
advantages in combination with location characteristics MNCs increase their competitive 
advantage. However, due to public good characteristics of knowledge and the need for 
interaction with local environment, some of the foreign knowledge is expected to spread 
across location resulting in improvements at both micro and aggregated productivity 
levels. In addition, knowledge can be transferred either voluntarily to suppliers and 
customers or involuntarily through knowledge spillovers. As we shall see in the next 
chapter a separate theoretical literature analysing indirect effects of MNCs’ entry has 
evolved explaining multiple channels of influence on indigenous firms. However, 
empirical studies often fail to capture the multiple channels through which FDI spillovers 
can occur, or when they do, firms are treated as homogenous entities. The provision of 
government incentives to MNCs is only warranted if the effects of FDI beyond direct 
effects such as direct capital financing or increase of employment are positive. Therefore, 
the next chapter will provide a conceptual framework for analysing the determinants of 
FDI spillovers paying attention to domestic and foreign firms’ heterogeneity, types of 
linkages and other complementary factors. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Governments around the world provide a range of incentives such as help with 
information about local business opportunities, tax holidays, employment subsidies and 
land grants to attract MNCs to their countries. The main motive for these policies is the 
assumption that MNCs add value to the host country’s economy such as job creation, 
provision of necessary capital and increased tax revenues identified in the previous 
chapter, and also generate indirect effects resulting in productivity growth. Productivity 
spillovers have been identified as one of the most important benefits of FDI (Blomstrom 
and Kokko, 1998). When a MNC sets up a subsidiary, it is expected to bring in a certain 
amount of firm-specific intangible assets that allow it to compete successfully with local 
firms and to overcome the “liability of foreignness”. The MNCs’ superiority arises from 
their advanced process and product knowledge, better managerial and organizational 
know-how and scale efficiency (Kokko and Kravtsova, 2008). With this superior 
knowledge, it is often expected that MNCs perform better, and are more efficient and 
productive than their domestic counterparts. In the process of transferring knowledge to 
their subsidiaries there is a possibility that some of this knowledge spills over to local 
firms involuntarily or voluntarily through several channels. These knowledge spillovers 
may affect firms within industry or across industries through backward and forward 
linkages. However, empirical evidence on indirect effects of FDI are ambiguous due to 
complexity of spillover channels and the mechanism through which knowledge spills 
over to local firms. Furthermore, one must take into account the heterogeneity of supply 
and demand side factors influencing the potential and actual spillovers. Moreover, the 
spillover process is influenced by external factors such as institutional environment, 
supply side factors (access to finance, skills acquisition) and spatial proximity. Recent 
studies have started to acknowledge these heterogeneous factors and appear to 
significantly influence the existence and magnitude of knowledge spillovers from FDI. 
The failure to take them into account may thus be a source of the empirical ambiguity 
(Smeets, 2008). 
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2 the concept and measurement of 
knowledge spillovers from FDI is briefly explained. The discussion of theoretical 
foundations of intra industry spillovers is provided in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 
 
35 
theoretical models of vertical technology transfer are presented and discussed. Section 
2.5 provides an overview of conceptual framework of the determinants of FDI spillover. 
This is followed in Section 2.6 by a critical review of empirical literature and the 
identification of shortcomings and limitations related to investigation of FDI spillovers 
in transition countries. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.  
 
2.2 KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVERS FROM FDI 
 
The previous chapter explained the nature of advantages of MNCs over domestic firms 
and noted that by engaging in FDI, MNCs can potentially bring direct and indirect 
benefits to their host economies. By expanding abroad, MNCs try to exploit the 
knowledge gained in their home country for the purpose of making profit and maintaining 
competitive advantage. However, some of the knowledge may spill over to local firms 
due to its public good nature, first recognized by Arrow (1962), as well as other 
mechanisms. Knowledge spillovers gained significance in the new economic growth 
literature as an important factor explaining long run growth (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1991). The key feature of endogenous growth theory (EGT) is 
that certain factors such as human capital and the utilisation of knowledge pool are not 
subject to diminishing returns as investment in physical capital.  Scholars in EGT argue 
that knowledge is non-rival and incompletely excludable, thus making it available to all 
firms in the economy. In this context FDI is seen as a source of new technology which, 
with its increasing returns on output, positively influences economic growth through 
spillovers. 
Although the term knowledge spillovers is commonly used, it lacks a precise definition. 
For example Jaffe et al. (2000, p. 215) suggest that knowledge spillovers occur as 
“investments in knowledge creation by one party produce external benefits by facilitating 
innovation by other parties”. This definition implies that knowledge is created by R&D 
and thus knowledge spillovers are the same as technological spillovers (Hallin and 
Holmström-Lind, 2012). Other taxonomies include those defined in Table 2.1. 
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TABLE 2.1 TAXONOMY OF KNOWLEDGE/TECHNOLOGY SPILLOVERS 
Author Type of spillovers 
Griliches (1979) Knowledge spillovers – 
arise from R&D 
activities, reverse 
engineering and 
exchange of information  
Rent spillovers - from 
imperfect price 
adjustments following 
quality improvements of 
goods and services 
Grunfeld (2003) Embodied spillovers– 
related to transfer of 
tangible goods 
Disembodied spillovers– 
related to transfer of 
intangible assets 
Keller (2004)  Active spillovers- 
codified knowledge such 
as patents, books, 
journals 
Passive spillovers– 
mainly related to tacit 
knowledge such as 
norms, routines, 
experience embodied in 
workers and difficult to 
transfer 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Blomström and Kokko (1997, p.3) note that technology “is an inherently abstract 
concept, and therefore difficult to observe and evaluate”.  Since technology can take 
many forms, it can be transferred through variety of channels making empirical analysis 
of technology spillovers from a certain source somewhat limited. In addition, market for 
technology is inefficient as involved parties in transaction are not able to agree about 
mutually acceptable prices (Kraemer-Mbula and Wamae, 2010). This is due to imperfect 
information about the value and specifics of technology. This is one of the reasons why 
market for technology are internalised which gives rise to FDI, as explained in more 
detail in Chapter 1. 
The term technology has been associated with the production function and the decisions 
on the combination of inputs with the aim of achieving higher levels of output. With that 
in mind Freeman and Soete (1997) define technology as the knowledge of production 
techniques embodied in tangible assets. However, Evenson and Westphal (1995) argue 
that the knowledge of the production process and efficiency of its use is tacit, not 
codifiable and non-transferable.  
Estimating the effects of knowledge spillovers is not an easy task. 5F6 As suggested by 
Krugman (1991a, p.53) “knowledge flows […] are invisible; they leave no paper trail by 
which they may be measured and tracked”. Furthermore, knowledge diffusion depends 
                                                 
6 The terms knowledge and technology spillovers will be used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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on the type of knowledge transferred from MNCs to local firms. In comparison to 
codified knowledge that is easy to convey through tangible forms, tacit knowledge 
requires extensive interactions and is difficult to transmit to other parties (Polanyi, 1962). 
Therefore, the degree of tacitness can influence the mechanism and channels of 
knowledge spillovers. Spencer (2008) argues that tacit knowledge can be mostly 
transferred through worker mobility when employees previously working for MNCs 
leave the company to become an entrepreneur or decide to join another company. 
Since knowledge spillovers are difficult to measure, those investigating indirect effects 
of FDI resort to second best solution by estimating productivity spillovers. The general 
premise is that technology plays an important role in augmenting productivity. The most 
common approach in evaluating the effects of FDI spillovers on host country firms is to 
use a Cobb Douglas production function in which the output, value added or productivity 
of domestic firms is related to a measure of foreign presence in the industry. The latter is 
usually defined as a share of foreign firms in industry sales, capital or employment. 
However, the problem is that productivity is a “measure of ignorance” (Abramovitz, 
1956, p.11) and thus many factors apart from technological externalities may have an 
impact on it. Ornaghi (2004) points that if there are other factors that affect productivity, 
then estimating productivity spillovers is not a good indicator of technological 
externalities. Recently, Zanfei (2012) has challenged the so called externality framework 
based on production function since benefits accruing to domestic firms entails certain 
costs associated with purchase, adoption and development of technology. Furthermore, 
the production function is not able to disentangle pure technological externalities from 
pecuniary externalities or other competition related effects (Driffield and Jindra, 2012). 
The former induces changes in the firm’s technology which allows firms to use fewer 
inputs for the same amount of output and affect long term competitiveness of firms. The 
latter type of externalities occurs through market transactions and formation of linkages, 
and affect the firms’ profit function by changing the prices of inputs. They may have an 
even larger beneficial effect since they are available to a large number of firms, some of 
them not involved in linkages with MNCs (Castellani, 2012). In order to properly 
measure pecuniary effects, one would need to have information on input and output 
prices before and after the entry of MNCs which is mostly unavailable in firm level 
databases.  
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The next sections will discuss in detail the channels through which MNCs affect local 
firms and provide an insight into some of the issues faced in estimating FDI spillovers. 
2.3 INTRA-INDUSTRY (HORIZONTAL) SPILLOVERS  
 
Although traditional theories of FDI answered the question of ‘under what circumstances 
would MNCs invest abroad’, they did not take into account the costs and benefits as well 
as the impact of technology transfer on host economies. The earliest discussion on 
productivity spillovers dates back to early 1960s and is related to the works of 
MacDougall (1960), Corden (1967) and Caves (1971) who investigated costs and 
benefits of FDI and technology spillovers together with several other effects influencing 
welfare in the host economy. Caves (1974) provided the taxonomy of various spillover 
effects and concluded that MNCs contribute to allocative and technical efficiency and 
technology transfer and diffusion.  
In this section the main theoretical studies modelling intra industry spillover effects from 
FDI will be presented and discussed. Horizontal spillovers involve involuntary leakage 
of knowledge through which its codified and tacit elements are transferred from MNCs 
to local firms (Hallin and Holmström-Lind, 2012). Three channels of technology transfer 
are recognised. Earlier studies viewed spillovers as an increasing function of foreign 
presence (Findlay, 1978). Most of these studies consider technology possessed by MNCs 
as a public good which can be transferred to domestic firms without costs through 
demonstration and imitation effects. The second strand of literature argues that spillovers 
involve costs and are not determined only by foreign presence. They are the outcome of 
interaction between foreign and domestic firms suggesting that technology diffusion and 
transfer are endogenously determined (Wang and Blomstrom, 1992). The more recent 
models, however, argue that spillovers occur through worker mobility where workers 
previously employed and trained in MNCs’ subsidiaries take some of the knowledge 
acquired to improve the efficiency of their new employers (Fosfuri et al., 2001). In what 
follows, each of these strands will be critically analysed. 
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2.3.1 DEMONSTRATION EFFECTS 
Knowledge spillovers are commonly expected to arise from demonstration and imitation 
effects. Saggi (2002) defines demonstration effects as occurring through reverse 
engineering of MNCs’ products, technologies and management practices by host country 
firms. Its scope depends on the complexity of goods produced and processes used by two 
types of firms (Barrios and Strobl, 2002). The entry and presence of MNCs in an industry 
reduce the risk associated with development of new products and processes since 
domestic firms have more information about the costs and benefits of new methods, thus 
reducing the uncertainty and providing incentives to imitate. Demonstration effect occurs 
without active involvement of MNCs and is based on quasi-public good characteristics 
of new products and processes as firms can observe the outcome of technological 
innovations at no or very little cost. In addition, demonstration effects include the foreign 
firms’ knowledge of distribution networks, transport infrastructure and consumer tastes 
which may help domestic firms wishing to become exporters or to enter global supply 
networks (Farole and Winkler, 2014). However, as argued by Zanfei (2012), the firms’ 
absorptive capacity is a key conditioning factor which enables local firms to evaluate and 
use external knowledge. 
Koizumi and Kopecky (1977) are the first to explicitly model FDI and technology 
transfer in the modified model of international capital movement.  Technology transfer 
is proxied by capital stock owned by foreign firms and it is assumed that technological 
benefits to indigenous firms depend on the extent of foreign ownership of a country’s 
capital stock. According to them the transmission of foreign technology is viewed as 
automatic and technology was treated as a public good. As MNCs are unable to 
internalise the total returns, host country firms can exploit the technology free of charge.  
Findlay (1978) developed a similar model of international technology transfer to examine 
the relationship between FDI from an advanced developed economy and technological 
change in a developing country. In his model, the rate of technological diffusion to the 
developing country is assumed to depend on two factors, the “relative backwardness” 
and the “contagious effect”. The first factor was introduced by Veblen (1915) and 
Gerschenkron (1962) who stated that the rate of technological convergence and 
technology diffusion is faster the higher is the technology gap between the backward and 
the advanced country. The second factor, used firstly by Arrow (1971), stresses the 
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importance of personal contacts as the most efficient way of technology diffusion 
between the parties that have the knowledge and those who adopt it. Findlay captures 
both effects and argues that the rate of technological change in the developing country is 
an increasing function of technology gap and foreign presence. FDI spillovers occur 
since increased foreign presence lead to smaller technological gap. However, Cantwell 
(1989) argues that Findlay’s hypothesis does not always hold as domestic firms differ in 
their capability to internalise technologies in their production process.  
Models of spillovers discussed above assume that differences in the level of technology 
between MNCs and domestic firms are the main determinant of demonstration and 
imitation effect. Furthermore, they assume that spillovers are exogenous, do not depend 
on the behaviour of foreign and domestic firms and do not take into account the 
absorptive capacity of the recipient(s). 
 
2.3.2 COMPETITION EFFECTS 
Another strand of literature emphasizes the competition effects in addition to the set of 
technologies available from FDI. Competition has two effects which are mainly 
pecuniary in nature. First, it reduces the monopoly power of domestic firms and forces 
them to benefit from new technology and management practices by introducing stricter 
or more cost conscious management (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998). Second, it 
encourages more efficient allocation of resources and reduction of market distortions 
across industries resulting in increased productivity. However, increased competition 
may result in negative spillovers effects in the short run due to the inefficiency of 
domestic firms and hence reduction in their market share. If fixed costs account for a 
considerable part of the production costs, average cost curves will be downward sloping, 
in which case a loss in market share will push firms up on their average cost curves and 
force them to produce at a less efficient scale (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). This implies 
that spillover process does not involve only MNC and is not automatic. Therefore, it must 
include the costs of technology transfer as well as the effort of domestic firms. 
Competition effects cannot be regarded as pure externalities as MNCs face the 
transaction costs of dealing with competition policy, or offer higher wages to attract 
qualified workers. 
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Das (1987) recognized the costs associated with spillovers and used a price-leadership 
model from oligopoly theory to analyse the transfer of technology from the parent firm 
to its subsidiary abroad. He examined the optimal behaviour of MNCs when there is a 
risk that local rivals succeed in learning their production techniques. Similar to previous 
models, he assumed that the rate of increase in efficiency of local firms is positively 
related to the output of MNC’s subsidiary. Therefore, the latter will decide to increase 
the price in order to reduce the amount of output at the expense of short term profit which 
will eventually lead to fewer spillovers to local firms. However, the behaviour of local 
firms is not explicitly taken into account. 
In the models discussed above the advanced technology introduced by foreign firms is 
considered to be a public good and transferred automatically. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that technologies can be transferred without facing any difficulties and are adopted by 
local firms without any adjustment cost. As a result, these models do not deal adequately 
with the issue of interaction between MNCs’ subsidiaries and host country firms. The 
contribution of Wang and Blomstrom’s model (1992) lies in its highlighting of the 
essential role played by competition. Whereas in previous models the extent of spillovers 
is determined by the degree of foreign presence, in Wang and Blomstrom’s model they 
are instead endogenously generated by the technological competition between foreign 
subsidiaries and domestic firms. Furthermore, the authors identified two types of costs: 
the cost to the MNCs of transferring technology to its subsidiaries and the costs of 
learning to domestic firms.     
Wang and Blomstrom (1992) construct a model based on two firms in which the rate of 
technological transfer is determined by strategic decisions of the two firms. They also 
follow Findlay’s assumption of a positive relationship between the technology gap and 
spillovers. Each firm solves the dynamic optimisation problem subject to other firm’s 
action. The objective of MNCs is to decide on how much technology will be transferred 
to local subsidiary while the domestic firm’s objective is to decide on how much to invest 
in learning to capture MNC’s technology.  The conclusion of the model is that the extent 
of spillovers depends on the investment decisions of both types of firms. The potential 
for spillovers is higher the more the MNCs invest in new technology, thus increasing the 
technology gap. However, learning by domestic firms will reduce technology gap and 
force the foreign subsidiary to import more advanced technology from its parent 
company in order to restore its market share and profit levels. This in turn provides an 
 
42 
additional incentive to local firms to increase their investment in learning and thus more 
spillovers. 
Perez (1997) developed a model of spillover effects using an evolutionary perspective 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982) which is different from previous models that fall in the 
framework of industrial organization theory. He emphasized that domestic firms’ 
catching up process is path dependent and that absorptive capacity is the main source of 
continuous technological development. Spillovers emerge as a result of a dynamic 
interaction between foreign and domestic firms at the existing technology level. Perez 
(1997) was able to show that domestic firms with high technology level are more 
successful in learning from FDI and thus to stay more competitive, while firms which 
lag far behind the technological level of MNCs are crowded out with increased foreign 
presence.  
       
2.3.3 WORKER MOBILITY 
A third channel of intra-industry knowledge spillovers is worker mobility. Local firms 
can benefit from employees previously employed in MNCs as the latter is likely to have 
provide the host country workforce with a higher degree of training, education and 
valuable work experience (Smeets, 2008). Given that a large part of labour training 
constitutes knowledge that is not completely firm specific, this generates a positive 
externality for the receiving firm by increasing the quality of its human capital. This in 
turn leads to higher productivity for domestic firms that hire these workers after they 
leave the MNC. Also some of the MNC’s senior managers may, at some point in time, 
choose to start up their own company, and would be able to apply the knowledge acquired 
in the MNC for their own firm’s benefit. Worker mobility generates both pecuniary and 
pure knowledge effects. The former arises due to increased supply of trained workers 
which are available at lower costs while the latter effect arises from tacit knowledge 
embedded in human skills as long as the salary does not reflect accumulated knowledge. 
(Ben Hamida, 2007; Zanfei, 2012). However, spillovers through this channel are more 
likely to occur in medium and long run as knowledge must be absorbed by local 
employees and in the short term foreign firms are more likely to offer higher wages and 
other benefits resulting in negative spillover effects (Sinnai and Meyer, 2004; Crespo and 
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Fontoura, 2007). Several models were recently developed which model spillovers 
through this channel. 
Fosfuri et al. (2001) construct a model in which a firm has to choose between FDI and 
exports to serve the foreign market, and needs to train the host country workers if it 
chooses the former. When training is completed, both foreign subsidiary and local firms 
compete for the services of employees previously employed by MNCs. Knowledge 
spillovers occur if the local firms make a higher offer to the trained employees. Even if 
workers do not change their employment status, the host country welfare might still be 
improved because of pecuniary spillovers embodied in the wages that the MNC pays to 
the trained workers to prevent them from moving to a local competitor. The conditions 
for occurrence of spillovers depend on several assumptions: competition in the product 
market is low; the training of workers is general involving organizational, marketing and 
managerial skills; and the absorptive capacity of domestic firms is high.   
The difference between technology spillovers which occur when worker is hired by the 
local firm and pecuniary spillovers occurring when worker is retained by the 
multinational subsidiary at a higher wage is shown in Glass and Saggi (2002). In contrast 
to the previous model, the role of training is kept aside and the emphasis is put on the 
superior technology that can be transferred to host country firms if the latter hire the 
workers previously employed in a MNC. As the attractiveness of its workers to the host 
country firms is recognized, the MNC weights the cost of paying higher wages to keep 
them within its boundaries against the benefit of limiting technology transfer to the host 
firms. In their model with multiple host and source firms the foreign firm can increase 
its profits by raising the wage it pays to workers to a level which is enough to prevent 
them from switching employers. Wage premium can raise foreign firm’s profit by 
preventing the cost reduction for the host country firm which would otherwise occur. 
Markusen and Trofimenko (2009) develop a model in which knowledge is transmitted 
when foreign experts visit the host country firms and train its workers. They show that 
hiring foreign experts increases the (real) wages and value added of the hiring plant. This 
effect is both instantaneous (it occurs during the period of hiring) and persistent (it 
remains even after the foreign expert has left the plant). They shed light on the timing 
issue and find that the longer the plant postpones the decision to hire foreign experts, the 
smaller their contribution to the improved wage and productivity. 
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2.4 INTER-INDUSTRY (VERTICAL) SPILLOVERS 
 
Unlike intra-industry spillovers which are regarded as technological externalities, MNCs 
also create pecuniary externalities by creating linkages with their suppliers and 
customers. The reasons for engaging in vertical relationship from the viewpoint of MNC 
are to overcome the deficiency of market transactions (Lall, 1980) and to prevent the 
leakage of information and knowledge to direct competitors (Javorcik, 2004a). Through 
linkage formation local firms can gain access to knowledge and technology of MNCs 
(Kugler, 2006). The concept of backward and forward linkages was developed by 
Hirschman (1958). The first type involves the benefits to domestic suppliers, while the 
second type creates spillovers to domestic customers. Hirschman suggested that the 
importance of backward linkages is best approximated by the percentage of inputs 
purchased from other industries while forward linkages should be measured by 
percentage of output sold to other industries.  
By creating vertical linkages technological externalities arise as MNCs facilitate learning 
by doing in local firms resulting in increased productivity (Eden, 2009). Suppliers can 
benefit from inter-firm exchange of technical and managerial knowledge (Giroud, 2007). 
MNCs provide technical assistance on product design, quality control and inventory 
management as well as financial and procurement assistance (Zanfei, 2012). Customers 
of MNCs can benefit from spillovers and knowledge embodied in products, processes 
and technologies as well as improved access to enhanced or previously unavailable inputs 
and products (Jindra et al., 2009). Lall (1980) has identified “complementary” activities 
which may lead to spillovers through vertical linkages with suppliers: 
- help prospective suppliers to set up production facilities; 
- help suppliers to raise the quality of their products or facilitate innovations by  
            providing technical assistance or information;  
- provide or assist in purchasing of raw materials and intermediaries; 
- provide training and help in management and organization; and 
- assist suppliers to diversity by finding additional customers. 
Besides cooperation effects listed above, MNCs may force domestic suppliers to meet 
the higher standards of quality, reliability, and speed of delivery of MNCs (Blomstrom 
and Kokko, 1998). 
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The recent surge in the literature on industry linkages has spurred the development of 
several theoretical models which have analysed the effects of MNCs on economic 
development. Rodríguez-Clare (1996) developed a model with monopolistic competition 
in the intermediate products sector, which domestic firms and MNCs use as inputs in 
their final goods production. It is based on three premises. First, greater variety of inputs 
leads to higher production efficiency in final good sector due to the “love of variety of 
inputs” (Ethier 1982) by local and foreign firms. Second, intermediate goods industry is 
characterised by increasing returns to scale. Third, the proximity of supplier and user is 
required as the domestic firms buy all of their inputs locally. The latter is required in 
order to ensure the development of final good industry. These assumptions lead to a 
“good” equilibrium characterised by high wages, complex goods and high variety of 
inputs while production of simple goods and small variety of inputs lead to “low” 
equilibrium (Glass et al., 2002). Under the scenario of two economies, one developed 
and the other developing, MNCs will establish a subsidiary overseas to enjoy the benefits 
of cheap labour, similar to vertical model of FDI discussed in the previous chapter. 
However, the crucial assumption is that intermediate products are not tradable and firms 
cannot use them unless they have a plant operating in the country in which inputs are 
produced.6F7  
The linkage coefficient developed by the author measures the ratio of employment 
generated in supplier industries per unit of labour hired directly by MNCs (Glass at al., 
2002). If positive, it implies that an increase in the number of MNCs which produce more 
complex goods and employ more specialized intermediate inputs will increase the variety 
of inputs produced locally and thereby help develop supplier industry in the host country. 
Increased demand and variety of intermediate inputs also generate positive externalities 
to other final goods producers, thus establishing forward linkages. As the complexity of 
final and intermediate products increases, the positive linkage effect is expected to lead 
to higher productivity of domestic firms and higher wages and skill levels in host 
economy. Backward linkages will be higher under conditions that MNCs use complex 
intermediate inputs, the higher are the communication costs between parent company 
and subsidiary and the higher is the similarity of variety of inputs produced between host 
and home country.  
                                                 
7 This assumption implies that relying on foreign suppliers entails additional coordination costs. 
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Markusen and Venables (1999) develop a model with two imperfectly competitive 
industries with increasing returns to scale, producing intermediate and final goods which 
are linked by an input-output relationship. It is somewhat different from Rodriguez-Clare 
model (1996) as it assumes intra industry competition. According to the model there are 
three effects of MNCs’ entry. First is the competition effect as foreign investment takes 
place in the final goods sector increasing total output and reducing market price, leading 
to the exit of domestic firms. The second effect is the creation of backward linkages to 
intermediate goods suppliers in the upstream sector. As firms operate in monopolistically 
competitive markets their number increases to generate more variety of inputs which lead 
to lower average costs and increase in profits. The increased entry thus causes a third 
effect as the reduction in prices of inputs benefits firms in downstream sector because of 
improved and cheaper intermediate products supplied by domestic firms. The stronger 
the demand effect compared to the competition effect, the better is the situation for the 
upstream and downstream firms.  
Similarly, Pack and Saggi (2001) have developed a model of technology transfer in 
which MNCs induce entry of other suppliers by transferring technology to firms in 
upstream sector, thus reducing concentration and lowering prices. Given the benefit of 
lower-priced inputs, downstream firms will lower prices and increase output, and new 
firm entry may occur. This would induce higher output in upstream sector due to stronger 
demand from downstream sectors. If the above argument holds, then benefits accrue 
widely to all sectors and consumers, not only through improved productivity but also 
through increased competition resulting in lower deadweight loss, thus improving 
welfare. 
In the models discussed above the basic premise is that MNCs alter the incentives for 
entry and that the interaction between MNCs and local suppliers is based on love of 
variety for inputs in final goods industry. However, as noted by Lin and Saggi (2007) 
these models ignore the strategic interaction which occur in an oligopolistic market 
structure and emphasize demand creation effects. In addition, the connection between 
technology transfer and backward linkages and the contractual relationship which may 
be used by MNCs to protect their knowledge is not addressed. 
Lin and Saggi (2007) explicitly consider vertical technology transfer (VTT) through 
backward linkages focusing on supply side effects. They develop a two-tier model in 
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which the production of final goods depends on intermediate goods and the market 
structure if both markets are oligopolistic. Upon entry, MNC are faced with the choice 
of sourcing their inputs from the market by interacting with all suppliers vs. sourcing the 
intermediate good locally with selected suppliers who exclusively agree to serve MNCs 
in return of VTT.  Two types of contractual agreement are discussed: one in which 
domestic supplier must abide by an exclusivity condition that forbids serving MNC’s 
rivals and another contract in which domestic firms do not face such a restriction. 
Generally, MNC is faced with a trade-off: on one hand it would like to prevent local 
firms and rivals to benefit from VTT, on the other hand it would prefer to have multiple 
suppliers in order to secure more competitive price. In reality, the MNC can combine 
these two contracts, although the number of local suppliers that accept exclusivity 
contract is likely to be smaller relative to the case where the multinational commits to 
sourcing only from its exclusive suppliers. The conclusion is that while the entry of the 
multinational creates additional demand for the intermediate goods, it can also reduce 
the number of suppliers available to local producers. This negative supply-side effect can 
dominate the positive demand-side effect so that the total output of the intermediate good 
as well as the final good can shrink due to the MNC’s entry. 
Recently, Alfaro et al. (2010) combined the theoretical model and the calibration exercise 
in which positive backward linkages depend on local financial markets, market structure 
and competition for skilled and unskilled labour.  They model a small open economy in 
which domestic and foreign firms compete for skilled and unskilled labour and 
intermediate products in the final goods industry. In order to operate in the upstream 
sector, firm must develop a new variety of inputs which requires capital investment, the 
latter being conditional on developed local financial markets. Increased variety of inputs 
leads to positive FDI spillovers in final goods sector. Hence, financial markets act as a 
channel for realisation of linkage effects. Furthermore, their model implies also the 
existence of horizontal spillovers in the final goods sector by raising productivity of 
domestic firms due to greater availability of intermediate inputs. 
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2.5 DETERMINANTS OF FDI SPILLOVERS 
 
In the previous section, we discussed the channels through which MNCs influence the 
productivity of host country firms. However, spillovers do not occur automatically. In 
what follows theoretical arguments derived from formalised models as well as those 
without mathematical representation will be used to develop a conceptual framework 
which is built on the premise that the realisation of FDI spillovers depends on domestic 
firms and MNCs’ heterogeneity. This interaction is influenced by the host country 
environment and institutional framework which affect foreign and domestic firms’ 
characteristics as well as the knowledge transmission channels. Figure 2.1 below 
illustrates the channels and mechanisms through which MNCs can influence local 
companies, and factors affecting their occurrence. As can be seen the realisation of 
vertical linkages and thus productivity spillovers between MNCs and local firms can 
occur through several mechanisms such as demand effects by requiring better and more 
diverse inputs, product quality and delivery time (Farole and Winkler, 2014). Also, 
assistance effects such as personnel training, leasing of machinery, sharing of production 
techniques and support in product design may help domestic firms to benefit from 
spillovers if MNCs is not fully compensated for these benefits (Lall 1980; Crespo and 
Fontoura, 2007; Farole and Winkler, 2014).  
 
The benefits accruing to domestic firms are however conditional on MNCs heterogeneity 
such as their motives, level of ownership, country of origin, mode of entry and sourcing 
strategies. The extent of knowledge diffusion effects depends on local firms’ 
characteristics in terms of size, absorptive capacity and spatial proximity. Finally, host 
country requirements such as level of foreign control or preference for certain types of 
FDI may also influence FDI spillovers. The same reasoning applies to the occurrence of 
intra industry spillovers where times since foreign entry or mode of entry may induce 
demonstration and competition effects as well as the type of knowledge available to local 
firms. The actual benefit to local firms depends on their ability to attract employees 
previously working for MNCs or their capacity to withstand fierce competition.  Aspects 
of host country policy such as access to finance, trade policy, development of physical 
infrastructure, learning and innovation infrastructure influence domestic firms’ capacity 
to learn and finance necessary investments while intellectual property right regime and 
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foreign investment policies influence the type of technology brought in by foreign firms 
(Farole and Winkler, 2014). 
 
FIGURE 2.1 A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR FDI SPILLOVER CHANNELS AND MECHANISMS 
AND THEIR POTENTIAL DETERMINANATS 
 
Raw materials                                                                                                       Final goods  
 
 
 
 
               
 
 
   
 
 
 
                          Intermediate inputs 
                               Technology spillovers 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s adaptation based on Farole and Winkler (2014) 
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different motives, origins of FDI, modes of entry, ownership characteristics, trade 
orientation and the complexity of technology they use. It can be argued that different 
types of FDI give rise to different amount of knowledge spillovers. First, specific 
spillover channels are more relevant for certain types of FDI than for others and, second, 
the tacit component in knowledge spillovers may cause different spillover effects from 
various types of FDI (Smeets and de Vaal, 2006). As argued by Castellani and Zanfei 
(2007), “not every multinational company is a good source of externality and not every 
domestic firm is equally well placed to benefit from multinational activity”. Here, we 
discuss some of these heterogeneities. 
Level of control (ownership).   Müller and Schnitzer (2006) and Gattai and Molteni 
(2007) derive a theoretical framework to study the relation between knowledge spillovers 
and the choice between FDI and joint venture (JV). Both studies conclude that FDI is the 
MNC’s best option where the risk of knowledge spillovers to other firms is high. Muller 
and Schnitzer take into account the active role of the host country. In particular, they 
examine the role of taxation and local infrastructure investments and find that these 
instruments can help MNCs to align their interest with those of the host country and thus 
choose to invest in JV increasing knowledge spillovers. Gattai and Molteni find that full 
ownership is the optimal solution in environments characterised by weak IPR and when 
local firms have high capacity to learn. 
 
Smeets and de Vaal (2006) argue that fully owned or partially owned firms differ in 
potential for transfer of knowledge as well as the time necessary to establish cooperation 
with local firms. The channels and mechanism of knowledge spillovers may differ as 
partially owned foreign firms are more likely to generate benefits to local firms through 
pecuniary spillovers in addition to pure knowledge spillovers Knowledge based view of 
the firm discussed in Section 1.3.6 pointed out that not only the ownership of specific 
technology, but also the ownership of specific architectural capabilities that enable 
MNCs to transfer tacit knowledge is a source of their unique competitive advantages 
(Kogut and Zander, 1993; Tallman, 2003). In this respect, joint ventures are seen as an 
important vehicle for transfer of tacit knowledge as they are more embedded in host 
country environment. By establishing joint ventures, the interests of domestic and foreign 
firm are more aligned and the incentives for knowledge sharing is high due to mutually 
beneficial interest to improve performance.  
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Partial ownership can create higher potential for spillovers, especially by creating vertical 
linkages since it is expected that MNCs are already integrated to a certain extent into the 
local economy, thus sourcing inputs from the host market (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 
2008). However, the transfer of foreign technology may be gradual, thus limiting the 
scope for spillovers in early years. Joint ventures are specifically beneficial for firms with 
high degree of mutual dependence characterised by frequent exchange of knowledge 
where local firms have substantial scope for learning new techniques and best practices 
(Konwar et al., 2014). 
 
However, wholly owned subsidiary are more likely to transfer more sophisticated 
technology. As demonstrated by Ramacharandran (1993) foreign firms are more likely 
to opt for full ownership in the weak institutional environment characterised by weak 
property rights. In case where knowledge transfer is complex and not easy to codify, 
where the capability of potential partners is weak or there is a potential for knowledge 
dissipation and MNCs pursue asset exploiting strategies, they (MNCs) will create a 
wholly owned subsidiary thus try to prevent leakage of know-how and other valuable 
knowledge information to competitors. Since wholly owned subsidiaries bring more 
advanced technology the potential for technology transfer is also greater and more rapid 
compared to joint ventures (Mansfield and Romero, 1980). However, the latter depends 
on the industry in which foreign firms enter as well as absorptive capacity of domestic 
firms. In summary, the volume of knowledge based assets and its quality is increasing 
with higher levels of ownership. However, the diffusion of knowledge is more likely to 
occur with joint ventures. 
 
Home country characteristics. One of the important factors influencing the potential of 
FDI spillovers and the extent to which local firms can benefit from MNC entry is related 
to the origin of investment. Although there is no formal theoretical treatment dealing 
with this element of heterogeneity, one may derive several propositions based on the 
home country differences affecting the performance of MNC’s subsidiary and thus 
indirectly the productivity of domestic firms (influenced by potential spillovers). Banga 
(2003) argues that productivity differences according to investors’ home country are 
expected, since FDI from distinct countries brings different levels of technology and 
different modes of transfer. Facing different opportunities and obstacles in the 
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environment, firms in different countries can create different technologies and 
management practices by exploiting the availability of specific industry knowledge, 
complementary products, technologies and institutional framework (Ghemawat, 2003).  
Egger and Keuschnigg (2011) argue that the innovativeness and productivity of MNCs 
are related to development of their home country financial market and institutions. If a 
MNC’s subsidiary relies upon technological inputs from home country, the degree of 
development of financial markets and credit tightness affect their productivity and 
innovativeness and impede intra firm knowledge transfer. This in turn influences the 
extent of technology spillovers to host country. Exposure to different technologies and 
management practices can facilitate local firms’ learning capability since “it increases 
the prospect that incoming information will relate to what is already known” (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990, p. 131). A greater variety of technologies can further strengthen and 
increase local firms’ competitive advantage by enhancing economies of scale and scope 
(Zhang and Li, 2010). This in turn enables local firms to compete on a global scale and 
satisfy stringent supplier requirements from MNCs. Furthermore, MNCs from different 
geographical locations require different inputs and offer different products and 
technologies thus creating forward and backward linkages within the host country 
(Zhang et al., 2010). A greater diversity of MNCs can also have beneficial effect on 
worker mobility channel of FDI spillovers as employees previously employed by MNCs 
can imitate some of the best practices and apply them in domestic firms.  Differences in 
home country can affect the production strategy and technologies used in host countries.  
Finally, theoretical model of vertical linkages (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996) predicts that the 
share of intermediate inputs transferred from source to host country is positively 
correlated to geographical distance. Increased geographical distance creates incentives 
for MNCs to source locally in order to reduce transport costs. The same line of reasoning 
can also be applied to cultural, legal and social differences. Nevertheless the differences 
in these latter factors could also pose problems for domestic firms in assimilating the 
new technology. 
Mode of entry. Another type of FDI heterogeneity affecting productivity spillover is the 
mode of entry in the host market. Several authors (Mattoo et al., 2004; Görg, 2000, 
Muller, 2007) have developed theoretical models to examine how the extent of 
technology transfer and level of competition affect the choice of entry, but without 
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considering the possibility of spillover effects. If the cost of adaptation due to specific 
production technology is high, foreign firms have a smaller cost advantage over domestic 
firms and greenfield FDI is thus the preferred mode of entry. However, in the case of 
marketing costs and costs of building distribution facilities, the opposite holds. 
Furthermore, the intensity of competition influences the choice of entry mode in a non-
monotonic way. In the case of high or low competition greenfield entry is preferred. The 
analysis also showed greenfield investment is the optimal mode of entry only if the 
technological gap between the domestic firm and the MNCs is sufficiently large. Muller 
(2002) explicitly modelled the effects of technology spillovers on the mode of MNCs’ 
entry under different forms of competition. He further introduced the notion of 
asymmetric information about spillover potential and their effects on the mode of entry. 
Under the assumption of perfect information and price competition, MNCs will engage 
in more acquisitions while opposite holds for quantity competition.  In contrast, when 
MNCs are faced with imperfect information acquisition, activity will be reduced because 
MNCs cannot take into considerations otherwise efficient acquisitions. In the model 
spillovers can occur only under greenfield investment especially if foreign firm is R&D 
intensive as in this situation it has a strong competitive advantage.   
However, these models failed to recognize the variety of spillover channels associated 
with the mode of entry and the speed through which spillovers occur under these two 
distinct modes. It has been asserted that acquisitions delay spillovers or even restrict them 
(Braconier et al., 2001). On the contrary, when FDI occurs through greenfield 
investment, the potential for spillovers is high as new and advanced technology becomes 
instantly available. However, the scope of spillovers may be diminished as MNCs import 
a technology that may significantly differ from the one existing in the host country. 
Moreover greenfield investors have incentive to protect intellectual property rights, thus 
limiting the potential for knowledge spillovers. In the case of acquisition or merger the 
scope for spillovers is larger as MNCs bring technology which shares similar 
characteristics with the existing host country technology and thus the potential for 
demonstration effects is larger (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). In addition, MNCs are 
likely to use the existing network of suppliers and customers, thus creating vertical 
linkages. 
MNC’s motives.  Although the issue of FDI motivation in the context of FDI spillovers 
is not explored, it can still affect the extent of productivity spillovers. In the previous 
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chapter we explained that FDI motivations can broadly be classified into two categories. 
The first one is related to OLI paradigm and the exploitation of existing ownership 
advantages brought from the home country. The second one is related to technological 
accumulation hypothesis and the literature examining R&D internationalisation in which 
MNCs locate near leading research centres or universities with the aim of sourcing 
technology from its rivals.  Fosfuri and Motta (1999) posed the question of whether high 
productivity firms (leaders) or low productivity firms (laggards) engage in asset seeking 
strategies. They show that a laggard MNC can choose to enter in a foreign market through 
FDI even when this involves sunk costs and the transport costs of exports are zero. The 
potential for positive spillovers can arise due to geographical proximity to a technological 
leader in a host country. Benefits coming from spillover effects cause a reduction in the 
production costs of the MNC both in the home country and in its foreign subsidiary. In 
this way technology sourcing outweighs the costs associated with establishing the 
subsidiary. The expectation therefore, is that spillovers to domestic firms are more likely 
to occur from traditional motivations of FDI.  
In this regard resource seeking investments have limited potential for spillovers, due to 
their high capital and technology intensity and limited time horizon (Farole and Winkler, 
2014). On the other hand, efficiency seeking FDI especially those oriented towards the 
manufacturing sector are expected to contribute to spillovers due to strong requirements 
for a broad range of inputs. However, it must be noted that the spillover potential arising 
from efficiency seeking motives depends on technology and skill intensity of the 
production process as well as sourcing behaviour of MNCs in different manufacturing 
sectors (Farole and Winkler, 2014). Market seeking motives are also conducive to 
spillovers, especially from MNCs in the retail sector which source a significant amount 
of inputs from food sector as shown by Javorcik and Li (2013). 
 
2.5.2 DOMESTIC FIRMS’ HETEROGENEITY 
Although the presence of MNCs provides a potential for knowledge spillovers and thus 
indirectly affects the productivity of indigenous firms, the actual effects are conditional 
upon the receiving party’s characteristics (country, industry and firm). Failing to take 
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into account factors that transform potential spillovers into actual knowledge spillovers 
may severely bias the empirical results (Smeets, 2008).    
Technological gap vs. absorptive capacity. The necessary condition for turning 
knowledge spillovers potential to actual is the existence of absorptive capacity. Two 
views dominate the literature with respect to the role of technological capability of 
domestic firms in adopting new technologies from MNCs. One view is represented by 
Findlay (1978) who suggests that the wider the technology gap between the advanced 
and less advanced countries (and firms), the larger is the potential for technological 
imitation and adoption. Moreover, the speed of adoption is a function of contagion where 
for a given level of foreign presence, the larger the technology gap between the foreign 
and domestic firms, the higher the spillovers.  Glass and Saggi (1998), however, argue 
that the larger the technological gap the less likely are the domestic firms to have the 
human capital, organizational capabilities, sources of finance, physical infrastructure and 
distribution networks to benefit from spillovers.  Moreover, the absorptive capacity 
influences not only the actual occurrence of spillovers but also their potential by affecting 
the MNCs’ decision to invest and the type of technology to employ. A large technology 
gap is therefore a signal of low domestic absorptive capacity which affects the probability 
of positive spillover benefits to domestic firms.  Some authors suggest that technological 
gap and absorptive capacity are complementary. Abramovitz (1986, p.388), for example, 
argues that “a country’s potential for rapid growth is strong not when it is backward 
without qualification, but rather when it is technologically backward but socially 
advanced”, thus suggesting the importance of the absorptive capacity. 
The importance of absorptive capacity is emphasized in a seminal paper by Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989) who define absorptive capacity as a firm’s ability to learn from external 
knowledge through identification, assimilation and exploitation. They hold that 
absorptive capacity is a by-product of the firm’s investment in R&D. Later on Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) redefined the concept of absorptive capacity by including cognitive 
aspects underlying the learning process. The firm’s level of absorptive capacity depends 
upon its existing level of technological competence at the time of foreign entry as well 
as the learning and investment efforts it makes afterwards in order to benefit from foreign 
knowledge. As argued by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) absorptive capacity is path-
dependent because learning experience, prior organizational knowledge and problem 
solving capacity facilitate the use of new knowledge, thus creating a cumulative process.  
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Similarly, Nelson and Phelps (1966) argue that human capital enables understanding of 
new technological developments, their evaluation and adaptation, thus affecting firm’s 
productivity. Narula and Marin (2003) suggest that absorption does not imply imitation 
as each firm possess specific technology; domestic firms need to invest in their own 
research and development, employee training and adapt organizational structures to be 
able to efficiently exploit foreign knowledge and increase their productivity. Ben-
Hamida and Gugler (2009) show that firms which are not far behind the technological 
frontier of the industry may fully exploit the advantages arising from imitation and 
demonstration channels. Firms with less developed technological capabilities are able to 
benefit from worker mobility since this channel provides (technical, managerial, etc.) 
assistance to managers of local firms who lack the necessary experience on how to act 
under competitive environment. In the case of backward linkages firms with high level 
of human capital are more able to meet the quality standards by producing high quality 
inputs, thus cooperation with foreign firms is more likely to arise. 
The concept of absorptive capacity has been expanded to include support infrastructure 
such as developed financial markets. Hermes and Lensink (2004) and Alfaro et al. (2009) 
argue that developed financial system reduces the risk of undertaking investments for 
domestic firms which aim to increase their absorptive capacity, thus favouring FDI 
spillovers.   
Trade orientation.  Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) argue that firms engaged in export 
activities already face international competition and therefore have higher absorptive 
capacity and productivity levels which enable them to benefit from foreign technology. 
Moreover, exporters may be in a better position to become suppliers of MNCs. However, 
they may also have limited contact with local market and face less competition from 
MNCs, thus having fewer incentives to improve resulting in reduced potential for intra-
industry spillovers. 
Size. Crespo and Fontoura (2007) hypothesize that firms’ size also have an important 
impact on FDI spillovers as larger firms are more likely to have the necessary production 
scale which enables them to imitate the production processes used in MNCs or have 
better access to finance which enables them to invest in production technology and 
increase the quality of their products. Furthermore, their larger scale enables them to 
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compete more efficiently with MNCs. Finally, small firms are less likely to experience 
large labour turnover thus limiting spillovers occurring through worker mobility. 
 
2.5.3 OTHER POTENTIAL FACTORS 
The efficiency of FDI spillover channels also depends on technological similarities 
between MNCs and local firms in the industry in which they operate. Furthermore, the 
extent of spillovers may be conditional on spatial proximity and institutional framework. 
Industry characteristics.  FDI is industry specific (Wang et al., 2009). And, therefore, 
the technological intensity of industries is an important factor influencing the extent of 
FDI spillovers as it is often argued that MNCs are located in industries with high value 
added and have competitive advantage over local firms in technologically advanced 
sectors. Hence, learning opportunities for local firms are higher in such sectors. However, 
in high-tech industries, MNCs’ knowledge is characterised by more complex and tacit 
elements which are difficult to codify and transfer (Spencer, 2008; Hashai, 2009). 
Moreover, as argued by McCharty et al. (2010), high tech industries are characterised by 
continuous change in demand, regulation, competition and technology which reduces the 
chances for domestic firms to learn from MNCs. In addition, it is more likely that 
domestic firms have larger technological gap in such industries which may impede 
successful integration of external knowledge and force MNC to use global suppliers 
(Hatani, 2009). Furthermore, the nature of knowledge flows may be different in 
manufacturing and services industries. This may reflect the way in which knowledge is 
protected and transferred to host country firms, thus influencing the mode of entry and 
level of control and subsequently the extent of spillovers. 
Spatial proximity. Economic distance discussed in previous section is concerned with 
relative backwardness and absorptive capacity. It determines whether and to what extent 
local firms can benefit from FDI spillovers. On the other hand, geographical distance 
affects the transmission costs, thus reducing the possibilities for indigenous firms to 
benefit from knowledge spillovers of foreign subsidiaries located further away. As 
knowledge is mainly tacit, geographical distance inhibits its transmission and absorption. 
Therefore, spatial proximity facilitates the process of knowledge diffusion influencing 
the existence and magnitude of spillovers for both domestic firms and MNCs with asset 
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seeking motives. Marshall (1890) and later on Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986) 
recognized that the concentration of an industry in a region promotes knowledge 
spillovers between firms and facilitates innovation within industry located in the region. 
These specialisation externalities arise due to specialised input markets which reduce 
transportation and distribution costs and enable producers to share specialised services. 
Furthermore, externalities of the labour market favour the creation of pools of specialised 
workers. Finally, physical proximity facilitates the exchange of information, ideas and 
knowledge in specialised areas such as clusters thanks to informal contacts and the 
mobility of workers across firms. 
Apart from Marshall, Arrrow, Romer (MAR) externalities, Jacobs (1969) put forward 
the idea of urbanisation externalities.  According to Jacobs, industrial diversity and 
variety leads to exchange of existing ideas and development of new ones and 
transmission of innovations from one industry to another fostering knowledge spillovers. 
The more diverse the structure of industries and R&D conducted in a region, the more 
the domestic firm could potentially benefit from linkages, demonstration and worker 
mobility effects.  
Girma (2005) argues that the relevance of geography is important for both horizontal and 
vertical channels of spillovers and provides four reasons. First, demonstration effects will 
be local, as the benefits are likely to spread to neighbouring firms, at least in the initial 
stage of foreign entry. Second, if one considers the worker mobility channel, the low 
mobility of labour can be a strong obstacle for technology spillovers. Furthermore, 
skilled employee previously employed in MNC often prefers to find new employment in 
the same region. Third, in the case of vertical linkages MNCs may prefer industries with 
local linkage in order to minimize transaction costs and facilitate communication with 
the domestic suppliers or distributors. Fourth, knowledge externalities will be transmitted 
more effectively over small distances which is in accordance with the literature on 
economic geography (Krugman, 1991b). 
Institutional characteristics.  Meyer and Sinani (2009) emphasize the importance of 
institutional framework for creating incentives and business practices that facilitate the 
knowledge acquisition process. North (1995) describes institutions as the rules of the 
game in a society and consists of both informal constraints such as traditions and customs 
and more formal rules such as laws and property rights. They shape the interaction 
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between firms and determine the knowledge acquisition, investment decisions, 
innovation and overall economic performance (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). These 
also have implications for FDI as countries at different level of technological 
development will attract different types of FDI, thus affecting the potential, extent and 
intensity of spillovers. The institutional environment thus has a significant impact on the 
extent of technology transfer and consequently on productivity improvements and 
efficiency of domestic firms (Tihanyi and Roth, 2002). It has been shown that FDI is 
especially sensitive to bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption and weak enforcement of 
property rights (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Wei, 2000; Antras et al., 2009). Good 
investment and business climate is also seen as a strong determinant of FDI spillovers as 
it encourages more dynamic FDI characterised by economies of scale, good management 
practices and technology (Moran, 1998). A particularly important aspect of institutional 
environment is the liberalised foreign trade regime (Keller, 1996; Hoekman et al., 2005). 
Import competition is likely to enhance learning practises and enable local firms to learn 
from and acquire complementary technologies that help them utilise knowledge from 
MNCs. Labour market regulations affect absorptive capacity through firm’s willingness 
to invest in training and thus skill intensity (Almeida and Aterido, 2011). In addition, 
labour market rigidities can limit the spillover effect through low worker mobility. On 
the other hand, flexible labour markets can reduce the incentive for investment in training 
and possibility of workers to obtain necessary skills and knowledge (Farole and Winkler, 
2014). Access to finance can inhibit firms’ investment decisions and thus negatively 
influence firms’ absorptive capacity. Firms faced with financial constraints might not be 
able to fully internalise the spillover potential as they do not have resources to employ 
high skilled workers or invest in new technologies. It has been shown both theoretically 
and empirically that the level of development of financial markets is crucial for the 
positive effects of FDI to be realised (Alfaro et al., 2010; Hermes and Lensink, 2003). 
 
2.6 REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
In this section empirical evidence will be analysed with the aim of shedding more light 
on the often contrasting evidence related to productivity spillovers. We also highlight the 
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substantive problems in previous empirical investigation, methodological approaches 
and the measurement of FDI spillovers. Finally, we identify shortcomings and gaps in 
the current literature investigating FDI spillovers in transition countries. 
 
2.6.1 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON FDI SPILLOVERS 
The empirical literature on intra-industry spillovers was pioneered by Caves (1974), 
Globerman (1979), Blomström and Persson (1983) and Blomström (1986) using data for 
Australia, Canada and Mexico, respectively. These studies were based on production 
function framework where labour productivity or its changes have been regressed on a 
number of explanatory variables, one of them being the share of foreign presence. Using 
aggregated data for the manufacturing sector, all these studies found a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for the foreign presence variable and concluded that 
spillovers exist at industry level. However, the findings of these studies can be challenged 
as the analysis of spillovers from FDI was limited to a very short time span using a 
contemporaneous level of foreign presence while at the same time it used aggregated 
data ignoring heterogeneity of industries arising from significant differences in 
technological capabilities and capacities to learn and innovate. Furthermore, none of the 
above mentioned channels of intra industry spillovers was taken into account explicitly. 
Hence, the mechanisms of spillover occurrence and their diffusion as well as the learning 
and technological changes were treated as a “black box” (Görg and Strobl, 2005).  
As Aitken et al. (1997) note, cross-section studies are subject to a critical identification 
problem. For example, MNCs may enter in industries which are more productive, 
dynamic and innovative or acquire more efficient domestic firms (“cherry picking 
behaviour”). If this is the case, the coefficients on cross-section estimates of productivity 
spillovers of FDI are likely to be biased upwards and overstate the positive impact of 
foreign investment. The seminal paper of Aitken and Harrison (1999) spawned a second-
generation of empirical studies of FDI spillovers in which panel data are used to deal 
with the endogeneity and selection bias problem that affected cross section studies. 
Furthermore, the second generation studies started to use firm level data to address 
aggregation bias and included factors such as industry and regional dynamics, support 
infrastructure, and general firm-level specificities that were not considered earlier.  
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The results for developing countries find mostly insignificant or even negative effects of 
FDI horizontal spillovers on productivity level (e.g. Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999; 
Lopez-Cordova, 2002; Kugler, 2006; Liu, 2008; Walkirch and Ofusu, 2010; Wooster and 
Diebel, 2010; Hale and Long, 2011; Xu and Sheng, 2012). If positive they have been 
limited to certain type of industries (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999) or types of firms 
(Abraham et al., 2010). Similar results are found in transition countries (Djankov and 
Hoekman, 2000; Sgard, 2001; Konings, 2001; Damijan et al., 2003a; Torlak, 2004; Gersl 
et al., 2007; Damijan et al., 2013a). However, recent studies provide some encouraging 
results and find positive horizontal spillovers for export oriented firms (Yudayeva et al., 
2006), firms which invest in intangible asset (Kolasa, 2008), domestic firms with high 
levels of human capital and productivity levels (Damijan et al., 2013a). 
The picture is more optimistic for industrialized countries where horizontal spillovers are 
mostly positive (Haskel et al., 2002; Görg and Strobl, 2003; Karpaty and Lundberg, 
2004; Keller and Yeaple, 2009; Belderbos and Van Roy, 2010). Since firm data seems 
to be the most appropriate level of analysis as they are able to incorporate more 
heterogeneity, the empirical results based on firm panel data do not provide convincing 
evidence of beneficial effects of FDI spillovers. Görg and Greenaway (2004) list several 
possible reasons for mixed findings: 
1. MNCs may be effective in protecting their knowledge resulting in no or very limited 
knowledge spillovers to domestic firms. 
2. Given that the coefficient of the horizontal spillovers variable captures the net effects 
between competition and demonstration channels, the entry of MNCs may induce 
crowding out effect in the short term. 
3. Positive spillovers may affect only a subset of firms, industries or regions, thus calling 
for incorporation of firm heterogeneity. 
4. Knowledge spillovers may occur through vertical relationships which have not been 
taken into account in several studies. 
5. The existence of FDI spillovers may depend on complementarities such as developed 
financial markets, the availability of good infrastructure and institutional framework.  
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Recent studies have attempted to incorporate some of these issues in empirical models. 
Studies discussed above failed to disentangle demonstration and competition effects. 
Spillovers from competition, unlike those from demonstration effects, are not 
proportional to the presence of foreign firms as they depend on the interaction between 
foreign and domestic firms (Kokko, 1996). Taking these considerations into account 
Chen et al. (2011) include two measures of spillovers, one related to contagion effect that 
is measured by employment share of foreign owned firms in industry and the second 
based on productivity of competitor. They analyse the system of equations for domestic 
and foreign firms and find that spillovers from contagion exhibit an inverse U-shaped 
relationship, whereas spillovers from competition are more linear. Kosova (2010) 
disentangled competition effects and technology spillover effects for firms in the Czech 
Republic. She analysed the effects of foreign presence on growth and survival/exit of 
domestic firms by developing a model that combines a dominant firm/competitive fringe 
framework with a model of firm and industry dynamics by Jovanovic (1982) and Sun 
(2002). She found that upon initial entry, MNCs induce crowding out effect which is 
short term phenomena. This effect is offset by the increasing number of foreign 
companies in the sector. Local competitors adapt their production processes to the 
changing market conditions, with their growth and survival rates actually increasing as 
more MNCs enter. 
Castellani and Zanfei (2006) suggest the use of absolute levels of foreign activity in the 
sector to measure foreign presence as the relative changes of the same magnitude in 
foreign and aggregate activities within a sector have no effect on the dependent variable. 
The correct assessment of horizontal spillovers further implies the recognition of time 
effect (Altomonte and Pennings, 2009; Kosova, 2010; Merlevede et al., 2014). 
Altomonte and Pennings (2009), using firm panel data for Romania, find that MNCs 
have initial positive effects turning negative with the increase in their presence in the 
sector. They also find robust evidence that after a given threshold in the FDI presence, 
the spillover effect is outweighed by a marginally decreasing role of learning, as domestic 
firms converge to the technology frontier and by a negative competition effects. 
Furthermore, they show that industries characterised by economies of scale display the 
highest FDI threshold.  
Wang et al. (2011) developed two constructs (pace and regularity) to examine how local 
firms benefit from the process of foreign entry. By using a panel of Chinese firms they 
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find that low to moderate and regular foreign entry is beneficial to local firms while 
opposite hold for fast and irregular entry as local firms are not able to assimilate foreign 
knowledge and benefit from externalities. Their analysis adds a further explanation to 
crowding out effects which arise due to fast foreign entry in a short period of time. 
Recently, Merlevede et al. (2014), using firm level data for Romania, analysed the time 
since foreign entry starts to affect spillovers to domestic firms both within and across 
industries. In order to avoid lumping together old and new FDI in a single variable they 
construct separate measures based on the time since MNCs entered host country. This 
helps them to identify the longevity of spillovers. They find that foreign entry initially 
negatively affects the productivity of firms within a sector but, after majority-foreign-
owned firms have been present for a while, negative effects is completely offset by a 
permanent positive effect on local competitors. Effects of minority foreign owned firms 
are smaller, less robust, and transient. 
Several studies investigate the worker mobility channel. Görg and Strobl (2005) estimate 
a model of worker mobility in a panel of 228 Ghanaian manufacturing firms. They 
control for the underlying capability of entrepreneurs, using years of schooling and 
previous experience in the same industry to control for possible ambiguity in the direction 
of causality between productivity and labour mobility. Their results indicate that an 
owner’s (of a local firm) previous experience with a MNC increases the local firm’s 
productivity, but only if that MNC is operating in the same sector as the local firm. 
Moreover, having an owner that also received explicit training in the MNC, does not 
contribute significantly to firm level productivity. Poole (2010) analyses knowledge 
spillovers through worker mobility at the worker rather than firm or plant level, using 
data on Brazilian formal-sector workers.  The results indicate that ex-ante identical 
workers in firms with a higher proportion of workers with some experience at a MNC 
earn higher wages. The magnitude of wage spillovers from workers with experience at 
MNC varies with sectoral characteristics, such as skill-intensity and the unionization rate. 
Balsvik (2011) using data from Norwegian manufacturing industry and tracing the flow 
of workers from MNCs to non-MNCs finds a robust and significantly positive correlation 
between the share of workers with MNC experience and the productivity of non-MNCs. 
The results hold even after controlling for unobservable worker characteristics, thus 
providing evidence consistent with labour mobility channel of FDI spillovers. 
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The third generation of empirical studies estimating FDI spillovers address some of the 
ambiguities by incorporating vertical linkages in the empirical model, incorporate 
foreign and domestic firms’ heterogeneity and introduce some host country factors.  
Vertical linkages. Javorcik (2004a) analyses vertical knowledge spillovers from MNCs 
on a sample of Lithuanian firms. She finds evidence of positive knowledge spillovers 
through backward linkages, but not through forward linkages or horizontal spillovers. 
Moreover, she shows that the productivity effect is larger when the foreign investors are 
domestic market-oriented rather than export oriented, and there is no variation of 
spillovers between joint ventures and wholly owned affiliates. Kugler (2006) analyses 
inter industry spillovers from FDI for eight Colombian manufacturing sectors, and finds 
strong and robust evidence of backward linkages, whereas forward linkages are largely 
absent. Another important contribution analysing vertical spillovers is a paper by Blalock 
and Gertler (2008) who analyse plant level data in Indonesia and find positive vertical 
spillovers. Furthermore, they also find that FDI in downstream sectors increases firm 
output and firm value-added, while decreasing prices and market concentration. Girma 
et al. (2008) show that export-oriented domestic firms face significant vertical spillovers 
in the UK. Investigating 17 emerging markets, Gorodnichenko et al. (2013) find that 
backward spillovers are consistently positive and that forward spillovers are positive only 
for old and service sector firms. Schoors and Marlevede (2007) employ dynamic input-
output tables to construct spillover linkages for manufacturing industry and service sector 
in Romania taking into account structural breaks and environmental changes into 
account. The authors separate out labour market effects from other effects in their 
identification of intra-industry spillovers, while inter-industry spillovers are identified 
through backward, forward, and supply-backward linkage effects. 7F8 The results suggest 
that labour market effects differ from other intra-industry effects and spillovers across 
industries dominate those within industries.  
Studies using firm level surveys are rare. Giroud et al. (2012) find that greater autonomy 
in basic and applied research of foreign subsidiary increases the intensity of backward 
linkages in five transition countries. Furthermore, the authors find that MNCs’ 
technological intensity, measured in terms of their relative innovation intensity also have 
                                                 
8 In theoretical model of Markusen and Venables (1999) besides an initial backward linkage effect (from 
MNCs in industry k to domestic suppliers in industry j) there is a second forward linkage effect (from local 
suppliers in sector j to other local clients in sectors k). 
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positive impact on development of backward linkages. Focusing on automotive sector in 
Poland, Gentile-Lüdecke and Giroud (2012) examine the mechanisms behind knowledge 
spillovers of suppliers. They find that R&D intensity of suppliers does not have an impact 
on knowledge acquisition, but on knowledge creation in terms of new products, services, 
and technologies. The most recent study in this area, Godart and Görg (2013), examines 
the underlying mechanism through which positive backward linkages occur. Using cross 
section data from 25 East European and Central Asian countries they find that the 
demand effect has a positive effect on productivity growth which cannot be said for the 
more cooperative learning mechanisms such as technology transfer from MNCs. 
The majority of empirical studies have found positive and significant backward linkages 
from FDI. These findings are further corroborated in a meta regression analysis by 
Havranek and Irsova (2011). However, the findings for forward spillovers are less clear. 
Kolasa (2008) argues that forward spillovers may become positive only if domestic firms 
have sufficient absorptive capacity. Similarly, Alfaro et al. (2010) argue that clients of 
MNCs require high up-front capital investment in order to benefit from forward 
spillovers.  
The main problem with measuring vertical linkages is the use of industry input output 
tables for one year which measures the extent of linkages based on increase in demand 
from downstream sectors in which MNCs operate and do not capture changes in industry 
sourcing which may be influenced by new investment (Driffiled and Jindra, 2012). 
Barrios et al. (2011) further emphasize the problem with measurement of backward 
linkages. It is assumed that foreign and domestic firms have the same input sourcing 
behaviour and that share of domestic inputs is the same as imported inputs. Furthermore, 
as argued by Smeets (2008) knowledge transfer and knowledge spillovers are distinct 
albeit related concepts and should be treated separately in empirical estimations. If the 
demand effect is accompanied by the desire of MNCs to increase the quality of inputs by 
providing knowledge transfer directly to suppliers this will affect the level of technology 
and shift the production function (Giroud et al., 2012). Spillovers from vertical linkages 
will then occur if productivity improvements exceed those related to voluntary 
knowledge transfer. Giroud et al. (2012) noted that what matters is also the intensity of 
knowledge transfer as it reflects supply side effect modelled in Lin and Saggi (2007). If 
intensity is low, this will limit the degree of knowledge transfer to suppliers and also the 
extent of technology externalities to other firms in the sector. 
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MNC heterogeneity. The search for explanation of ambiguous findings of FDI spillovers 
turned researchers to examine the role of MNCs’ heterogeneity. Differences in country 
of origin are based on the premise of technological gaps as MNCs from different 
countries bring different technologies. Buckley et al. (2007c) investigate the relation 
between FDI from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT) and from other countries 
outside China in a sample of 158 Chinese industries. They find that FDI from HMT 
generate more knowledge spillovers in labour intensive industries and that FDI from 
Western economies (USA, EU and Japan) generates more knowledge spillovers in 
technology intensive industries. Kosteas (2008) found relatively higher positive spillover 
effects of FDI from Canada than from the US and the rest of the world on a sample of 
Mexican firms. Abraham et al. (2010) and Du et al. (2012) found that FDI from emerging 
economies in Asia into China generate positive spillovers while FDI from Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan have no spillover effects due to their export orientation.  
An alternative hypothesis made by Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011) is that different 
effects of MNCs’ origin are due to transaction costs related to geographical distance. By 
using firm-level panel data from Romania they examine whether the nationality of 
foreign investors affects the degree of backward spillovers from FDI. They posit that 
investments from the EU will affect knowledge spillover from FDI differently than from 
other geographical origins due to Romanian membership in the EU. Their results suggest 
that FDI from USA has positive knowledge spillovers in upstream sector while the effect 
is negative for FDI from the European Union which is explained by crowding out effect 
in downstream sector, thus affecting the demand for intermediate inputs in upstream 
sector. The results hold even when controlling for differences in foreign ownership share 
and in regions where the MNCs operate. The positive effect of distance is confirmed in 
the meta-analysis by Havranek and Irsova (2011) too.  
Gorodnichenko et al. (2014) found that FDI from non-OECD countries provides more 
linkages to local firms than FDI from more developed countries. Specifically, they found 
that non-OECD FDI has positive vertical linkages in larger and older firms  in a sample 
of 17 transition economies, and this effect is positive for the whole sample in case of 
backward linkages, and only for services in case of forward linkages. On the contrary, 
FDI from developed countries seems to benefit only local suppliers in services industry 
and relatively new firms.  Ayyagari and Kosova (2010) analysed the impact of FDI on 
domestic firms’ entry   in the Czech Republic and found that horizontal spillovers are 
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driven by MNCs from the EU. When they further split the non-EU countries into Slavic 
versus Non-Slavic they do not find any significant differences. The positive effects of 
EU investment are consistent with trade literature that emphasize geographical (Redding 
and Venables, 2004) and cultural proximity (Disdier and Mayer, 2007) as a determinant 
factor of increasing trade and investment flows. Similar results are found in a study of 
Greek FDI within industries in Bulgaria by Monastiriotis and Alegria (2011) confirming 
that cultural and geographical proximity play a role in FDI spillover process. 
Another determinant of FDI spillovers is related to the level of foreign ownership. 
Dimelis and Louri (2002), on a sample of Greek firms, found that minority owned foreign 
firms generate positive effects on domestic firms with low and medium productivity 
levels while the opposite holds for majority owned foreign firms. Javorcik (2004a) and 
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) on the sample of firms in Lithuania and Romania 
respectively find positive effects of partially owned foreign firms on development of 
supplier relationship with domestic firms, while negative effects are evident from fully 
owned or greenfield investment which is consistent with the view that greenfield 
investments are less likely to source locally due to costs of finding a local supplier which 
would meet the stringent quality requirements. However, they find that fully owned 
foreign firms are more likely to provide spillovers within the industry. Positive backward 
linkages from partially owned foreign firms are reported by Abraham et al. (2010) for 
Chinese manufacturing industries and Almeida and Fernandes (2006) for firms in 
developing countries. 
Merlevede and Schoors (2007) investigated two horizontal and three vertical forms of 
spillovers for Romanian firms and found positive effects of horizontal labour market 
spillovers and forward linkages coming from fully owned or majority owned firms. Both 
types of spillovers tend to exhibit a U-shape relationship with the level of technology 
suggesting that both technology gap and absorptive capacity hypothesis are at work. 
Backward spillovers are found to be positive across all firms’ size classes when local 
firms supply fully owned foreign firms, but negative in case of majority or minority 
owned foreign firms. Recently, Gorodnichenko et al. (2014) found that partially owned 
foreign firms generate positive backward linkages, but these are limited to large firms 
and firms created after year 1990. The effects of forward linkages are insignificant while 
fully owned foreign firms seems to have positive within industry effects only on firms 
established during the socialist system. 
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Takii (2005) reported negative spillovers from majority owned foreign firms in 
Indonesia, while Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) and Kinoshita (2000) did not find any 
significant effect of degree of foreign ownership. The prevalence of positive effects of 
shared ownership on backward linkages is based on the premise that these firms face 
lower costs of finding local suppliers and are more familiar with the quality of their 
inputs. As far as horizontal spillovers is concerned, lower technological gap combined 
with better access to knowledge by local firms may result in higher degree of knowledge 
spillovers.  
FDI spillovers can also vary with the motives of MNCs. Driffield and Love (2007) 
analyse the manufacturing sector in the UK by distinguishing two motives. The 
technology seeking motive is tested using R&D intensity differentials between home and 
host countries. They found negative spillovers in sectors where MNCs are mostly 
oriented to technology sourcing activities and positive in case of technology exploiting 
activities. In contrast Smeets and Cantwell (2008) found support for their hypothesis that 
technology seeking FDI has a larger productivity effect using industry level data of US 
MNCs’ activities across 14 OECD countries. 
Empirical studies investigating the mode of entry and spillover effects associated with it 
are rather scarce. Few exceptions are Stancik (2009) and Balsvik and Haller (2010). The 
former analysed firms in the Czech Republic. The analysis showed that both acquisitions 
and greenfield investments have negative effect on domestic suppliers. In the case of 
horizontal spillovers the impact of takeover is positive, while the impact of greenfield 
entry remains negative. The effect on forward spillover is initially negative but in time, 
positive horizontal spillovers translate into forward spillovers affecting the consumers. 
The opposite holds for greenfield investment. Balsvik and Haller (2010) study 
Norwegian manufacturing plants and again find opposite effects for greenfield entry and 
acquisitions, the latter having positive effects on productivity of domestic plants 
operating in the same industry. The explanation provided by the authors is that greenfield 
investment has a larger impact on market structure by stealing market shares and on 
labour demand by attracting employees from existing firms. 
Domestic firm heterogeneity. The lack of consensus in empirical literature has spurred 
the investigation also towards domestic firms’ heterogeneity, mainly by exploring their 
absorptive capacity and technological gap. The former is measured as investment in 
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R&D, level of human capital and intangible assets, while the latter is measured as 
productivity difference between domestic and foreign firms’ TFP. 
Kathuria (2000) and Kinoshita (2001) are among the first studies that found 
complementarities between the firms’ level of R&D expenditure and the extent of FDI 
spillovers in India and the Czech Republic, respectively. Konings (2001) reported 
positive horizontal spillovers only for R&D intensive firms in Bulgaria and Romania. 
Keller and Yeaple (2009) found positive spillovers in US for high technology sectors 
which traditionally invest more in R&D. Similar results are found in other developed 
countries (Barrios and Strobl, 2002; Karpaty and Lundberg, 2004; Branstetter, 2006; 
Todo, 2006) and developing countries (Blake et al., 2009; Zhao and Zhang, 2010). 
Kolasa (2008) found that investment in R&D increases vertical spillovers, but not 
horizontal spillovers. A possible explanation is the large technological gap in high tech 
sector which is too large for domestic firms to upgrade their technology based only on 
their R&D effort. Damijan et al. (2003b) analysing a group of transition countries also 
found mixed evidence of the moderating effects of R&D. They are positive for Hungary 
and Slovakia and negative for Estonia and Latvia. Some studies have focused on human 
capital as an alternative measure of absorptive capacity and found that domestic firms in 
transition countries with educated workforce benefit from FDI spillovers (Damijan et al., 
2013a; Gorodnichenko et al., 2014). Similar findings are found in Sinani and Meyer 
(2004) for firms in Estonia.  
Some authors have tested Findlay’s (1978) hypothesis that large technological gaps 
provide greater opportunities for learning, induce more pressure for change and therefore 
provide more incentives for firms to quickly adopt foreign technologies. Griffith et al. 
(2002) measure backwardness as a relative distance between frontier level TFP and 
domestic firms’ TFP in the UK. The former is measured as the TFP of most productive 
firm at the four-digit industry level. They found a positive effect for the technological 
gap. Peri and Urban (2006) also showed the positive and significant effect of large 
technology gaps on the extent of spillovers for a panel of German and Italian firms.  
Other studies have found negative moderating effects for technological gap. For 
example, Dimelis (2005) and Blalock and Gertler (2008) found that domestic firms with 
large technological gaps in Greece and Indonesia respectively do not benefit from FDI 
spillovers. Flores et al. (2007) try to identify the range within which productivity 
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spillovers are maximized using firm level data for Portugal. The results suggest that 
spillover potential is the largest when the average level of domestic productivity is 
between fifty and eighty per cent of the corresponding productivity level of foreign firms. 
Castellani and Zanfei (2003) investigate manufacturing industry in France, Italy and 
Spain. They find that large TFP gaps are associated with positive spillovers, while high 
levels of absorptive capacity have no effect, thus confirming catching up hypothesis 
which suggest that the larger the productivity gap between host country firms and 
foreign-owned firms, the larger the potential for technology transfer to the former 
(Findlay, 1978). They argue that heterogeneity plays a crucial role as different sectors 
have different absorptive capacities, thus high technological gaps may be associated with 
high and low absorptive capacity. 
All studies described above assume that spillover effects are linearly related to absorptive 
capacity. Studying the manufacturing sector in the UK, Girma (2005) used three different 
specifications to assess the significance of absorptive capacity measured as domestic 
firms’ total factor productivity gap relative to the maximum TFP of the corresponding 
industry. He applied linear, quadratic and endogenous threshold models. The potential 
for spillovers is maximised at intermediate levels of absorptive capacity when it starts to 
decline, thus indicating an inverse-U relationship. Using the same measure, Girma and 
Görg (2007) employing quantile regression found a U-shaped relationship on the sample 
of firms in electronics and engineering industries in the UK. 
Host country heterogeneity. In addition to knowledge spillovers across industries, some 
studies have taken a regional approach. Torlak (2004) investigated regional horizontal 
productivity spillovers at NUTS2 level in five transition countries. She found evidence 
for productivity spillovers at regional level for the Czech Republic and Poland. However, 
when controlling for location-specific variations in productivity due to agglomeration 
economies or other region-specific effects positive effect remained only in the case of 
the Czech Republic, whilst a negative effect is detected in Bulgaria. Halpern and 
Murakozy (2007) examined productivity spillovers in Hungary where horizontal and 
vertical spillovers are weighted by distance to the foreign firm measured in kilometres. 
Although vertical spillovers were insignificant indicating the limited role of transport 
costs in supplier choice, horizontal spillovers were negative and significant suggesting 
that the magnitude of horizontal spillovers is decreasing with distance. They also found 
insignificant effects of county boundaries in determination of spillover effects. Nicolini 
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and Resmini (2010), investigating manufacturing firms operating in Bulgaria, Poland and 
Romania, took into account both spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity by 
estimating a spatial error model. They document positive and significant intra and inter 
industry spillovers at regional level. Negative spillovers are found outside the region, 
though limited to specific groups of regions, such as the capital regions and regions 
bordering with former EU-15 countries. Large firms in regions with high levels of human 
capital enjoy higher total factor productivity growth rates 
Finally, a set of studies have investigated the moderating role of host country factors. 
Smeets and de Vaal (2015) found that increased protection of IPR leads to two opposing 
effect on a sample of 17 countries. They found that stronger protection of IPR is 
beneficial for local suppliers, however, it is negative for local customers and competitors. 
They explain this by the ability of MNCs to exert stronger monopolistic pressures as IPR 
improves.  
Studies investigating the role of financial development found that spillovers are lower or 
even negative for local Chinese manufacturing firms if they are credit constrained 
(Agarwal et al., 2011). Similarly, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2009) found that less credit 
constrained firms in the Czech Republic are more likely to become suppliers of MNCs. 
Havranek and Irsova (2011) found negative FDI spillovers in more developed financial 
systems suggesting that MNCs may crowd out local competitors when competing for 
limited financial resources and thus reduce their absorptive capacity. 
Studies investigating the moderating role of trade policy found that more open countries 
benefit more from FDI spillovers (Lesher and Mirodout, 2008; Meyer and Sinani, 2009). 
Recently, Du et al. (2011) found that higher tariffs on final goods and intermediate inputs 
are negatively correlated with the extent of both horizontal and vertical FDI spillovers in 
China. They also found that firms enjoying investment subsidies generate positive 
backward linkages, while the opposite holds for firms not receiving them.  
 
2.6.2 SHORTCOMINGS OF THE STUDIES ON FDI SPILLOVERS IN TES 
The review of the literature on FDI spillovers has uncovered several shortcomings and a 
number of gaps in the state of knowledge on this subject. The first one is related to the 
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geographical coverage of the studies. Most studies have focused on single CEEC with 
ambiguous results due to different methodologies, empirical models and sources of data 
employed (Javorcik, 2004a; Sinani and Meyer, 2004; Halpern and Murakozy, 2007; 
Vahter and Masso, 2007; Kolasa, 2008, Bekes et al., 2009; Iwasaki et al., 2012; Vahter, 
2011; Merlevede et al., 2014). Some studies have investigated several countries together, 
but are limited to the early transition period (Konings, 2001; Damijan et al., 2003a) or 
early 2000s (Gersl et al., 2007; Nicolini and Resmini, 2010; Damijan et al., 2013a) and 
mainly focused on the manufacturing sector and static input output tables, thus excluding 
dynamic changes in the structure of the analysed economies. Furthermore, the 
institutional framework was still under development in TEs and this could have affected 
inward FDI and investor characteristics. Domestic firms were still experiencing an on-
going restructuring process which influenced their absorptive capacities and productivity 
levels. Very few studies have concentrated on non EU countries - mostly from Russia 
and Ukraine (Yudayeva et al., 2003; Tytell and Yudaeva, 2007; Gorodnichenko et al., 
2013). Another gap is related to the length of the period covered. Most studies used 
periods not exceeding five years-something which may influence the domestic firms’ 
learning process and the establishment of vertical linkages (Iwasaki et al., 2013; 
Merlevede et al., 2014). 
There is also an evident lack of research on FDI spillovers which include the service 
sector where the potential for FDI spillovers may be different due to lower sunk costs, 
their “footloose” nature and the character of global value chains (UNCTAD, 2004). A 
related issue is the lack of positive findings on forward spillovers which are more likely 
to occur through interaction between services and manufacturing sector. This issue has 
largely been ignored in existing empirical studies with few exceptions such as Arnold et 
al. (2011) and Fernandes and Paunov (2012). Little is known about the separate effects 
of manufacturing and services linkages on manufacturing firms’ performance as existing 
empirical work is focused solely on manufacturing linkages.  
Another gap is related to lack of empirical analysis investigating MNCs’ heterogeneity 
on a sample of TEs because foreign firms differ in terms of technology they bring to 
countries, level of control, their origin, mode of entry and motives. As argued by Narula 
and Dunning (2010) the potential for spillovers and linkages of one subsidiary may differ 
from that of a sister subsidiary in another host location although they are controlled by 
the same parent company. Only few studies investigated MNC heterogeneity but these 
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generally focused on Romanian manufacturing sector and backward linkages (Javorcik 
and Spatareanu, 2011; Merlevede and Schoors, 2007; Merlevede et al., 2014; Leanerts 
and Merlevede, 2014).  
Furthermore, those studies that incorporated both types of vertical linkages including 
manufacturing and service sectors, investor heterogeneity and analysed a group of 
countries are based on cross section data and only a small number of firms 
(Gorodnichenko et al., 2013). Similarly, the literature on complementarities has 
emphasized the importance of the absorptive capacity of domestic firms to respond 
successfully to MNCs’ entry, the technology they bring and increased competitive 
pressure. Weaknesses in this area may inhibit successful absorption of new technology. 
Therefore, the between country variation of absorptive capacity and its moderating 
effects on manufacturing firms’ productivity according to different source of vertical 
linkages may shed new light on the conflicting results in the literature. 
From a methodological point of view, the issue of simultaneity between MNCs’ presence 
and domestic firms’ performance have rarely been appropriately addressed. Foreign 
firms may enter less productive sectors to gain a higher market share at the expense of 
less productive local firms. If this is correlated with local firms’ ability to benefit from 
FDI spillovers, the coefficient measuring spillovers may be downward biased (Keller, 
2009). Also, other sources of endogeneity such as the measurement of FDI spillover 
variables and TFP have received less attention.  
Finally, most studies have used static panel estimation technique controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity which only partially addresses the issue of endogeneity and 
establishing causality remains a difficult task. In addition to that, studies using firm level 
productivity as dependent variable often fail to acknowledge path dependency and the 
assumption of first order Markov process made in estimations methods related to 
productivity estimation and place the latter in dynamic framework.  
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2.7 CONCLUSIONS  
 
The new economic growth theory has long recognized the importance of technological 
change and knowledge for economic growth. In this framework the role of FDI is 
associated with development of new technology and MNCs as repositories of knowledge 
enable the introduction of new technology at a faster pace and thus contribute to growth. 
Since knowledge is non-excludable and non-rival, it generates a pool available to 
everyone. Under these assumptions, theoretical literature on FDI spillovers has 
developed several possible channels of MNCs’ influence on indigenous firms. The first 
strand of literature views spillovers as a function of degree of foreign presence, implying 
that knowledge spills over when MNCs come into contact with domestic firms due to its 
public good nature, giving rise to demonstration or imitation effects. In the second strand 
of studies spillovers are endogenously determined by technology competition and costs 
faced by MNCs and domestic firms. The third strand of studies assumes that worker 
mobility is an important channel of knowledge diffusion especially of its tacit elements. 
The more recent theoretical models pay more attention to previously ignored potential 
channel of FDI spillovers, namely vertical linkages between suppliers and customers. 
The latter are mostly pecuniary in nature and affect firm’s profit function. However, they 
also involve knowledge transfer which may amplify the beneficial effects on firms’ 
competitiveness. Since knowledge spillovers are difficult to quantify, the literature has 
resorted to the estimation of productivity spillovers. In most cases the entry of MNCs is 
believed to have beneficial effects on domestic firms by increasing their productivity, 
improve access to foreign market and encourage new entry.  
However, empirical evidence are less clear cut and provide mixed evidence due to many 
factors at country, region, industry and firm level which influence the relationship 
between MNCs and domestic firms. The lack of uniformly positive spillover effects can 
be attributed to firm level panel analysis which addresses some of the shortcomings 
present in aggregate cross sectional studies such as aggregation bias and endogeneity and 
enables identifying true causal effects. Recently, empirical work has started to 
incorporate firm heterogeneity, vertical linkages and other potential determinants 
providing more encouraging results. Firm heterogeneity seems to play an important role 
in identifying positive spillover effect. The source of such heterogeneity can be attributed 
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to both MNCs and domestic firms. Regarding the former, the literature has identified 
differences such as degree of foreign ownership, mode of entry, nationality of investor, 
motives, autonomy, technological capability and embeddedness of subsidiaries.   
Similarly, a broad consensus in the theoretical and empirical research is that the local 
firms’ absorptive capacity or initial technology gap is crucial in order to benefit from 
FDI spillovers. Firms with medium technology gaps are found to benefit the most from 
knowledge spillovers. The reason is that firms with high technology gap will have little 
ability to absorb advanced technology due to insufficient internal knowledge resources 
to recognize and assimilate a variety of knowledge elements brought by MNCs. 
Similarly, those firms close to technological frontier have little to gain due to high 
technological competition which may prevent closer interaction between foreign and 
domestic firms. However, the factors which influence the development of absorptive 
capacity are not yet fully understood as the latter is a multidimensional phenomenon 
which is difficult to capture with variables typically available in firm level datasets. In 
addition, spatial proximity is an important factor considered by a number of studies on 
FDI spillovers as knowledge is mainly tacit in nature. Therefore the occurrence of 
spillovers through worker mobility and vertical linkages depend on proximity as the latter 
facilitates the transfer of tacit elements embodied in these two main channels. 
Apart from firm heterogeneity, empirical work has put a significant emphasis on the 
differentiation of horizontal spillovers regarded as pure knowledge spillovers and vertical 
linkages which through intentional knowledge transfer have the highest potential for 
development. Most empirical studies have found positive and significant effects for 
backward linkages and to a lesser extent for forward linkages. Horizontal spillovers are 
less likely to have beneficial impact due to efficient prevention of knowledge leakage by 
MNCs. In addition, horizontal spillovers capture net effects of different intra industry 
channels. They are measured as a degree of foreign presence in an industry which ignores 
the competition effects and worker mobility effects. Furthermore, it is a static approach 
disregarding the process of FDI accumulation in an industry and the evolution of MNCs 
ownership advantages and their familiarity with local environment (Wang et al., 2011; 
Merlevede et al., 2014).  
Finally, one must acknowledge the shortcoming when estimating knowledge spillovers 
from FDI. The most common approach is based on production function which is not able 
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to disentangle pure technological externalities from pecuniary externalities or other 
competition related effects (Driffield and Jindra, 2012). Therefore, estimating 
productivity spillovers is only the second best solution in the absence of information on 
firm level R&D and innovation. Furthermore, in order to understand the exact 
mechanisms and processes of knowledge flows and their impact on domestic firms’ 
development, one must resort to qualitative methods which are again cross section in 
nature and lack the appropriate standards on how to measure technology indicators 
(Driffield and Jindra, 2012). 
This chapter has demonstrated the complex nature of FDI spillovers and provided 
insights under what circumstances FDI creates spillovers and their potential 
determinants. It has been shown that spillover channels, and the heterogeneity of MNCs 
and domestic firms as well as their industries and countries are interrelated and coexist, 
and are shaped by host country factors such as intellectual property rights protection, 
labour market and trade policies. Further empirical research conducted in this thesis will 
try to address some of the problems discussed in this chapter. More specifically, it will 
try to shed more light on the following questions: does the productivity of domestic firms 
vary with the degree of MNCs’ ownership; what is the effect of MNCs’ nationality on 
different channels of spillovers; does the effect of different spillover channels vary with 
sector characteristics; whether there is an interrelationship between MNCs’ presence in 
the service sector and the productivity of downstream manufacturing firms; does the 
effect of manufacturing firms’ absorptive capacity  differ according to  the source of 
vertical linkages. In order to identify the true causal relationship between domestic firms’ 
TFP and measure of FDI spillovers, a firm level panel dataset and the dynamic 
instrumental variable estimator will be employed to address the possible endogeneity and 
capture the changing nature of investors’ characteristics, domestic firms learning efforts 
and development of linkages over time. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The breakup of the central planning system was in major part the consequence of its 
lower productivity levels and technological obsolescence. Since productivity growth is 
regarded as probably the most important single indicator of a country’s economic 
progress, it is only through increases in productivity that domestic firms may increase 
competitiveness on both domestic and international markets. Integration of formerly 
centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) into global financial 
and trade flows provides an interesting case for the analysis of the multiple impact of 
FDI. Hence, by taking a closer look into the nature of FDI, this chapter seeks to provide 
explanations for the contribution of FDI to structural changes experienced by these 
economies, their international competitiveness and their integration into global 
production networks.  
Although this chapter aims to provide a context for the empirical analysis in the rest of 
the thesis, the analysis of the transition process and its impact on economic development 
is kept to a minimum as there is already a substantial amount of work undertaken on this 
topic. Instead, the focus is on the key dimensions of the transition process and the role 
played by FDI in alleviating some of the structural problems inherited from the previous 
system. Special emphasis is paid to the process of income and productivity convergence 
before moving to the analysis of FDI trends in these countries and its contribution at both 
country and industry levels.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief overview of the 
structural problems Central and East European countries (CEECs) inherited from the 
previous economic system with special emphasis on their stance towards FDI and its 
role. Section 3.3 is devoted to the analysis of income and productivity convergence at 
national and industry level. The main features, extent and nature of FDI in CEECs are 
presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 analyses the contribution of foreign firms to total 
employment, turnover and value added and investigates the direct role of FDI in 
technology upgrading and productivity convergence. Section 3.6 analyses the effects of 
FDI on exports and their ability to integrate into the MNCs’ production networks. 
Finally, Section 3.7 concludes. 
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3.2 THE PROCESS OF TRANSITION AND THE ROLE OF FDI 
 
At the beginning of the transition process the CEECs were left with deep structural 
distortions inherited from the socialist system, reflected in a hierarchically organized 
system of ownership of production factors and products (Podkaimer, 2013). The 
economy of CEECs was mainly focused on agriculture and heavy industry, while the 
production of consumption goods and services were mainly neglected (Campos and 
Coricelli, 2002). In addition, the allocation of resources was not led by market signals 
but by centralized decisions based on annual or five year plans. The main tool for growth 
strategy was the artificially low prices of strategically important inputs for basic 
industries maintained through a combination of subsidies and taxes (Kornai, 1992).  
Furthermore, exchange rates were fixed at low (or below the equilibrium level) so as to 
facilitate the import of strategically important goods such as raw material and 
intermediate goods, and the export of goods for final use abroad, mostly to countries 
within the Eastern bloc (Lavigne, 1999). The fixed exchange rate was supplemented by 
extensive restrictions on exports and imports beyond that arranged by the state. These 
structural distortions caused shortages, misallocation of resources, low incentives, 
overgrown industrial sector and underdeveloped service sector. After the beginning of 
transition and the opening of the economy, countries were faced with severe 
macroeconomic imbalances such as hyperinflation, high budget deficits, high current 
account deficits, and debt problems (Kalotay, 2001).   
In the early transition period foreign firms contributed to the elimination of shortages by 
supplying the goods and services long demanded by the population, which also resulted 
in an increase in trade deficits. In addition, the entry of foreign firms contributed to the 
amelioration of price distortions.  
Apart from structural problems, domestic enterprises were faced with obsoleted capital 
and inefficient technology which prevented their successful restructuring (Filer et al., 
2001; Orts et al., 2008). The absence of private ownership acted as a disincentive for 
innovation and product development. Rewards for managers were tied closely to plan 
fulfilment. In addition, enterprises had to perform many non-core activities. For all these 
reasons, the consumption of energy and inputs was several times higher than in market 
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based economies (Gros and Steinherr, 1995). Another source of enterprise inefficiency 
in centrally planned economies was the existence of soft budget constraints (Kornai, 
1986). Liquidity and insolvency problems were solved through administrative 
refinancing by the so-called ‘monobanks’ which controlled central capital allocation 
(Estrin, 2002). Such soft budgetary constraints acted as obstacles to the restructuring of 
loss making enterprises as they were not subject to the threat of bankruptcy.  
Under these circumstances, the inflow of foreign capital was needed and beneficial as it 
provided the necessary funds to finance new investment in fixed assets given limited 
domestic savings (Demekas et al., 2005; Sohinger, 2005). Besides source of new capital, 
FDI was recognized as a source of technological progress (Campos and Kinoshita, 2002; 
Uzagalieva and Kocenda, 2010). The entry of foreign firms also contributed to the 
introduction of new products and management, organizational and marketing practices 
which facilitated enterprise restructuring (Rojec et al., 1995; Weiszburg, 1997; Kalotay 
and Hunya, 2000; Kalotay, 2001).  
Since enterprises in transition economies, apart from those in former Yugoslavia, 
Hungary and Poland, did not have any experience of private business, their integration 
into world markets and conducting of private business was challenging (Mihalyi, 2000; 
Kalotay, 2001). In these circumstances, privatisation policies were seen as an important 
element in transition process. The basic aim of privatisation process was to eliminate the 
inherent inefficiencies of state ownership and planning (Mihaly, 2001). With the 
exception of Hungary and in major part Estonia, other countries relied on different forms 
of privatisation (mass privatisation, voucher privatisation, management buy outs) and 
little space was left to foreigners (Kalotay and Hunya, 2000). The reasons for the small 
role of FDI in early privatisation period were non-economic reasons which emphasized 
the creation of a domestic capitalist class, fairness, special treatment of residents and 
political forces opposing and blocking sales of domestic firms to foreigners (Kalotay and 
Hunya, 2000; Rojec, 2005). It is only in the second phase of the privatisation process, 
after 1996, that foreign companies were put on equal terms with domestic investors. In 
that period, efficiency remained the main motive for privatisation, but corporate 
governance and firms’ restructuring replaced social considerations. With the shift in the 
concept of privatisation and policies from nation-wide distribution/discount schemes to 
case by case direct sales of companies, the use of foreign privatisation in CEECs 
increased (Kalotay and Hunya, 2000). 
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The main benefits of privatisation by foreign firms were product quality upgrading, the 
introduction of new products, transfer of technology, improved market access to foreign 
markets, training of the management and workforce and improved productivity (Estrin, 
1997; Hunya, 2000; Kalotay and Hunya, 2000; Kalotay, 2001; Rojec, 2005). 
Furthermore, large vertical networks were broken up and sold, while core competencies 
were developed to match the higher quality standards (Szanyi, 2001). Defensive 
restructuring of privatised companies which was characterised by labour shedding lasted 
shorter than in purely domestic companies and strategic restructuring that followed 
resulted in increased employment and investment. An important feature of FDI was its 
involvement in the privatisation of services sector especially network industries and 
financial sector which resulted in increased quality of service and reduction in operating 
costs which facilitated the development of private sector (Kalotay, 2001).  
The above mentioned improvements enabled some privatized companies to experience a 
new role as they became part of an international network which equipped them to meet 
quality requirements better (Kurtz and Wittke, 1998). This is especially true for 
companies in automotive and electronic industry that have grown in size and and operate 
as specialised sub-assemblers in the MNC’s network. The success of restructuring was 
also conditional on the type of FDI. Efficiency seeking FDI was characterised by the 
introduction of new production programmes, reorganised marketing activities, training 
and reorganisation of management, and financially consolidated acquired companies 
(Rojec, 2005). On the other hand, market seeking investors did not contribute to 
restructuring to the same extent. They were more interested in using local marketing 
networks and maintaining a large number of products that were well established in 
regional markets (Szanyi, 2001). 
To summarize, considering the arguments described in Chapter 1 on the potential 
benefits of FDI and the evidence on the role of FDI in early transition period discussed 
above we can say that FDI has contributed to a reduction of structural and 
macroeconomic distortions and helped in speeding up the transformation of economy 
and enterprise restructuring. The next section aims to shed more light on the speed and 
nature of catching up process given the substantial economic growth witnessed by 
CEECs that joined the EU from mid-1990s to 2008. Special emphasis is put on 
productivity convergence over the period. 
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3.3. INCOME AND PRODUCTIVITY CONVERGENCE PROCESS 
 
Following unprecedented economic and institutional transformational and the initial 
decline in economic activity at the onset of transition, CEECs that joined the EU achieved 
remarkable growth rates starting from mid-1990s. The most important factor explaining 
recovery and growth are related to initial conditions, macroeconomic policies and 
structural reforms (Havrylyshyn, 2001; Fischer et al., 1998; Berg et al., 1999; Falcetti et 
al., 2006; Kutan and Yigit, 2009). 
Figure 3.1 below indicates that the catching up rate of CEECs was quite spectacular over 
the period 1995-2013; on average 5.23 percent per year measured in GDP per capita 
expressed in PPP.8F9 CEECs’ income per capita growth outpaced EU-15 by 2.37 
percentage points on average during the analysed period. The highest growth was 
witnessed in the Baltic countries gaining nearly 8 percent, despite being hit relatively 
hard during the financial crisis (2007-2009).  In contrast, the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia grew less than four percent per year on average. However, as shown in the graph 
below, recent crisis put a brake on the income convergence process in all countries where 
average growth rates of GDP per capita fell to five percentage points lower in comparison 
to pre-crisis period. 
FIGURE 3.1 GDP PER CAPITA (PPP) GROWTH CONVERGENCE, DIFFERENCES TO EU -15 AVERAGE 
(1995=100) 
Source: Eurostat; authors’ calculations. 
                                                 
9 Please refer to Appendix I (Table I.1) for annual average growth rates. 
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In general, as can be seen in Figure 3.2, the scatter diagram and the fitted trend line 
indicate a strong inverse relationship between the starting per capita GDP (in 1995) and 
subsequent growth for the period 1995-2013. These results can be taken as evidence of 
absolute unconditional convergence.9F10 Countries with lower initial development such as 
the Baltic region, Bulgaria and Romania show different convergence path. The former 
group of countries have grown faster, while on the other hand Bulgaria and Romania 
have lagged behind. More developed countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia 
converge as expected.  
FIGURE 3.2 ABSOLUTE BETA-CONVERGENCE OF NMS DURING 1995-2013 PERIOD 
 
Source: Eurostat; authors’ calculations 
 
The differences in convergence can also be seen in Figure 3.3 which shows relative GDP 
per capita levels as a percentage of EU-15 across different countries. Stronger growth in 
income per capita in comparison to EU-15 enabled NMS to narrow the income gap by 
23 percentage points during the analysed period. 10F11  However, there still exist significant 
differences within the group of countries. By the time of recent crisis in 2007, the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia reached 74 and 79 percent of GDP per capita of EU-15, 
                                                 
10 Beta-convergence means that poorer countries are growing faster than richer ones and therefore are 
‘catching up’.  It is estimated as univariate cross-country regression of GDP per capita growth. If the 
estimated coefficient is negative, it means that countries with lower initial levels of income grow faster. 
Beta convergence can be absolute or conditional, the latter adding other explanatory variables apart from 
starting level of GDP per capita.  
11 Please refer to Appendix I (Table I.2) for more detailed data on GDP levels of NMS as percentage of 
EU 15. 
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respectively, while other countries were still lagging behind, most notably Bulgaria and 
Romania whose income levels stood below 40 percent of EU 15 levels. During the crisis 
years (2007-2009) which brought major GDP losses in the Baltic countries, Poland and 
Slovakia were affected only minimally.  Income gap decreased further after crisis, 
passing the threshold of 60 percent of EU-15 with the exception of three countries which 
joined the EU in the last two waves. 
FIGURE 3.3 GDP PER CAPITA (PPP) LEVELS, PERCENT OF EU-15 
Source: Eurostat 
 
One of the major contributions to income convergence and GDP growth was the increase 
in labour and total factor productivity.  Figures 3.3 and 3.4 below show the significant 
rise in both measures of productivity in comparison to EU-15.11F12 The most significant rise 
in labour productivity was experienced by the Baltic countries while Hungary and 
Slovenia were lagging behind. A similar picture emerges when looking at TFP where 
Latvia, Lithuania and Romania emerge as top performers with an average increase 
between 2.33 and 4.22 percentage points per annum. On the other hand, the Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary and Croatia experienced the lowest TFP growth with an 
average growth between 0.60 and 1.04 percentage points per annum. As a group, NMS 
experienced on average 2.48 percentage points increase in labour productivity and 1.36 
percentage points in TFP over EU-15 during 1995-2013 period.   
                                                 
12 Please refer to Appendix I (Tables I.3 and I.4) for more detailed information on labour and total factor 
productivity growth rates for each NMS and EU 15. 
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FIGURE 3.4 LABOR PRODUCTIVITY PER PERSON EMPLOYED (CONVERTED TO 2013 PRICE LEVEL 
WITH 2005 PPP, 1995=100) 
Source: Total Economy Database™; authors’ calculations. 
 
FIGURE 3.5 TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY OF NMS AND EU-15 (1995=100) 
 
Source: AMECO database; authors’ calculation. 
 
A more detailed look at growth and productivity changes at the industry level (shown in 
Figures I.3 and AI.5 in Appendix I) suggest that all industries have had much higher 
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especially pronounced in the manufacturing of machinery and electrical and optical 
equipment, coke industry, transport services and telecommunication. 12F13 However, despite 
remarkable growth in productivity, its levels are still well below EU 15 as shown in 
Figures I.4 and I.6 in Appendix I. 
 
The contribution of productivity to overall GDP growth in the 1990s can mainly be 
attributed to labour shedding which enabled firm restructuring and reallocations of 
resources from low to high productivity uses (van Ark and Piatkowski, 2004; Alam et 
al., 2008). When put in context with other drivers of economic growth in the second 
decade of transition one can notice significant differences in the role of factor inputs and 
TFP across countries in Table 3.1. The most significant contribution to growth in pre-
crisis period was made by TFP in Estonia, Lithuania and Romania and capital growth in 
Bulgaria and Latvia. A recent analysis by Benkovskis et al. (2013) found that TFP 
contribution to value added growth over the period 1996 to 2009 is largest in goods 
producing industries in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia while in 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania efficiency gains are more important in services sector. 
A more detailed picture of contribution of individual industries to TFP growth is 
provided in Figure I.7 in Appendix I. 
 
In post crisis period TFP growth largely declined with the exception of Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland and Romania where growth was weak while contribution of capital remained 
strong largely due to investments in ICT (Alam et al., 2008).  Labour markets were 
largely affected in the Baltic countries, Croatia and Slovenia, thus contributing 
negatively after crisis due to lower labour force participation and reduction in working 
hours (van Ark et al., 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 The data on labour productivity at industry level are calculated only for 8 NMS due to unavailability of 
PPP indices in GGDC Productivity Level Database for Romania and Bulgaria, and the unavailability of 
data on output and employment hours at industry level for Croatia. 
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TABLE 3.1 GROWTH CONTRIBUTIONS OF SUPPLY SIDE FACTORS IN NMS, (%) 
 Labour Capital TFP GDP growth 
Country/ 
Period  
2000-
2007 
2008-
2013 
2000-
2007 
2008-
2013 
2000-
2007 
2008-
2013 
2000-
2007 
2008-
2013 
Bulgaria 1.01 -0.54 5.65 3.89 -1.06 -2.70 5.60 0.64 
Croatia 1.25 -1.21 2.42 1.72 0.74 -2.40 4.41 -1.90 
Czech R. 0.19 -0.08 2.34 1.59 2.03 -1.30 4.56 0.20 
Estonia 0.89 -1.23 2.82 0.95 3.87 -0.16 7.58 -0.44 
Hungary 0.31 -0.42 2.58 1.62 0.67 -2.02 3.56 -0.83 
Latvia  1.12 -2.88 5.33 0.91 1.62 0.37 8.07 -1.61 
Lithuania 0.99 -1.48 2.81 1.29 3.44 0.40 7.24 0.21 
Poland 0.24 0.11 1.87 2.68 1.88 0.19 4.00 2.98 
Romania -0.91 -0.40 0.66 0.73 5.74 0.35 5.49 0.68 
Slovakia 0.37 0.07 2.08 2.12 2.97 -0.45 5.41 1.74 
Slovenia 0.97 -1.40 1.92 0.99 1.41 -0.98 4.30 -1.38 
Source: Total Economy Database™; authors’ calculations. 
 
3.4 OVERVIEW OF FDI IN NEW MEMBER STATES 
 
In the early years of transition, FDI in NMS played only a marginal role in global and 
European FDI flows. Positive initial conditions were shown to have played an important 
role for attraction of FDI (Garibaldi et al., 2002). In later stages of transition, the main 
determinants of FDI were progress in structural reforms and privatisation of state owned 
enterprises (Campos and Kinoshita, 2008). In addition, MNCs were offered general 
incentives such as tax exemptions for varying periods, job creation benefits, training 
grants (UNCTAD, 2008).  
An important driving force of FDI in NMS which significantly influenced their 
development in comparison to other transition economies especially the CIS group, is 
attributed to Association agreements signed between EU-15 and CEECs in 1990s 
followed by signing of bilateral free trade agreements (FTA). The Association 
agreements have played an important role in motivating economic and structural reforms, 
liberalisation of trade and full convergence of their domestic systems to the EU’s “acquis 
communautaire” which include a comprehensive body of laws, rules and regulations that 
govern the EU (Kaminsky, 2006). By joining the EU single market, CEECs were able to 
benefit from trade based fragmentation of production which is one of the MNCs’ 
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characteristics. Furthermore, Association agreements allowed CEECs to refund to the 
exporters the duty paid on imported inputs. Hence, MNCs from outside the EU found 
CEECs useful to undertake horizontal FDI to overcome trade barriers whereas EU MNCs 
could move their production chain to establish export platform and benefit from low 
costs.  
 
3.4.1 COUNTRY ANALYSIS OF INWARD FDI 
After the early stages of transition, NMS were quite successful in attracting FDI, although 
there were considerable differences among countries. Those countries which have been 
frontrunners in economic and institutional reforms and open to foreign privatizations 
were the most successful in attracting FDI (Figure 3.6). Furthermore, the quality of 
human capital, low labour costs and favourable geographical location contributed further 
to the increase in FDI. For example, annual FDI inflows in NMS averaged roughly 5 
percent of GDP between 1995 and 2007, while their stock of inward FDI grew from 25 
percent of GDP in year 2000 to 50 percent in year 2014 (UNCTAD, 2014).  
 
FIGURE 3.6 ANNUAL FDI INFLOWS PER CAPITA IN GROUPS OF NMS, EUR 
Source: WIIW FDI Database 
Note: First wave: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Estonia; Second wave: Bulgaria, 
Romania, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania. Agenda 2000 announced in 1997 by European Council 
defined two waves 
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Figure 3.7 below shows a more detailed look of inward FDI. Out of total 675 billion USD 
of FDI that went to NMS the bulk of it (294 billion USD) was invested in period 2004-
2008 followed by significant decline at the onset of recent financial crisis. Although 
foreign investors quickly regained confidence and continued with their investment in 
subsequent period, the amount of FDI in comparison to pre-crisis period has been 
reduced with the exception of Hungary. 
FIGURE 3.7 ANNUAL FDI INFLOWS TO NMS, MILLIONS USD 
Source: UNCTAD FDI Database 
Note: Only countries which attracted more than 5 percent of total inward FDI in NMS are shown in order 
to make the graph clearer. Other countries (Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia) attracted 
95.5 billion USD of FDI between 1993-2014. 
 
FDI has been largely concentrated in several countries as shown in Figure 3.8. The largest 
recipients of FDI at the end of year 2014 are Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary 
followed by Romania and Slovakia. The first three countries account for 64 percent of 
total inward FDI stock in NMSs. On the other hand, the Baltic countries and Slovenia 
account less than 10 percent. 
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FIGURE 3.8 THE STOCK OF INWARD FDI IN NMS, MILLIONS USD, 2014 
Source: UNCTAD FDI Database 
 
However, once the size of the economy is taken into account, a somewhat different 
picture emerges as shown in Figure 3.9. Estonia stands out as top performer, followed by 
Hungary and Bulgaria. It seems that large countries such as Poland and Romania 
attracted large amount of FDI mainly due to the size of their market. One of the reasons 
for Bulgarian success in attracting FDI is related to EU accession as well as large scale 
privatisation (Kalotay, 2008). The strong positions of Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia can be attributed to their strong orientation to manufacturing sector and being 
recognized as fast reformers among NMS (Sohinger, 2005). The importance of FDI for 
NMS can also be gauged by analysing its share in Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
(GFCF). In all countries except Slovenia the share of FDI inflow in GFCF averaged 
above 14 percent suggesting an important contribution towards physical capital or 
provision of capital necessary for its purchase. The highest contributions are in Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Croatia and Lithuania. These ratios are remarkable knowing that a significant 
part of FDI is related to acquisitions through privatisation which may not necessarily lead 
to large scale fixed capital formation. However, given the old vintage of capital at the 
onset of transition, MNCs found it necessary to invest in new capital upon acquisition 
(Meyer and Estrin, 2001).  
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FIGURE 3.9 AVERAGE FDI INWARD STOCK (INFLOWS) AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP (GFCF) IN NMS, 
1995-2014 
Source: UNCTAD FDI Database 
 
In terms of mode of entry, Figure 3.10 shows the average value of greenfield and M&A 
projects in each country. All NMSs have attracted significantly more greenfield FDI in 
comparison to brownfield, although the latter played a more significant role in the 
privatisation process in early transition period. Poland and Romania attracted the major 
bulk of greenfield FDI, while the value of M&A deals is highest in Poland and the Czech 
Republic. A significant difference between these two modes is the content of local value 
added which may have also important implication for FDI spillovers and local sourcing. 
In the case of greenfield FDI, the local value added is low and technological 
sophistication is usually higher than in brownfield FDI, although they may converge in 
later stages when initial investment is followed by new investments (Fillipov and 
Kalotay, 2009).  
FIGURE 3.10 AVERAGE VALUE OF GREENFIELD AND M&A PROJECTS, MILLIONS USD (2003-2014) 
Source: UNCTAD FDI Database 
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3.4.2 CROSS INDUSTRY ANALYSIS OF FDI 
As established in the previous section, the size of FDI differs among NMSs, however its 
importance can be further analysed by looking at more disaggregated level. Figure 3.11 
and 3.12 show the change in sectoral shares of FDI stock in two major sectors of economy 
before and after the financial crisis. As can be seen from Figure 3.11, the share of 
manufacturing FDI rose less rapidly during the period 2004-2007 and was replaced by 
FDI in services reflecting the increasing trend of services liberalisation, second wave of 
privatisation and in general low levels of FDI in services in comparison to manufacturing.  
From early 2000s NMS emerged as locations for outsourcing of specific business 
functions as well as offshoring of corporate business functions (Fillipov and Kalotay, 
2009). The FDI in these shared service centres were especially developed in Hungary, 
Slovakia and Poland and attracted by good infrastructure, employees with good language 
and functional skills and relatively low labour costs (Ernst and Young, 2014). This led 
to the development of the business service sector providing administration, financial, 
customer care and services related to the software industry. Services liberalisation was 
also accompanied by the privatisation of network industries and the financial sector, 
greenfield entry into wholesale and retail trade as well as the opening of country’ real 
estate market to foreigners. 
FIGURE 3.11 PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF FDI STOCK IN NMS BETWEEN 2004-2007 
Source: Eurostat; authors’ calculations 
Note: Data for Croatia are not available in Eurostat Statistics for selected years. In case of Slovenia, 
change in FDI stock in manufacturing sector is equal to 1 percent and therefore is not visible on the 
graph. The classification of sectors is based on NACE Rev. 1.1 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Bulgaria Czech
Republic
Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovak
Republic
Slovenia
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 c
h
an
ge
Manufacturing Services
 
93 
FIGURE 3.12 PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF FDI STOCK IN THE NMS BETWEEN 2008-2012 
Source: Eurostat; authors’ calculations 
Note: The classification of sectors is based on NACE 2 
 
However, in the period after the crisis which caused a large decline in all countries which 
relied on export platform FDI, especially in industries such as automotive and electronics 
exposing the weakness in economic growth model of NMS based on consumption, 
reliance on consumer credit and FDI from Europe (Fillipov and Kalotay, 2009), the trend 
in most countries except Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia has been reversed and 
manufacturing FDI showed a strong increase (Figure 3.12). The strongest increase is 
evident in automotive, rubber and plastic, chemicals, and other transport equipment 
(Ernst and Young, 2014). Some countries such as Poland also received increase in R&D 
operations that suggests that foreign subsidiaries are increasing their functional scope 
and competences (Fillipov and Kalotay, 2009; Ernst and Young, 2014). The possible 
consequence is a shift from export platform based on low value added activities and 
assembly to high value added activities in GVC based on R&D. 
A more detailed analysis of distribution of FDI across manufacturing and service sectors 
is provided in Table 3.2 below. It must be noted that motives of FDI in these two sectors 
are somewhat different. The service sector is more of interest to market seeking investors 
and those wishing to optimized their costs. On the other hand, manufacturing FDI is 
mostly motivated by low input and production costs, highly skilled labour, and the Pan-
European agreement on the cumulation of the rules of origin (Jimboeran and Kelber, 
2014; Kaminski, 2006). This has created an environment in which not only efficiency 
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seeking investors, but also those involved in complex integrated production characterized 
by international fragmentation of production such as those in automotive and electronics 
sector (Kaminski, 2006) have been attracted. Other common factors affecting FDI in both 
sectors were geographical and cultural proximity and the privatisation process. 
According to Eurostat statistics the share of services in FDI stock in NMS at the end of 
year 2012 stood at around 63 percent, while manufacturing FDI accounted for 25 percent, 
the rest being distributed across construction, primary sector and utilities. Large inflows 
of services FDI went to financial intermediation (NACE 2, K) as a result of the 
privatisation of state owned banks, followed by investment in wholesale and retail trade 
(NACE 2, G) which accounted for 19 percent and real estate activities (NACE 2, L) 
accounting for 15 percent being largely driven by large share in Bulgaria. A closer look 
at country level reveals that large countries have been the host of significant FDI in 
wholesale and retail trade emphasizing market seeking motives. While Hungary attracted 
the least amount of FDI in financial intermediation (20%), on the other hand, Croatia and 
Slovenia attracted about 53 and 60 percent respectively of their total FDI in services. 
Hungary also differs from other countries by attracting large amount of FDI in 
Professional, scientific and technical activities (NACE 2, M) and administrative and 
support activities (NACE 2, N) reflecting increased interest of foreign investors in setting 
up shared service centres. In terms of attracting FDI in information and communication 
technology, Lithuania and Bulgaria emerge as clear frontrunners where the share stood 
around 15 percent. Successful attraction of FDI in services also led to subsequent 
investments in manufacturing. The largest number of investment projects in terms of 
value has been attracted by food industry (NACE 2, C10_12), coke and refined petroleum 
(NACE 2, C19), motor vehicles (NACE 2, C29) and basic and fabricated metals (NACE 
2, C24_25). A closer look at country level reveals significant differences. The Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania have attracted the largest amount of 
investment oriented to manufacturing of motor vehicles. Almost one third and one fifth 
of total manufacturing FDI in the Czech Republic and Slovakia went to this industry. 
Estonia, Hungary, Croatia and Lithuania also received a substantial amount of FDI in 
high tech sectors such as electronics (NACE 2, C26) or pharmaceuticals (NACE 2, C21). 
In Estonia and Latvia, most of manufacturing FDI went to wood processing, paper and 
publishing sectors (NACE 2, C16_18). 
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TABLE 3.2 SHARE OF INWARD FDI STOCK ACROSS INDUSTRIES AND COUNTRIES, 2012 
COUNTRY CODE BG HR CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI 
INDUSTRY   % SHARE OF MANUFACTURING 
Manufacture of food products; 
beverages and tobacco products 
14 8 10 15 12 16 10 19 12 6 4 
Manufacture of textiles and 
wearing apparel 
4 3 1 5 1 3 4 1 4 1 2 
Manufacture of wood, paper, 
printing and reproduction 
3 2 4 20 5 26 6 8 7 4 11 
Manufacture of coke and 
refined petroleum products 
22 40 1 0 0 0 33 0 7 10 0 
Manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products 
8 2 4 13 4 2 16 7 5 4 7 
Manufacture of basic 
pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations 
0 16 2 2 13 1 12 3 2 0 25 
Manufacture of rubber and 
plastic products 
2 1 7 2 7 1 3 9 7 7 10 
Manufacture of basic metals 
and fabricated metal products, 
except machinery and 
equipment 
18 3 11 7 8 4 1 13 16 18 5 
Manufacture of computer, 
electronic and optical products 
1 2 3 10 14 0 0 3 2 7 3 
Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. 
6 2 8 2 3 1 1 4 6 9 6 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers 
2 1 30 5 15 4 1 14 15 22 8 
Manufacture of other transport 
equipment 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 3 2 0 0 
Other manufacturing  19 19 17 20 17 40 10 18 16 13 17 
Total manufacturing 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
INDUSTRY  % SHARE OF SERVICES 
Wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
16 14 20 17 16 21 19 24 24 21 22 
Transportation and storage 1 1 5 8 3 7 3 2 3 0 1 
Accommodation and food 
service activities 
4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Information and communication 15 11 9 4 8 5 15 7 10 8 3 
Financial and insurance 
activities 
27 53 40 33 20 43 31 42 39 47 60 
Real estate activities 26 7 15 22 9 19 20 12 11 13 9 
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities 
6 8 8 12 37 2 9 10 7 7 3 
Administrative and support 
service activities 
3 1 1 4 7 1 2 2 3 3 1 
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 
0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Other service activities 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Total services 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Eurostat; authors’ calculations 
Note: Industry classification is based on NACE 2 
 
One of the major factors affecting the success of automotive and electronics industry in 
attracting FDI was the revolution in ICT which reduced coordination and transportation 
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costs and completely revolutionised MNCs’ operations where vertical integration was 
replaced by complex and geographically dispersed supply chains (Kaminski, 2006). 
These chains also include support services. Substantial evidence points out that without 
MNC’s involvement most of local firms in electronics and automotive industry would 
have disappeared from the market (World Bank, 2003; Szanyi, 2004; Kaminski, 2006). 
The increased presence and export orientation of FDI was crucial in the shift to higher 
value added activities, modernisation of industries, export growth and the change of 
export structure towards more skilled labour and capital intensive products (Kaminski, 
2006; Welfens and Borbly 2006; Kutan and Vuksic, 2007; Damijan et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, the evidence points out that the entry of large MNCs has attracted 
sequential investment of other global MNCs as well as foreign suppliers in order to be 
closer to their customers. Some of these MNCs modernized local suppliers and enabled 
them to enter GVCs by creating backward linkages, thus making them less likely to move 
abroad and divest (Javorcik and Kaminski, 2004; Kaminski, 2006).  
 
3.5 IMPACT OF FDI ON NMS ECONOMIES 
 
Policy makers have argued that FDI could play a significant role in the economic 
recovery of NMS after the initial transition shock (Carlin and Landesmann, 1997; Jensen, 
2006). Based on the proposition of endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1986, 1990; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1997; Grossman and Helpman, 1991) in which FDI is seen as a 
bundle of knowledge and technology it is argued that the former can influence economic 
growth through direct and indirect technology transfer resulting in enhanced level of 
human capital, better quality of products and improvement in the technology systems 
(UNECE, 2001). Due to increased availability of data in 2000s a significant amount of 
research has been undertaken to explore whether FDI has caused economic growth and 
its role in productivity convergence in NMS. FDI was seen as the main vehicle of 
economic restructuring, technology diffusion and increased export competitiveness 
(Damijan and Rojec, 2007; Bijsterbosch and Kolasa, 2009). In a recent meta-analysis 
Iwasaki and Tokunaga (2014) found that CEE and FSU countries benefited from FDI 
which is 1.86 times larger in terms of its impact on growth than the world average. Figure 
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3.13 shows the growth of GDP in relation to cumulative FDI inflows/GDP ratio. Overall, 
simple correlation suggests a positive relationship. However, it must be noted that other 
factors may have contributed to GDP growth as well and, further, FDI and growth may 
be endogenously determined. 
FIGURE 3.13 GROWTH OF GDP AND RATIO OF FDI STOCK TO GDP(PPP) 
 
Source: UNCTAD FDI Database and World Development Indicators; author’s calculations 
Note: Data on GDP for Lithuania are missing for years before 2005 and therefore country is excluded 
from the figure. GDP growth refers to period 1996-2013. FDI stock and GDP(PPP) refer to year 2013. 
 
In section 3.3 it was shown that the growth of productivity in NMS by and large exceeded 
those experienced in most advanced economies of EU-15 and was the most important 
contributing factor to GDP growth in the pre-crisis period. However, the gaps in levels 
of productivity are still relatively large at both national and industry levels. The recent 
financial crisis has shown that the growth of CEECs based on FDI, export and private 
consumption may not be enough for sustainable economic growth. Kutan and Yigit 
(2008) found effect of R&D on industry productivity growth in CEECs to be insignificant 
due to their relatively low levels. Kravtsova and Radosevic (2012) argue that TFP growth 
is mostly driven by production capabilities based on passive learning and the import of 
knowledge from abroad, thus limiting further economic growth. They found that levels 
of productivity in transition countries are lower than expected given their production 
capabilities and latter does not translate to innovative capability. Hence technical change, 
which is necessary for the rapid catching up process, generation of new knowledge and 
improvements in absorptive capacity, is limited. 
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The aim of this section is to shed more light on the direct role of FDI as the latter provides 
necessary technology, management techniques, know-how, finance for acquisition of 
new equipment and market access which are assumed to lead to better resource 
reallocation across and within industries, industrial and export restructuring and 
increased productivity. The direct importance of FDI can be measured by the share of 
foreign affiliates in employment, value added, turnover and productivity premium. For 
this purpose, we rely on Eurostat Foreign Affiliates Statistics (FATS).  Given that the 
database has incomplete information, the year 2003 and 2011 are taken as the reference 
years.  
 
3.5.1 SHARE OF FOREIGN AFFILIATES IN EMPLOYMENT  
As can be seen from Figure 3.14 the share of foreign affiliates in employment of total 
business economy has grown between two periods. 13F14 Countries in which employment 
share is significant are the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary which also received 
relatively large amount of FDI in general. The increasing role of foreign affiliates in total 
employment can be observed in Slovakia and Romania where the shares increased by 11 
and 9 percent, respectively. 
FIGURE 3.14 SHARE OF FATS IN TOTAL DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT OF BUSINESS ECONOMY 
Source: Eurostat FATS statistics and SBS statistics; authors’ calculations 
Note: Data for Croatia and Poland are not available. Employment data for Lithuania refer to year 2004; 
for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic. and Hungary year 2006; for Slovenia year 2010.  
                                                 
14 For data in year 2003 NACE 1.1 Rev. was used while data for 2011 refer to NACE 2 industry 
classification. Total business economy in year 2003 includes industry codes C-K_X_J while in year 2011 
due to change in NACE classification the following industry codes were used, B-N_S95_X_K.  
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A closer look at the industry level at Table 3.3 reveals that in year 2011 share of FATS 
in ICT and manufacturing sector was 31 percent on average. Other industries where 
FATS employment share is significant are utilities (22 percent); mining and quarrying 
(24 percent), administrative and support activities (19 percent) and wholesale and retail 
trade (18 percent). The smallest share is evident in construction (6 percent) and 
transportation and storage (9 percent). 
 
TABLE 3.3 SHARE OF FOREIGN AFFILIATES IN INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT IN %, 2011 
 BG HR CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI 
Accommodation and food 
service activities 
8 7 12 17 11 16 9 9 7 6 7 
Administrative and support 
service activities 
10 \ 26 38 19 24 16 13 21 18 22 
Construction 6 2 8 7 7 5 6 6 5 6 4 
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 
28 \ 21 13 51 16 28 8 23 55 1 
Information and 
communication 
36 \ 43 40 35 29 35 27 45 42 13 
Manufacturing 23 14 42 36 47 22 22 28 37 47 21 
Mining and quarrying 20 \ 49 9 26 47 28 2 42 32 7 
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities 
12 5 13 7 11 14 13 9 18 12 5 
Real estate activities 12 13 9 \ 14 6 7 3 15 21 6 
Transportation and storage 7 6 14 10 11 12 6 8 7 12 8 
Water supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remediation 
activities 
7 4 35 \ 9 19 3 7 10 19 4 
Wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
10 15 25 21 24 25 15 14 16 15 19 
Source: Eurostat FATS statistics 
 
3.5.2 SHARE OF FOREIGN AFFILIATES IN VALUE ADDED AND TURNOVER  
The share of FATS in total domestic business sector’ value added is even higher than its 
share in employment. Figure 3.15 shows that FATS contribute between one third and one 
half of total value added created in NMS with the exception of Croatia and Slovenia. 
Regarding the share of turnover shown in Figure 3.16 the share of FATS is highest in 
Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Romania where foreign affiliates contribute 
more than one third or in some countries even one half of total turnover. 
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FIGURE 3.15 SHARE OF FATS IN TOTAL VALUE ADDED OF BUSINESS ECONOMY 
Source: Eurostat FATS statistics and SBS statistics; authors’ calculations 
Note: Data for Croatia for year 2003 is not available. Value added data for Lithuania and Poland refer 
to year 2004 and 2007, respectively.  
 
 
FIGURE  3.16  SHARE OF FATS IN TOTAL TURNOVER OF BUSINESS ECONOMY 
 
 
Source: Eurostat FATS statistics and SBS statistics; authors’ calculations 
Note: Data for Croatia for year 2003 is not available. Turnover data for Lithuania and Poland refer to 
year 2004 and 2007, respectively.  
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As was the case with employment figures, foreign affiliates make an important 
contribution in manufacturing and ICT industries with over 50 percent of 
turnover attributed to them. Other industries in which FATS contribute 
significantly to turnover are: mining and quarrying (37 percent), wholesale and 
retail trade (34 percent), utilities (33 percent), real estate activities (25 percent) 
and administration and support activities (24 percent). Regarding individual 
member states, FATS are an important contributor to manufacturing turnover in 
the Czech Republic (66 percent), Slovakia (78 percent), Hungary (69 percent) 
and Romania (60 percent). In general, the effects of FDI are substantial, but 
differ among countries reflecting their initial conditions, differences in policies 
towards FDI, their industrial structures, different levels of FDI penetration and 
their motives, prospects related to their productivity and technology catch up, 
institutional transformation and future profitability perceived by MNCs.  
TABLE  3.4 SHARE OF FATS IN TURNOVER AT INDUSTRY LEVEL IN %, 2011 
  BG HR CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI 
Accommodation and food service 
activities 
14 13 19 22 21 28 13 14 14 8 8 
Administrative and support service 
activities 
14 \ 29 25 31 35 32 23 30 25 21 
Construction 21 5 19 11 17 11 13 19 15 24 5 
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 
33 \ 37 22 70 29 43 13 48 64 6 
Information and communication 54 \ 63 60 67 37 61 48 68 62 25 
Manufacturing 53 23 66 54 69 31 58 44 60 78 30 
Mining and quarrying 42 \ 58 17 54 51 41 3 67 60 9 
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities 
31 13 23 6 32 28 24 18 34 22 10 
Real estate activities 33 26 28 \ 30 27 33 6 41 29 17 
Transportation and storage 18 10 25 16 32 23 15 16 16 27 13 
Water supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remediation 
activities 
28 8 38 \ 21 18 20 15 31 22 12 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles 
29 27 40 20 45 48 29 26 40 34 31 
Source: Eurostat FATS statistics 
Note: Industry classification is based on NACE 2 
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3.5.3 THE ROLE OF FATS IN TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING AND 
PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS 
The productivity catch-up and structural change in NMS much depended on the 
restructuring of their manufacturing industries. Given the importance of foreign affiliates 
in selected indicators analysed in the previous subsections, an important question is how 
these large inflows of foreign capital affected the competitiveness of the manufacturing 
sector, especially the shift from low to high value added industries. For this purpose, we 
first compare the penetration of foreign affiliates across different technology groups 
presented in Table 3.5. Manufacturing industries have been classified into four groups: 
high-tech; medium-high-tech; medium-low-tech; and low-tech according to OECD 
(2007b) classification.  
By the end of 2011, the number of enterprises in high and medium tech industries 
remained below those in other groups. However, when comparing the share of turnover, 
value added and employment, FATS in high and medium technology groups contribute 
significantly more than the low technology group. For example, the dominance of foreign 
affiliates is especially pronounced in Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
where more than three quarters of foreign affiliates’ turnover is earned in high tech and 
medium high tech industries. In contrast, in Croatia and Lithuania foreign firms’ turnover 
is more concentrated in low technology industries. The same picture emerges when 
comparing the share of high tech and medium high tech foreign affiliates in employment. 
In all countries, but Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia foreign affiliates in these technology 
groups employ the majority of employees indicating their superior size. In terms of value 
added FATS in Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic are clear frontrunners 
in creating value added in high tech and medium high tech industries. Finally, when 
comparing labour productivity of each technology group with average manufacturing 
productivity, results point out that FATS in high tech group are the driving force of 
manufacturing productivity. However, the results are more heterogeneous across 
countries. For instance, in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, foreign affiliates in medium 
high and medium low industries have the highest levels of productivity. Similarly, in 
Croatia and Bulgaria and to certain extent in Latvia, low tech industries are the main 
drivers of productivity. 
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TABLE 3.5  SHARE OF DIFFERENT TECHNOLOGY GROUPS IN VARIOUS FEATURES OF FOREIGN 
AFFILIATES , 2011 
 BG HR CZ EE HU LV LT PO RO SK SI 
 Number of enterprises (% of total) 
High tech 3 4 5 9 6 3 4 4 6 6 5 
Medium high 13 20 28 19 25 18 15 26 22 32 19 
Medium low 24 37 39 23 31 34 27 38 31 39 43 
Low 60 39 28 49 39 45 55 31 41 23 33 
 Turnover (% of total) 
High tech 10 0 25 72 52 3 8 23 19 28 11 
Medium high 23 39 47 13 33 19 46 41 42 50 54 
Medium low 52 24 24 6 10 27 19 22 27 18 29 
Low 15 37 5 9 5 52 28 15 11 4 6 
 Employment (% of total) 
High tech 16  15 50 40 5 7  15 16 6 
Medium high 32  47 23 35 32 23  50 52 48 
Medium low 23  30 9 16 28 24  19 24 28 
Low 29  7 18 9 36 46  17 8 18 
 Value added (% of total)  
High tech 16 0 11 52 41 4 5 18 14 18 14 
Medium high 26 31 51 23 41 20 45 40 37 49 49 
Medium low 40 32 31 9 13 30 17 26 32 26 30 
Low 18 37 7 15 6 45 33 16 17 7 6 
 Labour productivity (% of manufacturing average) 
High tech 92 0 99 105 152 110 72 119 132 136 66 
Medium high 82 90 105 106 110 71 173 87 97 89 118 
Medium low 160 108 106 96 79 114 70 95 102 95 128 
Low 66 102 90 93 59 106 85 99 69 79 89 
Source: Eurostat FATS statistics; author’s calculations 
Note: Employment data for Croatia and Poland are missing while for Slovenia year 2010 is taken as a 
reference year for employment. For Romania data on labour productivity and value added in medium 
low and low technology industries are taken from year 2008. Data for Croatian high tech industries are 
missing for all indicators. Labour productivity is calculated as gross value added per person employed. 
 
The analysis of specialisation and industrial structure by technology intensity of FATS 
shows that although foreign affiliates are mostly concentrated in low technology 
industries, their contribution to total foreign turnover, employment and productivity of 
low technology groups is much lower than those located in high tech and medium high 
tech industries. The next step is to analyse the contribution of foreign affiliates to industry 
restructuring by comparing them with domestic enterprises. Figures 3.17, 3.18, 3.19 and 
3.20 provide information on share of FATS in total domestic turnover, employment, 
value added and productivity premium by technology intensity of manufacturing 
industries for year 2011. As can be seen from Figure 3.17, FATS contribute an important 
share to manufacturing turnover which is especially pronounced in high tech industries.  
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For example, in Estonia 95 percent of turnover in high tech industries is accounted by 
FATS, followed by Slovakia at 48 percent, Hungary at 46 percent and the Czech 
Republic at 43 percent.  Given relatively low share of high tech FATS in total number of 
firms in this technology group (ranging between 5 and 15 percent with the exception of 
Estonia where share is slightly above 20 percent), their contribution is significant. Similar 
results hold in terms of value added and employment shown below. The share of FATS’ 
turnover, value added and employment in other technology groups is more in line with 
their share in total number of firms. The notable exceptions are Slovakia and Slovenia in 
terms of employment where FATS generate several times more jobs in medium low and 
low tech industries and in terms of value added and turnover in medium low tech 
industries in Slovakia and the Czech Republic respectively. In general, the more 
sophisticated is the industry, the higher is the share of FATS in each of the indicator 
clearly demonstrating the role of latter in upgrading of technological structure.  
FIGURE  3.17 FATS SHARE OF TURNOVER IN TOTAL DOMESTIC ECONOMY IN DIFFERENT 
TECHNOLOGY GROUPS, 2011 
Source: Eurostat FATS and SBS statistics; authors’ calculations 
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FIGURE  3.18 FATS SHARE OF VALUE ADDED IN TOTAL DOMESTIC ECONOMY BY TECHNOLOGY 
INTENSITY, 2011 
 
Source: Eurostat FATS and SBS statistics; authors’ calculations 
Note: For Romania value added data for medium low and low tech industries are for year 2008 
 
FIGURE  3.19 FATS SHARE OF EMPLOYMENT IN TOTAL DOMESTIC ECONOMY BY TECHNOLOGY 
INTENSITY, 2011 
Source: Eurostat FATS and SBS statistics; authors’ calculations 
Note: For Slovenia employment data are for year 2010; Data for Croatia and Poland are not available 
 
The growing role of FATS over the years can be assumed to bring also technological 
improvements and increased productivity for the manufacturing industry and whole 
economy. One way to gauge their contribution is to compare levels of productivity with 
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advantage over domestic firms in the 2003-2011 period. Labour productivity premium 
has even increased between the two periods with the exception of Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovakia. The largest differences exist in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia while smallest 
one is evident in Estonia and Romania. 
FIGURE 3.20 FATS LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PREMIUM  
Source: Eurostat FATS and SBS statistics; authors’ calculations 
Note: For Lithuania and Poland data on labour productivity are for years 2004 and 2007, respectively. 
Labour productivity is measured as vale added per person employed. 
 
A more detailed look at the industry level reveals that in year 2011, significant 
differences in productivity between foreign and domestic firms still existed. Table 3.6 
below shows that on average FATS are three times more productive than domestic firms 
in real estate sectors, followed by construction sectors (2.08 times), and hospitality sector 
(1.88 times). Looking at manufacturing sector only, the highest gaps are observed in 
Lithuania and Bulgaria at 1.83 and 1.81 times, respectively. The lowest gaps on the other 
hand are observed in Slovenia (1.24), Estonia (1.26) and Slovakia (1.31). A closer look 
at technology intensity groups of manufacturing industries presented in Figure 3.21 
reveals that mostly low tech industries are lagging further behind in labour productivity. 
However, there are considerable differences among countries. For instance, while in 
Bulgaria and Latvia medium low and low tech industries have significant gaps, their high 
tech industries are more competitive and in Latvia they are even more productive than 
FATS. On the other hand, countries which received significant FDI in high tech 
industries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia exhibit higher gaps 
in those industries than in medium high or in certain cases in medium low industries as 
well. 
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TABLE 3.6 RATIO OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY OF FOREIGN TO DOMETIC FIRM BY INDUSTRY, 2011 
 BG HR CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI 
Accommodation 
and food service activities 
2.08 2.33 1.89 1.36 2.27 1.76 1.77 2.08 2.40 1.58 1.18 
Administrative and 
support service activities 
1.98 2.32 1.43 0.84 2.21 1.77 1.85 1.95 1.82 1.67 1.10 
Construction 
2.29 1.77 2.10 1.12 2.35 2.59 1.62 2.66 3.21 2.27 0.86 
Electricity, gas, steam and 
air conditioning supply 
1.42 / 0.87 1.26 1.09 1.40 1.41 1.58 1.31 1.00 1.69 
Information and 
communication 
1.65 2.00 1.55 1.54 2.11 1.28 1.88 1.85 1.62 1.48 1.55 
Manufacturing 
1.81 1.58 1.40 1.26 1.40 1.62 1.83 1.64 1.46 1.31 1.24 
Mining and quarrying 
2.46 / 1.10 1.23 2.11 1.05 1.26 0.78 0.00 2.07 0.68 
Professional, scientific 
and technical activities 
2.34 1.91 1.69 1.32 3.02 1.96 1.79 2.12 1.92 1.60 1.87 
Real estate activities 
3.31 1.88 4.35 0.00 2.86 3.74 6.13 2.47 3.09 1.10 4.16 
Transportation and storage 
1.79 1.51 1.76 2.41 2.88 1.60 1.71 1.48 1.45 1.01 0.80 
Water supply; sewerage, 
waste management and 
remediation activities 
2.95 1.14 1.23 0.00 1.32 0.72 1.43 1.30 2.14 0.92 2.10 
Wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 
2.15 1.49 1.60 1.10 2.00 1.73 1.86 2.13 2.15 1.37 1.52 
Source: Eurostat FATS and SBS statistics: author’s calculations 
Note: Labour productivity is expressed as gross value added per person employed. 
 
FIGURE 3.21 RATIO OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY FOR FOREIGN TO DOMESTIC FIRM BY 
TECHNOLOGY INTENSITY GROUP OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 2011  
Source: Eurostat and SBS statistics; author’s calculations  
Note: Labour productivity is expressed as gross value added per person employed; data for Croatia for 
high tech industries are not available. 
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3.6 FDI AND INTEGRATION OF NMS INTO GVC 
 
As mentioned in Section 3.3 trade liberalisation of NMS was one of the transformation 
priorities towards market economy. The reorientation of trade towards more developed 
economies of EU resulted in increased economic growth and development (Blanchard, 
1998). By the end of 2012 over 70 percent of foreign trade was conducted with the EU 
states with Germany being the main trading partner for most NMS (Cieslik, 2014). The 
trade integration with European and other more developed economies resulted in 
structural change of NMS’s exports. Figure 3.22 shows the contribution of various 
sectors grouped into five main categories to total export growth in the period 1995-2010. 
Countries which received large amount of FDI in knowledge intensive and capital 
manufacturing sectors such as transport and electrical equipment, machinery, motor 
vehicles and chemical industry (see Table 3.2) also show significant export growth in 
these sectors which is in line with recent empirical analysis by Damijan et al. (2013b, 
2013c), finding that FDI contribute significantly to export supply capacity and export 
restructuring in all manufacturing industries. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia knowledge intensive sectors account between 40 and 60 percent of total exports, 
the rest being accounted by capital intensive industries. Croatia and Slovenia on the other 
hand experienced a significant growth in export of services accounting a third of total 
export growth.  
 
FIGURE 3.22 SECTORAL CONTRIBUTION TO EXPORT GROWTH IN %, 1995-2010  
 
Source: OECD TiVA database; authors’ calculations  
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Given that imports of intermediate products became an important determinant of export 
performance, Beltramello et al. (2012) argue that looking only at the evolution of exports 
of final products may misrepresent international competitiveness of countries. The 
shortcomings of trade statistics in countries which are heavily involved in re-export of 
intermediates products after initial processing is that export tend to be highly inflated and 
do not capture domestic value added (IMF, 2013). Trade transformation enabled NMS 
to participate in GVC and become an important link in the European production model 
(Dicken et al., 2001; IMF, 2013). One of the main features which enabled NMS to 
become increasingly involved in GVC are large inflows of foreign investment. The 
increased fragmentation and geographical dispersion of production is the main feature of 
MNCs seeking efficiency gains. The latter can be achieved by sourcing inputs either from 
domestic or foreign suppliers within or outside the firm boundary leading to outsourcing 
and offshoring of certain functions. MNCs are the main coordinators of GVC and most 
of worlds’ trade in intermediate and final products is occurring as intra firm trade within 
MNCs (OECD, 2013).  
 
In order to evaluate the role of FDI in participation of NMS in GVC gross exports are 
decomposed into five main categories following the work of Koopman et al. (2011). 
Figure I.1 in Appendix I shows the components of this decomposition which are 
calculated for manufacturing and service industries. In general, participation in value 
chain can be decomposed according to the origin of the value added embodied in exports. 
Backward participation is measured as the share of foreign value added in gross exports 
while forward participation is measured as share of domestic value added in inputs used 
in partner country’s export. The OECD TiVA database which has recently become 
available is based on this approach. The first indicator which can shed some light on the 
participation of NMS in GVC is the evolution of domestic value added in gross exports 
shown in Figure 3.23. Between 1995 and 2011 we can observe a decrease in domestic 
value added in almost all countries with the exception of Estonia, Croatia and Lithuania 
indicating that at the same time the share of foreign value added has increased, thus 
contributing to creation of linkages with global supply networks. 
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FIGURE 3.23 DOMESTIC VALUE ADDED SHARE IN COUNTRY EXPORT, %  
Source: OECD TiVa Database  
 
The participation in GVC is measured as the sum of forward and backward participation 
indices as shown in Figure 3.24. As can be seen, all countries with the exception of 
Bulgaria experienced an increase in GVC’s participation in two periods of observation. 
The largest increase was experienced in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.  
FIGURE 3.24  PARTICIPATION OF NMS IN GVC 
Source: OECD TiVA Database 
Note: GVC participation is defined as the sum of the foreign value added (FVA) embodied in a country’s 
exports and the indirect value-added (IVA) exports (i.e. value of inputs produced domestically that are 
used in other countries’ exports) expressed as a percentage of gross exports. 
Data for Croatia are not available due to lack of data on backward and forward participation indices. 
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The increased participation in GVC can be attributed to increased FDI inflows. For 
example, it is expected that export platform and complex vertical type FDI attracted by 
core NMS such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland can increase 
backward participation by importing a large share of intermediates for export processing. 
Foreign affiliates have thus become an important link in GVC as they produce inputs for 
neighbouring markets and other downstream affiliates in the same MNC’ network 
(OECD, 2007a). Figure 3.25 shows that FDI has been a major driver of GVC’s 
participation in NMS. This is especially emphasized in economies which attracted large 
amount of FDI such as core NMS, thus contributing to technology content of their 
exports. 
 
FIGURE 3.25 CORRELATION BETWEEN FDI  STOCK AND GVC PARTICPATION OF NMS 
Source: OECD TiVA Database and Eurostat; author’s calculations 
 
A more detailed look at the industry level presented in Figure 3.26 reveals that FDI stock 
in industry j averaged across countries has positively contributed to GVC participation 
of high tech and medium high tech manufacturing industries. In addition, FDI in services 
also positively contributed to increased GVC participation in transport and 
telecommunications industries and wholesale and retail trade emphasizing the increasing 
role of services in the export of these countries. This can be explained by improvements 
in ICT, infrastructure and reduced transportation costs which contributed to tradability 
of services and their increasing role as input to manufacturing production process.  
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FIGURE 3.26 CORRELATION BETWEEN FDI STOCK AND GVC PARTICPATION OF INDUSTRIES, 
2009  
 
Source: OECD TiVA Database and Eurostat; author’s calculations 
 
Although previous figure shows a positive correlation between FDI stock and GVC’s 
participation it says nothing about the gains of this participation. As already emphasized 
earlier in this section GVC participation can be decomposed to forward and backward 
linkages and higher are the forward linkages, higher are the gains from GVC. Figure 3.27 
shows that most countries have gained from participation in GVC with the exception of 
countries which heavily relied on manufacturing sector, thus deteriorating their position 
in GVCs by moving even further to more downstream markets. However, in total all 
countries are more involved in downstream segments of the markets characterised by 
processing and assembly functions. 
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FIGURE 3.27 RELATIVE POSTION OF COUNTRIES IN GVC IN 1995 AND 2009  
 
Source: OECD TiVA Database; author’s calculations 
Note: The borderline between upstream and downstream segments in GVCs is represented by thick black 
line at the value of 1. The thick line represents the net gains from participating in GVCs. The value 
larger than 1 implies that country is involved in more upstream markets characterised by high value 
added of exports.  
 
 
A more detailed look at the industry level in Table 3.7 reveals that increase in 
forward/backward ratio indicating the net gains from GVCs’ participation is driven by 
service industries, thus reflecting changes in the production phases where activities such 
as R&D and design of products in preproduction phase and marketing and distribution 
in post-production phase have increased their contribution in value added. This is in line 
with analysis by Francois and Worz (2008) who found that services are most important 
factor contributing to final exports in OECD countries.  
 
TABLE 3.7  RELATIVE POSITION OF COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRIES IN GVC, 2009  
 CZ EE HU PO SK SI BG LV LT RO 
  MANUFACTURING 
Agriculture 1.16 0.96 0.68 1.15 1.18 0.92 0.78 0.99 0.52 1.67 
Mining and quarrying 2.76 5.12 1.25 3.80 3.97 4.29 3.97 2.60 / 5.95 
Food products and 
beverages 
0.15 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.82 
Textiles, leather and 
footwear 
0.28 0.08 0.17 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.11 
Wood, paper, paper 
products, printing and 
publishing 
0.69 0.36 0.51 0.76 0.61 0.47 0.30 0.47 0.66 1.11 
Chemicals and non-
metallic mineral 
products 
0.52 0.45 0.43 0.51 0.27 0.40 0.16 0.49 0.19 0.57 
Basic metals and 
fabricated metal 
products 
0.73 0.54 0.69 0.87 0.72 0.67 0.47 0.51 0.66 0.81 
Machinery and 
equipment n.e.c 
0.43 0.27 0.26 0.43 0.25 0.28 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.56 
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Electrical and optical 
equipment 
0.13 0.41 0.13 0.27 0.04 0.28 0.29 0.18 0.34 0.84 
Transport equipment 0.29 0.14 0.28 0.17 0.16 0.05 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.35 
Manufacturing n.e.c; 
recycling 
0.26 0.09 0.22 0.24 0.10 0.33 0.21 0.13 0.10 0.25 
 SERVICES 
Electricity, gas and 
water supply 
2.30 1.21 0.83 4.13 5.39 1.70 0.61 3.02 0.80 3.01 
Construction 1.83 0.54 0.66 0.97 3.78 0.87 0.60 1.88 1.52 2.43 
Wholesale and retail 
trade; hotels and 
restaurants 
7.49 5.02 1.36 11.7 4.66 4.67 0.85 4.07 2.59 3.18 
Transport and storage; 
post and 
telecommunications 
2.22 0.56 1.31 1.53 1.90 0.80 0.72 1.93 1.73 2.42 
Financial 
intermediation 
6.35 2.32 8.45 5.79 4.86 5.38 4.48 2.91 17.95 8.05 
Business services 2.45 3.91 2.85 4.70 5.49 3.83 7.31 2.97 11.42 2.82 
Source: OECD TiVA database; author’s calculation 
Note: The numbers in the table represent the ratio of forward over backward linkages. The higher is the 
ratio the higher is the net gain from GVC participation and therefore industry j is more involved in 
upstream markets. 
 
In order to share more light on the role of FDI in the participation of industries in 
upstream and downstream markets, Figures 3.28 and 3.29 plot the backward/forward 
participation index against the FDI stock in industry j averaged across countries, 
including the average fitted line. As can be seen, a positive correlation between FDI stock 
and forward participation and negative one with backward participation indicates that 
FDI is sourcing the value added from host country markets for export to third countries. 
However, there is a large heterogeneity among industries. In manufacturing industries 
such as electronics and optical industry, transport equipment, chemicals and manufacture 
of basic and fabricated metals, where FDI stock is relatively high, domestic industries 
are more downstream oriented indicating that foreign firms source most of their 
intermediates from abroad. Although some of these manufacturing industries also have 
high forward participation indicating high involvement in intermediates trade through 
supply chains the gains from GVC’s participation are limited mostly to activities related 
to mid and low processing and less to high tech manufacturing. However, Ciezlik (2014) 
found that the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Romania rank in top 10 
countries in upstream segments of transport equipment indicating an important role 
played by FDI in their contribution to exports. Some of these countries also hold a strong 
position in upstream segment of electrical and optical equipment indicating their high 
technological specialisation. On the other hand, it seems that FDI has contributed more 
to services GVC’ participation, especially in transport and telecommunications, 
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wholesale and retail trade and business services suggesting a movement towards 
upstream segment of GVCs with higher value added, thus reinforcing the argument made 
by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994) that MNCs are more likely to perform coordination 
and control functions where higher profits are realised. 
 
FIGURE 3.28 CORRELATION BETWEEN FDI STOCK AND BACKWARD PARTICIPATION IN GVC PER 
INDUSTRY, 2009 
Source: OECD TiVA Database and Eurostat; author’s calculations 
 
FIGURE 3.29 CORRELATION BETWEEN FDI STOCK AND FORWARD PARTICIPATION IN GVC PER 
INDUSTRY, 2009 
 
Source: OECD TiVA Database and Eurostat; author’s calculations 
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3.7 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter the development of FDI in NMS in the course of transition to a market 
economy and thereafter was reviewed. The analysis showed that the fast increase in FDI 
in these countries is the result of coinciding favourable investor specific and host country 
conditions.  The speed of structural reforms characterised by opening to trade and capital 
flows, privatisation policies and signing of EAs led to strong increase in FDI.  MNCs 
exploited the opportunity to enter new market and satisfy local demand. Furthermore, 
privatisation provided a unique opportunity to acquire former SOEs which had a high 
quality workforce and significant market share on domestic market. All countries were 
in need of new capital and technology while providing market access and cheap assets to 
foreign investors. In the early period of transition, FDI was mainly market seeking in 
nature. However, when the restructuring of domestic firms acquired by foreign investors 
was mainly over, efficiency seeking and complex type of FDI prevailed and export 
demand became the major driving force of manufacturing FDI, while investors with 
market seeking motive started to emerge in services sector. However, there is still large 
heterogeneity among countries in terms of their attractiveness for FDI which is reflected 
in the structure of FDI across industries and contribution to economic development. 
Factors such as government stance towards privatisation, speed of structural reforms, 
expected profitability of MNCs and prospects for EU membership explain why some 
countries were more successful than others in their integration into world markets.  
The service sector attracted the largest share of FDI in all countries due to the 
underdevelopment of this sector under socialism, the potential for high returns on 
investment and the liberalisation and privatisation of the financial industry, 
telecommunications and greenfield investment in wholesale and retail trade. The 
attractiveness of services was also influenced by the need of MNCs to outsource or 
offshore specific business functions in order to benefit from educated labour force, 
functional skills and relatively low labour costs.  Manufacturing FDI is concentrated in 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland and Slovakia which attracted relatively 
large amount of FDI in high tech and medium high tech industries in comparison to other 
NMS. This has dramatically changed their trade patterns and led to the successful 
restructuring and the shift to high value added activities resulting in increased 
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international competitiveness. The efficiency seeking FDI accompanied by more 
complex forms of investments in network industries enabled these countries to enter the 
production fragmentation process and domestic firms to enter GVCs. However, the 
integration in GVC has mainly been associated with processing and assembly of foreign 
intermediates, thus providing limited gains especially in manufacturing industries. In 
contrast, the service sector is involved in more upstream activities with high value added. 
The analysis of the direct contribution of foreign affiliates has found their increasing role 
in employment, turnover and value added activities across all countries. Their 
contribution to these indicators is especially pronounced in manufacturing and certain 
service industries such as ICT, administrative and support activities and wholesale and 
retail trade. In general, the higher is the sophistication of industries, the larger is the 
contribution of foreign firms. The analysis of productivity levels between foreign firms 
and the rest of economy indicates the superiority of the former. Productivity gaps are 
pronounced in all industries, especially in services and low tech manufacturing. Hence, 
future productivity growth depends on the shift to knowledge based production and 
innovation activities some of which may be facilitated by attracting product mandate 
foreign subsidiaries involved in R&D. 14F15 Improvements in R&D policies would help 
foreign subsidiaries to shift towards competence creating activities and help local firms 
strengthen their absorptive capacity. Furthermore, a shift to more upstream activities in 
GVCs is conditional on the integration of domestic firms in MNCs’ networks. One way 
to achieve this is to introduce programmes whose aim is to help domestic firms to 
integrate with foreign firms through supply linkages. This would help domestic firms to 
survive and at the same time make foreign firms less footloose. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Product mandate subsidiaries possess unique local technological competence and pursue asset seeking 
strategies with the aim to form partnership with host country research centres or universities. They have 
wide geographical and functional scope and specific product scope (Filippov and Kalotay, 2009).  
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter we have seen that countries of Central and Eastern Europe have 
witnessed strong productivity gains and were able to reduce the gap with more advanced 
economies in Europe largely due to increase in FDI. However, their GDP per capita is 
still below the EU-15 average and therefore the need to raise productivity levels remains 
an important policy goal for these countries. Since the improvement in standards of living 
crucially depends on the increase in productivity, the aim of this chapter is to quantify 
productivity as it is used as an important tool to evaluate different policies. The 
estimation of productivity has gained considerable attention in economic literature. The 
earlier work was mainly based on the quantification of the role of TFP in economic 
growth to explain differences in performance across countries and industries. Macro 
approach to TFP estimation was mainly based on growth accounting and growth 
regression techniques. However, with the advances in economic theory, in which firms 
are regarded as heterogeneous entities, and increased availability of firm level data 
shifted the focus on describing mechanisms and channels through which productivity can 
be enhanced and its role in the integration process. Estimation of firm level productivity 
is most commonly based on some form of production function and usually the researchers 
do not give serious attention to possible difficulties to the estimation of the residual. Too 
often empirical work a priori assumes that chosen empirical methodology is superior to 
alternatives without giving much taught on the validity of production function estimates 
and assumptions employed to obtain them.  
The first contribution of this chapter is to point out the difficulties arising from TFP 
estimation at the firm level starting from explaining the major differences between 
parametric and non-parametric techniques, their assumptions about production 
technologies and problems with measurement of outputs and inputs. Second, we explain 
several methodological issues arising from the use of firm level Cobb Douglas 
production function and possible solutions. We pay specific attention to semi parametric 
methods which assume a flexible characterization of TFP and are less prone to different 
biases and measurement issues which may affect the elasticities of factor inputs. 
Theoretical review of semi parametric methods together with their practical 
implementation using typical firm level data obtained from the Amadeus database is the 
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second contribution. While similar studies test the assumptions of data generating 
process and validity of factor inputs estimates using different methodologies they mainly 
focus on one country or narrowly defined industries. In contrast this chapter contributes 
by examining TFP estimates across different countries and industries. 
Although different estimators make different timing assumptions about the choice of 
inputs, we remain agnostic about these issues as it has been shown that these assumptions 
make little difference on the production function and TFP estimates (Ornaghi and Van 
Beveren, 2012). The focus is on comparison of estimates of different semi parametric 
techniques and their interpretation. Specifically, we calculate TFP using OLS as a 
benchmark method and two structural estimators, and test their sensitivity across several 
dimensions. Finally, we compare different productivity distributions of foreign and 
domestic firms as an initial indicator of potential for generating productivity spillovers. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 briefly describes the 
origins of productivity measurement and different methodological approaches together 
with their advantages and drawbacks. Section 4.3 provides a detailed overview of 
methodological issues related to estimation of TFP using firm level data and Cobb 
Douglas production function, namely simultaneity bias between productivity and input 
choices, selection bias due to entry and exit for firms, omitted price bias and the 
appropriate level of analysis when firms produce multiple products. Section 4.4 provides 
theoretical overview of methodological solutions to some of the problems. Specific 
attention is paid to semi parametric techniques which have been extensively used in the 
literature of TFP estimation at the firm level together with more “classical” approaches 
relying on parametric technique, namely OLS and fixed effects. Section 4.5 introduces 
the data used in empirical estimation of TFP and subsequent empirical chapters. Specific 
focus is paid to representativeness of Amadeus database to official statistics, cleaning 
procedure to obtain the relevant sample and construction of foreign ownership variable. 
In section 4.6 the practical implementation of some of the estimators is applied together 
with comments on their relative performance. Comparison of foreign and domestic firms 
in terms of their TFP distribution is provided in section 4.7. Finally, section 4.8 provides 
concluding remarks. 
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4.2 MEASUREMENT OF PRODUCTIVITY 
 
Origins of productivity measurement can be traced back to seminal papers of Tinbergen 
(1942), Fabricant (1954), Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957) that decomposed output 
growth to input growth and productivity residual. Early studies were mainly concerned 
with aggregate TFP and its role in economic growth. The first empirical evidence 
explaining the sources of productivity growth were provided by Abramovitz (1956) by 
analysing U.S. economy. He was not able to identify any sources of productivity growth, 
which led to famous comment: “Since we know little about the cause of productivity 
increase, the indicated importance of this element may be taken to be some sort of 
measure of our ignorance about the causes of economic growth” (Abramovitz, 1956, 
p.11). Solow (1957) developed an analytical framework in which main assumption was 
that productivity growth is a mirror image of exogenous technological progress. Early 
work was mainly based on growth accounting methods which measure productivity 
indirectly as a residual of output growth that can not be explained by factor inputs, the 
former being the result of technological change. Jorgensen and Griliches (1967) continue 
along somewhat different line arguing that technological progress is embodied in factor 
inputs and therefore the residual can be completely eliminated. By taking into account 
differences in input quality the contribution of TFP disappears.  
Recently, with the emergence of new growth theory which put emphasis on imperfect 
competition, increasing returns to scale, innovation, externalities and creative destruction 
process TFP is regarded as an endogenous part of the development process (Del Gatto et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, development of new trade models which regard firms as 
heterogeneous entities within industry require detailed firm level data to explore TFP 
distribution and integration process (e.g. Melitz, 2003;  Melitz and Ottaviano; 2008; 
Chaney, 2008). The availability of microeconomic data has created possibilities to 
estimate productivity at more disaggregated levels and to explain the sources of cross 
country differences in economic growth. Several empirical studies have found that TFP 
growth can be decomposed into within and between components and the role of creative 
destruction process. The within component is related to innovative activities of the firms 
aimed to increase the efficiency of production process and choices firms make about 
input and output levels. Between components is the result of reallocation of inputs across 
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firms as a result of market interactions on inputs and output markets. Finally, net entry 
component reflects the difference in productivity growth of new more productive firms 
in the market from those firms who exit. Foster et al. (2001) and Bartelsman et al. (2009) 
decomposed aggregate TFP growth by using firm level data and came to conclusion that 
within component plays the major role in productivity growth and the process of creative 
destruction has a significant role in the process of reallocation of inputs and outputs. 
Recently, Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) have challenged the existing decomposition of 
TFP and suggested that one should focus on measuring aggregate productivity growth as 
the change in aggregated final demand minus the change in the aggregated cost of 
primary inputs. It is an indicator of the change in potential aggregate consumption 
holding total primary input use constant. They show how to use plant-level data to 
decompose aggregate productivity into technical efficiency and reallocation terms. They 
were able to show that traditional measures of TFP decomposition use no information on 
the differences between marginal revenue products and input prices in its assessment of 
growth arising from reallocation. 
Apart from productivity decomposition, data availability has also allowed to explore the 
determinants of TFP at micro level, thus enabling more specific policy recommendations. 
Syverson (2011) has recently summarised the determinants of TFP growth to those 
specific to the firms and those arising from environment in which the firms operate. 
Internal factors are related to managerial talent and quality of their practices, quality of 
labour and capital inputs, information technology, product innovation, learning by doing 
and firm structure decisions such as the degree of decentralisation, vertical integration 
and operation in multiple industries. On the other hand, external factors may not 
influence productivity directly, but they may influence the incentives to adopt previous 
practices. Also, they can influence the extent and success of internal efforts at moving 
producers on productivity ladder. External factors can be classified to productivity 
spillovers which are the aim of this thesis, intramarket and trade competition, regulation 
and flexible inputs markets which are closely related to flexibility in product markets. 
Although the measurement of productivity has recently gained significant attention in 
economic literature there is yet no common methodology which allows its consistent 
estimates. According to Van Biesebroeck (2008) there are at least six issues related to 
productivity measurement. First, different estimators make different assumption about 
the production technology used by firms. Second, most methods require assumptions 
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about functional form of production function. Third, one must make assumptions about 
firm behaviour due to technological differences. Fourth, even if the assumption of 
technological homogeneity is assumed, one is faced with endogeneity of input choices. 
Fifth, some other unobservable elements apart from productivity can affect output, and 
therefore some structure on stochastic evolution on the unobserved productivity 
difference must be imposed. Sixth, measurement errors in outputs and inputs are inherent 
in accounting data and therefore methodologies differ in sensitivity to such errors. 
Generally, methodologies used to estimate TFP at micro level can broadly be divided in 
two groups as shown in Figure 4.1.  
FIGURE 4.1 APPROACHES TO TFP MEASUREMENT AT MICRO LEVEL 
 
Source: Adapted from Del Gatto et al. (2011) and Kathuria et al. (2013) 
The above figure shows that TFP at the firm’s level can be estimated using deterministic 
methodologies such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and index numbers and 
second, econometric methodologies which can be further divided to semi-parametric 
methods based on proxy variables or instrumental variables and stochastic frontier. These 
methodologies differ according to assumptions mentioned above. Index method assumes 
perfect competition in products and inputs market in order to be able to calculate TFP 
without resorting to estimation of a production function. Furthermore, it remains agnostic 
on the functional form and some index number methods allow technology to differ 
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between firms which may be a very realistic assumption and in line with new trade 
models which argue that productivity differences may exist even in narrowly defined 
industries (Melitz, 2003). One of the main disadvantages of index methodology is that 
they do not allow for measurement errors which may be large due to imperfect 
measurement of output and input measures in accounting data. It also imposes necessary 
assumptions of firm behaviour and market structure which may influence productivity. 
DEA methodology is a non-parametric method developed by Farrell (1957) and further 
extended by Charnes et al. (1978). It belongs to frontier models which assume that firms 
are not fully efficient and in the presence of inefficiency productivity measurement is 
also affected. Productivity is defined as the ratio of a linear combination of outputs over 
a linear combination of inputs obtained using linear programming for each observation. 
It requires imposing specific weights on factor inputs and output in order to maximize 
productivity. The firm or linear combination of other firms are regarded efficient if it 
produces more output with the same input aggregate and the latter uses the same weights 
(Van Biesebroeck, 2007). The most efficient firms are located on frontier of the 
production and comparison is made with other less efficient firms. The distance from the 
frontier is termed technical inefficiency. The advantages of DEA are that it does not 
require any specific functional form, thus allowing technology to vary across firms. 
Furthermore, it is capable to disentangle two main sources of productivity growth, 
namely technological change which shifts production possibility frontier upwards and 
technical efficiency change which reflects the capability of firms to improve production 
with given set of input and technology. The major drawback is that this methodology 
does not allow for measurement errors and is very sensitive to outliers because each 
observation is compared to all others and therefore may affect the productivity estimates. 
Turning to econometric methodologies, parametric methods require specific functional 
form of the type such as Cobb-Douglas (CB), translog or Constant Elasticity Substitution 
(CES), thus assuming same input trade-offs and returns to scale for all firms within an 
industry or country (Van Biesebroeck, 2007). Parametric methods are less susceptible to 
measurement errors due to stochastic framework of analysis and productivity estimates 
depend on the chosen functional form. Furthermore, econometric methods allow taking 
into account adjustment costs arising for example by changes in factor inputs which 
become costly the faster they are implemented (Schreyer and Pilat, 2001). The major 
drawback of such methods is endogeneity of inputs, first discussed by Marschak and 
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Andrews (1944). It arises due the fact that firms observe their productivity level and 
adjust their inputs accordingly, thus creating possible correlation between inputs and the 
error term which is unobserved by econometrician. In order to deal with simultaneity 
bias and other problems specific to TFP estimation, several solutions have been 
proposed, the most prominent one being structural estimators discussed in more detail in 
the following section and GMM estimator. The latter is explained in more detail in the 
next chapter.  
Briefly, GMM estimator assumes a specific functional form of production function in 
which productivity is modelled as a firm fixed effect (ωit) which evolves as AR(1) 
process (ωit  =ωit-1 + ηit). Given this persistence in productivity, production function is 
transformed from static to dynamic specification. However, transforming the production 
function from static to dynamic models using OLS does not solve potential simultaneity 
bias as factor input are still correlated with time invariant productivity level  and 
productivity shock. Blundell and Bond (2000) estimate production function in first 
differences adding lagged levels of the dependent and independent variables to the right-
hand side. By doing that they eliminate time invariant productivity level and the 
assumption that factor inputs are correlated with productivity level is made redundant 
(Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). However, labour and lagged dependent variable are still 
correlated with productivity shock while capital is treated as predetermined. The latter 
assumption is based on the notion that investment in new capital is made in the t-1 and 
thus capital stock does not increase until period t. If this assumption is dropped, capital 
can be treated as endogenous as well. 
In practice, production function is first differenced which eliminates firm fixed effects 
and lagged levels of output from t-3 and t-2 for labour and capital can be used as 
instruments for equation in first differences at time t (Van Biesebroeck, 2007). One 
advantage of GMM over semi-parametric techniques discussed at length in the following 
section is that it its assumptions of data generating process (DGP) can be tested. 
Furthermore, since it uses information in both levels and first differences it can reduce 
measurement errors in both inputs and outputs in comparison to other methods. 
Moreover, the inclusion of fixed effects and lagged terms accounts for differences in 
production technology (Van Biesebreock, 2007). The problem with System GMM 
estimation is that it is vulnerable to large downward bias if there are severe measurement 
errors as found in Van Biesebroeck (2008). In addition, since productivity estimation is 
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usually conducted on industry level, the validity of assumptions must be satisfied for all 
industries to draw valid conclusions about parameter estimates. Finally, dynamic panel 
methods assume that all inputs are quasi fixed which differs from assumption of semi-
parametric methods discussed below which allow more flexible use of factor inputs. 
An alternative way to estimate TFP and contribution of efficiency change to change in 
TFP is stochastic frontier analysis originally proposed by Aigner et al. (1977), Meeusen 
and van den Broeck (1977) and Battesse and Corra (1977). As in the case of DEA, 
technical inefficiency assumption allows decomposing productivity changes due to 
changes in technical efficiency and technical progress. The stochastic production frontier 
defines maximum feasible output and the error term captures technical inefficiency. The 
latter can be written as: 
𝑇𝐸𝑖 =
𝑌𝑖
𝑓(𝑋𝑖; 𝛽)exp⁡(𝜐𝑖)
= exp(−𝜇𝑖) ≤ 1 
where TE represents technical efficiency, 𝑌𝑖 output,⁡𝑓(𝑋𝑖; 𝛽) a deterministic production 
frontier common to all firms,  𝜐𝑖 is the random error term capturing external shocks to 
output and 𝜇𝑖 captures technical inefficiency. In order to calculate technical efficiency 
one must first estimate production function to obtain estimates of technology parameters 
𝛽 and composite error term. However, one of the shortcomings of this methodology is 
the choice of distributional and independent assumptions of the error term, especially one 
related to  𝜇𝑖 as there is no a priori justification of certain type of distribution (Del Gatto 
et al., 2011). Since the composite error term is negatively skewed it requires the use of 
maximum likelihood method.  The main disadvantage is that the estimates obtained may 
be biased if the output is not correctly measured and it assumes that productivity is 
constant over the entire period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 127 
4.3 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN ESTIMATION OF TFP 
 
The most common approach used in estimating productivity is based on one specific 
form of production function, namely Cobb-Douglas which can be written as: 
Yit = AitKit
βkLit
βl          (4.1) 
where Yit is output of firm i in time t, Ait  is total factor productivity which is unobserved 
by econometrician, Kit is capital and  Lit is labour. βk and βl are intensities of capital and 
labour respectively. The common assumption is that Ait is Hicks neutral which captures 
disembodied technical change. 15F16 TFP can be the result of both internal and external 
factors mentioned in the previous section which are not directly related to any specific 
factor inputs. For example, Ait may not be related only to technological differences across 
firms, but can also include managerial ability, scope efficiency, expected machine 
breakdown or cyclical effect (Katay and Wolf, 2008; Konings and Vanormelingen, 
2010). 
By taking natural logarithms Cobb-Douglas production function can easily be 
transformed into linear equation suitable for empirical estimation which allows Ait to be 
additively separable from other factor inputs. 
ln(Yit) = β0 + βk ln(Kit) + βl ln(Lit) + ɛit       (4.2) 
and 
ln (Ait) = β0 + ɛit 
where β0 measures mean efficiency across all firms over time t and ɛit can be regarded as 
deviations from the mean capturing (i) unobserved factors affecting firm output such as 
managerial ability, (ii) measurement error in output and inputs, and (iii) random noise 
(Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). 
Error term ɛit in eq. (4.2) can further be decomposed in anticipated productivity Hicks 
neutral shock (𝜔𝑖𝑡
∗ )⁡affecting firms’ input choices and unanticipated productivity shock 
                                                 
16 Technical change is Hicks neutral whenever marginal rate of substitution between labour and capital 
remains unchanged for a given capital/labour ratio. Therefore, it is assumed that any increase in output is 
caused by disembodied technological changes such as advances in science, blueprints, diffusion of 
knowledge, better marketing and organizational techniques without any changes in factor inputs. 
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or other sources of error (vit) not observed by the firms (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010).  
Unanticipated changes may include unexpected machine breakdown, workers’ strike, or 
measurement problems in outputs and inputs. The productivity shock, unobserved 
productivity or TFP (𝜔𝑖𝑡
∗ )⁡can be further divided into elements common to all firms and 
specific to firms expressed in the following way: 
𝜔𝑖𝑡
∗ = ŋ𝑖 +⁡ƴ𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡          (4.3) 
where ŋi represents time invariant firm specific productivity term which arises from the 
industry in which firms operate or geographical location and is captured by firm fixed 
effects. This time invariant effect represents the permanent deviation of firm i  from the 
referene productivity level in the base year (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). ƴt is common 
technological shock such as the introduction of new technology or macroeconomic shock 
that affects all firms in the same way and represents the average productivity increase 
over time. Finally, ωit is combined effect of firm specific deviation from its own TFP 
level in the base period and average technological progress in period t (Eberhardt and 
Helmers, 2010). 16F17This firm and time specific effect or shock ωit can be attributed to “the 
technical knowledge, the will, effort and luck of a given entrepreneur”(Marschak and 
Andrews, 1944, p.145) in a given time period. In other words, technological shock does 
not affect each firm in the same way as some benefit more that others. For example, firms 
with higher productivity levels experience higher rate of technical progress in 
comparison to firms with lower productivity levels (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). 
Therefore, firm differences in responses to shocks observed over time are captured by 
ωit. 
After incorporating these elements18 into equation (4.2) we get: 
ln(Yit) = βk ln(Kit) + βl ln(Lit) + β0 + ŋi + ƴt + ωit + vit     (4.4) 
The measure of the TFP is obtained as the residual from production function, i.e.: 
ln (Ait) = β0 + ŋi + ƴt + ωit = ln(Yit) - βk ln(Kit) - βl ln(Lit)     (4.5) 
                                                 
17 Since factor inputs can not affect output without taking into account ωit, i.e., the later “transmit to” the 
input choices, this particular problem is known as the “transmission bias”. 
18 “Given that the econometrician also does not observe the common productivity ƴt and that fixed 
productivity effects may have a systematic relationship with the size of idiosyncratic shocks we could argue 
that β0 + ŋi + ƴt + ωit  are the productivity elements infuencing input choice” (Eberhardt and Helmers, 
2010, p.6).  
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However, the estimation of (4.4) is not straightforward as the assumption that firms 
operate on their production frontier may not be plausible due to different constraints 
arising from market conditions, financing investment and hiring of employees (Kvinge, 
2008). Furthermore, the assumption of perfect competition is not realistic as firms 
compete selling differentiated products and charge prices above marginal costs. Also, the 
Cobb-Douglas production function assumes that technology is Hicks neutral meaning 
that it affects marginal product of labour and capital in the same way, which is a strong 
assumption as firms operate in different industries (Van Biesebroeck, 2007). Therefore, 
empirical estimation relies on relaxed assumptions by estimating production functions at 
a more narrowly-defined industry level rather than at total sector level. Furthermore, 
demand conditions are introduced in the model to capture pricing behaviour of firms. 
An important issue not yet completely resolved in empirical work is the measurement of 
variables. As a measurement of output, some studies employ gross output while others 
use value added. Gross output allows to incorporate the contribution of material inputs 
in addition to labour and capital. Theoretically, it is preferred measure of output because 
it allows for substitution between materials and the other two inputs (Hall et al., 2009). 
Basu and Fernald (1995) show that apparent productivity spillovers are the result of 
specification error when using value added. They argue that in imperfect competitive 
industries gross output provides a better measure. Furthermore, productivity measures 
based on gross output specification are a valid representation of disembodied technical 
change if production technology is assumed to be Hicks neutral (Schreyer and Pilat, 
2001).  
However, when using firm level data value added specification may be more appropriate 
as share of materials in total output varies greatly across firms due to different degrees 
of vertical integration (Hall et al., 2009). Use of value added allows comparison between 
firms using heterogeneous intermediate inputs and allows taking into account different 
quality of inputs (Salim and Kalirajan, 1999). Moreover, in order to properly account the 
demand for intermediate inputs one should include the adjustment costs related to 
stocking of material (Hall et al., 2009). Finally, as we measure TFP for services sector it 
is difficult to define output since the latter is often intangible in nature and reflects quality 
improvements. In addition, since data on actual quantities sold are unavailable in firm 
level datasets one is able to consider only TFP based on deflated revenue. Syverson 
(2011) takes into account the fact that firms produce more than one product. Therefore, 
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differences in revenues could be the result of differences of market power and this would 
show up as productivity differences not arising from efficiency, but from price variation. 
So far, empirical studies did not give a strong support to any specification suggesting a 
more complex working of technical change (Schreyer and Pilat, 2001). 
Similar critique can be applied to measurement of inputs. Griliches (1987) argued that 
productivity dispersion is the result of measurement problems in inputs.17F19 For labour, the 
most common measure is the number of employees or cost of labour instead of number 
of hours one actually worked. However, not all employees are equally productive and 
thus usual measures of labour input do not reflect time, skills and effort of the workforce. 
Capital is usually measured as a book value of fixed assets or constructed by using 
observed investment and perpetual inventory method. Appropriate measure of capital 
would include capital service of each asset type. However, flows of the quantity of capital 
services are not usually directly observable and thus they are approximated assuming that 
the quantity of an asset held by a firm is proportional to the usage obtained from that 
asset (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). Furthermore, components of capital equipment 
may be of different vintage and thus affect productivity differently (Whelan, 2002). 
Transition economies face substantial measurement problems with the factor capital, 
which arise due to the poor accounting standards and the tendency to misstate the value 
of capital.  
In the following subsections, several methodological issues will be explained in more 
detail as they cause severe bias in factor elasticities and TFP estimation. Several 
estimation techniques are reviewed together with their advantages and drawbacks. 
Special attention is paid to structural estimators as they will be employed in estimation 
of TFP. 18F20 
 
 
                                                 
19 This claim disregards the fact that productivity dispersion can also be related to fixed firm characteristics. 
If the latter are a significant driver of productivity, than reallocation of inputs across firms and industries 
may be less effective and process of creative destruction may be needed to increase overall productivity, 
thus requiring different policy responses (Fox and Smeets, 2010). 
20 The review of potential econometric problems and solutions related to productivity estimation is based 
on excellent reviews by Van Beveren (2012), Del Gatto et al. (2011), Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) and 
Van Biesebroeck (2007). 
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4.3.1 SIMULTANEITY BIAS  
The issue of simultaneity bias was raised by Marschak and Andrews (1944) who argued 
that inputs in the production function are determined by the characteristics of the firm 
and its reaction to external shocks. Therefore, the inherent problem in (equation 4.2) is 
that firms’ choice of inputs is dependent on realized productivity shock which is only 
known to the firm, but not to econometrician. The estimation of production function 
using OLS requires that the inputs in the production are exogenous, i.e. determined 
independently from the firm’s efficiency level. However, in empirical analysis it is not 
possible to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of the input coefficients as we do 
not know how firms adjust their input choice based on productivity shocks specific to 
them.  Since productivity term is expected to transmit to input choices, this is known as 
“transmission bias” (Griliches and Mairesse, 1995). 
Hence, if there exist a positive serial correlation in firms’ productivity, a positive 
productivity shock will lead to more variable inputs usage introducing an upward bias in 
coefficients of labour and materials which are regarded as more flexible inputs than 
capital which takes time to adjust (De Loecker, 2011). When correlation between capital 
and labour is positive, capital coefficient will be biased downward and the estimation of 
TFP will be difficult (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). Given that expected biases for 
variable and quasi fixed inputs are different it is difficult to predict the impact on TFP. 
For labour intensive industries and industries which use more variable inputs this implies 
that TFP will be biased downward if not corrected for endogeneity. The opposite holds 
for capital intensive industries (Van Beveren, 2012). 
Traditional methods to deal with heterogeneity and endogeneity issues include fixed 
effects and instrumental variables estimation (Wooldridge, 2009). However, both 
methods are plagued by several problems discussed later. The use of Olley-Pakes (1996), 
Levinsohn-Petrin (2003), Ackerberg et al. (2007) and Wooldridge (2009) estimators 
solve these issues, although the data requirements and assumptions among the 
methodologies differ. 
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4.3.2 SELECTION BIAS 
Several theoretical models of firm growth and dynamics predict that productivity 
differences are a major source of firm’s entry and exit (Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 
1992). More recently, new trade models emphasise the importance of firms’ productivity 
distribution and the integration process (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; 
Bernard et al. 2007) as well as the determinants of these differences (Bernard and Jensen, 
1999; Del Gatto et al., 2011). Therefore, when estimating production function one must 
take into account selection bias which emerges because firms do not exit the market 
randomly, but because of their low productivity. Decisions on the allocation of inputs in 
a particular period are made conditional on its survival (Van Beveren, 2012). The latter 
is a function of productivity shock and observed capital stock.   
Firms with large capital stock are more likely to stay in the market. This holds even if 
they experience negative productivity shock in comparison to firms with lower capital 
stock which exit. This will in turn generate negative correlation between capital input 
and unobserved productivity. Consequently the capital coefficient will be biased 
downwards and TFP estimates will be biased upwards if dynamics of firms’ exit process 
have not been taken into account (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). Furthermore, omitting 
firms’ exit and use of balanced panels exert an additional upward bias in TFP. This is 
because exiting firms tend to have low levels of capital stock and low productivity and 
omitting these firms will result in lower factor elasticities and higher estimated TFP on 
average. The estimation algorithm developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) takes the 
selection bias explicitly into account. 
 
4.3.3 OMITTED PRICE BIAS 
Generally, firm price levels are not available, thus researchers are confined to use 
industry-level price indices to deflate firm-level sales and input expenditures in 
traditional production function estimates (De Loecker, 2011). The deflated values of 
output and inputs namely revenue, capital and materials using industry deflators, are thus 
typically used as proxies for their quantities. Therefore, given the data available, most 
studies use revenue based TFP. However, the use of the price index is only valid under 
the assumption of perfect competition, i.e. if all firm level prices do not deviate from 
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deflators used, if firms produce homogeneous products and face a common and infinite 
price elasticity of demand (Melitz, 2001). If prices reflect market power arising from 
firms’ size or production of differentiated products, deflated values of firms’ output using 
single industry deflators is a second best solution to measure quality or efficiency 
differences. The consequence of using industry level prices is a bias in input coefficients 
since choice of inputs is dependent on unobserved firm level price variation (Klette and 
Griliches, 1996). 
Standard supply demand framework assumes that inputs and outputs are positively 
correlated, while output and prices are negatively correlated. Thus, the correlation 
between (variable) inputs and firm level prices captured in error term will be negative. 
This will result in a negative bias for the coefficients of labour and materials (De Loecker, 
2011)19F21. The presence of imperfect competition can additionally be extended to input 
markets as input prices are also firm specific. As with output prices, input prices usually 
proxied by deflated values of inputs for capital and materials since actual quantities are 
mostly unavailable. Again, failure to take into account firm price deviations of input 
prices result in upward biased estimates of TFP if firms’ input prices are lower than 
industry prices leading to underestimation of input use (Van Beveren, 2012). De Loecker 
(2011) argues that if imperfect output markets are treated explicitly by including demand 
for output in the system, the omitted input price bias can be partially solved due to their 
positive correlation with output prices.  
 
4.3.4 MULTIPRODUCT  FIRMS 
Bernard et al. (2009) have recently questioned the relevant level of analysis for the 
estimation of a production function if firms produce multiple products. Since production 
function assumes that firms have identical production techniques and final demand 
(using output deflators) across products manufactured by a single firm, TFP estimates 
will be biased. In practice, single firms produce multiple products which use different 
production techniques and face different final demand. Bernard et al. (2010) document 
that 41% of all firms in their sample of US manufacturing produce multiple products. 
                                                 
21 For example, if firm is more efficient and is able to charge lower prices than the rest of the industry, 
the use of deflated sales will result in underestimation of firm’s output for a given level of inputs and in 
underestimation of TFP and vice versa if a firm is less efficient than its competitors. 
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They find that two-thirds of firms alter their mix of five-digit SIC codes every five years. 
Consistent estimation of TFP require detailed data on product types and number, product 
output, inputs and prices which are almost never available to researchers. One of the 
possible solutions to circumvent the data unavailability proposed by Bernard et al. (2009) 
is to sort the firms into groups by products to obtain product level factor elasticities and 
TFP. However, if there are synergies in the production process of different products 
which raise firm efficiency, TFP may be underestimated. An alternative way to obtain 
consistent and unbiased estimates of TFP is to allow for variation in production 
parameters across firms with different product mix (Bernard et al., 2009). 
 
4.4 SOLUTIONS TO ECONOMETRIC PROBLEMS 
 
Several solutions to “transmission bias” arising from equation (4.4) have been proposed 
in the literature. We begin by introducing methods which dominated the empirical 
literature until recently. Then, Sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 introduce structural models 
which are now common empirical strategy when calculating TFP at the firm level. 
Structural estimators explained below deal mostly with simultaneity and omitted price 
bias which means that estimation of TFP will still suffer from other biases. Each 
structural estimator has its own strengths and weaknesses, but for the purpose of this 
research three methods will be used. OLS will serve as robustness check for Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003) and Wooldridge estimators (2009). Other econometric problems 
mentioned above are partially addressed. Selection bias is solved by using unbalanced 
panel as estimation of survival probability in Olley and Pakes (1996) structural estimator 
which implicitly takes into account firms entry and exit could not be employed due to 
lack of investment data and noisy measure of exit in Amadeus database. However, other 
estimators have shown that incorporation of the survival probability has small efficiency 
gains in comparison to use of unbalanced panel of firms (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; 
Van Beveren, 2012). 
In order to tackle omitted price bias two approaches have been developed so far. First, 
Klette and Griliches (1996) suggest using growth in industry output as an additional 
variable in firm production function. De Loecker (2011) proposes to control for within 
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industry price and demand shocks by estimating market demand. Practical 
implementation of solution for omitted price bias in the Olley and Pakes estimator was 
developed by De Loecker (2011) under the assumption of Dixit Stiglitz demand system. 
By estimating augmented production function one can obtain true elasticities of input 
coefficients by multiplying them with the relevant mark-up. The problem with this 
approach is that it requires explicit assumption about market structure which leads to 
question the plausibility of estimates (Dumont et al., 2014). The second approach is to 
use firm level prices to deflate firm output. For example, Foster et al. (2008) found 
significant differences in TFP estimates when using firm level output prices instead of 
industry level on data from Colombian manufacturing sector. By using industry deflated 
sales, the productivity is especially underestimated for young firms that usually charge 
lower prices for their products. 
However, data on price variation are not available in most firm level datasets. Therefore, 
De Loecker et al. (2012) obtained product level information on prices and quantities to 
obtain firm price index. Using product level data for Spanish manufacturing firms, 
Ornaghi (2006) invalidates the correction proposed by Klette and Griliches (1996) due 
to existence of asymmetric biases among the input coefficients. Multiplying asymmetric 
coefficients with the same correction term does not yield unbiased input coefficients. 
Furthermore, Mairesse and Jaumandreu (2005) argue that the use of firm level prices 
when available has little effect on the estimated coefficients. Similarly, Dumont et al. 
(2014) use PRODCOM database for Belgian manufacturing firms to control for possible 
omitted bias when estimating firm level efficiency. They do not find many indications of 
systemic bias from the use of industry price deflated revenues as indicator of output.  
Correction for omitted price bias is not applied in this thesis for several reasons. First, 
we do not have data on investment which is necessary for employing Olley and Pakes 
(1996) estimator. Second, correction for omitted price bias employed in this estimator 
only possibly corrects the omitted output bias assuming equal demand elasticities across 
firms, while a formal solution for the bias induced by firm-specific input prices has yet 
to be introduced. Finally, the correction of bias arising from multiproduct firms is not 
possible in the absence of product level data on inputs and outputs.  
The empirical specification which forms the basis of further discussion is: 
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ln(Yit) = βk ln(Kit) + βl ln(Lit) + β0 + ŋi + ƴt + ωit + vit      (4.6)
  
4.4.1 TRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS TO ENDOGENEITY OF INPUT CHOICE  
Traditional solution to the unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity issues is related to 
panel firm fixed effects (FE) by using cross sectional dummy variables or mean 
differencing. In order to deal with simultaneity bias the strong assumption of constant 
productivity differences across firms must hold. 20F22 Therefore, any productivity increase 
over time (ƴt) captured in the model by year dummies must disseminate to all firms 
equally and within the same period (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). Moreover, selection 
bias can be resolved since the assumption is that endogenous exit decisions are 
determined by time invariant productivity and not by random component. The alternative 
is to allow for firm specific productivity shocks, but allow inputs to be exogenous. 
However, as noted by Wooldridge (2009) this is a strong assumption that is not likely to 
hold in practice. Using fixed effects has the additional drawback of removing substantial 
information from the data, since only variation over time remains to identify the 
parameters (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). Finally, empirical estimation using FE on 
both unbalanced and balanced panel has provided unreliable coefficient estimates which 
is especially pronounced in very low capital coefficients leading to severely decreasing 
returns to scale and selection bias (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). 
The problem of endogeneity can also be solved using an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach. This method   uses instrument which should be correlated with endogenous 
variable, do not enter production function directly and are uncorrelated with firm 
unobservable productivity (Greene, 2008). There are several possible instruments one 
can use such as input/output prices, variables that shift demand or supply for output and 
inputs and lagged levels of inputs (Ackelberg et al., 2007). By using lagged input prices 
one must assume that inputs market is perfectly competitive, the assumption being 
somewhat implausible. Firms with market power have more influence to set market 
prices in response to the input quantities and its productivity. This induces correlation 
between prices and productivity invalidating prices as good instruments (Van Beveren, 
                                                 
22 Since fixed effect transformation wipes away firm specific effect (ŋi) as it is time invariant it is necessary 
to assume that there are no further firm specific productivity shocks in order to tackle the endogeneity 
issue. 
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2012). Furthermore, prices need to be firm-specific and exhibit variation across firms to 
reflect input choices in the first stage of IV regression (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). 
Finally, most of available micro data do not report firm level prices. Using wages as 
instrument for labour imply exogenous labour market conditions. However, higher wages 
usually reflect better skills and qualifications (e.g. efficiency wage argument) and  thus 
the latter factors are correlated with productivity making wage invalid instrument (Van 
Beveren, 2012).  
IV deals with endogeneity of inputs, but not with selection bias. Firms facing higher input 
prices will be more likely to exit because of higher costs, thus leading to correlation 
between instruments and error term (Ackerberg et al., 2007). Turning to two other 
possible instrument sets mentioned above does not solve the problem. Firstly, variables 
that shift demand or supply are difficult to find. Second, by first differencing production 
function and using lagged input levels as instruments for their changes leads to downward 
biased, often insignificant capital coefficient and very large decreasing returns to scale 
due to weak correlation of input levels with its changes (Blundell  and Bond, 2000). 21F23 
In order to solve the problems related to “transmission bias” and selection bias several 
structural models of firm behaviour were developed (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn 
and Petrin, 2003; Ackerberg et al, 2007; Wooldridge, 2009). All these models rely on 
observed input decisions to control for unobserved productivity (ωit). Since ACF and 
Wooldridge estimators rely heavily on the assumptions of OP and LP the latter will be 
briefly discussed before explanation of Wooldridge estimator as the preferred 
methodology used to estimate TFP. 
 
4.4.2 OLLEY-PAKES AND LEVINSOHN-PETRIN METHODOLOGY 
Olley and Pakes (1996) were the first who adopted assumptions of structural model of 
firm behaviour and explicitly modelled the firm’s optimization problem to derive their 
production function estimator. The OP approach sets up a model where companies 
operate in discrete time and make decisions to maximize expected discounted value of 
                                                 
23 As a possible solution to weak instrument problem Blundell and Bond (1999) proposed systems of 
equations which use first difference of the variables as instrument for their levels which yields more 
reasonable parameter estimates. 
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net cash flows. At the start of each period, incumbent firms decide either to exit the 
market or to continue their operations. If firms stay in the market they choose appropriate 
level of factor inputs and investment. They solve endogeneity problem by using 
information about investment Iit to proxy for unobserved productivity (ωit) and apply 
control function estimator. 22F24 Selection issues are addressed by incorporating an exit rule 
into the model (Van Beveren, 2012).  
In general, structural estimators discussed in this section rely on certain assumptions. 
Assumption 1. Capital is assumed to be a fixed input. Capital has also dynamic 
implications for the next period arising from the following process: 
Kit = (1-δ)Kit-1 + Iit-1          (4.7) 
Where Kit is capital, δ is depreciation rate and Iit is investment of firm i in period t-1. 
Since present capital level was decided in previous period and it takes one period to be 
bought and installed it is not correlated with innovation in productivity ξit between t-1 
and t. In Levinsohn Petrin (2003) capital stock depends on investment in period t.  
In contrast, labour input is assumed to be a variable input chosen at the same time the 
productivity shock is realized and is therefore correlated with the innovation ξit. 
Furthermore, labour is also a static input implying that the present levels of labour input 
do not affect the cost of labour in the future. 
Assumption 2. The investment function (Iit) is fully determined by capital (Kit) and 
unobserved productivity ωit. This can be represented as Iit  = ft(Kit, ωit). As argued by 
Ackerberg et al. (2006) scalar unobservable assumption implies that any unobserved 
heterogeneity in adjustment costs of capital, demand or labour market conditions across 
firms is ruled out. It also assumes perfect factor and product markets. In case of imperfect 
competition firm level input prices will determine the optimal level of investment and 
therefore they should enter inverted function 𝑓𝑡
−1 defined below (Ornaghi and Van 
Beveren, 2012).  
Assumption 3. Unobserved productivity ωit can be proxied using an observable firm 
decision such as choice of investments. It is assumed that choice of investments is strictly 
                                                 
24 Control function approach is an alternative to instrumental variable approach and consists of deriving a 
proxy variable that accounts for any unobserved factors which may affect endogenous variables. 
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increasing with state variables capital and unobserved productivity. This implies that 
firms with higher productivity or capital invest more. As a consequence, only non-
negative values of investment can be used in the analysis. This condition needs to hold 
for at least some known subset of the sample (Van Beveren, 2012).  Following the 
monotonicity assumption and provided that investment is positive, productivity can be 
expressed as inverted investment equation. 
ωit  = 𝑓𝑡
−1 (Iit,Kit)                                           (4.8) 
Since the 𝑓𝑡
−1
 would require solving complicated dynamic programming problem, its 
functional form is proxied by higher order polynomial terms in investment variable and 
state variables and estimated non-parametrically. 
Assumption 4. Productivity follows a first order Markov process. This implies that 
future productivity is determined only by information known at current period and 
exogenous productivity shock which arise between time t and t+1. The latter is assumed 
to be uncorrelated with productivity (ωit) and capital in t+1 (Ornaghi and Van Beveren, 
2012). Therefore evolution of productivity can be represented as: ωit = Ε[ωit | ωit-1] + ξit 
= g(ωit-1) + ξit where g is an unknown function and  innovation term ξit is introduced 
which is the deviation from the expected productivity level which is mean independent 
of any information at t − 1 or before, and is thus not foreseeable by the firm.  
The potential issue with Olley and Pakes estimator is that data on investment are rarely 
available or large number of observations report missing values or zero investment thus 
causing violation of monotonicity assumption. Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) suggested that 
monotonicity condition is more likely to hold by using intermediate inputs as a proxy 
variable. Using intermediate inputs increases the sample size as data on material inputs 
are more widely available in firm level databases. The reason for using intermediate 
inputs is that under assumption of perfect markets higher productivity implies higher 
marginal product of capital and thus firms will increase production until marginal product 
of capital equals its rental rate (Katay and Wolf, 2008). By increasing their output firms 
also increase the usage of intermediate inputs, therefore providing information about 
productivity of firms. 23F25  
                                                 
25 However, firms’ productivity may be increased by better quality management or improvements in 
organization of production process, thus making intermediate inputs less responsive to productivity shocks. 
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In LP estimation labour and intermediate inputs are freely available and chosen 
simultaneously once that unobserved productivity is known to the firm. LP specify the 
demand for intermediate inputs as Mit  = ft(Kit, ωit). They use the same method of 
inverting out ωit with the difference that productivity is a function of capital and 
materials. 
ωit  = ht(Kit,Mit)          (4.9) 
In this way, observable variables, namely capital and material costs give information 
about productivity. By substituting equation (4.9) in equation (4.6) one gets: 24F26 
ln(Yit) = β0 + βk ln(Kit) + βl ln(Lit) + ŋi + ƴt + ht(Kit,Mit) + vit             (4.10) 
In practice, LP or OP production function estimator is implemented in two steps. First, 
by regressing output (Yit) on labour input (Lit) and a nonparametric function ϕ(Kit, Mit) 
which act as a proxy for unobserved productivity. If labour had dynamic implications, 
its identification would not be possible in the first stage. This is because in the case of 
firing and hiring costs labour would not be perfectly adjustable, and therefore it would 
enter the set of state variables on which the choice of proxy variables depends (Ornaghi 
and Van beveren, 2012). The following equation can be estimated by Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS): 
ln(Yit) = βl ln(Lit) + ϕ(Kit, Mit) + vit                 (4.11) 
where ϕ(Kit, Mit) = β0 + βk ln(Kit) + ht (Kit, Mit)                                                      (4.11a) 
ϕ(Kit, Mit) is approximated by a higher-order polynomial in Mit and Kit (including a 
constant term). 25F27 In order to account for time variation, polynomial terms are interacted 
with time or by including time dummies in first stage of regression.  
The first stage provides an estimate of ϕ(Kit, Mit)  and unbiased and consistent estimate 
of labour.26F28 It solves endogeneity of capital and productivity because the firm-observed 
                                                 
26 Structural estimators discussed here are not able to account for time invariant firm level fixed effects (ŋi) 
while common shocks (ƴt) are accounted for by including year dummies or interacting the polynomial 
function with time. 
27 LP suggest estimation based on a third-order polynomial series expansion, but any other flexible 
estimation approach is valid.  
28 β0 cannot be identified as it is included in polynomial term. 
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productivity has been controlled for by ϕ(Kit, Mit).  Capital is not identified in the first 
stage as it is included in polynomial term and would lead to collinearity issues with non-
parametric function. Second stage identifies capital coefficient using estimated ϕ under 
the assumption that ωit follows a first order Markov process defined as ωit = Ε[ωit | ωit-1] 
+ ξit = g(ωit-1) + ξit. As before g is an unknown function and ξit represents productivity 
innovation not foreseeable by firm at time t-1, where capital is decided, the two are 
orthogonal and thereby uncorrelated. This moment condition is necessary to identify 
capital. Given the obtained estimate of labour in the first step the production function can 
be expressed as: 
Yit - βl Lit = βk Kit + ωit  + vit                                                                                      (4.12) 
Following Markov process gives us: 
Yit - βl Lit = βk Kit + g(ωit-1) + ξit + vit                                                                       (4.13) 
     = βk Kit + g(ϕ(Mit-1, Kit-1) - βk Kit-1) + ξit + vit 
Finally by using ϕ(Kit, Mit) and estimated labour coefficient from first stage LP/OP 
propose the following empirical model:  
Yit - βl Lit = βk Kit + ?̂?(ϕ it-1 - βk Kit-1) + ξit + vit                                                              (4.14) 
Use of non-linear least squares is required due to βk entering the equation twice and in 
combination with other parameters (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). Due to the fact that 
innovation shock (ξit) and labour input are contemporaneously correlated, LP and OP 
subtract βl (Lit) from the output using the coefficient obtained in the first stage regression. 
Capital stock is exogenous with respect to innovation shock (ξit) since its level is 
determined in the previous period.  Therefore capital cannot be affected by change in 
productivity in current period (ξit) (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). ?̂?(ϕ it-1 - βk (Kit-1) is 
found using higher order polynomials as in the first stage and its estimate is not of 
particular interest in the second stage.  
In summary, both OP and LP achieve identification of labour coefficient through specific 
structural assumptions. In both estimators labour is a static input chosen in time t which 
does not affect cost of input in time t+1. This assumption is necessary as otherwise if 
labour is chosen before investment it will become part of state space on which the optimal 
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amount of proxy is determined. In this case identification of labour would not be possible 
using inverted investment function as a proxy for unobserved productivity (Katay and 
Wolf, 2008). In LP labour and material costs are assumed to be perfectly variable inputs. 
In other words once productivity shock is observed, they adjust immediately within the 
same time period. In case materials are chosen before productivity shock, inverse demand 
function for intermediate inputs would not be possible. Identification of capital has also 
timing assumptions and is treated as “quasi fixed” input where its current level is 
determined before the occurrence of productivity shock.   
It should be noted that consistency of control function depends on how closely 
unobserved productivity is approximated by polynomial function. If scalar unobservable 
assumption fails, approximation error between true productivity and those approximated 
by proxy variables can lead to inconsistent estimates. The failure of this assumption can 
happen due to omitted observables and different investment or intermediate inputs 
responses to permanent and transient changes in TFP (Stoyanov and Zubanov, 2014). 
Furthermore, as argued by Ackerberg et al. (2007) productivity is a complex function of 
many observables and unobservables and may not follow first order Markov process. 
This is especially worrisome in case of OP as investment may respond to demand factors 
that are independent of firm’s productivity, thus invalidating monotonicity condition 
(Van Beveren, 2012). In case that productivity follows a higher order Markov process, 
control function in the first stage is not able to capture additional lags unless additional 
proxy variables are available. The same holds for second stage as consistency of results 
relies on Assumption 4 (Stoyanov and Zubanov, 2014). 
 
4.4.3 ACKERBERG CAVES FRAZER CRITIQUE 
The main assumption in above described estimators is that at least one of the inputs is 
flexible. In gross output specification those are intermediate inputs and labour, while in 
value added specification it is only labour. As discussed in detail by Bond and Soderbom 
(2005) and Ackerberg et al. (2006) in order for labour coefficient to be identified in the 
first stage there must exist sample variability that is independent of other regressors. To 
illustrate this we take LP estimator as a starting point. Under the assumption of perfect 
competition and dynamic properties of capital coefficient, firm state variables at time t 
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are represented by ωit, Kit, Pt Wt. and Zt where output price (Pt), wages (Wt). and 
intermediate input price (Zt) are assumed to be constant over firms. Ackerberg et al. 
(2006) point out that the first stage of OP and LP fails to identify labour coefficient 
because it is the function of the same state variables ωit and kit, i.e. it is correlated with 
the non-parametric terms ϕ(Kit, Mit). The problem is more acute in the case of LP 
estimator as it assumes that labour and materials are chosen simultaneously and are 
allocated in similar ways. This implies that both materials (Mit) and labour (Lit) are 
chosen as a function of productivity (ωit) and capital (Kit). 
Mit = ft (ωit,Kit) 
Lit = gt (ωit,Kit) 
Therefore, there is no independent source of variation at the firm level which could help 
identify labour coefficient in the first stage. Using invertibility condition from LP, where 
ωit = ft-1(Mit, Kit), Ackerberg et al. (2006) showed the following: 
Lit = gt [ft
-1(ωit, Kit), Kit] = ht (Mit, Kit)                (4.15) 
Since labour is a function of both ωit and kit it is not possible to simultaneously estimate 
a nonparametric function of ωit and kit together with the labour coefficient leaving the 
latter unidentified. To solve the issue of collinearity, Ackerberg et al. (2006) assume that 
labour is chosen by the firm at time t - b, where 0 < b < 1 as it is “less variable” than 
materials which is chosen at time t. This implies that firms choose labour prior to 
materials, but after capital stock has been determined in t-1. Now labour enters the 
demand function for intermediate inputs as a state variable which can be expressed as: 
Mit= ht (ωit, Kit, Lit )                                                                                                   (4.16) 
Maintaining the scalar unobservable assumption in practice, the first stage is 
implemented by regressing output on a polynomial function of labour, capital and 
intermediate inputs. The estimated output net of ɛit is then simply the residual from the 
first stage regression: 
γit - ɛit = ?̂?𝑘⁡Kit + ?̂?𝑙 Lit + 𝑔 (Mit, Kt, Lt)                (4.17) 
First stage is used only to eliminate the part of output determined by some random 
component of unobservables (ɛit) such as measurement error of inputs or unanticipated 
shocks at time t from productivity shock observable by the firms (Eberhardt and Helmers, 
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2010). Estimation of above equation gives an estimate of ϕ̂⁡(polynomial function) which 
is used to identify input coefficients in the second stage. To do this, the assumption that 
productivity follows first order Markov process is defined as: 
ωit = Ε[ωit | ωit-1] + ξit                  (4.18) 
where ξit represents innovation in productivity explained earlier. Since it is assumed that 
capital is uncorrelated with productivity (ωit) as investment decisions are made in t-1 
identification of capital coefficient is possible as Ε[ξit | Kit] = 0. The identification of 
labour coefficient depends on the timing assumptions. If labour is assumed to be 
independent of innovation in productivity because of adjustment frictions or training 
requirements moment conditions are defined as Ε[ξit | Lit] = 0. On the other hand, if labour 
is allowed to be correlated with productivity innovation than it needs to be instrumented 
and the moment conditions are Ε[ξit | Lit-1] = 0 (Ornaghi and Van Beveren, 2012). In 
practice, after obtaining ϕ̂⁡ from the first stage regression productivity is computed as: 
ωit = ?̂? - βk ln(Kit) - βl ln(Lit)                                                                                     (4.19) 
where starting values of input coefficients are obtained using OLS. After approximating 
ωit next step is to non-parametrically regress ωit on ωit-1  (eq. 4.18) and obtain residuals, 
i.e.⁡ξit̂ which represent innovation in productivity. The last step is to solve optimization 
problem through iterative process in order to achieve a global minimum when the process 
stops and final values of input coefficients are obtained (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). 
 
4.4.4 WOOLDRIDGE ESTIMATOR 
Wooldridge (2009) proposes that instead of two step approach, inputs can be estimated 
in one step. He argues that two step estimators discussed above which require 
bootstrapping technique to obtain standard errors are inefficient because of two reasons: 
(i) they ignore the contemporaneous correlation in the errors across two equations and 
(ii) there is no correction of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the errors. 
Furthermore, Wooldridge estimation technique also allows the inclusion of cross 
equation restrictions and an option to test the validity of the specifications using the 
Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions.   
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The assumption in equation (4.10) is that materials, labour and capital are uncorrelated 
with the errors. Wooldridge defines a stronger form to include independence of past 
values of inputs: 
E (vit | Lit, Kit, Mit, Li,t-1, Ki,t-1, Mi,t-1,…Li1, Ki1, Mi1) = 0                         (4.20) 
Second, productivity is assumed to follow a first order Markov process as in previously 
described estimators: 
E [ωit | ωi,t-1,…, ωi1] = E [ωit | ωi,t-1] + ξit                (4.21) 
where ωi,t-1 = g(Ki,t-1,Mi,t-1) and ωit = j(ωi,t-1) + ξit 
He notes that in the second stage capital coefficient can be estimated by using lagged 
values of intermediate inputs and labour. Therefore, to reinforce the assumption that 
current levels of capital are orthogonal to productivity shock, it is also assumed that 
productivity innovation ξit is uncorrelated with past values of the state variable Kit as well 
as Lit-1 and the proxy variable M. 
Replacing ϕ(Kit, Mit) in equation (4.11) with the term in (4.11a) and plugging ωit = f 
[g(Ki,t-1,Mi,t-1)] + ξit into equation (4.6) gives two systems of equations with same 
dependent variables: 
ln(Yit) = β0 + βk ln(Kit) + βl ln(Lit) + h(Ki,t,Mi,t)] + vit                                               (4.22)           
ln(Yit) = β0 + βk ln(Kit) + βl ln(Lit) + f [g(Ki,t-1,Mi,t-1)] + ξit + vit               (4.23)    
The final result is that we have two equations (4.22 and 4.23) that identify labour and 
capital. In order to estimate these two equations by GMM the orthogonally conditions 
must be satisfied.  The orthogonally conditions for equation (4.22) are outlined in 
equation (4.20), while for equation (4.23) are: 
E (uit | Kit, Li,t-1, Ki,t-1, Mi,t-1,…Li1, Ki1, Mi1) = 0 where uit = ξit + vit              (4.24) 
In order to take into account the ACF critique which argues that neither of the parameters 
can be identified as labour is a deterministic function of polynomials of capital and proxy 
variable, Wooldridge proposes to estimate a single equation model similar to equation 
(4.23). Specifically, empirical model requires specifying the functions f and g and 
common practice is to include the third degree polynomials in Kt-1 and Mt-1.  
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4.5 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Central to the empirical analysis is the firm level Amadeus database. It is a commercial 
database provided by Bureau van Dijk updated on a regular basis and contains financial 
information on over 19 million private and publicly owned firms across different sectors 
and regions in 43 European countries (update of November 2011). The time horizon goes 
back to year 1996 for some European countries. However, given that the coverage was 
poor prior to year 2002, we limit our analysis to data between years 2002-2010. Because 
of its large scope it is suitable for economic analysis of firm behaviour across industries, 
geographical areas or firms’ size. Moreover, since it collects firm level information for 
up to 10 years it enables creation of longitudinal data and analysis of firm behaviour and 
determinants. This advantage is rarely available  in  national business surveys in which 
firms are selected on the basis of a rotating sample to minimise response burdens (Ribeiro 
et al., 2010).27F29  
A further advantage of the database is that it provides common definition and comparable 
information on 25 balance sheet items and 25 profit and loss account items which adhere 
to international standards. This enables avoiding possible errors which may arise with 
different sources of data, various units of measurement, uneven sector coverage and 
inconsistencies in inclusion criteria (Bos and Zhang, 2013). Therefore, the maximum 
level of comparability across countries is ensured as data quality for this type of 
administrative information can be easily checked using basic accounting algebra. In 
addition to financial information, Amadeus also provides other firm level information, 
such as date of incorporation, legal status, region and city, detailed industry classification 
and what is central to the analysis, detailed ownership information. Ownership Database 
permits to retrieve information on the control chain and the ownership type (foreign or 
domestic; industrial or individual; controlled or independent). Furthermore, an important 
advantage of Amadeus is that it provides the exact percentage of equity held by foreign 
investor. Hence, continuous measurement allows us to estimate the marginal effects of 
                                                 
29 For example, Amadeus database has been widely used to explore the effects of entry regulation on 
business dynamics (Klapper et al., 2006), international rent sharing within MNCs (Budd et al., 2005), 
product market regulation (Arnold et al., 2008), the effects of employment protection legislation and 
financial market imperfections on investment, job reallocation and labour productivity (Cingano et al., 
2010) and effects of FDI spillovers on productivity (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008; Javorcik and Li, 2008; 
Gersl et al., 2008, Damijan et al., 2013a).  
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foreign ownership and related heterogeneity more precisely than with the binary “yes/no” 
variables. 
 
Amadeus database also has drawbacks. The quality of data is inferior to data obtained 
from National Statistical offices. For example, the amount and quality of data depend on 
accounting standards in each country and legal obligation of firms to reports certain 
items. This reflects the use of several national sources which have different threshold for 
firms to be included in the database. Therefore, the number of firms and quality of data 
is biased towards countries with more demanding accounting standards. Moreover, this 
may also create sample selection bias towards larger firms. In addition, firms which do 
not provide data for the last four years are removed from the database with their entire 
history. Hence, any variation in information retrieved from the database can be the result 
of sample fluctuations and not related to change in the indicators. As the aim of the 
chapter is to estimate and explore any differences in productivity estimates across several 
dimensions as well as differences between domestic and foreign firms the availability of 
reliable firm level data is crucial along two important dimensions: the coverage of the 
database and the quality of the data available for each country, issues explored in more 
detailed in the next subsections. Despite these drawbacks Amadeus database remains the 
best available database for cross country analysis (CompNet Task Force, 2014). 
 
4.5.1 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
The November 2011 edition of Amadeus database is used for the estimation purpose, 
covering the time period of 2002-2010. The data are taken from “full” version of 
Amadeus with no thresholds applied to the number and types of firms included. The 
sample is restricted to the following countries: Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Hungary. The choice of the countries was guided by data availability and 
time constraint when accessing the data. The initial sample contained 1,236,219 firms. 
However, after cleaning the dataset for the purposes of productivity estimations we ended 
up with 96,567 firms representing around 8 per cent of the original dataset. 28F30  
                                                 
30 Detailed cleaning procedure is explained in the Appendix II. 
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In order to differentiate between domestic and foreign companies Amadeus ownership 
database provides information along three dimensions (independence indicator, ultimate 
owner and shareholders) which are used to calculate percentage of shares held by foreign 
shareholders. 29F31 We use several information available to separate foreign and domestic 
firms. These are “shareholder ID”, “shareholder name”, “shareholder direct %”,  
“shareholder total %”, and “shareholder country” available for each year. The most 
recent version of Amadeus enables to track ownership changes across years which is a 
significant improvement over previous studies which were able to disentangle firms 
based on only the most recent information, thus assuming that local firm was foreign 
through entire period. In order to identify foreign firms we rely on direct ownership link 
since this is taken from original source and not amended by BvD. Firm is defined as 
foreign if foreign shareholder identified by “shareholder country” has acquired at least 
10 per cent of equity stake in local company. This definition of foreign owned company 
is in line with OECD or IMF classification. In order to be classified as foreign, data on 
country of origin must be available. Therefore, private individuals are excluded since 
there is no information about their nationality and in such cases it is often assumed that 
the owner is located in the same country as acquired company (Rosen et al., 2013; 
Merlevede et al., 2015). Furthermore, as argued by Lesher and Miroudot (2008) private 
foreign individuals are less likely to have any active role in the management of company 
and therefore do not represent “true foreign presence” which is important to gauge the 
potential of productivity spillovers in the following chapters.  
To illustrate the coverage of Amadeus database we compare the original augmented 
version to Eurostat Structural Business Surveys (SBS). The comparison is limited to 
manufacturing sector and service sector (NACE 1.1 Rev. at 2 digit codes 15-74) since 
productivity estimation and subsequent analysis of FDI productivity spillovers in the next 
chapter is based on these two broad sectors of economy.  Data in Table 4.1 below are 
averaged over industry-time cells by country. After assigning each firm to specific cell 
we calculate average number of employees and average turnover as a share of 
corresponding aggregate from SBS. The calculations are based on entire universe of 
firms which report the indicated variable. As can be seen, the coverage of Amadeus in 
terms of employment and turnover is high in all countries except in Slovenia for both 
variables and Hungary for employment. Averaged over countries, our dataset covers at 
                                                 
31 Detailed calculation of foreign ownership share is provided in Appendix II. 
 
149 
least 47 per cent of employment and 63 per cent of total turnover in the economy. In 
general, it seems that Amadeus includes larger firms. Since the main interest is in the 
sample of firms for which productivity can be estimated the last three columns in the 
table show that the number of firms reporting number of employees is very low with the 
exception of Estonia and Slovakia. Further, when we impose additional restrictions on 
firms reporting turnover as well, the share of firms drops slightly with the exception of 
Slovakia where the drop is now significant. Finally, the last column shows the share of 
firms for which productivity estimation is possible. As expected, the number of firms 
drops even further. While Slovakia and Estonia keep relatively large number of firms 
and may be regarded as fairly representative sample of firms, data quality for Hungary is 
very poor as we end up with only 0.5 per cent of firms. This representativeness is similar 
to CompNet database of the ECB Competitiveness Research Network (CompNet Task 
Force, 2014). Provider of the data, Bureau-Van-Dyke (2010) does not provide any 
explanation why the data on some key financial variables are missing. It may be that 
firms in transition countries do not meet their legal obligations of submitting reports to 
authorities since penalties are low. Dall’Ollio et al. (2013) also discuss that there is an 
overall bias towards larger firms in Amadeus which is also confirmed in our case if we 
look at Table 4.2 below. Overall, micro firms are underrepresented while other categories 
are overrepresented. This bias even increases when we limit the comparison to TFP 
estimation sample and is especially pronounced in Hungary.
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TABLE 4.1 REPRESENTATIVENESS OF AMADEUS DATABASE VERSUS EUROSTAT SBS  
 
SBS 2002-2010 (average)   Amadeus as a share of SBS 
 # firms # employees turnover #firms with employees #firms with employees and turnover 
#firms with employees , value 
added and tangible fixed assets 
Czech Republic 884,842 64% 80% 7% 5.1% 3.9% 
Estonia 42,463 79% 86% 60.1% 59.0% 35.5% 
Hungary 556,195 28% 81% 5.5% 5.2% 0.5% 
Slovakia 47,624 53% 55% 43% 20.8% 17.7% 
Slovenia 98,568 12% 11% 3.9% 3.2% 3.0% 
Note: Data on the number of firms and turnover in year 2010 for Czech Republic are not available for most industries in SBS, therefore the comparison is made up until 2009. 
Similarly, there was a large increase in the number of firms in SBS for Slovakia starting from year 2010 so in order to reduce possible misrepresentation of the data, we limit the 
comparison up until 2009 for shares involving the number of firms. 
 
TABLE 4.2 COMPARISON OF FIRM SIZE DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN EUROSTAT SBS AND AMADEUS DATABASE 
 
SBS 
(2002-2010 average) 
Amadeus (firms with employment) 
(2002-2010 average) 
Amadeus (firms with TFP) 
(2002-2010 average)  
 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-249 >250 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-249 >250 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-249 >250 
Czech Republic 95.3% 2.4% 1.4% 0.8% 0.2% 68.2% 12.9% 9.5% 7.7% 1.8% 46.2% 19.2% 16.6% 14.5% 3.5% 
Estonia 84.0% 8.0% 5.1% 2.6% 0.4% 79.3% 10.2% 6.7% 3.4% 0.4% 69.5% 15.0% 10.1% 4.8% 0.6% 
Hungary 94.6% 3.0% 1.5% 0.8% 0.1% 78.8% 9.6% 6.5% 4.1% 1.1% 7.0% 10.8% 24.1% 41.6% 16.5% 
Slovakia 84.8% 9.4% 2.8% 2.4% 0.6% 77.8% 10.9% 4.9% 5.1% 1.4% 67.7% 14.7% 10.5% 6.1% 1.0% 
Slovenia 92.9% 3.6% 2.0% 1.2% 0.3% 72.3% 13.3% 8.7% 4.9% 0.8% 41.0% 23.1% 13.3% 17.7% 5.0% 
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4.5.2 VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
The financial data obtained from Amadeus are downloaded in ‘000 euros at the market 
exchange rate in each year. Since for productivity estimation we need to obtain 
comparable values over time adjusted for price changes, OECD STAN database was used 
as a primary source to deflate nominal variables using industry price indices defined at 
NACE 1.1 Rev. 2 digit level for output, capital and intermediate inputs expressed at 2005 
constant prices. 30F32  Because price deflators are expressed in national currency we used 
year end exchange rates from European Central Bank (ECB) to convert euros back to 
original currency values and applied price deflators to them. At the second stage deflated 
values are converted back to euros at 2005 exchange rate to avoid that exchange rate 
fluctuations would drive cross-country productivity comparisons (Gal, 2013). 
Output is measured as total sales deflated by corresponding price deflator at NACE 1.1 
Rev. 2-digit level. Value added is constructed as difference between real gross output 
and real intermediate inputs. The latter are defined as material costs deflated by 
intermediate price index. Capital is measured by stock of tangible fixed assets. Changes 
in capacity utilisation cannot be accounted for which is a common problem in firm level 
databases which may result in low capital coefficients. Labour is measured as number of 
employees without further breakdown of employees’ characteristics or skills levels due 
to unavailable information. 
Before turning to TFP estimation, we will shed some light on the descriptive statistics of 
the final dataset used for productivity estimation. The data in Table 4.3 show distribution 
of domestic and foreign firms across countries, technology intensive sectors and years. 
 
                                                 
32 The exception is Slovakia for which data are not fully available and therefore we used the deflators 
obtained from WIOD database at more aggregated group of industries. In addition, data for year 2010 are 
not available for Estonia and Slovakia at 2-digit industry level, so we used total industry prices for major 
sectors in the economy or if not available for total economy. 
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TABLE 4.3 DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS ACROSS COUNTRIES, INDUSTRIES AND YEARS 
PANEL A Slovenia Slovakia Hungary Estonia Czech Republic 
Number of observations per industry and country domestic foreign domestic foreign domestic foreign domestic foreign domestic foreign 
Construction and utilities 2664 10 5871 87 880 80 14423 237 29685 350 
High tech manufacturing 192 2 493 50 338 40 424 159 3439 307 
Medium high tech manufacturing 869 31 2983 282 966 134 1596 296 16027 1563 
Medium low tech manufacturing 2247 4 4036 286 1448 200 3784 392 20029 1517 
Low tech manufacturing 1997 18 4478 236 1539 104 9228 668 19762 824 
High tech knowledge intensive services 682 11 1412 80 348 37 2694 209 7319 514 
Market knowledge intensive services 1847 21 7383 172 758 66 17649 584 41997 1226 
Less knowledge intensive services 9050 226 20760 688 5308 497 40006 2281 85194 3692 
Total 19548 323 47416 1881 11585 1158 89804 4826 223452 9993 
PANEL B Slovenia Slovakia Hungary Estonia Czech Republic 
Number of observations per year and country domestic foreign domestic foreign domestic foreign domestic foreign domestic foreign 
2002 660 5 1305 33 16 - 9058 24 12588 313 
2003 1060 8 2093 57 19 - 10288 332 18791 540 
2004 1781 7 2724 75 162 16 11255 444 27064 732 
2005 2293 16 5387 174 587 56 12090 507 29094 949 
2006 3242 31 9747 230 924 64 13369 589 35899 1125 
2007 3493 39 10853 254 3096 272 14874 679 39336 1266 
2008 3327 63 7899 234 3402 358 13218 1210 30706 2299 
2009 2867 119 7408 824 3255 355 3010 547 29974 2769 
2010 825 35 - - 124 37 2642 494 - - 
Total 19548 323 47416 1881 11585 1158 89804 4826 223452 9993 
Note: The table shows the number of observations in TFP sample. 
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Descriptive statistics in Table 4.3 above illustrates that there is substantial heterogeneity 
in sample size across years and industries among countries. Majority of local firms across 
countries (on average 44%) is operating in less knowledge intensive services and this 
holds for foreign firms as well where on average 47 per cent of the latter are operating in 
this sector. When looking at manufacturing sector only, most of local firms operate in 
medium low tech or low tech manufacturing. However, foreign firms are more 
concentrated in medium high tech and medium low tech sectors. Further, on average, 
foreign firms take a larger share of total number of firms in high tech manufacturing and 
high tech knowledge intensive services sectors across all countries. When we separate 
foreign firms according to ownership type and nationality we can see that most of the 
firms are fully owned and originate from the EU (Table II.2 - Appendix II). This 
distribution of foreign firms remains similar both for the original sample and TFP sample. 
Looking at the bottom panel of Table 4.3, a large heterogeneity of firms’ distribution 
across years and countries is immediately noticeable. Overall, the number of firms in the 
database increased steadily over years up to 2008 which may indicate increased exit of 
firms due to financial crisis or change in the sample composition where firms which did 
not report their financials for the last four years are dropped from the sample. Moreover, 
the number of firms in the last years is substantially reduced and in the case of Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic there are no firms which satisfy the necessary condition for TFP 
estimation. The reason for substantial reduction in the number of firms reporting their 
financial indicators may be that prior to becoming available in database, the data must 
go through time consuming administrative procedures which can take from a couple of 
weeks to several years. 
In table II.3 in the Appendix II we also provide in-sample data coverage. On average in 
each country we have four years of observations per firm. However, data coverage varies 
per country as less than 8 per cent of firms have 7 or 8 years of time series observations, 
with the exception of the Czech Republic and Estonia where this percentage rises to 12 
and 23 percent respectively. The problem is most acute in Hungary where majority of 
firms have three years of data once again indicating data reporting problems and missing 
observations which may play an important role in TFP estimation in terms of differences 
in input coefficients estimates across different methodologies. Table 4.4 below provide 
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basic statistics (mean values) for local and foreign firms separately across several 
indicators. 31F33  
TABLE 4.4 SUMMARY STATISTICS ON SELECTED INDICATORS 
 
Firstly, the size distribution of firms across countries differs substantially. In particular, 
firms in Hungary are much larger and more productive (measured by number of 
employee, total sales, labour productivity or TFP) than firms in other countries. This 
confirms the statistics from Table 4.2 where we found overrepresentation of large firms. 
Excluding Hungary, firms in Slovenia are more labour productive, have the highest sales 
per employee and pay the highest wage. This holds true for both local and foreign firms. 
On average local firms are smaller, less productive, pay lower wages, use less intangible 
asset and are less profitable than foreign firms. The largest gap between local and foreign 
firms measured as difference in mean values of TFP and LP is experienced in the Czech 
Republic. In addition, it seems that local firms in Estonia use far less intangible asset 
than their foreign counterparts. 
                                                 
33 Descriptive statistics for factor inputs and output for each country are provided in the Table II.4 in 
Appendix II. 
34 TFP is estimated in the next section. 
 Slovenia Slovakia Hungary Estonia 
Czech 
Republic 
Variable Domestic firms 
log TFP32F34 3.98 3.15 4.14 2.67 3.11 
Sales per employee (€, '000) 134.29 155.51 183.47 56.17 98.76 
LP (€, '000) 59.74 55.67 81.02 19.11 31.75 
Total sales (€, '000) 2135.45 4439.00 20651.80 747.52 3650.22 
No of employees 18.56 60.83 188.68 13.37 47.28 
Net profit (€, '000) 50.59 103.86 470.62 49.73 111.54 
Average wage (€, '000) 16.92 15.27 14.31 6.89 10.85 
Total intangible asset (€, '000) 51.20 45.24 734.76 2.91 25.36 
  Foreign firms 
log TFP 4.64 3.70 4.81 3.65 4.41 
Sales per employee (€, '000) 263.70 222.46 288.42 119.08 187.06 
LP (€, '000) 97.04 72.48 133.00 35.33 67.50 
Total sales (€, '000) 11605.75 35228.99 90918.55 5754.14 33835.03 
No of employees 74.63 245.77 373.44 65.22 234.01 
Net profit (€, '000) 407.25 1523.20 5617.94 309.38 1830.31 
Average wage (€, '000) 31.45 19.10 25.33 15.22 20.61 
Total intangible asset (€, '000) 265.78 424.77 11795.07 57.83 644.44 
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4.6 TFP ESTIMATION 
 
The estimation of TFP is based on pooled OLS with year dummies, Levinsohn-Petrin 
(2003) and Wooldridge (2009) techniques described in detail in Section 4.4 and applied 
to only domestic firms in manufacturing and market service sector. 33F35 The Cobb Douglas 
production function is estimated separately for each 2 digit industry in order to capture 
the heterogeneity arising from different production technologies, quality and intensity of 
inputs used in the production. However, to meet the requirement of at least 50 
observations per industry (Gal, 2013), some industries are merged based on the grouping 
used in the WIOD database. 34F36 Productivity estimates for financial sector (NACE Rev 1.1 
codes 65-67) and the rest of service sector are also calculated, but should be treated with 
caution due to inherent difficulties in measuring output. The Wooldridge estimator is 
applied in one equation framework as implemented by Petrin et al. (2011) and Petrin and 
Levinsohn (2012). Standard errors for both pooled OLS and Wooldridge estimator are 
clustered at the firm level to control for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and within panel 
correlation. The Wooldridge estimator is the preferred choice for several reasons. First, 
it provides efficient standard errors robust to both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
which is not the case with other structural estimators which rely on bootstrapped standard 
errors. The latter is particularly worrisome in ACF case as it is demanding in data 
requirements. The problem increases in unbalanced dataset with many gaps as fewer 
observations are available to estimate input coefficients (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). 
Second, Wooldridge estimator is robust to ACF (2006) critique where labour may be 
unidentified in the first stage of LP estimator. 
Both value added and gross output production function were employed in empirical 
analysis in order to check their suitability for data in hand. However, in the case of 
Levinsohn-Petrin estimation of gross output production function on 2-digit NACE Rev 
1.1 level was not feasible for a number of industries and countries. The reason was the 
                                                 
35 Levinsohn and Petrin estimator is applied using STATA user written command “levpet” developed by 
Petrin et al. (2004). 
36 Due to low number of observations some industries were grouped together following the classification 
of WIOD database which is used to construct vertical linkages in the following chapters. Please refer to 
Tables II.5-II.9 in Appendix II were results by industry are reported. The first column is the NACE 1.1 2-
digit code which shows which industries were grouped. 
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lack of variation in data for a separate identification of input coefficients. Also, in certain 
cases the material coefficients were equal to one due to imposed upper limit in the 
estimation algorithm and as suggested by Arnold (2005) these estimations should be 
discarded. In the case of modified Wooldridge estimator, the capital coefficient was 
extremely low, while labour and materials coefficients had implausible values in certain 
industries across countries. In addition, diagnostic tests used to gauge instrument validity 
were not satisfied for most industries. For these reasons, we decided to continue the 
analysis using value added specification. 35F37 The decision to use value added instead of 
revenue as dependent variable is also motivated by findings of Bond and Soderbom 
(2005) and Ackerberg et al. (2006) who suggest that identification of perfectly variable 
inputs (materials) is not possible without input price variation across firms in a gross 
revenue specification of the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
In order to create internal instruments for instrumental variable regression we construct 
third degree polynomial approximation using first order lags of capital and intermediate 
inputs and labour input as instruments for equation (4.23) which allows us to obtain all 
production function coefficients in one step and at the same time controlling for 
multicollinearity of labour with polynomial function. Since first order lag of labour input 
is used as an external instrument for its current level, the validity of instrument is tested 
using Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic (2006). The latter is used to test whether the equation 
is identified, i.e., that the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous 
regressors. The null hypothesis is that equation is under identified which is rejected 
across all industries and countries. Further, since the assumption of identically and 
independent distributed errors (i.i.d.) is dropped we use Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 
to test for weak identification which arises when excluded instruments are weakly 
correlated with the endogenous regressors. The critical values obtained from Kleibergen-
Paap statistic are compared to critical values from Stock and Yogo (2005) and the null 
hypothesis of weak identification is rejected. Finally, we use Stock and Wright (2000) S 
statistic to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the endogenous regressors in 
the structural equation are jointly equal to zero and that the over identifying restrictions 
are valid. Again, the test rejects the null hypothesis suggesting that excluded instrument 
                                                 
37 By using value added specification we also tested dynamic implications of labour coefficient 
instrumenting it with longer lags starting at t-2. The reason for including longer lags is that labour in t-1 is 
part of the polynomial term used to invert out productivity. However, diagnostic tests did not support 
instrument validity. 
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is relevant and equation is exactly identified. Overall, we can be confident that TFP 
estimated by Wooldridge estimator satisfy the necessary diagnostics before turning to 
interpretation of input coefficients. 
In discussing the results special attention is paid to differences in parameter estimates 
across different methodologies. The results for all three estimators are shown in Tables 
II.5-II.9 in Appendix II. All reported estimates are based on an unbalanced sample of 
firms, thus allowing for implicit entry and exit of firms. 36F38 The results from pooled OLS 
model yield a labour coefficient value between 0.7 and 0.8 across industries and countries 
with the exception of Slovakia where parameter estimate of labour takes the value of 0.5 
on average across industries for OLS estimates and even lower for estimates obtained 
through semi parametric methods which may be the result of collinearity with 
productivity term. The parameter estimates of labour are slightly higher for services 
which are not surprising since the latter are more labour intensive. The labour estimates 
drop when applying structural estimators suggesting a positive correlation between 
labour and productivity term leading to an upward bias of labour coefficient in the case 
of OLS due to possible transmission bias. In general labour coefficient obtained from all 
estimators is highly significant across industries and countries. In some industries such 
as transport or financial industries the labour coefficient falls outside unit interval being 
larger than one suggesting a negative relationship between labour and productivity.  This 
is consistent with the idea that some firms within a sector are more productive and thus 
employ fewer workers per unit of output (Newman et al., 2015). 
The estimates of capital coefficient vary across country industry pairs and are mostly 
insignificant in Hungary when applying structural estimators probably due to lower 
precision of estimates arising from smaller number of observations. Furthermore, given 
that large firms are overrepresented in Hungarian dataset the complexity of accounting 
issues when evaluating different book values and different vintages may add to 
sometimes negative and insignificant capital coefficient (Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010). 
In all countries except Slovakia, the average value of capital takes the values between 
0.10 and 0.20 and the estimates of LP and Wooldridge are fairly similar. In general, it 
seems that structural estimators do not correct for possible downward bias of capital 
                                                 
38 It has been shown that including survival probability in the second stage of Olley and Pakes algorithm 
did not significantly changed the value of capital estimates (Van Beveren, 2012). 
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coefficient as the estimates are in most cases lower than those obtained from OLS. It may 
also suggest that firms’ use of capital is positively correlated with productivity, thus 
leading to an upward bias in OLS estimates. In general, this is a common finding in firm 
production function estimates as it is well known that measurement of capital is the most 
complex one (Galuscak and Lizal, 2011). The poor results for capital coefficient are 
possibly due to the fact that available services from this factor input are underutilised. 
Also, it may be that that the variables included in the polynomial approximation of the 
unobserved productivity hamper the identification of capital coefficient. However, it 
could also be the results of an attrition bias where only surviving firms are selected in the 
sample thus introducing a correlation between inputs and the error term which biases 
both input coefficients (CompNet Task Force, 2014). 
To summarize, comparison of the results across sectors and countries reveals that OLS 
tend to produce higher coefficient for labour input pointing out the importance of 
correcting the transmission bias. Furthermore, it is found that capital coefficient in 
Wooldridge estimator tends to be relatively smaller or in very few cases larger than OLS 
counterpart depending on the industry and chosen estimation algorithm which is a usual 
finding in the literature (Ornaghi and Van Beveren, 2012). Similar results are also 
obtained when running LP estimator, thus confirming the need to correct for biased 
labour coefficient when using OLS. The heterogeneity of point estimates is even clearer 
when we test whether the obtained coefficients satisfy the constant return to scale 
hypothesis. In general, OLS estimates point to higher returns to scale especially in the 
Czech Republic’s service sector and across all sectors in Estonia than structural 
estimators. The latter mostly predict decreasing returns to scale in almost all countries 
and industries. This is expected as OLS coefficient estimates tend to be upward biased. 
Overall, OLS seems to confirm constant returns to scale more often than Wooldridge and 
LP estimator. This heterogeneity may be the result of different characteristics of firms, 
industries and countries in terms of timing assumptions of inputs and their dynamic 
implications which is difficult to test form a practical point of view especially if one is 
interested to make comparison of estimates using the same methodology (Ornaghi and 
Van Beveren, 2012).  
An important question is whether the estimates obtained have any significant differences 
on the obtained TFP from different estimation algorithms. For this purpose, we have 
calculated Pearson pair-wise correlation coefficients across years from three estimators 
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provided in Tables II.11-II.15 in Appendix II. For each country there is a uniformly high 
correlation coefficient among different estimators (above 0.85) with the exception of 
Hungary where the correlation between structural estimators and OLS is 0.49. The same 
correlation matrix is calculated following several transformations, namely deviations 
from firm specific means, deviations from cross section means, growth rates of TFP and 
correlations in two main sectors of the economy. The correlation coefficients remain 
fairly robust across these different transformations. The exception is again Hungary 
where structural estimators are not strongly correlated across years and sectors. The latter 
result also holds for Slovenia where in manufacturing sector the correlation between OLS 
and Wooldridge/LP estimates is 0.50 and 0.57, respectively. Overall, the results indicate 
that different types of productivity measures are strongly correlated across several 
transformations, and especially their growth rates and within firm variation, are generally 
strongly related.  
A key stylized fact from firm level productivity estimations is wide dispersion even in 
narrowly defined industries which drives aggregate productivity as shown theoretically 
within a standard model of firm heterogeneity and international trade (Melitz and 
Ottaviano, 2008). A large dispersion of productivity may indicate a large room for 
improvements in aggregate productivity by reallocating resources from less productive 
to more productive industries (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). For this reason, in Table 4.5 
below we report standard statistics of productivity distribution measured as the difference 
between the 90th (top ten percent) and the 10th (lowest ten percent) percentile of log TFP 
of firms for each estimation algorithm (Syverson, 2011; Gal, 2013). As can be seen, 
productivity dispersion is larger for OLS estimates and the differences in comparison to 
Wooldridge are in range of 0.04-0.49 log points. 37F39 It is reassuring that productivity 
dispersion displays very similar patterns across different structural estimators and 
countries. The findings imply that firms with the highest productivity within industry 
will produce between 1.5 and 2.5 times more output with the same amount of inputs in 
case of Wooldridge estimator and 1.5 and 3 in case of OLS than firms within 10th 
percentile of TFP distribution. The highest dispersion of productivity estimates is evident 
in the Czech Republic followed by Estonia. On the other hand, lowest dispersion can be 
                                                 
39 In order to express the differences in percentages one needs to transform log points using this formula: 
100(ediff – 1) where e is exponential taking the value of 2.71 and diff is the difference in logpoints. In our 
case, the difference between OLS and WLP estimates in the Czech Republic of 0.49 log points amounts to 
approximately 63 percent. The lowest difference of 4 percent can be observed in Slovenia. 
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seen in Hungary and Slovenia. The latter results point to possible gains from reallocation 
of activity from low productive to high productive firms. 
TABLE 4.5 WITHIN INDUSTRY DISPERSION OF TFP ACROSS COUNTRIES AND ESTIMATION 
ALGORITHMS 
Note: Dispersion is measured as a ratio between top and lowest ten percentiles of TFP distribution within 
industry 
The importance of TFP dispersion can be gauged by looking at Figure 4.2 which shows 
that in all countries except Hungary dispersion within industries is greater than across 
industries. 38F40 These results imply that reallocation within the industry may be even more 
important than change in country specialization across industries, a finding similar to 
CompNet (2014).  
FIGURE 4.2 WITHIN AND ACROSS INDUSTRY TFP DISPERSION 
 
                                                 
40
Within-industry dispersion is computed as average standard deviations of firm-level productivity 
estimated by WLP within each industry. Across-industry dispersion is computed as the standard deviation 
of average industry-specific productivity. 
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CZECH 
REPUBLIC ESTONIA HUNGARY SLOVAKIA SLOVENIA 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Wooldridge  2.474 2.296 1.563 2.076 1.528 
Levinsohn Petrin 2.460 2.283 1.555 2.040 1.532 
OLS 2.973 2.550 1.654 2.163 1.532 
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To shed more light on the persistence of TFP dispersion Tables II.16-II.20 in Appendix 
II provide transition matrices for each country and main sectors using TFP estimates 
obtained from WLP estimation algorithm. Transition matrices are based on Markov chain 
processes which define a set of states, S = {s1,s2,…sr}. The process can start in any of the 
states and moves successively from one state to another. The basic assumption of Markov 
process is that its future given its present state is independent of the past. This can be 
expressed as P[Xn+1 = x | Xn = y] = P[Xn = x | Xn-1 = y]. Each cell in transition matrices 
shows the probabilities of firms moving from the first quartile of distribution to higher 
quartile over the period 2002-2010.39F41 The striking feature emerging from transition 
probabilities is that diagonal elements are always higher than off diagonal elements 
suggesting strong persistence in TFP of local firms. In all country-industry pairs the 
probability to remain in the same quartile of distribution over the period is above 50 per 
cent. If firms move in TFP distribution, they are more likely to end up either in the higher 
or lower closest quartile. In summary, it seems that factors such as selection and learning 
by doing do not find strong support in our sample as documented by other studies 
(Martin, 2008; Dumont, 2011). 
Finally, to evaluate whether different estimators yield similar conclusions we follow Van 
Beveren (2012) and Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) and evaluate sensitivity of TFP to 
some exogenous shock. The financial crisis that commenced in late 2007 with global 
repercussions on both financial and real sector represents a useful empirical exercise. 
Therefore, a simple regression with firm fixed effects was used to regress ln TFP on a 
crisis dummy taking the value of one from year 2008 until the end of period and zero 
otherwise. Results of this regression are reported in Table 4.6 and indicate similarities in 
the magnitude, sign and significance of crisis dummy across different estimation 
algorithms. The only notable differences can be seen in the case of Slovenia where 
structural estimators predict lower negative effect of crisis on TFP in comparison to OLS.  
Overall, it is reassuring that different estimation algorithms give comparable estimates 
                                                 
41 For example, if the firm’s TFP is below the median at time t, its probability to move to another state, 
i.e., above the median TFP at time t+1 can be obtained by dividing each cell in the matrix by its row total 
which sums to 1. The probability is then denoted as pij. known as transition probabilities. In general, if we 
have several possible states, the n-step probabilities to move from one state to another can be expressed as  
pij
n = ∑ pir
(k)
prj
(n−k)
r∈S  for any k such that 0 < k < n and S is the state space of Markov chain which in our 
case corresponds to quartiles of TFP distribution. 
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of TFP across countries, are highly correlated and provide the same conclusions when  
simple policy questions are analysed. 
TABLE 4.6 EFFECTS OF EXOGENOUS SHOCK ON TFP  
Note: cluster robust standard errors in brackets where ***, ** and * denote statistical significance of 
variables at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively 
 
4.7 ARE FOREIGN FIRMS MORE PRODUCTIVE? 
 
In the previous section we have determined that different estimation algorithms produce 
consistent and robust TFP estimates and that there is a substantial heterogeneity of TFP 
within industries. Recent theoretical and empirical literature has widely documented that 
firms engaged in international production or trade are more productive than purely 
domestic firms even in narrowly defined industries (Greenaway and Kneller 2006; 
Wagner 2007; Mayer and Ottaviano 2008; Arnold and Husinger, 2010). A theoretical 
model by Helpman et al. (2004) discussed in Chapter 1 predicts a pecking order of firms 
based on their productivity; least productive firms serve domestic markets, while better 
performers succeed in international markets and only those with the highest productivity 
engage in FDI. While the aim of this chapter is not to test Helpman et al.’s (2004) theory 
or to explore the black box of international premia, it is useful to test whether MNCs in 
our sample of countries are on average more productive and hence provide the potential 
to generate productivity spillovers to local firms. 
In order to have a first look at productivity differences we plot kernel density estimation 
of foreign and domestic firms, shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 for manufacturing and 
service sector respectively. 40F42 The graphs show all possible values of TFP of respective 
groups of firms on x axis and probability density function on y axis. We find that TFP 
                                                 
42 TFP is estimated using Wooldridge (2009) methodology described in Section 4.3 and empirically 
estimated in Section 4.5. 
 Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Slovakia Slovenia 
WLP 0.0826*** -0.0685*** -0.134*** -0.0505*** -0.00925* 
 (0.00297) (0.00425) (0.00622) (0.00541) (0.00566) 
LP 0.0855*** -0.0701*** -0.132*** -0.0457*** -0.00368 
 (0.00296) (0.00425) (0.00623) (0.00532) (0.00563) 
OLS 0.0613*** -0.0659*** -0.134*** -0.0676*** -0.0386*** 
 (0.00304) (0.00432) (0.00634) (0.00562) (0.00583) 
No of obs. 223,452 89,804 11,585 47,416 19,548 
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distribution of foreign firms is to the right of domestic firms in each country and sector. 
Moreover, the TFP estimates of foreign firms are more narrowly distributed around the 
average and for both groups TFP is more evenly distributed in manufacturing. 
FIGURE 4.3 TFP DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC FIRMS IN MANUFACTURING SECTOR   
 
 FIGURE 4.4 TFP DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC FIRMS IN SERVICE SECTOR  
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In order to formally test the TFP difference between foreign and domestic firms, one 
sided and two-sided nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) statistics are used. This 
test allows comparison and rankings of TFP distribution based on first order stochastic 
dominance. The advantage of this test in comparison of mean levels is that it compares 
all moments of distributions. In particular, following Delgado et al. (2002) we perform 
tests of stochastic dominance of a given distribution F(z) (for instance, the productivity 
distribution of foreign firms) with respect to another distribution D(z) (for instance, the 
productivity distribution of domestic firms). If foreign firms’ TFP distribution F(z) lies 
entirely right of  domestic firms’ distribution  D(z) first order stochastic dominance is 
defined as F(z) − D(z) ≤ 0. Stochastic dominance can be evaluated by testing two 
hypotheses: 
H0 : F(z) − D(z) = 0 ∀ z ∈ Ʀ  vs. H1 : F(z) − D(z) ≠ 0 for some z ∈ Ʀ  
H0 : F(z) − D(z) ≤ 0 ∀ z ∈ Ʀ  vs. H1 : F(z) − D(z) > 0 for some z ∈ Ʀ  
 
The first hypothesis is that TFP distributions of both groups are identical. This can be 
tested employing two sided K-S test for which the asymptotic distribution of the test 
statistic has been derived by Kolmogorov (1933) and Smirnov (1939) under the 
assumption of independently drawn samples. If one can reject first hypothesis and at the 
same time accept the second hypothesis, it can be concluded that distribution of F(z) 
dominates D(z). Since we have panel data, the independent assumption between samples 
may be violated. For this reason, we use K-S test for each country-year pair shown in 
Table 4.7 as suggested by Arnold and Hussinger (2010).  
TABLE 4.7 KOLMOGOROV SMIRNOV TEST OF EQUALITY OF TFP DISTRIBUTIONS 
 Czech R. Estonia Hungary Slovakia Slovenia 
Year 
One 
sided 
Two 
sided 
One 
sided 
Two 
sided 
One 
sided 
Two 
sided 
One 
sided 
Two 
sided 
One 
sided 
Two 
sided 
2002 0.000 0.411 -0.005 0.670 - - -0.041 0.233 -0.094 0.806 
 1.000 0.000 0.999 0.000 - - 0.899 0.061 0.916 0.003 
2003 -0.002 0.475 0.000 0.517 - - -0.012 0.228 0.000 0.827 
 0.997 0.000 1.000 0.000 - - 0.984 0.006 1.000 0.000 
2004 0.000 0.522 0.000 0.494 0.000 0.653 -0.002 0.300 -0.047 0.795 
 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.969 0.000 
2005 0.000 0.466 0.000 0.490 0.000 1.000 -0.008 0.236 -0.002 0.617 
 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.432 0.000 0.980 0.000 1.000 0.000 
2006 0.000 0.497 0.000 0.465 -0.007 0.340 -0.010 0.270 -0.003 0.545 
 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.994 0.000 0.960 0.000 1.000 0.000 
2007 0.000 0.487 0.000 0.470 0.000 0.326 -0.001 0.337 -0.002 0.507 
 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
2008 0.000 0.437 0.000 0.400 -0.001 0.313 -0.001 0.361 -0.013 0.338 
 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.980 0.000 
2009 0.000 0.409 -0.001 0.328 0.000 0.318 -0.002 0.194 -0.003 0.354 
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 1.000 0.000 0.999 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.994 0.000 0.998 0.000 
2010 - - 0.000 0.392 -0.016 0.304 - - -0.047 0.299 
 - - 1.000 0.000 0.985 0.010 - - 0.861 0.005 
Note: The largest difference in TFP between two groups is presented in the first row, while corresponding 
asymptotic p-values are marked in bold and italics. Due to insufficient number of observations in certain 
years, KS test was not calculated. 
 
As can be seen, the asymptotic p-values for two sided test are almost always zero for 
each country year pair suggesting that the equality of distributions can be rejected. The 
null hypothesis for one sided test stating that foreign firms have larger TFP than domestic 
firms cannot be rejected. From both tests it can be concluded that foreign firms are more 
productive than local firms as predicted by theory. In order to shed more light on these 
results we also run an OLS regression as in Bernard and Jensen (2007) to quantify the 
productivity premia of MNCs. The analysis is fairly straightforward and consist of the 
following model: 
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ⁡𝛼 +⁡𝛽⁡𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡⁡ +⁡𝛿⁡𝑙. 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 +⁡𝑦𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛾𝑟 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡             (4.25) 
In equation (4.25) firm TFP is regressed on a dummy variable indicating foreign 
ownership interpreted as average percentage difference between foreign and domestic 
firms, lagged size of the firm measured in terms of number of employees to eliminate the 
size effect and a set of time, industry and region dummies. Table 4.8 contains the 
estimated values of foreign ownership dummy across seven different specifications as 
indicated by names in the rows of the table. 
TABLE 4.8 TFP PREMIUM OF FOREIGN OVER DOMESTIC FIRMS 
 Czech R.  Estonia Hungary Slovakia Slovenia 
MNCs 0.684*** 0.476*** 0.509*** 0.526*** 0.415*** 
 (0.018) (0.0218) (0.0396) (0.0335) (0.0678) 
Fully owned 0.717*** 0.530*** 0.561*** 0.536*** 0.476*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0277) (0.0455) (0.0393) (0.0767) 
Partially owned 0.486*** 0.299*** 0.279*** 0.415*** 0.236* 
 (0.0340) (0.0291) (0.0644) (0.0545) (0.130) 
MNCs from the EU 0.692*** 0.488*** 0.517*** 0.555*** 0.430*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0225) (0.0402) (0.0350) (0.0687) 
MNCs from non EU 0.399*** 0.215*** 0.111 0.265*** 0.0109 
 (0.0890) (0.0764) (0.190) (0.0948) (0.368) 
MNCs in manufacturing 0.540*** 0.295*** 0.418*** 0.400*** 0.324*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0383) (0.0562) (0.0450) (0.109) 
MNCs in services 0.764*** 0.538*** 0.546*** 0.645*** 0.414*** 
 (0.0249) (0.0262) (0.0543) (0.0463) (0.0816) 
Observations 163,326 70,850 8,004 32,136 14,534 
Note: cluster robust standard errors in brackets.***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
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Results point to significant foreign ownership premium across all countries, the highest 
being in the Czech Republic and lowest in Slovenia where foreign firms are on average 
98 per cent and 51 per cent more productive, respectively. 41F43 Looking in more detail, fully 
owned foreign firms seem to be more productive in comparison to partially owned firms, 
but both groups outperform purely domestic firms. In terms of FDI origin, the TFP 
premium of EU firms is two to three times higher in comparison to non EU firms. 
However, one must bear in mind that there is a very low number of non-EU firms in TFP 
sample, which is also indicated with insignificant coefficient in Slovenia and Hungary. 
Finally, when we split the sample, we can see that MNCs in service sector are on average 
70 per cent, while those in manufacturing are 48 per cent more productive than domestic 
firms which is in line with Figures 4.2. and 4.3. 
As a robustness check we have also compared TFP distribution of foreign and domestic 
firms in manufacturing and service sector as well as the difference between foreign firms 
themselves according to ownership type using K-S test. Again, the results suggest that 
foreign firms’ TFP distribution stochastically dominates their counterpart in both 
sectors. 42F44 In addition, fully owned foreign firms are more productive than partially owned 
foreign firms which is in line with theoretical propositions discussed more thoroughly in 
the next chapter. The results hold for each country and sector, except for foreign firms in 
manufacturing sector in Slovenia.  Finally, we have estimated productivity difference 
between domestic and foreign firms using OLS estimates of TFP and found almost 
identical results except in Slovakia for the first two years of data. The estimation results 
for OLS estimates are shown in the Tables II.26-II.30 in Appendix II.  
Although there is evidence that foreign firms have higher productivity levels than purely 
domestic firms it may be that foreign firms self-select into more productive sectors or 
regions or “cherry pick” most productive domestic firms thus causing endogeneity 
problem. The later can be properly addressed only if one creates a missing counterfactual 
on how domestic firms would have performed in the absence of foreign investment.  One 
method commonly employed is a combination of propensity score matching with 
difference in difference approach to control for both observable and unobservable 
                                                 
43 In order to get the exact percentage effects of dummy variable on ln TFP we need to apply the following 
formula: 100[exp(dummy coefficient) - 1]. 
44 Please take note that this comparison is made on pooled sample of firms over the entire period available 
so they should be taken as indicative. The results of this exercise are shown in Tables II.21-II.25 in 
Appendix II. 
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characteristics, something that we leave for further research as the aim of this thesis is 
the estimation of indirect effects of FDI. 
 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter we have provided a review of different methodologies used to estimate 
TFP together with their basic assumptions about functional form, production technology 
used and the impact of measurement errors on the parameter estimates. The aim was not 
to test all available techniques, but to show the strengths and weaknesses of each method 
as guidance for empirical work taking into account data specificities, research interests 
and assumptions one is making about DGP. Since our analysis is focused on publicly 
available information obtained from Amadeus database it is necessary to recognize that 
although the sample of analysed countries is fairly representative in terms of total 
employment and turnover when compared to official statistics it is less ideal for TFP 
estimation due to large number of missing observations on input and output data.  This 
is especially pronounced in Hungary which also differs from other countries in above 
average representativeness of large firms in the sample. Furthermore, the accounting data 
do not provide detailed enough information about different products nor their 
composition changes over time which may affect the measurement of output. Similarly 
we are not able to control for bias arising from using industry deflators to gauge firms’ 
physical output. Data on factor inputs are presented in very crude form which may 
additionally exacerbate measurement in inputs. These and other issues related to TFP 
estimation discussed in the text affected our choice of methodology.  
Several reviews have shown that semi parametric techniques are robust to measurement 
issues and provide accurate productivity estimates. It assumes that productivity evolves 
as Markov process which enables its flexible characterization in comparison to other 
techniques. Furthermore, the problem of simultaneity bias between inputs and 
unobserved productivity term is resolved without the need to use GMM estimation 
techniques which require validity of instruments used for each set of regressions. 
However, structural estimators are not without drawbacks as the assumption of 
monotonicity between proxy variable and productivity conditional on capital has to hold. 
 
168 
Furthermore, scalar unobservable assumption may not hold if there are any other omitted 
variables affecting unobserved productivity. Since TFP is used as a dependent variable 
in the following empirical chapters we have used three methodologies (OLS, LP and 
WLP) to test whether TFP estimates differ in several aspects.  The reliance on semi 
parametric methods has become very popular in recent years, however little attention has 
been paid to estimates of input coefficients and TFP obtained through such procedure in 
comparison to other “classical” approaches such as OLS. The result of our analysis 
suggests that OLS indeed leads to overestimation of labour coefficient giving support to 
the structural estimators as a possible solution to “transmission bias”. Similarity of 
coefficients is also partially confirmed when comparing returns to scale. In most cases 
all three estimators suggest decreasing returns to scale although the magnitude is 
somewhat higher for OLS estimates. Several robustness checks such as correlation 
coefficients across several dimensions, within industry dispersion of TFP and simple 
regressions have indicated that productivity estimates are very robust across different 
methodologies, a finding similar to other studies (Van Beveren, 2012).. In summary, if 
one is interested in non-deterministic part of production function the choice of estimation 
methodology is of lesser importance as shown in other studies (Van Biesebroeck, 2006; 
Van Beveren, 2012). Given the advantages of Wooldridge estimator over other 
estimations techniques it is chosen as our preferred method for TFP estimation and used 
as dependent variable in subsequent chapters. 
The main findings related to TFP estimation can be summarised as follows. Firms in 
Hungary are on average the most productive while firms in Estonia are the least 
productive, which is not surprising given the average size of the firms in the sample, thus 
providing support to heterogenous trade models which recognized firm size as an 
important determinant of productivity (Melitz, 2003) and is in accordance with some 
previous empirical analysis (e.g. Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007). During the period of 
analysis, domestic firms in all countries have experienced improvements in productivity 
as indicated by interquartile movements, especially firms whose TFP is below median 
levels in both services and manufacturing sector. However, majority of firms still 
experience a strong persistence in TFP. 
In terms of productivity differences between domestic and foreign firms, the empirical 
findings suggest that productivity distribution of foreign firms is significantly different 
from purely domestic firms across years and sectors using WLP and OLS methodology. 
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In addition, regression results point that on average foreign firms are more productive as 
implied by both non parametric tests across manufacturing and services sector. This is 
also confirmed in regression analysis taking into account foreign firms’ ownership 
characteristics and origin as well as their sector of operation. Since potential for 
productivity spillovers estimated in the next chapters relies on the assumption of superior 
performance of foreign over domestic firms we may be confident that domestic firms 
may benefit from indirect effects of FDI. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The endogenous growth theory suggests that technological progress is a key factor to 
economic growth of countries (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and 
Howitt, 1997). In this context FDI is seen as bundle of intangible assets, codified and 
tacit knowledge and technology which are transferred either directly or indirectly to host 
economy. Through technology transfer and spillovers, endogenous growth theory 
suggests that FDI can increase the development of intermediate product variety, improve 
the quality of products, increase the intensity of R&D and bring new forms of human 
capital (UNECE, 2001). Therefore, transition countries have made considerable efforts 
in attracting FDI through various financial, fiscal and other forms of investment 
incentives such as subsidies for infrastructure, regulatory concessions and certain 
exemptions from labour laws. The investment policies and various incentives offered to 
MNCs are based on the premise that FDI delivers important contributions to economic 
development of countries through technology transfer and productivity improvements 
resulting from knowledge diffusion to local firms. Although the theoretical arguments 
provide strong positive relationship between FDI and economic growth, the empirical 
studies on both macro and micro level are less clear cut. 
As is discussed in Chapter 2 the main reason for such an ambiguity is related to the 
employment of firm level data - which appear to be the most appropriate level of analysis 
of FDI spillovers. Furthermore, different methodologies, data sources, and firm, industry, 
country and geographical heterogeneity are mentioned as possible sources of the failure 
to corroborate the expected positive effects. Recently, several improvements have been 
made to alleviate these problems, the most important ones being the differentiation 
between horizontal and vertical spillover channels, the incorporation of firm 
heterogeneity and moderating factors such as absorptive capacity. Substantial research 
in the area has found that vertical linkages are a major source of FDI productivity 
spillovers and that absorptive capacity of firms and host countries also matter for these 
spillovers. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of MNCs has been recognized as an important 
factor for spillover potential. However, many questions still remain, especially those 
related to exact mechanisms of knowledge transfer.   
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In order to shed more light on the inconclusive results of FDI spillovers found in the 
transition literature, this chapter makes several contributions. First, the existing studies 
of FDI spillovers reviewed in Chapter 2 have provided partial analyses of spillover 
effects focusing on foreign presence in a manufacturing industry (e.g. Vahter, 2006; 
Halpern and Murakozy, 2007; Nicolini and Resmini, 2010; Damijan et al., 2013a) or in 
case they include all firms in the economy only horizontal spillovers is investigated 
(Djankov and Hoekman, 2000; Konings, 2001; Sinani and Meyer, 2004; Vahter and 
Masso, 2007; Kosova, 2010) with the exception of Kolasa (2008). The volume of FDI in 
service sector has gained significant share and overpassed that in manufacturing sector, 
thus influencing the changes in economic structure. The motives and strategic objectives 
of such investment are inherently different and thus provide diverse knowledge spillover 
potential.  
The second contribution is related to MNC heterogeneity, specifically the role of partially 
and fully foreign owned enterprises in generating knowledge spillovers and creation of 
vertical linkages. Furthermore, the theory suggests that FDI origin brings different 
managerial practices and technologies which may benefit local firms to the extent that 
the latter are able to synthesize various sources of knowledge and result in higher 
productivity.  Therefore, we deviate from the contemporary literature which has focused 
on issues such as absorptive capacity and other factors influencing the demand side of 
FDI spillovers. Third, the time period of investigation is in most cases confined to the 
end of 1990s or the beginning of 2000s. However, changes in macroeconomic and 
business environment as well as the progress in institutions further influenced the entry, 
type and motive of foreign firms at the onset of transition and integration of these 
countries into international and supranational organizations. As was discussed in Chapter 
3, these countries experienced a significant institutional restructuring characterised by a 
slow and complex process of creating informal network of government agencies, 
suppliers and research centres (Narula and Guimon, 2010). Studies investigating IDP 
found significant differences across CEECs due to socio-political and economic 
histories, absorptive capacity, industrial policies and legal frameworks (Bourdier, 2008; 
Chobanova, 2009). Significant changes in the mode of entry, internal organisations and 
motives of MNCs towards efficiency seeking and strategic assets seeking followed by 
fragmentation of their activities across countries and industries are likely to have 
different developmental impact on host countries. 
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Fourth, methodological and data issues as well as the model specification have 
contributed to ambiguity and diversity of results among countries. The current static 
approach to FDI spillovers is inadequate as it does not correspond to theoretical 
transmission channels suggesting short and long run effects of MNC entry and effects on 
local firms. This also has important policy implications as the incentives are warranted 
only if FDI brings long term benefits to local firms. With that in mind, we use dynamic 
panel estimation which enables us to control for various specification issues such as 
simultaneity bias, measurement errors in foreign presence due to incomplete datasets and 
possible selection issues inherent in some of the previous empirical work which did not 
include small firms. Since previous research has shown that small firms lack the capacity 
to benefit from FDI spillovers (Altomonte and Pennings, 2009; Blalock and Simon, 
2009), excluding them leads to overestimation of true spillover effect (Eapen, 2013). 
Finally, the use of a comprehensive firm level database which covers the more recent 
period and the use of common methodology enable us to make cross country comparisons 
of FDI spillover effects, thus partially contributing to explanation of ambiguous 
empirical results witnessed so far.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the empirical model and 
estimation strategy used, followed by data description and methodological approach in 
Section 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. Section 5.5 provides the discussion of results from FDI 
spillovers effects and their heterogeneous effects due to MNCs’ characteristics. Finally, 
Section 5.6 concludes. 
 
5.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
The most common assumption in international business and international trade literature 
discussed in Chapter 1 is that firms engaged in cross border transactions possess specific 
advantages that enable them to transfer technology across borders while reaping the 
benefits of host locations. Ethier and Markusen (1996) and Markusen and Venables 
(1998) argue that FDI is chosen as the optimal entry strategy because it minimises the 
probability of imitation, especially under imperfect state of intellectual property rights in 
the host-country. In these models, productivity spillovers are less likely to arise. 
Organizational choices, economies of scope stemming from product specific R&D, trade 
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secrecy and efficiency wages are means which MNCs use to protect their knowledge 
(Kugler, 2006). However, as discussed in Chapter 2, a large literature has developed over 
the last three decades which argue that FDI spillovers can still occur due to market failure 
and the public good nature of firm specific assets (Koizumi and Kopecki, 1977; Findlay, 
1978; Das, 1987; Wang and Bloomstrom, 1992; and Fosfuri et al., 2001). The major 
shortcoming of this literature is that they only provide a partial picture of spillover 
channels focusing on the homogenous effects of FDI within a specific industry or 
country.  
More recent research on FDI spillovers has focused on the role of domestic firms in the 
Global Value Chains (GVC) which encompass specific activities in the production 
process where individual firms and even countries are involved in just one stage of 
product’s value chain (Baldwin, 2012). Since the MNC can benefit from knowledge 
diffusion when it establishes connection with downstream clients and upstream suppliers, 
it will cooperate with domestic firms by signing supply contracts or licensing 
agreements. The creation of linkages benefits suppliers directly due to transfer of generic 
knowledge increasing their specialisation and efficiency.  This in turn creates pecuniary 
externalities to MNCs and local firms as they are able to source intermediate inputs at 
lower prices. This set of models, concerned with dynamic vertical linkages between 
MNCs and local firms as well as the outcome of their interaction, is discussed more 
thoroughly in Chapter 2 (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Markusen and Venables, 1999). 
Although vertical linkages involve market transactions, they also generate technological 
externalities as local firms absorb, adapt and replicate the knowledge and technology of 
foreign firms, receive training and financial support, engage in joint product and process 
development and share business information.  
The empirical model developed in this chapter is built upon transmission channels of FDI 
spillovers discussed in Chapter 2, namely horizontal spillovers and vertical linkages, 
linked with the insights discussed in Section 2.5.1 in Chapter 2 emphasising MNCs’ 
heterogeneity. Horizontal channel of FDI spillovers in our case includes net effects of 
technology or knowledge spillovers arising from a combination of demonstration, 
imitation and competition effects while potential effects arising from worker mobility 
are not explored due to unavailable data on worker flows. The other type of knowledge 
spillovers arise from vertical linkages between MNCs and local firms. They can be 
divided between backward and forward linkages. They include both pecuniary spillovers 
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arising from changes in relative prices and costs and technological spillovers such as 
informal knowledge transfer (e.g. technical assistance, quality control, employee 
training).  Empirically it is difficult to disentangle pecuniary from technological 
spillovers and thus the former are usually captured in productivity estimates. Therefore, 
in this case term “spillovers” refers to FDI externalities that capture both knowledge 
spillovers and voluntary technology transfer occurring through buyer supplier linkages. 
Since we do not have data which would enable us to identify direct linkages between 
domestic and foreign firms, it is not possible to estimate direct effects of knowledge 
transfer such as technical assistance or quality assurance systems provided by foreign 
firms. 
As the main objective of this chapter is the analysis of economic effects of FDI spillovers, 
we rely on a production function framework commonly used in the literature. In line with 
endogenous growth theory productivity is not only determined by firm specific 
technologies, but also by various external factors available in the economy. Therefore, 
total factor productivity (TFP) estimated in Chapter 4 is related to various factors that are 
internal and external to the firm. Since the main interest lies in technology shock Tit 
induced by FDI, this can be expressed in the following way: 
Tit = f
i (Iit, Ejt)                      (5.1) 
where (Fit, ACit) ϵ Iit 
          (HSjt, VTjt,ITjt)  ϵ Ejt 
 
Internal factors (Iit) are foreign ownership (Fit) and absorptive capacity (ACit) of firm i at 
time t expressed in terms of intangible assets (Marroccu et al., 2012), human capital 
(Blalock and Gertler, 2009), size and age. Main external factors (Eit) include various 
measures of horizontal spillovers (HSjt) and vertical linkages (VTjt) together with 
variables controlling for competition effects and demand conditions (ITjt) expressed at 
industry level j. The basic idea underlying equation (5.1) is that firms can increase their 
technology level internally through investment in human capital and intangible assets or 
by changing their ownership structure.  Since the main interest of this thesis lies in the 
estimation of indirect effects of FDI on purely domestic firms, the term Fit indicating 
direct foreign equity participation is dropped from the empirical model. An alternative 
way to boost its technology is to rely on external sources of knowledge, namely those 
generated by presence of MNCs in industry in which domestic firms operate or in 
upstream or downstream industries acting as suppliers or customers. 
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Formally, the empirical model has the following form: 
 𝒍𝒏⁡𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝝆 𝒍𝒏 (𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊,𝒕−𝟏)⁡+⁡𝜹𝟏𝑯𝑺𝒋𝒕 +𝝋𝟐𝑽𝑻𝒋𝒕 + 𝜽𝟑𝑨𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝝈𝟒𝑰𝑻𝒋𝒕 +
 𝜸𝒋 +  𝜸𝒓 + 𝜸𝒕 + ɛ𝒊𝒋𝒕                                                                                                   (5.2) 
Where ln 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of TFP of firm i at time t that is estimated in Chapter 4 
and 𝑙𝑛 (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) is lagged level of TFP. 𝐻𝑆𝑗𝑡 and 𝑉𝑇𝑗𝑡 are defined at the industry level 
and stand for horizontal spillovers and vertical linkages respectively defined below in 
more detail. 𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 denotes the vector of firm level variables, namely the stock of human 
capital and intangible assets. In addition, we control for firm’s age and size. Vector 𝐼𝑇𝑗𝑡 
includes variables controlling for competition in the market and demand from 
downstream sectors defined at the industry level j at time t. Finally  𝛾𝑗⁡represents industry 
dummies (defined at NACE 1.1 Rev. level) controlling for unobserved time invariant 
industry specific factors that may influence both the level of FDI and productivity of 
local firms.  Region (defined at NUTS 3 level) dummies 𝛾𝑟 control for spatial differences 
in the pattern of FDI and differences in regional performance. Year dummies 𝛾𝑡 take into 
account changes in economic environment that could lead to changes in MNCs’ presence 
and improvements in TFP. In the following paragraphs we present the description of 
these variables and explain the rationale of including them in the empirical model.  
The specification is derived from theoretical propositions, the most relevant of which is 
the “partial adjustment” model. In that model, the dependent variable responds sluggishly 
to changes in the explanatory variables, with geometrically declining lag weights. In this 
context responses in productivity may be delayed, for example because technological 
externalities take time to materialise as they depend on the formation of business links 
with domestic firms in case of vertical linkages or reactions of indigenous firms to 
increased competition. Since TFP follows a first order Markov process in structural 
estimators discussed in more detail in the Chapter 4 it is lagged one year to capture the 
dynamic process of learning by doing occurring within the firm. Furthermore, TFP is a 
highly persistent variable indicating autocorrelation problems which are best addressed 
in a dynamic framework. 
In the literature, the methodology for calculating spillover variables is drawn from the 
works of Caves (1974) and Javorcik (2004a) and it is based on an input output 
framework. In the absence of detailed data on inter firm relationship, which are only 
available if one conducts a survey, input-output tables provide the best possible option 
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to gauge the relationship between firms in different industries. In principle it provides 
information on interconnections between industries and relies on the assumption that 
sectoral R&D and technology or knowledge is embodied in output. We begin by 
constructing a measure of intra-industry or horizontal spillovers calculated as following:  
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑗𝑡(𝐻𝑆) =
∑ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡∗⁡𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
                                                     (5.3) 
where Yijt is the output (measured as revenue) produced by foreign firm i in industry j in 
year t.  𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating if the firm is foreign owned. It takes 
the value of one if the sum of shares of foreign investors exceeds 10% of a firm’s equity 
and zero otherwise. As common in the literature intra industry spillovers are calculated 
at NACE (Rev. 1.1) 2-digit industry group level defined in World Input Output Database 
(WIOD) given that input output tables used to construct vertical linkages defined below 
are based on this classification. Horizontal measure captures the output produced by 
foreign firms i in industry j in time t and is a measure of both demonstration and imitation 
effects. 43F45  
 
In order to calculate vertical linkages the data from WIOD is used (Timmer, 2012). 44 F46 
This database has been published only recently and provides yearly input output tables 
aggregated over 35 NACE Rev. 1.1 2-digit level sectors covering 27 EU countries and 
13 other major countries. Yearly data allow us to estimate time varying Input-Output 
coefficients which is a significant improvement over previous studies which used I-O 
tables from early/mid 2000s, thus ignoring the changing economic structure of countries 
over years.  
 
The impact of foreign suppliers or customers is assessed using the proportion of foreign 
firms in upstream and downstream sectors respectively. In order to compute technical 
coefficients that are used for calculating vertical linkages, we depart from the work of 
Javorcik (2004a) and include inputs supplied within the same industry. 45F47 The reason for 
                                                 
45 When calculating horizontal measure the total number of firms available in the database was used 
regardless of whether these firms had data on all production function variables for TFP estimation.  
46 This project is funded by the European Commission, Research Directorate General as part of the 7th 
Framework Programme, Theme 8: Socio-Economic Sciences and Humanities. The details on how WIOD 
has been constructed and sources of data can be found in Timmer (2012). 
47 Measure of backward linkages employed by Javorcik (2004a) typically exclude inputs supplied within 
the same industry as these are captured by horizontal spillovers. It is calculated as 𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘≠𝑗 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑧𝑘𝑡 . 
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this lies in the fact that is unrealistic to assume no inter-industry linkages in highly 
aggregated industries. For example, when calculating input/output coefficients among 
industries we were constrained to use the same I-O coefficients for four NACE Rev. 1.1 
sectors (30, 31, 32 and 33). Therefore, if buyer supplier linkages between those four 
sectors are higher than competitive pressures measured by horizontal spillovers 
backward or forward linkages will be underestimated.  If we exclude inputs supplied 
within the same industry we imply that productivity spillovers occurring at lower levels 
of aggregation are captured by horizontal spillovers and vertical spillovers will not be 
identified (Barbosa and Eiriz, 2009). Therefore, excluding/including inputs supplied 
within the same industry might affect empirical results as shown by Lenaerts and 
Merlevede (2012). Backward linkages at two-digit industry level are calculated as 
following: 
⁡𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡⁡(𝑉𝑇) ⁡= ∑𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5.4) 
where 𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡 measures the proportion of industry j’s output supplied to industry k at time t 
and 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡⁡is share of foreign owned firms in downstream sector k. The technical 
coefficients 𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡 ⁡are calculated for domestic intermediate consumption, therefore 
excluding final uses, export and imports. 46F48 By concentrating on domestic intermediate 
consumption we are able to relax the common and wrong assumption that MNCs use 
domestic inputs in the same proportion as imported inputs. Although both types of inputs 
can increase TFP of domestic firms, MNCs may source different inputs in host country 
according to literature on international outsourcing of intermediate inputs (Barrios et al., 
2011). The backward linkage captures spillovers between MNCs and local suppliers and 
it has two sources of changes. The first is related to changes in customer-supplier 
relationship at the industry level, thus rejecting a restrictive assumption of stable inter-
industry relationship in transition countries. The second source of variation comes from 
changes in foreign presence in downstream industry and as the latter increases so does 
the extent of vertical linkages. 
 
                                                 
48 To compute technical coefficients, the inputs in the domestic intermediate IO table are used to find the 
row and column totals and then each input is divided by the appropriate total (the column total for forward 
spillovers, the row total for backward spillovers). No adaptations are made to the coefficients in the input-
output table. 
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Similarly, forward linkages are calculated as: 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡(𝑉𝑇) =∑𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5.5) 
In this case technical coefficient 𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡 the proportion of industry j’s inputs purchased from 
industry l at time t. The forward linkage is a proxy for spillovers between MNCs and 
their local clients in industry j. The larger the presence of MNCs in upstream sectors l 
and the larger the output sold to local firms the higher is the value of the variable. 
 
Since we are interested in examining the supply side of spillover process, the above 
measures are corrected to take into account MNCs’ heterogeneity, namely their 
geographical origin and the extent of foreign ownership. This enables us to partially 
address the critique put forward by Barrios et al. (2011) that MNCs of different origin do 
not have the same input sourcing behaviour 47F49. Foreign firms are therefore divided among 
two groups reflecting investors from EU and rest of the world. Vertical linkages and 
horizontal spillovers are recalculated accordingly taking into account MNCs’ different 
origins. Similarly, we recalculate vertical linkages and horizontal spillovers to capture 
the heterogeneous effects of different degree of foreign ownership according to fully 
owned (>99%) and partially owned foreign firms (>10% & <99%). 
Most of the studies surveyed in Chapter 2 have shown the importance of firm absorptive 
capacity to reap the benefits of foreign presence. Therefore, two measures of absorptive 
capacity are developed and are captured within AC vector. First, human capital is 
recognized as an important determinant in the context of FDI-growth effects (Romer, 
1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Borensztein et al., 1998) and in innovation and 
learning process (Meyer and Sinani, 2009). Human capital affects TFP growth by 
facilitating the adoption and implementation of new technology developed exogenously 
(Nelson and Phelps, 1966), and/or by promoting the domestic production of 
technological innovations (Aghion and Howitt, 1997). By incorporating the quality of 
labour inputs into a production function, O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) were able to 
explain the large part of the TFP growth. Haltiwanger et al. (1999) used a matched 
                                                 
49 Barrios et al. (2011) in addition to separate horizontal spillover according to nationality of foreign 
investors also use investors’ home country IO tables to calculate IO technical coefficients.   
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employer-employee dataset and found that labour productivity is positively associated 
with higher proportion of educated workers. 
Apart from its direct effects on TFP, human capital is important in the context of FDI 
spillovers through its multifaceted moderating role. First, firms with high levels of human 
capital are more likely to benefit from direct entry of MNCs since imitation of foreign 
technology, operational and management skills required to cope with increased 
competition require some level of human capital. Second, in order to become a supplier 
of MNCs, domestic firms need to increase their efficiency and supply quality. MNCs 
provide domestic firms with information about products, prices, markets; they also 
provide technical, financial, management and procurement assistance (Giroud et al., 
2012).  Therefore, the higher the level of human capital, the more likely it is that firms 
will meet quality standards and become suppliers of MNCs. Merlevede and Schoors 
(2005) argue that domestic firms with lower levels of human capital can experience 
negative backward linkages due to their inability to compete. However, higher levels of 
human capital may also be detrimental as firms with skilled labour may charge higher 
prices for their products. This might be the case if MNCs are more oriented to cost 
savings and prevention of knowledge transfer. If cost savings are the main reason for 
engaging in backward linkages, firms with lower levels of human capital are more likely 
to be hired as suppliers as they are engaged in low valued added activities (Giroud et al., 
2012).  
In the case of forward spillover, firms with skilled labour are more likely to benefit from 
high quality inputs in their production process, thus increasing their productivity. On the 
contrary, firms with lower levels of human capital are less likely to benefit from foreign 
firms’ inputs and may even experience negative competition effects from both foreign 
subsidiaries and local firms. Since the Amadeus database does not provide information 
on skill structure of employees, another measure of the quality of human capital is 
constructed for this study. Following Becker (1964), it is assumed wage rates reflect the 
employee’s general human capital. Accordingly, we use average wages paid within the 
firm as a measure of labour quality. Wagner (2012) demonstrated that the average wage 
in a firm is a useful proxy variable for the qualification of the employees, although it 
does not account for the heterogeneity of the labour force. 
The second variable used as a determinant of firm TFP and as a measure of absorptive 
capacity is intangible assets. Studies investigating FDI productivity spillovers have 
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found that technologically advanced industries and firms with high R&D intensity are in 
a better position to benefit from the presence of MNCs (Keller and Yeaple, 2009; Aghion 
et al., 2009). Recent research has recognised that a range of intangible assets grouped in 
digitized information (IT capital), innovative property (scientific and non-scientific 
R&D) and economic competences (brand names, firms’ specific human capital and 
organizational structure) is conducive to innovation based growth and productivity 
improvements (Andrews and de Serres, 2012; Corrado et al., 2009). The widespread 
heterogeneity and asymmetry in the distribution of firm performance has been related to 
different within-firm factors such as varying use of intangibles (Syverson, 2011).  This 
is in line with Resource Based Models (RBM) which views firms as distinctive bundles 
of resources and capabilities (Teece, 1988) and capability based theory of the firm in 
which firm’s decisions are determined mainly by the capabilities of the firm accumulated 
over time (Dosi et al., 2000). 
At the macro level, research has shown that intangible assets explain a larger share of 
labour productivity growth than tangible assets in a number of countries (Corrado et al., 
2009; Marrano et al., 2009; Borgo et al., 2013). Similarly, micro level studies have found 
a positive relationship between firm investment in intangibles and productivity level 
(Bontempi and Mairesse, 2008; Marrocu et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2013; Battistini et al., 
2014).  In order to include a broader measure of firms’ capabilities, intangible asset will 
be used in this study. The choice of using intangible asset is driven both by the 
unavailability of data on R&D expenditure in the Amadeus database and empirical 
motivation. The latter can be explained by the fact that TFP estimation discussed in the 
previous chapter is based on the revenue approach. Since R&D expenditure is only one 
of the many variables that can influence firms’ revenue, Battistini et al. (2014) argue that 
intangible assets provide more comprehensive measure of effort that firms incur in order 
to improve their market position and revenues as they include R&D costs, absorptive 
capability and marketing, design and technical expenditure with the goal of increasing 
revenues. However, as intangibles include a broad range of factors, measuring them is a 
challenging task from the accounting perspective as some items can be considered as 
both current expenditure or capital accumulation (Marrocu et al., 2012).   Since Amadeus 
database does not provide detailed information on different factors comprising 
intangibles the latter is proxied by the ‘share of intangible asset in total fixed assets’ and 
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measures firms’ endowment with specific advantages. 48 F50 It should be noted that a large 
number of firms do not report intangible asset. Since the variable is expressed in 
logarithms, observations with zero values of intangible asset have been transformed to 
half of the smallest observable value as it is highly likely that these are not true zeros but 
very small values which are reported as such in the database. The expected effect of 
intangible asset as a moderating factor of FDI spillovers is the same as in the case of 
human capital. Therefore, both variables measuring absorptive capacity will 
simultaneously be included in the model as they measure knowledge capital which is 
expected to positively affect productivity. 
Other firm specific variables include firm size and age and their quadratic terms to 
control for possible nonlinear effects. It is expected that firm size measured as natural 
logarithm of total assets play an important role in absorption of spillovers and 
productivity enhancing process. Passive learning model of firm dynamics predicts that 
larger firms are more productive due to a selection process in which more efficient firms 
grow and survive (Jovanovic, 1982). New trade theory suggests that differences in firms’ 
performance can be attributed to heterogeneity in terms of productivity and size (Melitz, 
2003). The empirical evidence has shown that the average productivity of countries is 
driven by large firms (Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008, CompNet, 2014). Besides direct 
effects such as learning by doing and scale and scope economies there are also indirect 
effects through other variables affecting productivity which are related to firm’s size 
(Barbosa and Eiriz, 2009). Larger firms usually invest more in R&D, have large number 
of trained and skilled people, more competent management, and pay higher wages 
increasing the probability to introduce innovation and enhance their efficiency (Huergo 
and Jaumandreu, 2004; Farole and Winkler, 2012). They are also more adaptable and 
flexible, thus are more likely to be selected as suppliers and become clients of MNCs 
(Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare, 2004). Therefore, the sign of this variable is expected to 
be positive.  However, small and medium sized firms are also likely to benefit from 
spillovers, as they are more innovative and can adapt their business processes more 
quickly. The inclusion of a quadratic term is motivated by the fact that size of the firm 
may be relevant to TFP, i.e. there might be an optimal firm size which enables firms to 
benefit from low unit costs and organizational structure. Similarly, age can also be an 
                                                 
50 Definition of intangible asset in Amadeus database include R&D expenditures, patents, copyrights, 
software, employee training, trademarks and other similar costs and as such comprises only those 
intangible assets that have been capitalized. 
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important determinant of productivity as it reflects business experience, ability to adapt 
and familiarity with customer needs. Thus, it is expected that older firms have more 
specific knowledge that enables them to benefit from foreign entry since they have 
accumulated experience and knowledge through learning by doing. However, younger 
firms may be more productive as they may use more advanced technology and innovative 
business practices. By including quadratic term of age we control for the possibility that 
young firms may have lower TFP due to limited access to finance and time to 
accommodate to industry conditions while older firms may experience a decrease in their 
productivity due to vintage capital effect. 
Since a measure of horizontal spillovers may also capture the effect of competition, it is 
necessary to isolate these two effects. Foreign entry may induce more competition, thus 
forcing local firms to become more efficient and productive. By not incorporating a 
specific variable measuring competition, increased productivity may be wrongly 
attributed to spillovers. The Herfindahl-Hirshman concentration index is used to 
calculate the intensity of competition. It is defined as the sum of the squares of sales 
shares of all firms in industry j (defined at 2 digit NACE Rev. 1.1 level) and time t. The 
sign of this variable is expected to be negative, at least in the short run. Besides 
competition which may affect horizontal spillovers, we also include a demand variable 
for two reasons. First, foreign firm entry may increase demand for local inputs which 
may favour economies of scale. On the other hand, if MNCs import most of their 
intermediates, local firms will face a decrease in productivity since fixed costs of 
production will be spread to fewer units. The second reason of including the demand 
variable is the fact that most firms operate in monopolistic competition or in other 
imperfect market structures, thus having enough market power to influence the price. As 
our measure of output in Chapter 4 is not expressed in physical quantities but as deflated 
sales using industry price deflators, it may be subject to omitted price bias and therefore 
not reflect the true level of productivity.  Therefore, it is necessary to separate the 
variation in quantities which are a measure of true efficiency from variation in prices due 
to market power by including the demand variable (Van Biesebroeck, 2007). Hence, the 
demand variable is calculated as: 
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑡 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝑌𝑘𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5.6) 
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Where 𝛼𝑘𝑗 represents quantity of good j needed to produce one unit of good k at time t 
while Ykt represents the total real output of industry k.  The definitions of all variables are 
provided in Table 5.1. 
TABLE 5.1 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
Variable Definition 
TFP 
Logarithm of total factor productivity estimated using WLP 
(2011) method 
TFPit  = yit  − β K kit  − β L lit 
Proxy for horizontal spillovers 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ ⁡𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
 
Proxy for backward linkages 𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑧𝑘𝑡  
Proxy for forward linkages 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡 =∑𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑧𝑙𝑡 
Proxy for horizontal spillovers 
arising from EU countries  
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐸𝑈⁡𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐸𝑈 ∗⁡𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
 
 
Proxy for horizontal spillovers 
arising from non-EU countries 
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈⁡𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈 ∗⁡𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
 
 
Proxy for horizontal spillovers 
arising from fully owned foreign 
firms 
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙⁡𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 ∗ ⁡𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
 
 
Proxy for horizontal spillovers 
arising from partially owned 
foreign firms 
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡⁡𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 ∗ ⁡𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
 
 
Proxy for backward linkages arising 
from EU countries 
𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝐸𝑈𝑗𝑡 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡𝐸𝑈 
 
Proxy for backward linkages arising 
from non-EU countries 
𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈𝑗𝑡 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑧𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈 
 
Proxy for backward linkages arising 
from fully owned foreign firms 
𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑡 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 
 
Proxy for backward linkages arising 
from partially owned foreign firms 
𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑗𝑡 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 
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Proxy for forward linkages arising 
from EU countries 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝐸𝑈𝑗𝑡 =∑𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝐸𝑈 
 
Proxy for forward linkages arising 
from non-EU countries 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈𝑗𝑡 =∑𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈 
 
Proxy for forward linkages arising 
from fully owned foreign firms 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑡 =∑𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 
 
Proxy for forward linkages arising 
from partially owned foreign firms 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑗𝑡 = ∑𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 
 
Ln Size ln(Total_Assets ijt ) 
Ln Size squared ln(Total_Assets ijt )
2 
Age Time T – date of incorporation 
Age squared (Time T – date of incorporation)2 
Ln Human capital ln (cost of employees / number of employees) 
Ln Intangibles ln (intangible fixed assets / tangible fixed asset) 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index of 
industry concentration 
∑(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡⁡/⁡∑𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝑗𝑗
)2 
Ln Demand 
ln𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑡 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝑌𝑘𝑡  
 
5.3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Central to the analysis of FDI productivity spillovers is the firm-level Amadeus database 
which has already been described in detail in Chapter 4. The investigation is limited to 
manufacturing and services firms for the period from 2002 until 2010. The sample is 
restricted to the following five countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Since country, industry and firm heterogeneity play an important 
role in demand and supply process of spillovers five countries in the sample are treated 
as distinct samples throughout to fully benefit from the scale of the database. This allows 
all the coefficients to vary freely across the countries, which would not be achieved by 
using country fixed effects. Perhaps more importantly, an additional advantage of 
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country specific estimations is the higher degree of robustness of the analysis by 
eliminating potential differences in the sample composition across countries. Previous 
studies (Damijan et al., 2003, 2013a; Gersl et al., 2007; Nicolini and Resmini, 2010) 
which also focused on examining FDI spillovers in several transition countries were 
based on incomplete coverage of Amadeus database and mainly focused on the period 
before the EU accession and only on manufacturing sector. The observed period of 
analysis coincides with large volume of FDI in the last decade partially induced by 
substantial investment incentives. Therefore, it is important to analyse whether MNCs 
brought the expected increase in productivity of domestic firms across the two most 
important sectors of economy.  
Before turning to empirical analysis investigating the effects on TFP of domestic firms 
associated with observed heterogeneity of foreign subsidiaries, a short preview FDI 
spillover and other control variables is provided in Table 5.2.  
TABLE 5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Slovakia Slovenia 
Variable  Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. 
ln TFP 3.108 1.148 2.667 0.898 4.549 1.383 3.525 1.072 3.923 0.765 
Horizontal 0.208 0.141 0.220 0.148 0.204 0.123 0.144 0.154 0.069 0.105 
Horizontal EU 0.196 0.134 0.200 0.135 0.180 0.105 0.123 0.126 0.057 0.091 
Horizontal non-EU 0.012 0.015 0.021 0.027 0.024 0.040 0.021 0.074 0.013 0.040 
Horizontal full 0.167 0.126 0.164 0.121 0.160 0.112 0.107 0.134 0.049 0.085 
Horizontal part 0.041 0.055 0.056 0.048 0.044 0.057 0.037 0.074 0.021 0.055 
Backward  0.180 0.085 0.088 0.043 0.180 0.057 0.175 0.091 0.060 0.043 
Backward EU 0.170 0.078 0.176 0.073 0.154 0.049 0.133 0.060 0.054 0.042 
Backward non-EU 0.010 0.009 0.022 0.010 0.026 0.012 0.042 0.039 0.006 0.003 
Backward full 0.143 0.077 0.134 0.062 0.126 0.045 0.138 0.083 0.029 0.023 
Backward part 0.038 0.017 0.065 0.026 0.054 0.024 0.037 0.017 0.031 0.029 
Forward  0.170 0.062 0.123 0.059 0.138 0.043 0.130 0.059 0.052 0.035 
Forward EU 0.162 0.058 0.157 0.065 0.120 0.035 0.115 0.052 0.040 0.033 
Forward non-EU 0.008 0.005 0.019 0.010 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.010 0.012 0.007 
Forward full 0.124 0.057 0.126 0.062 0.076 0.026 0.079 0.047 0.033 0.027 
Forward part 0.046 0.019 0.051 0.019 0.062 0.034 0.051 0.027 0.019 0.016 
ln Wage 2.146 0.768 1.710 0.755 2.537 0.594 2.177 0.854 2.740 0.447 
ln Intangibles -4.235 2.075 -3.717 1.925 -4.569 2.182 -4.812 1.992 -4.134 2.099 
Hirschman 
Herfindahl index 0.024 0.044 0.036 0.075 0.084 0.122 0.042 0.074 0.085 0.114 
ln Demand 9.077 1.092 7.676 1.246 9.911 1.278 9.912 1.441 8.036 0.992 
Age 9.230 4.843 8.051 6.690 11.977 5.647 9.076 5.912 11.089 6.480 
ln Size 6.176 1.767 4.774 1.696 8.584 1.427 6.558 1.771 6.148 1.568 
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In general, one fifth of industry output is produced by foreign firms with the exception 
of Slovakia and Slovenia, indicating the importance of foreign firms across industries 
and relatively high potential for productivity spillovers. A more detailed look at the 
descriptive statistics indicates that fully foreign owned firms and those coming from the 
EU have the highest potential for generating spillovers, but also inducing competitive 
pressure on domestic firms. Turning to vertical linkages, firms in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia have the highest potential for becoming suppliers of MNCs 
judging by the mean value of backward linkages. This is somewhat expected as those 
countries have strong manufacturing base and attracted a significant number of MNCs in 
manufacturing industries which are thought to have strong backward linkages. The 
lowest potential for development of backward linkages is evident in Slovenia. Again, 
fully foreign owned firms coming from the EU have the highest potential for developing 
supplier linkages with local firms. Forward linkages are most likely to occur in the Czech 
Republic, especially from EU MNCs and those which are fully owned. Firms in Slovenia 
and Hungary pay the highest average wages while the share of intangible asset as a proxy 
for knowledge capital is highest in Slovenia, followed by Hungary and the Czech 
Republic. The competitive environment measured by HHI indicates high competition in 
all countries. The mean age of firms ranges between 8 and 12 years suggesting that the 
sample includes relatively young firms formed after the first few years of the transition 
period. The size of firms is largest in Hungary as expected due to sample structure and 
smallest in Estonia.  
Since FDI is not only country specific, but also industry specific the Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 
5.3 below provide a more detailed picture of the development potential of FDI spillovers 
related to entry and presence of foreign firms across different industries and countries. 
One can immediately notice the significant heterogeneity in all measures of FDI 
spillovers across countries and industries. The largest share of foreign firms’ output is 
accounted in Post and Telecommunications industry (64) in all countries except Slovenia, 
followed by Electrical and Optical equipment industry (30_33), Transport equipment 
(34_35), Chemical industry (25) and Rubber and Plastics (26). Overall, it seems that 
foreign firms in the database still have a significant influence in manufacturing industries 
despite the large amount of FDI in the service sector. However, the potential for 
backward linkages development shown in Figure 5.2 is more pronounced in services, 
especially in Retail (51), Wholesale and commission trade (52) and Water Transport (61). 
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However, it must be noted that these averages are pulled up mainly by the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Within the manufacturing industries, the higher 
potential for supplier development and inclusion in GVC is evident in production of 
Rubber and plastics industry (25), Machinery (29) and Basic and Fabricated metals 
(27_28). Finally, in terms of forward linkages shown in Figure 5.3 there is a clear 
indication of the importance of transport industries (60_62) for downstream clients 
followed by Chemical industry (24) and Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 
(50). 
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FIGURE 5.1 HORIZONTAL SPILLOVERS ACROSS INDUSTRIES AND COUNTRIES  
 
 Note: Industry codes correspond to industry classification in WIOD database and are based on 2-digit NACE Rev. 1.1 group 
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FIGURE 5.2 BACKWARD LINKAGES ACROSS INDUSTRIES AND COUNTRIES  
 
Note: Industry codes correspond to industry classification in WIOD database and are based on 2-digit NACE Rev. 1.1 group 
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FIGURE 5.3 FORWARD LINKAGES ACROSS INDUSTRIES AND COUNTRIES 
 
Note: Industry codes correspond to industry classification in WIOD database and are based on 2-digit NACE Rev. 1.1 Rev. group
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5.4 METHODOLOGY 
  
Since we are dealing with longitudinal data, several possible estimators such as pooled 
OLS, standard fixed effects estimation or corrected least square are potentially available. 
However, given the possible endogeneity and the fact that the main interest is to estimate 
dynamic effects of FDI spillovers, the fixed effects model or pooled OLS, which are most 
commonly used in empirical literature on FDI spillovers, are prone to several drawbacks. 
First, both dependent variable and FDI spillovers are measured with errors thus making 
regression coefficients biased and inefficient and worsen identification difficulties 
(Eapen, 2013). Second, fixed effects correct for the possible correlation between 
unobserved effects and some of the independent variables, by taking deviations from 
time-averaged sample means. This approach may be inappropriate in our case since the 
dependent variable is stripped of its long run variation and hence any conclusion about 
dynamic nature is precluded (Doytch and Uctum, 2011). Third, the most severe problem 
with OLS estimation, especially when firms’ specific effects are not controlled for is 
endogeneity. Since FDI is more likely to go to industries or regions which exhibit higher 
productivity ex ante the positive correlation between FDI and productivity of domestic 
firms might simply reflect the location decision by foreign investors rather than the 
positive spillover productivity effects (Hale and Long, 2011). This may lead to upward 
bias in the estimates of productivity spillovers. Fourth, since the model discussed in 
Section 4.2 includes lagged dependent variable, the estimation by OLS or fixed effects 
would lead to a dynamic panel bias. Nickell (1981) established that OLS estimates of the 
lagged dependent variable’s coefficient in a dynamic panel model are biased due to the 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term. This bias is 
inversely related to panel length. Since firms in the dataset have 3 to 4 years of data on 
average, the possible bias cannot be regarded as negligible. Recently, Kiviet (1995) and 
Bruno (2005) proposed a bias-corrected least squares dummy variable estimator 
(LSDVC) which corrects for “Nickell bias” using an estimate of the short-panel bias 
computed from each firm’s data. However, this procedure assumes that the independent 
variables are exogenous. 
A common strategy to deal with above mentioned problems is to use a difference or 
system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell 
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and Bond 1998). Furthermore, Roodman (2009) suggests that the GMM estimator is the 
proper methodological approach in cases where the number of time periods (T) is small 
relative to the number of groups (N), independent variables are not strictly exogenous, 
there is heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within groups, and variables are not 
normally distributed. A necessary moment condition which needs to be satisfied is the 
restriction on the covariance between the error term and independent variable, i.e. (𝜀𝑡,) = 
0. If this is not the case, coefficient estimates will be biased and inconsistent. The 
problem is usually overcome by using instruments which are uncorrelated with the error 
term, but correlated with endogenous variables. GMM is specifically designed to capture 
the endogeneity of some explanatory variables through the creation of a matrix of internal 
instruments. The latter is important for this study as it is very difficult to find external 
instruments for FDI at industry level for countries under analysis. The number of 
instruments can be very large, and by defining more than one moment condition per 
parameter to be estimated, the information available to the estimation process is 
maximised. 
Using Arellano and Bond (1991), we can transform our baseline model (eq. 5.2) into 
first-differences to eliminate firm-specific effects as follows: 
𝒍𝒏⁡𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊𝒕 − 𝒍𝒏𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝝆 𝒍𝒏 (𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊𝒕−𝟏 − 𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊,𝒕−𝟐)⁡+⁡𝜹𝟏(𝑯𝑺𝒋𝒕 −⁡𝑯𝑺𝒋,𝒕−𝟏) +
𝝋𝟐(𝑽𝑻𝒋𝒕 − 𝑽𝑻𝒋,𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜽𝟑(𝑨𝑪𝒊𝒕 − 𝑨𝑪𝒊,𝒕−𝟏) + 𝝈𝟒(𝑰𝑻𝒋𝒕 − 𝑰𝑻𝒋,𝒕−𝟏) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1)   (5.7)                                             
Although time invariant effects are removed, simultaneity bias still remains since 
differenced lagged dependent variable and differenced error term are correlated. Arellano 
and Bond (1991) proposed that the lagged difference (𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−3) or lagged levels 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 
of the regressors should be used as instruments. This is valid under the assumptions: (i) 
the error term is not serially correlated, and (ii) the lag of the explanatory variables are 
weakly exogenous. 
A potential problem of the Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator is that (i) 
coefficient estimates may be biased, making lagged levels weak instruments for their 
differences if variables follow a random walk, (ii) the explanatory variables are persistent 
over time, and (iii) the time dimension of the sample is small (Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
In order to alleviate these problems a system GMM estimator was developed which 
combines the equation in first differences with the equation in levels (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The introduction of levels equation in the model 
 
194 
is explained by the argument that past changes may be more predictive of current levels 
than the levels can be of future changes when the series are close to random walk 
(Roodman, 2009). System GMM allows for the inclusion and estimation of slowly 
changing variables or time invariant variables. Finally, Roodman (2009) suggests that 
system GMM performs better in the case of unbalanced panels since difference 
estimation magnifies gaps in the data. An additional requirement for the efficiency in 
system GMM is that unobserved firm specific effect is uncorrelated with first difference 
of variables (Windmeijer, 2005). In other words, the condition implies that deviations of 
the initial values of the explanatory variables from their long-run values are not 
systematically related to the firm-specific effects.  The major shortcoming with GMM 
models is the possible instrument proliferation since it may overfit endogenous variables, 
weaken diagnostics used to test instrument validity and provide imprecise estimates of 
the covariance matrix of the moments. The general rule of thumb suggested by Roodman 
(2009) is that the number of instruments should not exceed the number of groups. One 
of the ways to reduce the instrument matrix is to restrict the lag ranges that are used in 
generating these instrument sets. This is done by including different instruments for each 
lag, but for all time periods. Mehrhoff (2009) and Roodman (2009) suggest that 
collapsing the instrument sets is an efficient way of dealing with possible instrument 
proliferation. By collapsing, an instrument for each lag distance is created rather than for 
each time period and each lag. It has the advantage over the truncation of the lag depth 
that it retains much more information as it does not involve dropping of any lag.  
Given the shortcomings of difference GMM, we decided to apply system GMM and, 
since both estimators can be estimated in one or two step procedure, we decided to opt 
for the second one as it is robust to heteroscedasticity and cross-correlation. The problem 
with two step procedure is that standard errors are known to be downward biased when 
the number of instruments is large. Therefore, Windmeijer (2005) correction, which is 
found to be superior to the cluster-robust one-step standard errors (Roodman, 2009) is 
applied. Furthermore, all specifications include time dummies to control for possible 
cross-sectional dependencies arising from spatial dependence, economic distance or 
common shocks (Sarafidis et al., 2009). 
In order to verify that the moment conditions or assumptions of System GMM are 
satisfied we rely on several diagnostic tests. The instrument validity is tested with the 
Hansen test which is robust to heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis of Hansen test is 
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that overidentifying restrictions are valid. Roodman (2009) suggests that p-values of 
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions lower than 0.25 and those approaching unity 
should be viewed with concern. However, Blundell et al. (2000) have shown that using 
system GMM on a large panel may weaken Sargan/Hansen test and over reject the null 
hypothesis. Consistent with this, several studies employing system GMM on a large 
panel found statistically significant Hansen test (Benito 2005; Becker and Sivadasan, 
2010; Chen and Guariglia, 2013). We also rely on the difference in Hansen test to test the 
subset of instruments as it can affect the overall Hansen statistics, and the choice 
considerably alters the coefficients obtained for the independent variables. 
The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation examines the hypothesis of no second-order 
serial correlation in the error term of the difference equation (i.e., cov (Δεit, Δεit−k)=0 for 
k≥2). In the presence of serial correlation of order n in the differenced residuals, the 
instrument set for the equation in first-differences needs to be restricted to lags n + 1 and 
deeper (Roodman, 2009). The GMM estimator requires that there is first-order serial 
correlation (m1 test) but that there is no second-order serial correlation (m2 test) in the 
residuals. Since there is no formal test of weak instrument in system GMM, Bun and 
Windmeijer (2010) maintain that the both GMM estimators may suffer from small-
sample bias, but the bias for the system GMM estimator is rather small when the variance 
of unobserved heterogeneity (𝜎ᵑ
2) is equal to the variance of the idiosyncratic disturbance 
term(𝜎𝜀
2). Hence if two variances have roughly similar values it could provide a hint that 
instrument are not too weak. Similarly, Bond et al. (2001) suggest that the coefficient of 
lagged dependent variable can be compared to those obtained from OLS which is upward 
biased and fixed effects which are downward biased. A consistent GMM estimator 
should lie between two values and if not, it may be due to weak instrument problem. 
Another benefit of the dynamic analysis is that it allows us to distinguish between short 
and long run effects. In our case, this is important as policy makers need to be aware 
whether the entry of MNCs provides long term benefits to the host country firms in order 
to devise policy recommendations towards FDI. The estimated coefficients provide short 
term effects which represents only a fraction of the desired change (Baltagi, 2008). 
Hence, long run effects are calculated as a product of estimated coefficients and long run 
multiplier⁡
1
1−𝛽1
⁡ (where β is the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable).  
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The statistical significance of such obtained coefficients can be calculated using the so-
called ‘delta’ method (Papke and Wooldridge, 2005). 49F51 
 
5.5 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
Starting from the basic model discussed in Section 5.2, the empirical estimation is 
conducted in statistical software Stata 12 using xtabond2 command developed by 
Roodman (2009). As a starting point, the model is estimated for domestic firms only in 
order to avoid aggregation bias which might arise due to inclusion of foreign firms. The 
consequences of such bias are exaggerated positive productivity spillovers since foreign 
firms are more productive. The lagged dependent variable and variables measuring FDI 
spillovers (horizontal, backward and forward) are treated as endogenous and as such are 
instrumented with their own lags and lagged differences. As suggested by Roodman 
(2009) in the levels equation instruments are found among the one and more periods 
lagged differences of endogenous variables. In the difference equation the endogenous 
variables are instrumented with their own levels lagged two or more periods. The choice 
of lags was determined by model diagnostics. The initial specifications included a 
minimum number of lags, i.e. the number of instruments came from restriction to start 
with one lag for levels and differences in case of lagged dependent variable and two lags 
for FDI spillover variables (Roodman, 2009). However, in certain cases model 
diagnostics with minimum number of lags were not satisfied and therefore the 
instrumentation matrix included higher order lags (three or four) of the regressors as 
instruments. Consequently we also report the AR(3)/AR(4) tests for third/fourth order 
serial correlation of the differenced residuals in our tables. Furthermore, if specification 
tests rejected no second order autocorrelation tests or validity of instruments, a second 
lag of dependent variable was added to the right hand side of the model (Sarafidis et al., 
2009; Merikull and Room, 2014). 
In this section only the result of variables of interest are presented, while coefficients of 
year, industry and region dummies are excluded for presentation purposes. However, the 
                                                 
51 This method is based on deriving linear function that approximates non-linear combination of estimators 
using Taylor’s series expansion. Stata command “nlcom” is used to transform non-linear equation and to 
calculate standard error. 
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latter can be found in Appendix III together with the original printouts and syntaxes. The 
following subsections explain in more detail model diagnostics and results for the 
baseline model and its extensions. 
 
5.5.1 RESULTS FOR BASELINE MODEL  
As discussed in Section 5.5 system GMM uses internal instruments to correct for 
endogeneity. Since there is no clear rule on the optimal number of instruments, we follow 
Roodman (2009) suggestions and use lag limits and collapse option to limit the number 
of instruments and obtain a more parsimonious model.50F52 Hansen J test of overidentifying 
restrictions is valid for each regression taking the p-values between 0.15 and 0.43. The 
null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in differences of errors is rejected for the 
autocorrelation of first order but there is no sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation of second order in differences of errors. It is also 
important to check the validity of subsets of instruments. For this purpose, one can use a 
difference-in-Hansen test, also known as the C-test (Baum, 2006). The null hypothesis 
of the C-test is that the specified variables are proper instruments, i.e. that the set of 
examined instruments is exogenous. As can be seen from Tables III.1-III.5 in Appendix 
III, we do not have sufficient evidence to reject this hypothesis.  
In order to test for cross sectional dependence, the difference-in-Hansen test statistic for 
the lagged dependent variable is examined. The corresponding p-values suggest that 
there is not sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments for lagged 
dependent variable are valid. To check whether the steady-state assumption which states 
that convergence process of TFP is independent from unobserved time invariant firm 
specific effects holds, difference-in-Hansen test for level equation is used. The latter 
implies that there is not sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of valid 
instruments. Therefore, system estimator can be preferred over the difference one. 
Moreover, the value of lagged dependent variable indicates convergence as, in all cases, 
it is less than unity (Roodman, 2009). Finally, following the suggestion of Bond et al. 
(2001) an additional test of validity of dynamic panel estimates is performed by checking 
whether the value of lagged dependent variable lies between lower bound of FE and 
                                                 
52 In all regressions presented below, the number of instruments is far below the number of cross 
sectional units as expected due to large number of firms. 
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upper bound of OLS estimates. As can be seen from Table III.16 in Appendix III, all 
specifications satisfy this condition. Having satisfied all diagnostic tests, we can 
conclude that our model is well specified and allows us to proceed with the interpretation 
of results of the baseline model, presented in Table 5.3. 
TABLE 5.3 DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVER EFFECTS ON 
PRODUCTIVITY (LN TFP) OF DOMESTIC FIRMS, 2002-2010 (ALL SECTORS)  
Note: robust standard errors in brackets  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
respectively. 
 
VARIABLES Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Slovakia Slovenia 
            
L. ln TFP 0.400*** 0.402*** 0.463*** 0.658*** 0.572*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0144) (0.0636) (0.0648) (0.102) 
Horizontal 0.304 4.118*** 3.835*** -3.082*** -1.208*** 
 (0.225) (1.009) (0.722) (0.614) (0.433) 
Backward 0.459*** -0.945*** 1.908* 0.203** -0.0694 
 (0.0784) (0.200) (1.063) (0.0937) (0.107) 
Forward -3.883*** -4.918*** -5.465 5.599*** 4.864*** 
 (0.450) (1.257) (5.023) (1.279) (1.629) 
Ln Human capital 0.427*** 0.368*** 0.348*** 0.283*** 0.317*** 
 (0.00837) (0.0105) (0.0307) (0.0153) (0.0430) 
Ln Intangibles 0.0512*** 0.0929*** 0.0117*** 0.0592*** 0.0320*** 
 (0.00175) (0.00402) (0.00359) (0.00672) (0.00590) 
Age -0.0106*** -0.00744*** -0.0109*** -0.0104*** 0.0316** 
 (0.00103) (0.00146) (0.00203) (0.00148) (0.0130) 
Age^2 8.47e-05** 9.39e-05*** 4.29e-05*** 0.000209*** -0.00179*** 
 (3.36e-05) (1.26e-05) (1.56e-05) (2.86e-05) (0.000604) 
Ln Size 0.201*** 0.361*** 0.111* 0.159*** 0.0910*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0401) (0.0686) (0.0388) (0.0277) 
Ln Size^2 -0.00494*** -0.0191*** 0.00117 -0.00632*** 0.000395 
 (0.000827) (0.00386) (0.00419) (0.00183) (0.00153) 
HHI -0.326*** -4.382*** -0.172 0.774*** -0.259** 
 (0.0662) (1.057) (0.111) (0.224) (0.116) 
Ln Demand -0.00706 -0.105*** 0.101 -0.0868*** -0.388 
 (0.0141) (0.0349) (0.108) (0.0228) (0.271) 
Model diagnostics      
Observations 97,891 46,368 6,910 30,490 12,884 
Number of groups 36,700 13,978 3,635 13,595 4,335 
No. of Instruments 62 57 86 59 69 
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Region effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes 
AR(1) p-value 0 0 1.21e-06 0 4.66e-09 
AR(2) p-value 0.261 0.298 0.173 0.827 0.0847 
AR(3) p-value 0.382 0.421 0.344 0.00187 0.953 
AR(4) p-value 0.469 0.367 0.918 0.0437 0.287 
Hansen Test p-value 0.193 0.155 0.431 0.236 0.154 
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The model includes domestic firms in both manufacturing and market service sector (at 
NACE Rev. 1.1 classification, codes 15-74). The dynamic specification, through the 
lagged dependent variable, contains the entire history of the independent variables and 
their influence on the current level of productivity. Therefore, we are able to identify the 
additional short-run effects on local firm’s productivity of recent changes in the FDI 
spillover variables, absorptive capacity and industry conditions. The coefficient on 
lagged dependent variable is positive and highly significant in every country. A one 
percent increase in TFP in previous period implies an increase in TFP in current period 
between 0.40 and 0.66 percent. In other words, the speed of adjustment to desired level 
of TFP ranges between 0.34 and 0.60. The results suggest that learning by doing has an 
effect in all countries, the smallest being in the Czech Republic and the largest in 
Slovakia.  
Turning to our greatest concern about the relationship between FDI spillovers and TFP, 
the results provide a mixed picture for horizontal and vertical spillovers. The findings 
with respect to knowledge capital indicate that both human capital and intangibles have 
a significant and positive role in increasing the level of productivity of domestic firms. 
Turning to industry level variables, it seems that concentration and demand effects have 
a negative and significant effect in most cases. Finally, a firm’s size and age exhibit 
nonlinear effects in most cases indicating that there might be a turning point where the 
firm’s productivity starts to rise after it accumulates experience and adapt to market and 
organizational structure which impeded firms to achieve efficiency at certain point 
during their business life. 
In order to shed more light on the mixed effects in the case of FDI spillover, we start by 
examining the effects of horizontal spillovers. These are positive and significant in the 
case of Hungary and Estonia where the share of foreign firms’ output is the highest, and 
negative in the case of Slovakia and Slovenia. The results suggest that a one percentage 
point increase in the share of foreign owned output in an industry increases productivity 
of domestic firms by 3.83 and 4.11 percent in Hungary and Estonia, respectively. The 
effects are larger in the long run where horizontal spillovers increase the domestic firms’ 
TFP by 6.88 and 7.13 per cent respectively. It seems that domestic firms in these two 
countries are able to cope with increased competition induced by increased foreign entry 
either by imitating foreign firm practices or by increasing their efficiency – they are in 
line with empirical work of Bekes et al. (2009) for Hungary, Sinani and Meyer (2004) 
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for Estonia and Stancik (2007), Kosova (2010) and Javorcik and Spatarenau (2011) for 
the Czech Republic.51F53 On the other hand, it seems that domestic firms in Slovakia and 
Slovenia are not able to benefit from increased foreign presence in their sectors.  A one 
percentage point increase in foreign owned output in a sector is associated with a 
decrease in productivity between 1.20 and 3.08 percent. This finding is consistent with 
the literature arguing that domestic firms which do not have a certain level of absorptive 
capacity are crowded out from the market as some of their markets is captured by foreign 
firms. This is also confirmed in a multi country study by Damijan et al. (2013a) who 
initially found negative horizontal effects, but positive after controlling for absorptive 
capacity. By reducing their market share, domestic firms in Slovakia and Slovenia seem 
to be operating at less efficient scale and face increased costs which may affect their 
profits and result in less investment in training and technology. Furthermore, negative 
horizontal effects may arise from negative effect of worker mobility as foreign firms pay 
higher wages than domestic firms (Heyman et al. 2007; Earle and Telegdy, 2008), thus 
leaving domestic firms with less skilled workforce affecting their ability to benefit from 
potential imitation or demonstration effects. 
Turning the discussion to backward linkages, the results imply that foreign presence in 
downstream sector is associated with positive productivity effects in upstream sector in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. The positive effects of backward linkages is 
highest in Hungary where a one percentage point increase of foreign firms’ output in a 
downstream industry increases the demand for local inputs resulting in increase of TFP 
of local firms by almost 2 percent in short run and 3.55 per cent in the long run, the latter 
effects being reported in Tables III.1-III.5 in Appendix III. Similarly, in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, this positive effect amounts to 0.45 percent and 0.20 percent in 
short run and 0.76 percent and 0.59 percent in the long run, respectively. However, it 
seems that foreign firms in Estonia have negative effects on upstream local suppliers. 
The negative effects of backward linkages are in contrast to studies by Javorcik (2004a), 
Halpern and Murakozy (2007), Gersl et al. (2007) and Kolasa (2008), but in line with 
Merlevede and Schoors (2007), Stancik (2007, 2009) and Damijan et al. (2013a). 52F54 It 
seems that total negative effect of backward linkages is driven by the inability of 
                                                 
53 Bear in mind that these studies are based on manufacturing sector only.  
54 In Damijan et al.’ (2013a) study backward linkages become positive when controlling for absorptive 
capacity and domestic firms’ heterogeneity in terms of their size, productivity levels and technological 
gap. 
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domestic firms to establish vertical linkages and enter supply chain of MNCs, but it is 
still unclear which foreign firms are driving these results.   
Forward linkages exhibit positive and statistically significant effect on productivity of 
domestic firms in Slovakia and Slovenia, while for the Czech Republic and Estonia we 
find a significant negative relationship. The large negative effects of forward spillovers 
in the latter two countries outweigh the positive effects arising from backward linkages 
in the Czech Republic and horizontal spillovers in Estonia in both short and long run. In 
contrast to these two countries, the results suggest that forward spillovers are a source of 
net positive productivity spillovers in Slovakia and Slovenia, a finding similar to 
Gorodnichenko et al. (2014), Zajc and Kumar (2006) and Merlevede and Schoors 
(2009).53F55 This finding is again in contrast to majority of other studies which focused on 
productivity spillovers within manufacturing sector (Gersl et al., 2007). However, given 
the large amount of FDI in the service sector which is almost entirely motivated by 
market seeking behaviour of MNCs and their concentration in sectors such as financial 
services, telecommunications, transport and business services domestic firms may be 
able to benefit from high quality inputs provided by foreign service firms. This has 
provided strong incentives for domestic firms to switch from imports or to cope with 
import competition and procure high quality inputs from local market, especially those 
inputs coming from service sector as the latter have important implications for 
manufacturing productivity. A more detailed analysis of these effects will be analysed in 
the next chapter. 
Turning to variables measuring absorptive capacity of domestic firms, namely human 
capital and share of intangible assets in total fixed assets we find positive and significant 
effects of knowledge capital across all specifications. The findings suggest that one 
percent increase in average wage which act as a proxy for quality of human capital 
increase productivity of local firms between 0.28 percent in Slovakia and 0.42 percent in 
the Czech Republic. The effects are even stronger in the long run where a one percent 
increase in the average wage leads to 0.62 percent increase in TFP in Estonia and 0.82 
per cent in Slovakia. The magnitude of coefficient indicates that the level of human 
capital is relatively high and may significantly influence the increase in productivity and 
realisation of potential positive productivity spillovers coming from FDI. Since MNCs 
                                                 
55 A study by Gorodnichenko et al. (2014) find partially positive forward spillovers in case of older firms; 
firm facing high import competition; and linkages arising with domestic oriented MNCs. 
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often require trained staff and product upgrading in order to develop linkages, it is of 
utmost importance that domestic companies further invest in their human capital which 
will enable them to benefit from the presence of MNCs in their sector as well as entering 
the GVC of MNCs. 
In the main model (eq. 5.2) presented in Table 5.3, the effects of intangibles are in line 
with previous empirical estimates (Marroccu et al., 2012; Bontempi and Mairesse, 2014). 
It enables domestic firms to increase their productivity between 0.01 per cent in Hungary 
and 0.09 percent in Estonia in the short run. In the long run, the effects are almost 
doubled. The finding may be the consequence of increased competition induced by both 
domestic and foreign firms which force firms to increase investment in marketing, design 
and technical expenditure with the goal of increasing market share but also to become 
supplier of MNCs. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2009) found that the Czech suppliers 
increased their investment in product upgrading and that vast majority of such 
development came from their own effort and developed in house.  
The effect of concentration measured by Hirschman-Herfindahl index is mostly negative 
with the exception of Slovakia. A one percentage point increase in industry concentration 
leads to a decrease in productivity between 0.25 in Slovenia and 4.38 per cent in Estonia. 
The large coefficient in the case of Estonia accompanied with positive horizontal 
spillovers suggests that surviving domestic firms have high absorptive capacity that 
enables them to benefit from imitation or demonstration effects and at the same time 
outweigh any crowding out effects. On the other hand positive productivity effects of 
higher concentration of firms in Slovakia seem to be accompanied by negative market 
stealing effect. The findings imply that remaining domestic firms do not have the ability 
to benefit from MNC entry either because of lack of absorptive capacity, foreign firms’ 
successful prevention of knowledge leakage or MNCs poaching the best workers from 
domestic firms. 
The variable measuring increased demand for inputs suggests that both domestic and 
foreign firms decrease the intermediate inputs purchase which does not allow domestic 
suppliers to reap the benefits of scale economies. Demand effects is negative and 
significant in Estonia and Slovakia suggesting that a one percent increase in the purchase 
of intermediate inputs lead to a decrease in productivity between 0.08 percent in Slovakia 
and 0.11 percent in Estonia. The negative effect of demand may explain the negative 
backward linkages in Estonia as local firms are not able to achieve increasing returns to 
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scale in the production of inputs which may enable them to lower the prices of 
intermediate goods and transfer the benefits to downstream firms.  
The findings for firms’ age are consistent across countries (negative on age and positive 
on the squared term), except in the case of Slovenia where the coefficient is positive for 
the linear term and negative for the squared term. Since age is an interaction variable it 
is necessary to interpret both coefficients at the same time. An additional year of 
experience for an average firm leads to a decrease in TFP of 0.01 percent across all 
countries. 54F56 However, in case of Slovenia the effect is positive, indicating an increase in 
productivity of 0.02 percent. Younger firms typically need to accommodate to market 
conditions and therefore their performance is below existing firms in the first years of 
operation. This finding is consistent with those of Jensen et al. (2001) examining the 
effect of age on TFP of US firms and Harris and Moffat (2015) for UK firms, although 
the former study found that the negative vintage effect of older plants is offset by positive 
learning effect. Negative age effect can also be correlated with changes in organizational 
structure as it influences the way firms operate and may result in decrease in TFP (Van 
Witteloostuijn, 2003). The turning point after which the age of firms starts to negatively 
affect TFP is around 9 years in Slovenia and given that more than 50 percent of firms are 
older we can conclude that age has a decreasing effects on domestic firms’ productivity. 
The opposite effect is experienced in other countries where turning point starts at 25 
years in Slovakia up to 127 years in Hungary. 55F57 Given that there are a small number of 
firms which are older than the turning point in other countries  we can conclude that there 
is a negative selection effect due to the inability of domestic firms to learn, acquire more 
advanced technology, or achieve economies of scale in the medium term.  
Turning to other control variables, the results suggest that there is a strong and positive 
effect of firm size in all countries. This relationship however takes the concave form in 
all countries except Slovenia where the effect of quadratic term is not significant, 
indicating that size has diminishing effects on the productivity levels.  The positive 
effects of size on TFP range from 0.09 percent in Slovenia to 0.32 percent in Estonia. 
The findings are broadly consistent with theoretical models of industrial dynamics and 
                                                 
56 A common interpretation of coefficients in case of nonlinear variables is by taking the first partial 
derivative with respect to dependent variable. In this case, the effects of age can be expressed as:⁡
𝜕𝑇𝐹𝑃
𝜕𝑎𝑔𝑒
=
⁡𝛽1 + 2𝛽2𝑎𝑔𝑒. 
57 Quadratic function 𝑎𝑥2 + 𝑏𝑥has its minimum or maximum at: 𝑥 = ⁡−𝑏/2𝑎, therefore this is the point 
of inflection where function changes its direction. 
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heterogeneous trade models which predict that larger firms are more productive 
(Jovanovic, 1982; Melitz 2003). These are also corroborated by the findings of Van 
Biesebroeck (2005b) who found significant differences between small and large firms in 
nine African countries. Furthermore, Garcia-Santana and Ramos (2013) found a 
significant relationship between size and labour productivity at the micro and size and 
TFP at aggregate level across 104 developing countries controlling for standard 
determinants of plant efficiency while Castany et al (2007) found that large firms are 
more productive due to differences in endowments and returns to innovation and skilled 
labour. Nonlinear effects suggest that after a certain point becoming too large has a 
negative effect on productivity due to inefficiencies in coordination, management and 
supervision resulting in diseconomies of scale (Fernandes, 2008). 
 
5.5.2 THE EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
The second part of the analysis is concerned with ownership structure of foreign firms 
and their effects on the extent of spillovers. Existing empirical studies disentangling the 
effects of different degrees of foreign ownership on productivity of domestic firms are 
mostly focused on developing countries (Almeida and Fernandes, 2008; Abraham et al., 
2010) with the exception of Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008), Merlevede and Shoors 
(2007), Kolasa (2008), Merlevede et al. (2014) and Gorodnichenko et al. (2014) who 
analysed the effects of ownership in Romania, Poland and Eastern European countries, 
respectively. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the supply side of FDI spillover process has 
gained little attention so far in empirical literature. One of the possible reasons is that the 
data to conduct such analysis is not widely available. However, since the Amadeus 
database provides detailed ownership information on foreign equity stakes in each firm, 
we decided to investigate the effect of ownership structure on the results presented in 
Section 5.6.1.  
As mentioned in Section 2.5.1 the equity stake of foreign firms can reveal something 
about their market entry preferences and technology they bring with them (Blomstrom 
and Sjoholm, 1999). The results obtained in Section 5.6.1 can hide significant and 
contrasting effects and magnitude of spillovers. To shed more light on different spillover 
effects arising from different ownership structures, the total spillovers are decomposed 
according to those arising from partially foreign owned firms (where the share of foreign 
 205 
owners ranges from 10 to 99%) and fully owned foreign firms (where the share of foreign 
owners is greater than 99%). Therefore, we have two horizontal measures of spillovers, 
two backward and two forward measures of vertical spillovers defined as follows: 
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙⁡𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙∗⁡𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
                     (5.8) 
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡⁡𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡∗⁡𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
                  (5.9) 
𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑡 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5.10) 
𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑗𝑡 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5.11) 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑡 =∑𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5.12) 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑗𝑡 =∑𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5.13) 
where 𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡⁡and⁡𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡 are input  and output coefficients from annual IO tables measuring 
the proportion of industry j’s output supplied to or purchased from industries k or l at 
time t weighted by the share of foreign firms with full or partial ownership in industry k 
or l. 
Before turning to the explanation of results, which are presented in Table 5.4 below, it is 
useful to discuss the diagnostics of the econometric models. In all regressions, the Hansen 
J test of overidentifying restrictions is valid for all models while the null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation in differences of errors is rejected for the autocorrelation of first order 
but there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of 
second order in differences of errors. 56F58 The C-test of the instrument subset also confirms 
that specified variables are valid instruments, i.e. exogenous. Moreover, the value of 
lagged dependent variable indicates convergence as in all cases it is less than unity 
                                                 
58 Since AR(n) test rejected null hypothesis of no second and higher order autocorrelation in the case of 
Czech Republic, a second lag of dependent variable was added to the specification. Similarly, in case of 
Estonia, the second order autocorrelation is rejected at conventional levels of significance, however, given 
that all variables are instrumented with three or four lags or regressors, AR(3) and AR(4) cannot be 
rejected.  
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(Roodman, 2009). The additional test of the validity of dynamic panel estimates confirms 
that the value of lagged dependent variables lies between the lower (FE) and the upper 
(OLS) bound values. Finally, the difference-in-Hansen test for the level equation implies 
that there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments and 
therefore system GMM is preferred over difference GMM. 
TABLE 5.4 DYNAMIC SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVER EFFECTS ON DOMESTIC FIRMS’ 
PRODUCTIVITY (LN TFP) - EXTENT OF MNC’S OWNERSHIP , 2002-2010 (ALL SECTORS) 
 VARIABLES Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Slovakia Slovenia 
L. ln TFP 0.389*** 0.530*** 0.559*** 0.435*** 0.523*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0364) (0.0826) (0.0242) (0.101) 
Horizontal_full -0.356 0.721 -0.480 -1.113*** -0.785** 
 (0.347) (0.570) (0.383) (0.274) (0.320) 
Horizontal_partial 0.568*** 1.438** 1.620* -2.580*** 0.549 
 (0.192) (0.727) (0.879) (0.776) (0.441) 
Backward_full 0.0591 0.523** 1.558* 0.287** -0.240* 
 (0.0919) (0.241) (0.854) (0.113) (0.148) 
Backward_partial 1.868** -2.383*** -3.801** -3.070*** 1.036*** 
 (0.866) (0.643) (1.546) (0.855) (0.393) 
Forward_full -1.785*** -4.767*** -7.679*** 2.223*** 4.724*** 
 (0.553) (1.253) (2.090) (0.836) (1.565) 
Forward_partial -6.071*** 7.145*** -5.630** 5.509* 2.712* 
 (2.067) (2.193) (2.515) (3.129) (1.384) 
Ln Human capital 0.435*** 0.335*** 0.307*** 0.324*** 0.369*** 
 (0.00852) (0.0134) (0.0381) (0.00848) (0.0401) 
Ln Intangibles 0.0524*** 0.0826*** 0.0104*** 0.0817*** 0.0356*** 
 (0.00180) (0.00348) (0.00337) (0.00352) (0.00555) 
Age -0.0108*** -0.0125*** -0.00954*** -0.0132*** 0.0252*** 
 (0.00104) (0.00106) (0.00194) (0.00142) (0.00938) 
Age^2 8.43e-05** 0.000139*** 3.69e-05*** 0.000214*** -0.00149*** 
 (3.38e-05) (1.09e-05) (1.32e-05) (3.02e-05) (0.000436) 
Ln Size 0.209*** 0.236*** 0.132** 0.283*** 0.0805*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0215) (0.0581) (0.0227) (0.0287) 
Ln Size^2 -0.00520*** -0.00872*** -0.00145 -0.0112*** 0.00230 
 (0.000840) (0.00206) (0.00322) (0.00146) (0.00153) 
HHI -0.253*** -1.298** -0.131 0.196 0.0101 
 (0.0744) (0.564) (0.0998) (0.139) (0.0993) 
Ln Demand -0.0597 -0.0339 0.113* -0.0581** -0.954*** 
 (0.0382) (0.0411) (0.0673) (0.0229) (0.237) 
Model diagnostics      
Observations 97,891 66,194 6,910 30,490 12,884 
Number of groups 36,700 18,684 3,635 13,595 4,335 
No. of Instruments 67 61 119 65 71 
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Region effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes 
AR(1) p-value 0 0 4.35e-05 0 1.51e-08 
AR(2) p-value 0.399 0.0419 0.161 0.229 0.333 
AR(3) p-value 0.382 0.441 0.364 0.155 0.990 
AR(4) p-value 0.360 0.141 0.926 0.217 0.0438 
Hansen Test p-value 0.114 0.153 0.317 0.316 0.223 
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Note: robust standard errors in brackets  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
respectively. 
 
The lagged dependent variable is highly significant and positive in all cases, ranging 
from 0.39 in the Czech Republic to 0.56 in Hungary, again indicating high persistence of 
past productivity improvements and learning effects. Increased concentration in 
industries has negative and significant effect only in Estonia and the Czech Republic, 
although the magnitude of the coefficient in the former country is now lower. The 
demand variable again indicates that the bulk of firms in Slovakia and Slovenia are not 
buying inputs from domestic suppliers, thus negatively affecting productivity by 0.05 
and 0.95 percent, respectively.  In comparison to the baseline model, the effect of demand 
is now positive in Hungary. It seems that firms benefit from increased economies of scale 
as a 10 percent increase in purchased inputs leads to improvement of local firm’s 
productivity by one percent.  
Firm level variables, namely age and size kept the same sign, with similar magnitude and 
significance levels as in the baseline model. Again, the turning point after which the 
effect of the age of firms becomes positive and outweighs initial negative effects is too 
large to have any significant effect in the medium term. The results suggest that older 
firms in all countries except Slovenia are not capable of increasing their productivity 
probably due to obsolete capital equipment or do not have the necessary knowledge or 
level of investment to keep pace with advances in technology. Findings for the firm size 
corroborate those from the baseline model indicating inverse U shaped effects in the case 
of the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia and positive linear effects throughout the 
sample period for Hungary and Slovenia.  
Findings related to variables measuring absorptive capacity are in line with those 
obtained in the baseline model suggesting that human capital and the share of intangible 
assets play a positive and significant role in increasing TFP. The effect of human capital 
on TFP is largest in the Czech Republic, where a one percent increase in average wage 
leads to an increase in TFP by 0.43 percent, followed by Slovenia (0.36 percent) and 
being smallest in Hungary (0.30 percent). Similarly, the effect of intangible assets 
confirms the positive findings from the baseline model although the magnitude of the 
hor_part=hor_full 0.00636 0.136 0.0173 0.0183 0.00179 
back_part=back_full 0.0385 0.000610 0.0149 0.000297 0.00895 
for_part=for_full 0.0378 2.26e-06 0.550 0.263 0.0436 
 
208 
coefficient is slightly smaller. If the share of intangibles increases by 10 percentage 
points the effect on TFP ranges from 0.1 percent in Hungary to 0.8 percent in Estonia 
and Slovakia, whilst for other countries the effect is moderate (between 0.3 and 0.5 
percent). It seems that domestic firms have either invested in the process or product 
innovation or increased their stock of knowledge by adopting the fruits of other firms’ 
innovation efforts embodied in intangible asset purchased on the market.  
Turning to FDI spillover variables, it is noticeable that the average coefficient in the 
baseline model hides important information. Although the results are robust to change in 
specification in terms of significance and signs, the magnitude of coefficients vary. 
Partially foreign owned firms have stronger effect on productivity within the sector, 
while the opposite holds for backward vertical linkages. Starting from horizontal 
spillovers it seems that the percentage of foreign ownership does matter for productivity 
as partially foreign owned firms seem to generate positive horizontal spillovers in the 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary, while fully foreign owned firms generate negative 
spillovers within the industry in Slovenia and Slovakia. In the latter country, total 
negative effects are driven by both types of foreign firms. The difference between 
partially and fully foreign owned firms is statistically significant in all countries except 
in Estonia. Overall, the productivity effects range from 0.56 percent in the Czech 
Republic up to 1.6 percent in Hungary for every one percentage point increase in the 
output of partially foreign owned firms in the industry. Negative effects of fully foreign 
owned firms are in line with the hypothesis suggesting that these firms are bringing more 
advanced technology in order to obtain higher market share. Furthermore, the full control 
of operation enables them to prevent knowledge dissipation and to cope with the liability 
of foreignness. At the same time, local firms are not equipped to capture potential 
technology spillovers due to their higher technological gap. However, foreign firms 
entering the local market through joint ventures or as a part of partial acquisitions have 
beneficial effect as the technology and productivity levels are more likely to be similar 
to local firms which enable them to benefit from demonstration or imitation effects.  
Furthermore, as argued by Smeets and de Vaal (2006), a tacit component of knowledge 
requires frequent communication and interaction providing another reason why shared 
ownership is more likely to result in greater knowledge spillovers. Finally, it is more 
likely that in firms with shared ownership the local partner is mostly involved in hiring 
decisions of local staff and increased labour mobility may lead to technology transfer. 
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The heterogeneous effects of ownership is also evident in the case of backward linkages 
where positive effects in the baseline model for the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia are driven by two different types of firms. In the former, the positive effects on 
local firms’ productivity are driven by partially foreign owned firms corroborating the 
findings by Javorcik and Spatereanu (2008) who hypothesize that firms with partial 
foreign ownership are more likely to source their intermediate inputs from local markets 
due to the knowledge of local conditions and quality of suppliers.  An increase in demand 
for inputs from these firms in the Czech Republic and Slovenia may also arise due to the 
less stringent requirements for quality and production process which benefit domestic 
suppliers who otherwise would not be able to provide inputs to more technologically 
advanced foreign firms. On the other hand, the negative effect of fully foreign owned 
firms in Slovenia may be attributed to the time necessary to familiarise with domestic 
suppliers and provide them with training and support. In addition, greenfield investments 
are usually undertaken by large firms with high bargaining power and usually require 
large discounts for their inputs as a prerequisite to become supplier.  
A different picture emerges in the case of other countries. In Hungary, a one percentage 
point increase in the backward linkage from fully foreign owned firms is associated with 
1.5 percent increase in productivity, while for the other two countries the effect is smaller 
in magnitude and in the range between 0.28 in Slovakia and 0.52 percent in Estonia.  On 
the other hand, the positive effects from fully foreign owned firms are offset by negative 
productivity effects on local suppliers from partially foreign owned firms which are 
larger in magnitude and possibly explain total negative effects of backward linkages in 
Estonia. In all cases, the difference between coefficients is statistically significant. The 
positive effects of fully foreign owned enterprises in these countries can be explained by 
the large number of these firms being established through either greenfield investment 
or full acquisitions in both manufacturing and service sectors. Since fully foreign owned 
investments are in general more productive and bring more advanced technology into the 
host market they are more likely to induce technological improvements in existing 
suppliers such as higher standards on product features, delivery schedules, quality 
control, inventory holding (Godart and Gorg, 2013). In their theoretical model, Carluccio 
and Fally (2013) have demonstrated that the entry of more advanced foreign firms 
induces reconfiguration of the supply chain and forces technology adoption by domestic 
firms that are willing to supply to MNCs. Those firms that do not adopt foreign 
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technology suffer from increased competition from foreign suppliers, while firms in 
downstream sector are faced with less availability of inputs compatible with domestic 
technology and are forced out of the market.  
In Hungary acquired companies retained their original suppliers while other local firms 
have also been successful in joining the international network of MNCs mainly 
established through greenfield investment (Sass, 2008). Since fully foreign owned 
enterprises, especially those that are smaller and privatised, are more independent in their 
decisions about which supplier to choose and most of them exist for a certain period of 
time, the positive effects reflect the increasing familiarity with domestic supply capacity 
(Vince, 2001; Sass, 2007). Finally, the overall improvement in institutional progress and 
especially in the protection of intellectual property rights might have induced more entry 
in high tech and knowledge intensive industries through wholly owned subsidiaries 
requiring more advanced inputs (Javorcik and Saggi, 2010). 59 
The strong negative effect of partially foreign owned enterprises can be explained by 
higher import ratio of components which may result in a loss of customers for suppliers, 
reduction in profit and a decline in their productivity (Newman et al., 2015). In addition, 
it is well documented that joint ventures or M&A bring less advanced technology to local 
market (Mansfield, 1980). Therefore, the incentive to improve the quality and efficiency 
may be weaker when domestic firms supply partially foreign owned firms with less 
valuable technology and know-how which could be transferred to their local suppliers. 
Alternatively, firms with shared ownership may be operating in less knowledge intensive 
sectors with low value added and obsolete technology which do not require 
technologically advanced inputs or may be involved more in distribution activities which 
require less intermediate inputs.  
                                                 
59 In order to shed more light on the  role of intellectual property rights in moderating the relationship 
between FDI spillovers and firms’ TFP we interacted the former with Legal System and Property Right 
index obtained from Fraser Institute. The expectation was that an improvement in IPR will have negative 
moderating effects on horizontal spillovers due to increased competitive edge of MNCs, especially from 
fully owned foreign firms which are more likely to appropriate the benefits of their advanced technology. 
In case of vertical linkages the moderating effect is more ambiguous. On the one hand, stroger IPR are 
likely to increase productivity enhancing effects of FDI spillovers as it enhance the enforcement 
mechanism that foreign firms can utilize in case of expropriation of the obtained knowledge or encourage 
MNCs to transfer more advanced technology and thus provide inputs of superior quality to local customers 
(Smeets and de Vaal, 2015). On the other hand, foreign firms can gain monopoly or monopsony power, 
thus requiring local suppliers reduce their prices or charge higher prices to local customers. However, the 
obtained data had very little variation over time and the corresponding empirical results did not satisfy the 
necessary model diagnostics or when they did the results were to mixed to shed more light on the already 
heterogenous results. 
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Forward spillovers are significant and positive in Slovakia and Slovenia for both types 
of foreign firms. The productivity effects on local firms are especially beneficial when 
inputs come from partially foreign owned firms in Slovakia and fully foreign owned 
firms in Slovenia. A one percentage point increase in output of foreign firms with shared 
ownership in upstream sectors is associated with 5.50 and 2.71 percent increase in TFP 
of downstream firms in Slovakia and Slovenia, respectively. This effect may stem from 
domestic market orientation of these companies which are more familiar with the needs 
and capabilities of domestic firms.  Similarly, a one percentage point increase in output 
of fully foreign owned firms is associated with 2.2 and 4.7 percent increase in TFP in 
Slovakia and Slovenia, respectively, indicating that local firms in both countries have the 
ability to benefit from high quality inputs. In both Slovakia and Slovenia, the net effects 
of vertical linkages are positive arising mainly from the ability of local firms to benefit 
from increased quality of intermediate inputs purchased from MNCs. The F test of 
equality of both types of forward spillovers is rejected in all countries expect in Slovakia 
and Hungary as indicated at the bottom of Table 5.4.  
In the case of Estonia, the average negative effect of forward linkages is driven by fully 
foreign owned firms. However, this detrimental effect is offset by the significant and 
economically meaningful effects of firms with shared ownership which, by selling their 
output to local firms, increase their TFP by 7.1 percent. In other countries, local firms 
are not able to reap the benefits of better intermediate inputs probably due to insufficient 
absorptive capacity or differences arising from sourcing behaviour of domestic firms in 
different sectors. The negative effect is mostly pronounced in Hungary where both type 
of foreign firms have a combined negative effect of 13.2 percent while in the Czech 
Republic this negative effect amount to 7.85 percent reduction in the productivity levels 
of local firms. 
 
5.5.3 THE EFFECTS OF MNC’S ORIGIN 
The third part of this chapter is concerned with the analysis of MNC’s country of origin. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 origin of MNCs can have differential impact on local firms’ 
productivity and their inclusion in GVCs. It has been shown that foreign affiliates from 
emerging economies generate fewer positive spillovers to local firms since they rely 
more on non-technological assets, mature technology, and production capabilities, 
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networks and relationships (UNCTAD, 2006; Buckley et al., 2007b). Related to this, 
recent research has found that these affiliates engage in asset seeking strategies relying 
on host country technology with the aim to improve the performance of its parent 
company thus limiting spillovers to local firms (Driffield and Love, 2007; Chen et al., 
2012). However, Javorcik and Spatareanou (2011) drawing on theoretical model of 
vertical linkages (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996) argue that geographical distance can have a 
positive impact on the creation of linkages as MNCs have incentives to source more from 
local companies to reduce transportation and communication costs. 57F60  
Similarly, it has been shown that services MNCs follow their clients in foreign markets 
due to strong need for geographical proximity with users of business services inputs 
(Nefussi and Schwellnus, 2010). Therefore, the variety of services inputs brought by 
MNCs of different origin can also benefit local customers in both manufacturing and 
service sectors. However, the expected sign of forward linkages is ambiguous and 
depends on the level of technology brought by foreign firms and the ability of local firms 
to absorb different inputs. Furthermore, free trade area within the EU can encourage 
export platform FDI from MNCs located outside of the EU that are attracted by improved 
market access to countries within the trading bloc. Since local firms are often not direct 
competitors, export oriented MNCs do not need to worry about potential technology 
leakage. Also, non-EU MNCs have to comply with the rule of origin which requires that 
sufficient share of value in their product is added within the host country (Javorcik and 
Spatareanou, 2011).  Since our sample consist of EU member states the assumption of 
increased domestic sourcing of non-EU MNCs is likely to hold in order to avoid import 
tariffs. 
In the case of foreign affiliates from EU political, economic, cultural and institutional 
proximity induced by EU integration process facilitate the cooperation and creation of 
linkages (Monastiriotis, 2014). For example, cultural and institutional similarity evident 
in business laws, customs, ways of doing business and possibly familial links may induce 
trust and mitigate misunderstanding (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009; Conti et al., 2014). 
This in turn may result in reduction of transactions costs between suppliers and 
customers, thus facilitating vertical linkages. However, EU investors are exempt from 
rule of origin requirement and thus are more likely to import their intermediate inputs 
                                                 
60 Services may not be affected to the same extent as manufacturing goods due to improvements in ICT. 
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from their home countries or third countries using global sourcing network. If this is the 
case, one would expect lower or even negative backward linkages from investments with 
EU origin. At the same time, increasing fragmentation of production process may 
generate coordination costs. Therefore, as noted by Markusen (2005) co-location of 
services functions such as R&D, logistics, sales and marketing may complement existing 
production activities within the country potentially leading to forward spillovers.  
In order to investigate the importance of country of origin the FDI spillover variables are 
separated and recalculated according to MNC’s home country. The Amadeus database 
identifies large shareholders of companies by country of origin. Thus this information is 
used to group firms according to whether their owners are of EU or non-EU origin. The 
former include 28 EU member states plus Switzerland and Norway while non-EU 
investors include those from other countries. 58F61 Therefore, horizontal and vertical 
spillovers are recalculated in the following way: 
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐸𝑈⁡𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐸𝑈 ∗ ⁡𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5.14) 
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈⁡𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈 ∗⁡𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑖𝜖𝑗
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5.15) 
where Foreign EU and Foreign nonEU are dummy variables indicating the origin of 
foreign investors, while Yit  indicate total output of firm i at time t.  
𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡𝐸𝑈 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡𝐸𝑈⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5.16) 
𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑡𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5.17) 
                                                 
61 Since we are interested in investigating geographical, institutional and cultural proximity of different 
FDI origin the sample is split into two main groups of countries. Furthermore, our sample is consistent 
with official statistics where majority of MNCs come from within the EU. Therefore, we are interested in 
whether sourcing behaviour of firms from EU is different from those with non-EU origin. Although 
combining high income countries such as US with less developed countries such as China or Ukraine may 
have different spillovers effects due to technology differences, scale and motives of investment, splitting 
the sample in more non-EU groups would result in very few firms from certain countries of origin which 
could bias the results. In addition, literature does not clearly distinguish between different groups of 
affiliates from emerging economies. Some authors include only low and middle income countries (Chen 
et al., 2012), others include only large emerging countries (Athreye and Kapur, 2009) while the third group 
of scholars include companies from high income countries in Asia (Mathews, 2002). In our sample, 
majority of non-EU investors come from Russia, Ukraine, US, China and in case of Slovenia from Western 
Balkan countries. 
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𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡𝐸𝑈 =∑𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝐸𝑈⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5.18) 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈 =∑𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑈⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5.19) 
where 𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡(𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡) are input (output) coefficients from annual IO tables measuring the 
proportion of industry j’s output (input) supplied (purchased) to (from) industries k(l) at 
time t. 
Table 5.5 below provides empirical results of the combined effects of strategic, 
geographical, institutional and technological diversity that MNCs from different origin 
bring into host countries. Before turning to the explanation of results, the diagnostics of 
the models are discussed. The Hansen J statistics of over identifying restrictions indicates 
that the probability of making Type I error if rejecting the null hypothesis of the validity 
of instrument ranges from 18 to 94 percent, thus providing sufficient evidence of 
instrument exogeneity in all countries except the Czech Republic. In the latter country, 
over identifying restrictions are not satisfied, thus casting some doubt on the validity of 
results. A more detailed analysis can reveal that the difference in the Hansen test for 
exogenous variables, more specifically the variable age is most likely the cause for 
rejection of the test for the overall validity of the instrument. We tried different 
specifications by including higher order lags of the dependent variables in the instrument 
set or treating intangible assets and human capital as endogenous variables, but the 
diagnostics of the model did not improve and in some cases even worsened. Second order 
serial correlation cannot be rejected thus satisfying the necessary condition for the 
validity of estimates. Only in the case of Estonia, the test indicates the presence of 
autocorrelation in second and fourth lags at 5% significance level. However, in 
specifications when second order autocorrelation is satisfied this comes at the expense 
of rejecting the Hansen J test, but the signs and significance of coefficients remains 
similar across different specifications providing a certain degree of confidence in the 
results obtained. Overall, the results for the Czech Republic and Estonia must be taken 
with these caveats in mind. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in all 
countries lies between lower (FE) and upper (OLS) estimates, thus we can be confident 
that dynamic specification satisfies Bond et al. (2001) informal test for a good estimator. 
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Difference-in-Hansen test for level equation cannot be rejected, hence we can conclude 
that there is sufficient evidence that system GMM is a proper estimator.  
 
TABLE 5.5 DYNAMIC SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVER EFFECTS ON DOMESTIC FIRMS’ 
PRODUCTIVITY (LN TFP) – THE ROLE OF MNC’S ORIGIN, 2002-2010 (ALL SECTORS) 
 VARIABLES 
Czech 
Republic Estonia Hungary Slovakia Slovenia 
L.ln TFP 0.387*** 0.540*** 0.362*** 0.546*** 0.556*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0358) (0.0671) (0.0290) (0.102) 
Horizontal_EU 0.464*** 2.123*** 1.565*** -0.190 -1.299*** 
 (0.103) (0.419) (0.456) (0.320) (0.269) 
Horizontal non_EU -2.959*** 6.977*** 0.701 -1.047** 2.977** 
 (0.506) (1.084) (0.621) (0.517) (1.443) 
Backward_EU -1.964*** -1.510*** 2.500** 2.048*** -1.816*** 
 (0.282) (0.212) (1.251) (0.582) (0.502) 
Backward_nonEU 11.14*** 6.131*** 3.369 -5.133*** 3.015*** 
 (1.604) (0.945) (3.195) (1.536) (0.925) 
Forward_EU 1.910*** 0.668 6.218*** 2.562*** 4.173*** 
 (0.528) (0.945) (1.708) (0.480) (1.256) 
Forward_nonEU -12.04*** -22.32*** -7.255** 1.037 7.675 
 (1.971) (5.530) (3.578) (0.993) (20.27) 
Ln Human capital 0.438*** 0.332*** 0.384*** 0.282*** 0.384*** 
 (0.00836) (0.0132) (0.0314) (0.0144) (0.0504) 
Ln Intangibles 0.0525*** 0.0856*** 0.0138*** 0.0548*** 0.0324*** 
 (0.00177) (0.00352) (0.00362) (0.00471) (0.00522) 
Age -0.0106*** -0.0112*** -0.0126*** -0.00875*** 0.0128 
 (0.00107) (0.00108) (0.00200) (0.00192) (0.00946) 
Age^2 8.48e-05** 0.000128*** 5.23e-05*** 0.000160*** -0.000901** 
 (3.51e-05) (1.09e-05) (1.51e-05) (3.17e-05) (0.000434) 
Ln Size 0.208*** 0.279*** 0.136** 0.148*** 0.0718*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0239) (0.0596) (0.0334) (0.0269) 
Ln Size^2 -0.00500*** -0.0135*** 0.00138 -0.00471** 0.00207 
 (0.000840) (0.00237) (0.00363) (0.00185) (0.00133) 
HHI -0.317*** -3.074*** -0.328*** 0.0289 0.338** 
 (0.0626) (0.671) (0.112) (0.159) (0.160) 
Ln Demand 0.0840*** -0.0835*** 0.0744 0.00197 -0.836*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0273) (0.123) (0.0108) (0.236) 
Model diagnostics      
Observations 97,891 66,194 6,910 16,440 12,884 
Number of groups 36,700 18,684 3,635 7,326 4,335 
No. of Instruments 68 65 104 67 75 
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Region effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes 
AR(1) p-value 0 0 9.76e-06 0 7.04e-09 
AR(2) p-value 0.198 0.0435 0.125 0.132 0.167 
AR(3) p-value 0.475 0.167 0.215 0.442 0.974 
AR(4) p-value 0.102 0.0324 0.928 0.875 0.128 
Hansen Test p-value 0.00971 0.233 0.948 0.198 0.189 
hor_EU=hor_nonEU 1.63e-10 9.03e-07 0.212 0.0128 0.00608 
back_EU=back_nonEU 0 0 0.707 0.000668 0.000465 
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Note: robust standard errors in brackets;  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
respectively. 
 
The coefficient of lagged TFP is positive and significant indicating the persistence or 
inertia effect from past levels of TFP and suggest that learning by doing and both 
observed and unobserved influences from the past have a strong impact on current levels 
of TFP. However, the magnitude of lagged dependent variable is somewhat lower in 
comparison to the baseline model or the model investigating the effects of ownership 
levels. As was the case with previous specification, the effects of FDI spillovers across 
countries are heterogeneous. The investments from EU in general provide potential for 
domestic firms to benefit from demonstration or imitation effects except in Slovenia 
where the effect from the EU is negative leading to a decrease in domestic firms’ 
productivity by 1.2 percent in response to one percentage point increase in foreign firm’s 
output. In Estonia the average positive effect from foreign presence within industry is 
driven by both EU and non-EU firms, however the effect of the latter is more than three 
times larger in magnitude. Since the non-EU variable captures different dimensions of 
institutional, geographical, strategic and technological context, domestic firms benefit 
from increased diversity of management practices and technologies which can be used 
to increase their own productivity and competitive advantage (Zhang et al, 2010). 
Alternatively, the level of technology used by these foreign firms is more suited and less 
advanced which enables domestic firms to imitate the practices of foreign firms and 
compete with them. The positive effects of FDI can also be seen in countries which 
attracted considerable amount of EU investments such as the Czech Republic and 
Hungary.  In both countries, increase in foreign output from EU firms by one percentage 
point leads to productivity improvements by 0.46 and 1.56 percent, respectively. These 
positive effects can be attributed to technological, social, cultural and institutional 
proximity between EU investors and domestic firms creating local synergies and advance 
learning capabilities (Monastiriotis, 2014). On the other hand, negative effects from non-
EU investors in the Czech Republic can arise for example from the size of investments 
from Russia or Ukraine which enable them to capture higher market share and lead to 
market stealing effects. The negative effects in Slovakia can be attributed to more 
advanced technology brought from US investors potentially explaining negative effects 
of horizontal spillovers in the baseline model due to inability of local firms to imitate 
for_EU=for_nonEU 1.28e-08 0.000176 0.000159 0.119 0.861 
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foreign technology and therefore improve their efficiency in the wake of increased 
competition.  
Turning the attention to backward linkages, the effect of EU MNCs are negative and 
statistically significant in three out of five countries. Negative effects in the Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Slovenia indicate that presence of EU firms in downstream 
industries hurts productivity of domestic suppliers as they are not able to join global 
production networks. Furthermore, MNCs from EU are in better position to source their 
inputs from their home country supplier due to their vicinity and may be more 
technologically advanced than MNCs coming from rest of the world, thus requiring 
higher quality of inputs which may act as a barrier for domestic supplier to enter GSC. 59F62 
As suggested by Rodriguez and Clare (1996) the negative effect of backward linkages 
may also stem from dissimilarities in terms of variety of inputs between host and home 
countries. On the other hand, positive effects are experienced by local suppliers in 
Hungary and Slovakia where a majority of EU investment went to industries with high 
potential for developing local linkages, such as automobile and electronics, due to long 
history, tradition and intense cooperation in the field of production and/or trade with 
foreign partners (Sass, 2008). The magnitude of coefficients are economically 
meaningful suggesting that a one percentage point increase of foreign firms’ output of 
EU MNCs in downstream sectors leads to increase in TFP of domestic suppliers  by 2 
percent in Slovakia and 2.5 percent in Hungary.  
On the other hand, non-EU investors seem to source inputs from local markets as 
suggested by positive coefficients in each country except Slovakia where the effect is 
negative and statistically significant indicating a decrease in TFP of 5.1 percent. Positive 
effects of non-EU investors are highest in the Czech Republic where a one percentage 
point increase of foreign firms’ output from outside EU in downstream sector leads to 
11.1 percent increase in TFP, followed by 6.1 increase in Estonia and 3 percent increase 
in Slovenia while in Hungary the effect is not significant. The difference between 
coefficients is statistically significant in all countries except Hungary. The effects of non-
EU investment are in line with the proposition that distance plays a role in the extent of 
                                                 
62 When log TFP of foreign firms is regressed on a dummy variable taking the value of one for non-EU 
and zero for EU investors controlling for industry, region and time effects the result point out that there is 
a negative and statistically significant relationship between TFP and the presence of foreign firms outside 
the EU in the Czech R. and Estonia. Hence, we can take this result as an indication of lower productivity 
levels of non-EU MNCs. This in turn may benefit domestic firms as non-EU MNCs are able to transfer 
knowledge to their local suppliers. 
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backward linkages. Most of foreign investors outside the EU were established to benefit 
from relatively cheap location and at the same time enjoy access to the EU market using 
countries under analysis as export platforms. In order to qualify for preferential tariff 
these foreign subsidiaries are more likely to be actively involved with local suppliers. 
However, as suggested by Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011), to confirm the role of distance 
it is necessary to test if knowledge transfer from non- EU MNCs is larger in sectors with 
high transport costs, something that is difficult to test given the data and space limitations 
of this thesis and the fact that our focus is on manufacturing and service industries, the 
latter being mostly a non-tradable sector for which transport costs is difficult to obtain. 
Furthermore, given recent advances in ICT, the transport costs are less relevant for 
services. 
In the case of forward linkages EU investment seem to have a positive and significant 
effects in all countries except Estonia indicating increased market seeking motives of EU 
subsidiaries and at the same time a possible increase in absorptive capacity of local firms 
which are able to use better quality and variety of intermediate inputs. Moreover, given 
that in most cases foreign suppliers within the EU followed their customers acting as a 
Tier 1 60F63 suppliers or providers of business services, the increased presence of foreign 
firms in upstream sectors may have resulted in cheaper inputs which benefit local 
downstream firms (Markusen and Venables, 1999).  
In general, the effects of positive forward linkages from the baseline model in Slovakia 
and Slovenia are driven by EU investors entirely although there is no statistically 
significant difference between the effects of EU and non-EU MNCs. In other countries, 
the effect of non-EU investors is negative, being the highest in Estonia where an increase 
in foreign firms’ output in upstream sector by one percentage point leads to decrease in 
productivity of domestic firms in downstream sector by 22 percent. Similarly, in the 
Czech Republic this negative effect amount to 12 percent and in Hungary to 7.2 percent. 
The possible reason for negative forward linkages from non-EU MNCs may stem from 
their motive of investment. It is likely that non-EU firms engage in export platform FDI 
to circumvent the trade costs related to distance. However, such investment motive is 
more oriented to supplying other neighbouring countries, thus reducing the spillovers 
                                                 
63 Tier 1 are more technologically capable companies which act as direct suppliers to original equipment 
manufacturers (OEM) in automotive or aerospace industry which require complex and specialized 
components.  
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potential for domestic firms and even crowd out existing domestic suppliers. If this is the 
case, domestic firms buying inputs from foreign MNCs may be faced with higher quality 
inputs and higher costs, thus resulting in decreased TFP. The difference in coefficients is 
statistically significant implying that positive effects brought by EU MNCs are entirely 
offset by negative effect from non-EU MNCs.  
The effects of concentration ratio are significant and positive in case of Slovenia, non-
significant in Slovakia and negative in other countries confirming previous findings 
suggesting that increased competition benefit productivity of domestic firms. The results 
are in line with selection effects of heterogeneous producers in which competition induce 
existing firms to become more efficient and force less efficient firms to exit (Syverson, 
2011). However, the exact mechanism through which competition is postulated to 
increase productivity cannot be discerned from the variable used in this analysis. The 
effects of a one percent increase in demand for intermediate inputs in the economy leads 
to diseconomies of scale resulting in decrease of TFP between 0.08 in Estonia and 0.83 
percent in Slovenia confirming findings from previous models. It seems that increased 
demand for inputs have positive albeit small effects on local firms’ productivity in the 
Czech Republic.  
Age and size kept the same signs and significance levels as in the ownership and baseline 
model with the exception of age which is now insignificant at conventional levels in the 
case of Slovenia. Nonlinear effects of firms’ size are again found only in the case of the 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia where TFP starts to decline after firms cross 
certain threshold. Firm specific variables measuring absorptive capacity are in line with 
those obtained in other models suggesting that human capital and the share of intangible 
assets play a positive and significant role in increasing TFP.  
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The literature on productivity spillovers has made significant advances in the last ten 
years. A large body of empirical evidence based on micro level data has been produced 
focusing predominantly on factors that condition the spillover process. Despite these 
advances, the heterogeneity of MNCs has largely been ignored – except for some 
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theoretical work on the extent of technology transfer arising from differences in MNCs’ 
country of origin, ownership structure and heterogeneous role of subsidiaries in MNCs’ 
network. The aim of this chapter was to examine the size and direction of productivity 
spillovers to local firms accruing from MNCs’ heterogeneity in a sample of five CEE 
countries controlling for firms’ absorptive capacity, market competition and demand 
effects. The novelty of this chapter is the introduction of new methodology which 
controls for the potential endogeneity of FDI spillovers and dynamic effects. In addition, 
unlike most other studies, the investigation takes into account not just the manufacturing 
but also the service sector, shedding new light on the role of MNCs and providing 
comparable results across countries by using the same data source and empirical model. 
The results of the baseline model show that previous findings related to horizontal 
spillovers may be misleading as in several cases it is found that local firms may benefit 
from increased presence of foreign firms and that these spillovers may become even more 
important than vertical linkages. In countries where MNCs reduce the TFP of local firms 
due to negative competition effects or labour poaching, the results are driven by both 
fully and partially foreign owned firms indicating the lack of absorptive capacity of the 
average firm in the sample. On the other hand, in all countries the positive effects of 
MNCs within sector can be explained by beneficial effects of partially foreign owned 
firms due to their lower technological sophistication which enable local firms to obtain 
technology at lower costs. It can be argued that local firms improve their productivity 
relying on well diffused technology brought by partially owned foreign firms. The 
findings related to the origin of foreign investment suggest that EU investment tend to 
generate greater productivity spillovers within their sector except in Slovenia and 
Slovakia. Overall, it appears that at least part of these increased knowledge spillovers is 
related to socio-cultural and institutional proximity which facilitates the process of 
learning and knowledge diffusion.   
The findings for vertical linkages partially confirm the previous findings for backward 
linkages.  The latter are found to be significant and positive in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia and negative in Estonia. A closer look reveals that partially foreign 
owned firms are driving the total negative effects in Estonia and partially offset the 
positive effects of full foreign ownership in other countries. Interestingly, it seems that 
fully foreign owned firms contribute to the development of supplier linkages - the reason 
for this may lie in the time period under investigation. The latter factor is related to time 
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and effort of both local firms to satisfy quality requirements and increase their absorptive 
capacity and of foreign firms to become more familiar with the capabilities of local firms. 
On the other hand, local firms in the Czech Republic and Slovenia seem to benefit more 
from partially foreign owned firms as they are more likely to transfer less advanced 
technology and be more involved in local economy, thus facilitating knowledge 
absorption by local firms.  
Similarly, we find that MNCs from the EU are more likely to source inputs from local 
markets in Hungary and Slovakia, thus confirming the hypothesis that cultural and 
institutional proximity are more likely to lead to more cooperation with local economy. 
On the other hand, in other countries the productivity advantage of EU firms has 
detrimental effects on local firms’ productivity which is offset by greater sourcing of 
local inputs by MNCs from distant countries due to higher trade costs and motives of 
investments oriented to serve local markets and neighbouring countries.  
Finally, perhaps the more interesting findings is related to forward linkages where in all 
countries except Hungary, the effects are statistically significant and economically larger 
than backward linkages shedding new light on the role of MNCs. This result may be 
driven by firms in the service sector which may explain insignificant findings in earlier 
studies investigating manufacturing firms only. It seems that overall forward spillovers 
follow a common pattern across countries, being negative in the Czech Republic and 
Estonia and positive in Slovakia and Slovenia. This is also confirmed when considering 
differences in ownership characteristics of foreign firms where the positive effects in 
Slovakia and Slovenia are driven by both fully and partially foreign owned firms while 
in Czech Republic and Hungary the opposite effects are observed.  
However, when considering geographic heterogeneity, the effects are less clear cut. It 
seems that EU investments have a positive and significant effect in all countries except 
Estonia. On the other hand, non-EU investments exhibit negative effects on productivity 
of local firms in downstream industries possibly due to their orientation towards 
supplying third countries in the EU trading bloc. Hence, potential for forward spillovers 
may be limited.  The magnitude of negative effects from non-EU MNCs offset any 
positive effects in the Czech Republic and Estonia, thus contributing to total negative 
effects. The results for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia in augmented models 
suggest the importance of disentangling linkages as the average effects of forward 
spillovers hide the important implications of MNCs’ heterogeneity on productivity of 
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local firms. Hence, governments should question their laissez-faire view that advocates 
inflow of FDI without paying close attention to heterogeneity of MNCs and the benefits 
they bring to local firms in different sectors.  
Summarizing the empirical results from this chapter, we can identify several findings. 
First, there is large heterogeneity across countries and any further attempt to analyse the 
mechanism of FDI spillovers should take into account the country’s specificities. Second, 
the MNC heterogeneity should also be taken into account as firm’s ownership and origin 
have important implication for productivity spillovers. Third, forward spillovers are more 
likely to influence the net benefits or costs of the foreign presence in the local economy. 
Finally, local firms should continue to invest in building their human capital, innovation 
capital, scientific and creative property and organizational capital incorporated in the 
firms’ intangible assets as these are found to be important determinants of productivity.  
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Motivated by recent theoretical modelling suggesting differential effects of FDI arising 
from heterogeneity within and across MNCs, previous chapter focused on examining 
productivity spillovers in manufacturing and service sectors combined. Given the 
inherent differences between these two sectors arising from type of products and services 
offered, entry barriers, productivity levels of both domestic and foreign firms, mode of 
entry, motives and strategies of MNCs, this chapter aims to shed more light on the effects 
of services and manufacturing FDI on productivity of local firms in these two sectors.  
It is shown that productivity differences across countries can be largely attributed to 
differences in services productivity (Bosworth and Triplett, 2003; Inklaar et al., 2008; 
Maroto and Rubalacaba, 2008). Recent liberalisation of services due to improvements in 
ICT, decreasing entry barriers and deregulation has fostered not only domestic 
competition but also entry of foreign firms with the aim to benefit from increased market 
opportunities arising from underdeveloped service sector in transition countries. The 
large share of service sector in employment and value added increased the need to raise 
the efficiency, improve availability and variety of services inputs. Better services also 
contribute to manufacturing competitiveness through reduction in costs and 
improvements in manufacturer’s ability to differentiate from competitors. Nordas and 
Kim (2013) argue that removing restrictions on FDI in services leads to more 
differentiated products for which consumers are willing to pay a premium and enables 
manufacturers to obtain higher export prices in sectors with comparative advantages.  
As witnessed by industry level data in Chapter 3 and firm level data in Chapter 4, main 
recipients of FDI have been services, a trend which is common to majority of middle and 
high income countries. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to investigate inter-industry 
linkages beyond those occurring within manufacturing sector. Although a bulk of 
empirical work investigated the effects of vertical linkages with domestic firms and 
externalities associated with MNC entry, little empirical work was done incorporating 
MNCs in services.  The area of investigation includes total spillovers accruing to 
domestic firms in manufacturing and service sectors. Furthermore, the effects of vertical 
linkages resulting from MNC operating in manufacturing and service sector on local 
firms’ productivity in manufacturing sector is investigated in order to shed more light on 
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the customer supplier relationship between domestic and foreign firms in two main 
sectors of economy. 
Previous work has focused on services forward linkages with the rationale that entry of 
MNCs in service sector provides more variety, better quality and reduced prices of 
intermediate inputs, thus enabling domestic firms to upgrade their technological 
capabilities resulting in increased TFP. This chapter adds and expands on existing work 
investigating the effects of services liberalisation on both upstream and downstream 
manufacturing firms by examining four possible channels of vertical linkages 
simultaneously. In addition, we examine whether the scope and scale of FDI spillovers 
depends on firms’ absorptive capacity. 
The reminder of chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 presents conceptual 
framework and empirical evidence related to the role of services in economy and their 
interrelationship with manufacturing sector. Section 6.3 describes the data used to 
construct manufacturing and services vertical linkages and explains the methodology 
adopted for empirical investigation and how the possible endogeneity of FDI is dealt 
with. Section 6.4 discusses the findings for baseline and augmented models applied to 
manufacturing sector and the role of absorptive capacity. Finally, section 6.5 concludes. 
 
6.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RELATED RESEARCH 
 
The previous chapter emphasized the limitation of existing studies examining the FDI 
spillovers in transition economies which focused mainly on homogenous effects of 
foreign firms within manufacturing sector. Recent research has started to include vertical 
linkages and horizontal spillovers simultaneously, but they only refer to manufacturing 
sector (e.g. Javorcik, 2004a; Nicolini and Resmini, 2010; Damijan et al., 2013). Despite 
the increases in FDI in services, which now account for almost 65 per cent of total 
worldwide FDI inward stock (UNCTAD, 2014), and development of corresponding 
theoretical literature on the importance of linkages between services and manufacturing 
sectors and their effects on productivity and exports, empirical literature is scarce. Even 
scarcer is the literature on the effects of FDI spillovers on service sector TFP or the 
impact of services MNCs on productivity of downstream manufacturing firms. Given the 
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large inflows of foreign investment in services in transition countries, it is important to 
separately examine the impact of MNC’s entry in services and manufacturing sectors on 
productivity of manufacturing firms. This will shed new light on the effects of vertical 
linkages on local firms.   
 
6.2.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF SERVICE SECTOR AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
MNC’S ENTRY 
The rising importance of service sector can be attributed to two main factors. First, rise 
in income per capita increases the demand for more elastic final goods and thus increases 
the need to shift resources into the sector explaining the rise in services employment 
(Clark, 1940; Fourastie, 1949). In addition, Raa and Wolff (2001) and Fixler and Siegel 
(1999) argue that shift to services is caused by structural changes in the economy which 
moves the demand curve for services outward. They explain this by increased 
outsourcing of manufacturing activities to the providers of specialist external services 
and increased female participation in the labour market, hence increasing the demand for 
services which were previously produced and consumed within household. 
On the other hand, Baumol and Bowen (1966) and Baumol (1967) argued that increase 
in share of final or consumer services in total output is the result of productivity gap 
between two main sectors of the economy. Therefore, this shift would have detrimental 
effects on aggregate productivity growth as services are less productive and less 
technologically advanced. The increased share of services on current price basis is thus 
the result of fall in relative prices of manufacturing and increased costs and prices in 
stagnant sectors which rise by magnitude of productivity differential. However, the major 
critique to Baumol is his focus on consumer services while ignoring the importance of 
producer services (Katouzian, 1970; Francois, 1990a).  
This leads to second factor emphasized by Oulton (2001). He pointed out that not all 
services are demanded for final consumption. Therefore, as long as some services are an 
important source of intermediate inputs to other industries and their productivity is 
positive the shift to services can increase overall productivity. Wolfl (2003) emphasized 
several channels through which increased share of producer services can contribute to 
overall growth and productivity. The first one is related to outsourcing of certain 
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activities previously performed within manufacturing firms’ boundary which increases 
the productivity of the latter. Second, the rise of producer services can help realize 
economies of scale in those activities. Lastly, increased demand for intermediate services 
also spurs new entry and competition, leading to increased productivity. In addition, 
urban and regional economics has recognized the importance of producer services for 
downstream users as an important source of agglomeration externalities (Greenfield, 
1966; Jacobs, 1969; Chinitz 1961; Vernon 1960; Stanback, 1979). Recently, new 
economic geography literature emphasized the role of agglomeration externalities as a 
source of differences in economic performance across regions (Krugman, 1991a; Fujita 
et al., 1999). As argued by Markusen et al. (2005) the source of such externalities are 
producer services since the lack of tradability and higher costs due to imports from distant 
markets create disadvantages for its users.  
However, second unbundling has reduced the relative production, transport, trade and 
coordination costs enabling the service sector to increase its share in overall economic 
output and trade acting as a main impetus to structural changes within and across 
economies (Baldwin, 2012). Even before the full impact of information technology on 
services trade, Bhagwati (1984) argued that trade in services will expand as there is an 
incentive to “splinter” the value chain geographically. The advances in information and 
communication technology (ICT) allowed slicing up the value chain into different stages 
where functions became more geographically and organizationally dispersed (Nordas 
and Kim, 2013). The advances in ICT industry have enabled the reduction of 
coordination costs leading to outsourcing and offshoring of services which are no longer 
produced in house (Amiti and Wei, 2005). As a consequence, trade in intermediate goods 
and services has gained momentum and now surpass the trade in final goods. 
Furthermore, if trade is measured as value which is added by processing imported 
components into final goods for export, the share of global services trade rises to almost 
50 per cent (Francois and Hoekman, 2010). This further increases if one accounts for 
sales of OECD foreign subsidiaries which were estimated at $1.5 trillion (WTO, 2008). 
The expansion of outsourcing and offshoring activities led to emergence of services 
MNCs which provide organisational, managerial and information processing/analysis 
skills and knowledge (Miozzo and Grimshaw, 2008).  
Second, unbundling has enabled MNCs to bring services into international markets and 
to specialize in more upstream (R&D and design) and downstream (marketing and after 
 228 
sale service) activities while shifting low value added activities to low cost locations. 
Although improvements in ICT suggest that proximity and geographical concentration 
no longer matter, knowledge intensive business services (KBIS)  heavily rely on tacit or 
combination of codified and tacit knowledge, high complementarity of in house 
knowledge base and frequent interaction between services provider and manufacturing 
firms (Landry et al., 2012). Therefore, it is expected that nature of KIBS requires physical 
presence of MNCs in host country. In general, services often have an element of 
“jointness in production” suggesting that other services are also needed in order for trade 
to occur (Francois and Hoekman, 2010).   
The reason for this is the nature of services which are characterised by intangibility, 
inseparability, heterogeneity, ownership, perishability. Also, their exchange requires the 
proximity of supplier and customer (Rodriguez and Nieto, 2012). The proximity burden 
was the main factor inhibiting the exchange of services (Christen and Francois, 2009). In 
theoretical model of Brainard (1993) discussed in Chapter 1, firms face “proximity 
concentration trade-off” between fixed costs related to outward FDI and transportation 
costs related to exports.  In subsequent extension by Helpman et al. (2004) the model 
predicts a pecking order of firms’ international activity where the most productive firms 
will decide to engage in OFDI as they are able to overcome fixed costs of setting up a 
new production facility while less productive firms will export or serve to home market. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2010) note that in a world with tradable services, Helpman et al’s 
model differ in two key aspects. First, transportation costs are irrelevant for services 
offshoring as long as they are not higher than set up costs abroad. Second, the 
characteristics of services mentioned above create uncertainty about the true quality of 
services provided. This uncertainty dimension creates incentives for OFDI, while the 
lack of transportation costs discourages it. Furthermore, services are difficult to export 
since they are non-storable and require interaction between provider and customer. The 
consequence of this is that a large bulk of trade in services is carried out via FDI which 
is also acknowledged in Article I:2 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) where mode 3 is related to “commercial presence”, whereby the service is 
rendered by a foreign subsidiary (Kelle et al, 2012). 61F64   
                                                 
64 Other three modes are: 1. “Cross border trade” where services is produced at home and delivered to a 
foreign country through ICT; 2. “Consumption abroad” where foreign customers travel to home country 
to consume the services; 3. “Temporary movement of natural persons” where employee of home country 
temporarily travels abroad to provide a service to a foreign customer. 
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Until recently entry of MNCs in service sector was regarded to have less potential for 
provision of advanced technology, development of linkages or access to export markets 
in comparison to manufacturing. However, this perception has now changed. Services 
MNCs often bring both hard (equipment) and soft technology (expertise, marketing, 
organizational, management and information processing and other skills). They can also 
provide vital intermediate inputs to manufacturing and information about international 
markets (UNCTAD, 2004). Foreign firms in host countries are more skill intensive than 
those in manufacturing and rely less on labour cost difference between alternative 
locations. This has implications for technology transfer as services employ a larger share 
of local staff in high skilled occupations with better salaries, thus leading to potential 
spillovers through worker mobility. The example of such skills are specialised skills in 
risk management, management and marketing skills in banking and insurance industry. 
Furthermore, local service firms may adopt similar information and systems and 
electronic banking techniques leading to imitation effects (UNCTAD, 2004). Services 
MNCs can easily add supply capacity in complex, capital intensive services such as 
telecommunications, transport or utilities due to better access to finance and ability to 
manage complex systems.  
However, increased presence of services MNCs can also lead to crowding out effects in 
certain industries such as hotel industry with entry of international hotel chains and retail 
industry due to better pricing structures, better access to finance, firm level economies of 
scale and negotiating power (UNCTAD, 2004). Since MNCs’ entry in 
telecommunications industry and utilities was mostly motivated by privatisation in case 
that previous domestic suppliers do not satisfy quality requirements, foreign firms can 
resort to foreign supplier thus indirectly contribute to crowding out effect. In addition, 
the second unbundling enabled MNCs to increase the range of their strategic options and 
rank locations hierarchically depending on the character of global value chains (GVC) 
within which the multinational is embedded (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994) and 
availability of favourable local conditions in terms of cheap labour, infrastructure and 
institutional framework (Thomas, 1997). Furthermore, there is evidence that service 
MNCs are more “footloose” as investment in services is less capital intensive and 
involves lower sunk costs, creating weaker linkages with local firms (UNCTAD, 2004). 
As already discussed in Chapters 1 and 3 the emergence of GVCs has important 
implications for technological upgrading and productivity improvements of transition 
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economies as it depends on successful integration into specific production stages of 
global or regional MNCs. So far, these countries have been involved in vertical 
specialization based on wage differences which enable them to restructure their 
industries, improve export performance and increase their productivity (Damijan et al., 
2013b). However, as noted by Baldwin (2012) increasing internationalization and 
fragmentation of GVCs mean that MNCs can easily switch to other locations to benefit 
from favourable local conditions. Moreover, only specific know how of MNCs’ 
headquarters has been transferred leading to technology lending not transfer which is 
more likely to have productivity enhancements properties in the long term. 
 
6.2.2 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SERVICES AND MANUFACTURING 
The importance of services for manufacturing sector is manifold and has been 
extensively studied. The extent of services use depends on the competitive pressure and 
the need to increase efficiency, the availability of high quality services and the relative 
costs of in house provision of services against outsourcing or offshoring (Banga and 
Goldar, 2007). Guerrieri and Meliciani (2005) noted that application and use of new 
technology has contributed to increased complexity of manufacturing production and 
distribution. Therefore, increased role of producer services is attributed to coordination 
problems and the need for control of specialised operations within the firm (Greenfield, 
1966; Miozzo and Soete, 2001). Similar arguments are put forward by Jones and 
Kierzkowski (1990) and Francois (1990a) who noted that demand for employees in 
producer services increases with changes in specialization and scale of production in 
order to ensure better functioning of specialized and interdependent operations.  
Services are also direct inputs into economic activities, and determine the productivity 
of factors of production (Hoekman and Mattoo, 2008). For example, Antonelli (1998) 
found that output elasticities of business services have comparable values to more 
traditional inputs and conclude that services are the engine of competencies and 
knowledge accumulation. Similar results are found in Drejer (2002) and Crespi (2007). 
Melvin (1989) emphasized the role of producer services as input to manufacturing as 
some services facilitate transactions through space (transport and telecommunications) 
and time (financial services). 
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More recently, the focus shifted on the effects of services liberalization and deregulation 
and the benefits it can bring to manufacturing sector in terms of cost reduction, increased 
variety, availability and better quality of inputs. Horn and Wolinsky (1988) explored the 
role of entry barriers in upstream sector and concluded that input prices are often 
determined in bargaining between suppliers and customers. Therefore, downstream firms 
may be locked in bilateral monopoly relations with providers. They showed that 
increased competition leads to lower input prices.  Recently, Barone and Cingano (2011) 
develop a simple framework relating services regulation to the costs of production of 
downstream firms. They showed that the share of services inputs whose price is 
determined under perfect competition increases while opposite holds in the case where 
the price is determined by a monopolist. The consequence of deregulation is the shift in 
equilibrium allocation of production and trade to those industries which use services 
more intensively. Bourles et al. (2013) highlighted two main channels through which 
lack of competition in service sector can have detrimental effects on manufacturing users. 
First, imperfect competition in upstream sectors incurs costs for new manufacturing firms 
downstream as search for intermediate inputs is costly and time consuming, thus curbing 
new entry and firm growth. Second, the existence of regulation in upstream sectors can 
create a hold up problem. By increasing the market power of suppliers and curbing the 
incentives to improve efficiency in downstream sectors the latter is forced to share the 
rents with upstream supplier.  
A related literature investigated the role of producer services and the presence of MNCs 
in service sector on downstream industry productivity.  Markusen (1989) demonstrated 
that trade in producer services has more beneficial effects than trade in final goods only, 
due to the complementarity between domestic and foreign producer services. Francois 
(1990b) showed that costs and availability of producer services are important to realize 
the increasing returns due to specialization and that disintegration of production chain 
depends on the scale and supply of producer services. Liberalisation of trade in services 
either by trade or FDI can have significant productivity and growth effects and enable 
less developed countries to become a part of international production chain. Rivera-Batiz 
and Rivera-Batiz (1992) argued that FDI in the business service sector encourages 
specialization and increases the productivity of the downstream firms. Markusen et al. 
(2005) developed a theoretical model to quantitatively assess the impact of FDI 
liberalisation in services and argue that foreign producer services may act as a 
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complement to domestic services. Furthermore, imported inputs may allow transition 
economies to obtain the inputs which are not available or require substantial time and 
resource to develop. As the entry of foreign firms increases the costs of intermediate 
inputs may decrease leading to better competitiveness of manufacturers.  
Apart from increased competition, which results in input price reductions, FDI can lead 
to improvements in quality due to superior technology of MNCs (Mirodout, 2006). 
Knowledge intensive services provide input upon which manufacturing firms can 
increase their innovation and productivity (Kox and Rubalcaba, 2007). It has been found 
that producer services are important vehicles for transmission of knowledge spillovers 
and induce changes in production process resulting in increased productivity (ECSIP, 
2014). Besides quantitative effects the development of producer services, particularity 
business services is also likely to stimulate the innovation capacity of their clients by 
enhancing their ability to design, develop and introduce new products and organizational 
models (Evangelista et al., 2013). Moreover, use of services, such as logistics, transport 
and wholesale and retail trade ease the flow of goods between different geographical 
locations. R&D improve the quality and technological content of products, financial 
services facilitate transaction within and across borders while telecommunications and 
reliable electricity are crucial for modern use of capital equipment and software (Nordås, 
2010). Transactions costs associated with the operation of financial markets and the 
enforcement of contracts are greatly reduced with developed business services such as 
accounting, engineering, consulting and legal service (Hoekman and Mattoo, 2008). 
Availability of financial instruments, transport and telecommunication services are 
necessary for productivity improvement of manufacturing firms as they increase access 
to finance, limit disruption in production, reduce costs and make provision of service 
more reliable (Arnold et al., 2011; Fernandes and Paunov, 2012). This is especially 
relevant for transition countries in which business services played a minor role before 
liberalization. The increasing variety and availability of services enable firms to exploit 
international division of labour and benefit from splitting production in low cost 
locations. This is also supported by Ethier (1982) who theoretically showed that greater 
variety of services is beneficial for downstream manufacturing productivity.  FDI can 
therefore bring new and technologically advanced services and may induce domestic 
provider to increase their quality.   
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Lastly, the productivity potential of services and manufacturing interactions is dependent 
on information asymmetries between services provider and users. This warrants the 
increased presence of MNCs in services sector. Markusen (1989) specifically focused on 
producer services and argued that they are knowledge intensive and differentiated and 
therefore require a big initial investment and existence of scale economies. This 
knowledge intensity creates an impediment to cross border trade as local customer has 
difficulties to assess their quality. Similarly, Raff and von der Ruhr (2007) developed a 
model where they test information asymmetries between foreign provider and local 
customer in terms of quality of services. They argue that since provision of services often 
includes experience their provision entails moral hazard problem where foreign providers 
misrepresent the quality of their products to capture the higher prices. Recognizing the 
problem, local firms continue to purchase lower quality services from local providers. 
They show that the information barrier is likely to be overcomed when there is a 
significant presence of downstream foreign firms using MNC’s inputs from foreign 
services provider since the former are more familiar with the quality of inputs. This 
creates incentives for foreign services provider to deliver high quality inputs and 
increases the likelihood that local customers will also start buying foreign services inputs.  
This may have implications on the occurrence of spillovers from services FDI as the 
quality of services is difficult to measure and it is often more suited for downstream 
foreign firms. Only with the passage of time local firms may start to recognize the quality 
and use foreign inputs more intensively or foreign firms may become more responsive 
to local needs.  
 
6.2.3 REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
The existing empirical work investigating service sector and its impact on firm 
performance is relatively scarce and started to emerge only recently due to increased 
availability of databases including services companies. One strand of literature is related 
to the process of servitization where manufacturing firms shift into production and sale 
of services with the aim to increase productivity and move up the value chain. The major 
impetus to such process is increased import competition and the process of offshoring 
which enabled manufacturer to move some of their tasks abroad to benefit from cheap 
labour. The empirical evidence largely confirms the increased use of services in 
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manufacturing production in both developed and developing countries (e.g. Pilat and 
Wolfl, 2005; Nordas, 2010; Neely et al., 2011; Falk and Peng, 2012; Fernandes and 
Paunov, 2012; USITC, 2013). Similarly, studies investigating the role of services export 
in manufacturing found an increasing share of services such as in the export of R&D and 
engineering services (Kelle, 2013). Crozet and Miller (2014) found increasing share of 
services in production sales of French manufacturing firms. The authors mainly attribute 
the trend to within-firm increases in sales of services although the entry and exit of firms 
also contributes.  
Another strand of empirical literature which is more closely related to our objective is 
the role of services and FDI liberalisation and its effect on downstream manufacturing 
productivity. On macro level, Eschenbach and Hoelkman (2006) utilizing EBRD 
indicators of progress in banking, non-bank financial services and infrastructure 
liberalization investigated the impact of changes in services policy on economic 
performance for a sample of 20 transition economies. They found that changes in policies 
towards services liberalisation are strongly correlated with FDI and that measures of 
services policy reform are statistically significant explanatory variables for the post-1990 
economic performance of the transition economies in the sample. Fernandes (2009) 
found that liberalization of services in transition countries had a positive and significant 
effect on labour productivity growth for most services subsectors. However, the author 
found large disparities across countries and sectors.  The effects were stronger for 
countries joining the EU in 2004 and for the ICT sector. Finally, they found a positive 
and significant effect of service liberalisation in finance and infrastructure on 
downstream manufacturing productivity. Camacho and Rodriguez (2007) looked at the 
effects of Knowledge Intensive Services (KIS) on 11 EU-15 countries and found in 
general positive impact on productivity, although there are important differences across 
countries and time. 
Studies based on firm level data are relatively scarce and only few of them are related to 
transition countries. Arnold et al. (2011) analysed the impact of privatization, services 
liberalization, FDI penetration and the extent of competition in services industry in the 
Czech Republic and found a strong positive association between liberalization in services 
industries and performance of Czech firms in downstream manufacturing. They found 
that FDI in services is a key channel, which affects productivity of manufacturing firms 
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through increased availability, quality and range of services inputs. In related research 
using enterprise survey data from over 1,000 firms in 10 sub-Saharan African economies, 
Arnold et al. (2008) also found a statistically significant positive relationship between 
firm productivity and the performance of three service input industries (access to 
communications, electricity and financial services). Similarly, Fernades and Paunov 
(2012) using firm level data from Chile find that forward linkages from FDI in services 
to downstream manufacturing industries had increased the productivity of Chilean 
manufacturing firms by five percent. The novelty of their approach is the use of plant 
level time varying intensity of services usage as weight for FDI penetration. Recently, 
Arnold et al. (2015) found that services reforms in the telecommunications, insurance 
and transport sectors significantly increased productivity of manufacturing firms in India. 
The effect is stronger for foreign firms which experience a 7.5 percent increase in 
productivity for one standard deviation increase in aggregate index of service 
liberalisation. They also found an independent positive effect on productivity of overall 
FDI and foreign presence in banking and transport, but not for telecommunications.  
Using data from over 40,000 firms in Ukraine over period 2001-2007, Shepotylo and 
Vakhitov (2015) analysed the impact of services liberalization on productivity. They find 
that one standard deviation increase in services liberalization, taken from EBRD 
indicators, leads to a 9 percent increase in TFP of Ukrainian manufacturing firms. The 
authors argue that such a large increase can be attributed to initially protected services 
sector. They also find that beneficial effect of services liberalisation is more pronounced 
for domestic and small firms. As an important methodological innovation, this study 
controls for market structure and demand shocks and also takes into account the dynamic 
effect of the liberalization on investment and exit decisions, and consequently on future 
productivity. Although their results may be plagued by endogeneity problem as services 
reform are often followed by other economic reforms or may be induced by increased 
manufacturing productivity authors argue that services liberalisation was exogenously 
imposed. This is also confirmed by Copenhagen Economics (2005) which argue that 
WTO accession explicitly demanded the liberalisation of services. Furthermore, they 
note that FDI liberalisation would have significant welfare gains and development 
stimulus to manufacturing sector. 
 
236 
Two papers which are closest to our empirical model and estimation are those by 
Klishchuk and Zelenyuk (2012) and Mariotti et al. (2013). The first uses data from EBRD 
transition indicators to examine the impact of services liberalisation on labour 
productivity in 21 transition countries. They use firm level data on 19,912 firms obtained 
from Orbis database. This is the first study that uses data from several countries using 
longitudinal data.  Although Arnold et al. (2008) also used data from multiple countries 
they studied service sector performance as opposed to liberalisation and relied on 
enterprise surveys. Klishchuk and Zelenyuk found that firm TFP is positively related to 
services liberalisation of transportation services and negatively related to banking. 
Second paper by Mariotti et al. (2013) examined the impact of FDI in services on 
downstream manufacturing productivity using data from Italy. Their approach is 
different from other papers as they investigate the impact of services MNCs on both 
upstream and downstream manufacturing firms. Their results point out to both backward 
and forward linkage effects, the latter being the main channel for the transmission of 
knowledge to manufacturing firms. They also find that manufacturing suppliers benefit 
from increased demand in downstream sectors and customers from increased competition 
and absorptive capacity in upstream sectors.  
 
6.3 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
Following the discussion in previous section the baseline model from Chapter 5 is 
replicated and applied to manufacturing and service sectors separately. The reason for 
this is the expected heterogeneity of both foreign and domestic firms arising from 
different productivity levels, nature of linkages and type of knowledge transferred to 
local firms, motives and strategic objectives of investment. Despite increasing 
importance of services in overall economic output and international trade, policy makers 
do not yet have a clear understanding of potential benefits or costs of services FDI. For 
example, Inklaar et al. (2008) found that cross country differences in aggregate 
productivity levels and growth are entirely attributable to service sector. They found that 
TFP in services is a key element explaining cross country differences. Given that a bulk 
of international trade in services is still occurring through Mode 3 (Lejour and Smith, 
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2008), that is via commercial presence of foreign firms in host country it is of interest to 
investigate linkages and knowledge spillovers to local firms in service sector. The 
divergent productivity dynamics between manufacturing and service sector could be 
better explained by exploring the effects of FDI spillovers comparatively. Therefore, this 
chapter will add to the literature by examining the effects of FDI spillovers separately 
for manufacturing and services firms.  
In addition, only few studies disentangle vertical linkages according to industry source. 
To the best of our knowledge most studies investigate backward and forward linkages 
within manufacturing sector (Javorcik, 2004a; Blalock and Gertler, 2009; Nicolini and 
Resmini, 2010). However, recent liberalisation of services in transition countries 
characterised by second wave of privatisation of large companies in banking and 
telecommunications industry, subsequent greenfield investments and foreign 
acquisitions in other service sectors provide an opportunity to investigate inter-industry 
linkages. Previous studies focused only on either forward services spillovers (Miozzo 
and Grimshaw, 2008; Arnold et al., 2011; Fernandes and Paunov, 2012), backward 
services spillovers (Javorcik and Li, 2013) or their combined effects (Mariotti et al., 
2013) on manufacturing firms’ productivity. We take a somewhat different approach and 
investigate the impact of MNC’s entry in service and manufacturing sector on 
productivity of local manufacturing firms which are at the same time supplier and 
customer of foreign firms. In addition, the analysis is conducted on several countries thus 
providing a comparative view of the effects of FDI spillovers arising from different 
sectors. 
 
6.3.1 EMPIRICAL MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
As in Chapter 5 we start our analysis by employing the baseline model which in this case 
is applied separately to manufacturing and services firms. Empirical model has the 
following form: 
𝒍𝒏⁡𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝝆 𝒍𝒏 (𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊,𝒕−𝟏)⁡+⁡𝜹𝟏𝑯𝑺𝒋𝒕 +𝝋𝟐𝑽𝑻𝒋𝒕 + 𝜽𝟑𝑨𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝝈𝟒𝑰𝑻𝒋𝒕 +
 𝜸𝒋 +  𝜸𝒓 + 𝜸𝒕 + ɛ𝑖𝑗𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(6.1) 
 where TFP is total factor productivity of firm i in industry j at time t, which is estimated 
in Chapter 4 using Wooldridge estimator adapted by Petrin et al. (2011) and Petrin and 
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Levinsohn (2012). As in the previous chapter,  𝐻𝑆𝑗𝑡 and 𝑉𝑇𝑗𝑡 stand for horizontal 
spillovers and vertical linkages respectively defined at the industry level; 𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 includes 
firm level determinants of TFP, namely human capital, intangible assets, size and age 
and their squared terms. Vector 𝐼𝑇𝑗𝑡 controls for industry competition and demand 
effects. Finally  γj , γr,γt denote industry, region and time dummies to control for any 
unobserved effects such as economy wide technological progress, changes in 
specialisation of certain industries or changes in their market and agglomeration 
economies. 
In order to examine the link between FDI in service sector and downstream 
manufacturing productivity we need information on linkages between different sectors 
of economy. Since Amadeus database does not provide information on individual firms’ 
reliance on services inputs our services FDI linkage draws upon measures based on input 
output coefficients obtained from WIOD database that is discussed in the previous 
chapter. This approach is applied in several papers (Arnold et al., 2011, Mariotti et al., 
2013) and provides information about the average inter industry sourcing behaviour of 
firms within a sector. As already emphasized in the previous chapter some precision is 
lost when using input output coefficients. However, using data on firm level sourcing 
behaviour would lead to endogeneity as significant use of services inputs may be 
correlated with firm performance (Arnold et al., 2015). An additional advantage of time 
varying IO table is the ability to capture the sourcing behaviour of manufacturing and 
service industries over time as the process of outsourcing and offshoring as well as 
splintering the value chain has increased dramatically reflecting the ability and incentives 
of firms to benefit from favourable conditions across different geographical regions 
(Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2014).   
Since FDI in services can be regarded as outcome of policy reforms and some services 
are more important for manufacturing it is necessary to properly measure the intensity of 
which services inputs are used by manufacturing sector.  Therefore, information on inter-
industry sourcing from WIOD database are combined with information on sales of 
foreign firms in each sector obtained from Amadeus database. Similar reasoning applies 
to the intensity of manufacturing inputs used by service industry which are constructed 
in a similar fashion. In summary, total backward and total forward linkages that are 
applied to manufacturing and service sectors separately in the baseline model are 
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disentangled to four types of vertical linkages (manufacturing backward/forward and 
services backward/forward). This allows us to assess the importance of MNCs’ presence 
in manufacturing and service sectors on downstream manufacturing productivity.   
Specifically, if sector k is the sector in which MNCs are present and sector j is the 
manufacturing sector, backward linkages from manufacturing and service sectors are 
calculated as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑧𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑛⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(6.2) 
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠⁡𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
⁡𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑧𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(6.3) 
The coefficient 𝛼𝑗𝑘 measures the share of manufacturing sector j’s output that is sold to 
downstream industry k and is reported in the rows of IO table. Variables 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑧𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑛⁡and 
𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑧𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣⁡measure the share of foreign firm’s output in manufacturing and service 
industry respectively in time t, expressed as the share of foreign sales in total sales within 
an industry k.  
Similarly, to quantify the intensity of exchanges between downstream manufacturing 
industries (j) and upstream service and manufacturing industries (l) where MNC is 
located we rely on technical coefficients obtained from the columns of IO tables. Thus, 
forward linkages arising from manufacturing and service sector are calculated as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡 =∑𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1
⁡𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑧𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑛⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(6.4) 
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠⁡𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡 =∑𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1
⁡𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑧𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(6.5) 
The coefficient⁡𝛾𝑗𝑙𝑡 is the amount of inputs sourced from sector l, expressed as a fraction 
of the total inputs used by manufacturing sector j weighted by foreign firm’s output in 
manufacturing (𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑧𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑛)⁡and service⁡(𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑧𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣) industry l in time t.  
Our augmented empirical model allows us to simultaneously quantify the intensity of 
vertical linkages by distinguishing different channels of spillovers. The final augmented 
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model investigating differential impact of manufacturing and services FDI on 
productivity of manufacturing firms has the following form: 
𝒍𝒏⁡𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝝆 𝒍𝒏 (𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊𝒋,𝒕−𝟏)⁡+⁡⁡⁡𝜹𝟏𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒛𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍𝒋𝒕 +
⁡𝜹𝟐𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈_𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒋𝒕 +
⁡𝜹𝟑𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈_𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒋𝒕⁡+⁡𝜹𝟒𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒔_𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒋𝒕 ⁡+
⁡⁡𝜹𝟓𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒔_𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒋𝒕 + 𝜽𝟔𝑨𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝝀𝟕𝑰𝑻𝒋𝒕 +  𝜸𝒋 +  𝜸𝒓 + 𝜸𝒕 + ɛ𝑖𝑗𝑡⁡⁡⁡               (6.6) 
  
where ln TFP is the logarithm of total factor productivity of manufacturing firm i 
operating in manufacturing industry j at time t. Imitation and demonstration effects are 
captured within vector ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑗𝑡  while vertical linkages arising from manufacturing 
and service sector are captured with above defined variables. As is the baseline model, 
firm level determinants of productivity are represented within 𝐴𝐶𝒊𝒕 vector, while vector 
𝐼𝑇𝑗𝑡 controls for industry concentration and demand effects. The measure of 
concentration is especially relevant for horizontal and forward spillovers as it is expected 
that increased entry of MNCs would lead to lower prices due to increased competition 
and increased efficiency of firms. To isolate the effects of increased competition and 
knowledge spillover or transfer, it is important to separate these two effects (Javorcik, 
2004a). Demand variable on the other hand controls for increased demand in downstream 
sectors due to entry of MNCs. Since increased demand may induce scale economies 
which may be translated into higher TFP of local supplying firms, we need to control for 
market size. 
As already explained in Chapter 5 since both the baseline and augmented model contain 
lagged dependent variable and FDI spillover variables and TFP are measured with errors 
we resort to system GMM estimation. Additional reasons for dynamic panel estimation 
are dynamic nature of TFP which in structural estimators based on proxy variables is 
assumed to evolve as first order Markov process, thus making static model of FDI 
spillovers currently employed in the literature misspecifed. An additional concern of 
augmented empirical model is potential endogeneity of FDI services linkage with respect 
to manufacturing productivity.  As argued by Shepotylo and Vakhitov (2015) large and 
more productive manufacturing firms may lobby the government for liberalization of 
particular service subsectors leading to reverse causality. However, FDI regime in 
analysed countries was liberal before our sample period and as argued by Arnold et al. 
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(2011) policy reform was under tight supervision of EU Commission as a part of 
preparation for EU accession. Nevertheless, strong productivity growth of manufacturing 
firms may have attracted services MNCs due to strong demand. Also, there is ample 
empirical evidence that MNCs providing services are locating near major manufacturing 
locations, thus positive effects of FDI may simply reflect location decision of MNCs in 
certain industries or regions (Nefussi and Schwellnus, 2010; Meliciani and Savona, 2011; 
Castellani and Meliciani, 2014). The same reasoning applies to service sector itself where 
successful privatisation of financial industry and telecoms may have induced other 
MNCs to invest in certain location due to increased use of services by manufacturing 
firms. Given the above mentioned problems system GMM based on exploitation of 
internal instruments is thought to provide more efficient and unbiased estimates of FDI 
spillovers. The initial specifications included minimum number of lags, i.e. the number 
of instruments came from restriction to start with one lag for levels and differences in 
case of predetermined variable (ln TFP) and two lags for endogenous variables, namely 
FDI spillover variables (Roodman, 2009). However, in certain cases model diagnostics 
with minimum number of lags were not satisfied and therefore the instrumentation matrix 
included higher order lags (three or four) of the regressors as instruments. 
 
6.3.2 DATA 
The empirical analysis is based on Amadeus and WIOD databases described in Chapters 
4 and 5. Since the baseline model in Chapter 5 is estimated using firm level data from 
both manufacturing and service sector we continue along the same line in order to 
provide a comparative view of the effects of FDI spillovers on local firms in 
manufacturing and service sector. Therefore, the data applied to the models defined in 
Section 6.3.1 pertain to 23 manufacturing and 20 service sector. However, due to low 
number of observations in some industries WIOD industry classification is applied which 
groups 2-digit industries producing similar goods or providing a similar service based on 
NACE Rev 1.1 classification. 62F65 The same grouping is applied in the previous chapters in 
estimation of TFP and construction of vertical linkages, thus resulting in 14 
                                                 
65 NACE Rev 1.1 is used as input output tables are constructed using this classification. 
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manufacturing sectors and 13 service sectors. Namely, the presence of foreign firms in 
service sector focus on the following broad NACE Rev 1.1.  2 digit categories: 
 Electricity, gas and water supply (NACE 1.1-E) 
 Construction (NACE 1.1-F) 
 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal 
and household goods (NACE 1.1-G) 
 Hotels and restaurants (NACE 1.1-H) 
 Transport, storage and communication (NACE 1.1-I) 
 Financial intermediation (NACE 1.1-J) 
 Real estate, renting and business activities (NACE 1.1-K) 
 
The data period under investigation is the same as in previous chapters and covers period 
2002-2010. In order to shed more light on the intensity of vertical linkages, Figures 6.1 
and 6.2 provide mean values of manufacturing and service linkages within manufacturing 
sector. A closer look at Figure 6.1 reveals that foreign firm presence in manufacturing of 
rubber and plastics (25) provide the strongest potential for manufacturing backward 
linkages followed by manufacture of machinery and equipment (29), manufacture of 
metals and fabricated metals (27_28) and leather related products (19). On the other hand, 
as expected forward manufacturing linkages provide a lower potential for spillover 
development in almost all industries. The highest forward linkages are evident in 
manufacture of machinery and equipment (29), chemical products (24) and other 
manufacturing industries (36_37). Regardin the countries, suppliers and customers of 
foreign firms within manufacturing sector in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia 
are more likely to benefit from manufacturing backward and forward linkages. Given 
that these countries experienced a higher productivity growth in comparison to growth 
in unit labour costs (ESCIP, 2014) they were able to attract significant amount of FDI 
and enter MNCs’ production networks. 
Similarly, Figure 6.2 provide information on services linkages. It seems that 
manufacturing suppliers in coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel industry (23) and 
paper, publishing and printing industry (21_22) are more likely to benefit from supplying 
downstream services firms over the analysed period. Similar conclusion can be made for 
suppliers in other non-metallic mineral industry (26) and electrical and optical equipment 
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industry (30_33). Turning to forward services linkages we can notice the relatively high 
share of services inputs, partially reflecting the increased manufacturing specialization 
of analysed countries (ESCIP, 2014). This is especially the case in the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Hungary where high quality inputs are necessary to increase the quality of 
export goods and in Estonia where increased specialisation in service sector contributed 
to large productivity gains in business services and manufacturing productivity (ESCIP, 
2014). 
The increased reliance of manufacturing industries on services inputs also reflects the 
rising share of foreign output in services which increased from 8 per cent in 2002 to 30 
per cent in 2010 on average (Appendix IV, Figure IV.1). The largest increase can be 
observed in Slovakia where the share of foreign output increased from only 12 per cent 
in year 2002 to over 33 per cent in 2010. The service sector in the Czech Republic (20 to 
40 per cent) and Slovenia (4 to 25 per cent) was also characterised by large increase in 
foreign output. During the same time period, the average share of foreign services inputs 
rose from 4 per cent to 17 per cent due to strong increase in recent years partially 
reflecting better coverage of firms in the database (Appendix IV, Figure IV.2). The 
largest increase was evident in Slovakia and Estonia, where the share increased by 16 
and 20 percentage point, respectively. A more detailed analysis across industries and 
countries provided in Figure 6.2 illustrates that manufacturing industries in Estonia are 
most reliant on foreign services inputs followed by Slovakia and the Czech Republic. 
However, our measure of direct cost share of services in manufacturing total costs 
measured using technical coefficients from IO tables is somewhat imperfect as some 
services such as telecommunications may capture relatively small share of total cost, but 
are very important for normal functioning of business. Industries with highest usage of 
foreign services inputs are chemical industry (24), leather and leather products (19) and 
textile and textile products (17_18) closely followed by other manufacturing industries. 
Thus, these figures illustrate the increasing relevance of services FDI and diverse impact 
of foreign firms in manufacturing industries in our sample, and thereby provide a 
compelling motivation to investigate separately the impact of services and manufacturing 
FDI linkages on the performance of manufacturing firms. 
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   FIGURE 6.1 MANUFACTURING LINKAGES ACROSS INDUSTRIES AND COUNTRIES  
 
Note: Industry codes correspond to industry classification in WIOD database and are based on 2-digit NACE Rev. 1.1 group
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FIGURE 6.2 SERVICES LINKAGES ACROSS INDUSTRIES AND COUNTRIES  
 
 
 
Note: Industry codes correspond to industry classification in WIOD database and are based on 2-digit NACE Rev. 1.1 group
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6.4 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
Before turning to explanation of results, a brief comment on the model diagnostics is 
made. As System GMM relies on internal instruments to deal with possible endogeneity, 
Hansen J test together with autocorrelation test is reported in the model diagnostics 
(Table 6-1). Further diagnostics tests for all models along with the syntax for each are 
enclosed in Appendix IV (Tables IV.1-IV.10). As shown below, in both baseline models 
used to estimate FDI spillovers in manufacturing and service sector, overall Hansen test 
cannot be rejected providing confidence that employed instruments are valid. In all 
models the p-values are always larger than the 0.25 threshold that was proposed by 
Roodman (2009), except for service sector in Slovakia. Even it that case Hansen test 
cannot be rejected at 10 per cent significance level. The null hypothesis of no second 
order autocorrelation in the error term of differenced equation is rejected only in the case 
of Estonia for baseline model applied to services. We tried to increase the lag order of 
the lagged dependent variable or even add a second lag of dependent variables on the 
right hand side of the model, but the diagnostics did not improve. 63F66 However, the sign 
and significance of coefficients remain robust across different specifications, though 
some caution is still warranted when interpreting the results. 
Next important step is to check for steady state assumption. Difference in Hansen test for 
levels equation does not provide sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis, 
therefore we can conclude that system GMM is preferred estimator. Time dummies are 
included to control for time universal shocks such as financial crisis, which is expected 
to affect productivity levels. However, as argued by Sarafidis et al. (2009) some cross 
sectional dependence may still remain, therefore we also use difference in Hansen test to 
test the validity of instruments for lagged dependent variable. The difference in Hansen 
test for lagged dependent variable cannot be rejected at conventional level of significance 
in most models. Some concerns can be raised in the case of Slovakia where both 
difference in Hansen test for levels equation and for lagged dependent variable in services 
model are rejected at 10 per cent significance. However, overall Hansen test, 
                                                 
66 In the case of the Czech Republic and Slovenia, inclusion of second lag of dependent variable on the 
right hand side improved the model diagnostics.  
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autocorrelation tests and difference in Hansen test for endogenous variables are satisfied, 
thus supporting our specification. Finally, the estimated coefficient of lagged dependent 
variable is compared to those obtained by OLS which is known to be upward biased and 
fixed effects which provides a lower bound of estimated coefficient. In all models the 
coefficient of lagged dependent variable lies between lower and upper bound providing 
sufficient evidence that system GMM estimator is a true dynamic estimator. 
 
6.4.1 RESULTS OF BASELINE MODEL ACROSS SECTORS 
Table 6.1 presents the results for both manufacturing and service sectors to allow for an 
easier comparison. Starting with the lagged dependent variable (TFP), we can see that in 
all models there exist a partial adjustment to the desired level of productivity. On average, 
across countries a one per cent increase in past productivity leads to 0.42 per cent increase 
in current productivity in manufacturing sector and 0.55 per cent increase in service 
sector. This implies that past determinants of productivity have positive and significant 
effects on their current levels. 
Turning to our main variables of interest, we start by examining the effects of horizontal 
spillovers. The latter are negative and significant across manufacturing sector, with the 
exception of Slovenia, which points to a possible crowding out effect of foreign firms 
within the industry. This is in line with meta regression results investigating indirect 
effects of FDI in transition countries (Iwasaki and Tokunaga, 2014). Additionally, as 
found by Smeets and de Vaal (2015) stronger intellectual property rights will reduce 
positive knowledge spillovers and enhance negative competition effects by increasing 
MNCs’ competitive position. Negative horizontal spillovers are even stronger in the long 
run suggesting inability of local firms to learn (see Appendix IV, Tables IV.1-IV.5). 
These results imply that local firms are not able to increase the efficiency to cope with 
increased competition. The negative effect on local firms’ productivity in the short run 
range from 0.40 per cent in Slovakia to 1.77 per cent in Estonia for every percentage 
point increase in foreign firms’ output in the same industry. On the other hand, in service 
sector the presence of foreign firms has positive effects evident in the case of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Estonia. However, the effect is not significant in the latter case. 
The results are similar to Ayyagari and Kosova (2010) investigating the impact of FDI 
spillovers across services and manufacturing on domestic firms’ entry. As in 
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manufacturing sector, long run positive effects are more pronounced and lead to an 
increase in TFP of services firms by 2.09 and 2.86 per cent in Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, respectively (see Appendix IV, Tables IV.5-IV.10). There are several possible 
explanations of beneficial effects in services. First, our sample contain more firms in 
services. Second, as argued by Kugler (2006) firms in manufacturing have higher 
incentives to minimize technology leakage. Third, these results suggest that local firms 
are more likely to benefit from demonstration and imitation in service sectors due to 
inseparability of production and consumption and where methods of production are 
transferable (Gorodnichenko et al., 2014). In case of Slovakia and Slovenia, the results 
suggest that MNCs in service sector are putting competitive pressure on local firms which 
are not able to cope with better technology, managerial and organizational know how of 
foreign firms resulting in their reduced productivity. Furthermore, since entry of MNCs 
bring reduction in prices and increase the variety of services, previous monopoly rents 
are reduced, thus negatively affecting revenues and TFP. These negative effects range 
from 0.83 per cent in Slovenia to 1.77 per cent in Slovakia. Overall, these results suggest 
that total effects of horizontal spillovers estimated in the previous chapter are largely 
driven by the service sector thus shedding new light on the role of services FDI in 
respective economies.  
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TABLE 6.1 DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATIONS OF FDI SPILLOVER EFFECTS ON PRODUCTIVITY (LN TFP) OF DOMESTIC FIRMS (MANUFACTURING VS. 
SERVICES), 2002-2010 
VARIABLES Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Slovakia Slovenia 
  manufacturing services manufacturing services manufacturing services manufacturing services manufacturing services 
L.ln TFP 0.393*** 0.410*** 0.345*** 0.590*** 0.547*** 0.486*** 0.381*** 0.325*** 0.443*** 0.601*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0144) (0.109) (0.0415) (0.103) (0.0821) (0.0407) (0.106) (0.0591) (0.0336) 
Horizontal -0.671*** 1.690*** -1.774** 0.160 -1.145*** 1.075* -0.401** -1.771*** 1.948** -0.833*** 
 (0.186) (0.215) (0.834) (0.320) (0.388) (0.594) (0.179) (0.258) (0.945) (0.311) 
Backward -0.276 -0.774*** -1.936** -0.350*** -2.414*** 1.565** 0.874 0.758*** 1.731* -0.113 
 (0.371) (0.130) (0.882) (0.121) (0.854) (0.624) (0.819) (0.120) (0.898) (0.144) 
Forward -2.792*** -5.042*** -1.374 -5.724*** -2.037 -23.13*** 0.247 0.712* 0.763 4.985* 
 (0.623) (0.542) (1.057) (1.240) (1.838) (4.903) (0.382) (0.430) (1.168) (2.818) 
Ln Human capital 0.478*** 0.414*** 0.420*** 0.308*** 0.311*** 0.328*** 0.339*** 0.347*** 0.517*** 0.296*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0101) (0.0394) (0.0148) (0.0526) (0.0385) (0.0144) (0.0244) (0.0495) (0.0278) 
Ln Intangibles 0.0449*** 0.0526*** 0.101*** 0.0801*** 0.00956** 0.0103** 0.0608*** 0.103*** 0.0290*** 0.0186*** 
 (0.00256) (0.00224) (0.0148) (0.00385) (0.00462) (0.00441) (0.00517) (0.0118) (0.00572) (0.00322) 
Age -0.00915*** -0.00977*** -0.00167 -0.0126*** -0.00725* -0.0110*** -0.00921*** -0.0183*** -0.0103*** -0.00328* 
 (0.00147) (0.00155) (0.00438) (0.000968) (0.00415) (0.00249) (0.00257) (0.00234) (0.00283) (0.00198) 
Age^2 8.05e-05** 3.38e-05 5.65e-05 0.000132*** -1.59e-05 3.51e-05* 8.76e-05* 0.000337*** 4.50e-05 -3.75e-05 
 (3.98e-05) (6.16e-05) (4.26e-05) (1.04e-05) (0.000132) (1.81e-05) (4.76e-05) (4.46e-05) (8.47e-05) (6.59e-05) 
Ln Size 0.213*** 0.209*** 0.638*** 0.169*** 0.0865 0.121 0.142*** 0.386*** -0.0185 0.0906*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0173) (0.147) (0.0160) (0.0601) (0.0957) (0.0315) (0.0688) (0.0607) (0.0265) 
Ln Size^2 -0.00446*** -0.00627*** -0.0457*** -0.00307*** 0.000997 0.000660 -0.00244 -0.0158*** 0.00972** -0.00259 
 (0.000929) (0.00117) (0.0136) (0.00111) (0.00349) (0.00574) (0.00199) (0.00335) (0.00495) (0.00167) 
HHI -0.191*** -1.327*** -3.524*** 0.489*** -0.203* -0.123 -0.0943 -0.306** -0.135 0.0904 
 (0.0587) (0.237) (1.298) (0.157) (0.114) (0.193) (0.109) (0.144) (0.153) (0.130) 
Ln Demand -0.00930 0.198*** 0.0626 0.223*** 0.0925* 0.447* -0.0115 -0.172*** -0.0779 -0.0858 
 (0.0267) (0.0291) (0.0694) (0.0754) (0.0530) (0.232) (0.0151) (0.0333) (0.178) (0.308) 
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Model diagnostics 
No. of observations 29,263 68,628 11,451 54,743 2,499 4,411 8,140 22,350 3,584 6,016 
Number of groups 9,712 26,988 2,870 15,814 1,278 2,357 3,074 10,521 1,136 2,394 
No. of instruments 47 47 42 46 63 86 60 53 68 71 
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
AR(1) p-value 0 0 3.36e-07 0 0.00107 0.000144 0 5.08e-08 0 0 
AR(2) p-value 0.570 0.588 0.718 0.0106 0.869 0.0925 0.742 0.591 0.228 0.546 
AR(3) p-value 0.411 0.189 0.684 0.418 0.342 0.474 0.0575 0.484 0.663 0.106 
AR(4) p-value 0.925 0.979 0.771 0.361 0.196 0.178 0.756 0.852 0.977 0.913 
Hansen Test p-value 0.277 0.412 0.307 0.286 0.278 0.402 0.883 0.110 0.481 0.555 
Note: robust standard errors in brackets; 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
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In case of backward linkages, the results suggest negative and significant relationship 
between increase in foreign firm’s output in downstream sectors and productivity of local 
manufacturing suppliers in Hungary and Estonia in both short and long run, thus 
contradicting the findings in meta regression analysis (Havranek and Irsova, 2011). A 
possible explanation of negative effects in manufacturing sector may arise from 
competition effects in downstream sectors which outweigh any positive backward 
linkage effects from increased sourcing of inputs from foreign firms as suggested in 
theoretical model by Markusen and Venables (1999) discussed in Chapter 2. Also, it may 
be that domestic linkage effect is lower for MNCs due to differences in technology and 
variety of inputs available in the economy or may reflect differences in sourcing 
behaviour where MNCs use only a fraction of the intermediates with respect to the 
domestic firms they displace. Furthermore, foreign suppliers may enter the industry 
following their major customer, thus exacerbating an additional pressure on existing 
domestic suppliers and result in full crowding out effect in both downstream and 
upstream industry (Altomonte and Resmini, 2002). In addition, the construction of 
backward linkages is such that includes both manufacturing and services MNCs and thus 
may simply reflect negative effects arising from services FDI which is known to have 
fewer linkages with the local economy, partly because they are more footloose and 
require less sunk costs (UNCTAD, 2004).  The only country which seems to benefit from 
entering supply chains of MNCs is Slovenia where one percentage point increase of 
foreign firm’s output in downstream sectors leads to 1.7 per cent increase in productivity 
in the short run and 3.1 per cent in the long run. 
Similar effect of backward linkages can be seen in service sector where suppliers in the 
Czech Republic and Estonia experience a decline in productivity between 0.77 and 0.35 
per cent in the short run and between 1.31 and 0.85 in the long run, respectively. The 
effect in Slovenia is not significant. On the other hand, for every percentage point 
increase in downstream foreign firm’s output, domestic services suppliers in Slovakia 
and Hungary increase their productivity by 0.75 and 1.56 per cent, respectively. The long 
run positive effects are stronger and range from 1.12 to 3.04 per cent. These findings 
suggest that FDI has heterogeneous effects across and within countries as evident in the 
case of Hungary. Furthermore, a close inspection on the sign of backward linkages 
suggests that total positive effects in Hungary and Slovakia estimated in previous chapter 
are driven by beneficial effects of MNCs on suppliers in service industry, a finding 
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similar to Lesher and Mirodout (2008), while opposite holds for the Czech Republic and 
Estonia. It seems that increased presence of foreign firms in former two countries has 
forced domestic suppliers in services to reduce their costs, become more efficient and 
improve the quality of their products. Furthermore, services have strong backward 
linkages with all industries which is less of a case for manufacturing industries. 
Turning to forward linkages, the findings suggest a negative and significant relationship 
in all countries and industries except Slovakia and Slovenia where positive short term 
effects on local firms’ productivity are evident only in service sector and range from 0.71 
per cent in former and 4.9 per cent in the latter country. Negative effects of using foreign 
inputs are more pronounced in service sector which may reflect the lack of absorptive 
capacity of average firms in the sample or the increased costs of inputs due to higher 
quality. The strong negative effect of forward linkages in service sector may also reflect 
the fact that services inputs are less tradable and therefore MNCs are exploiting their 
strong bargaining position to charge higher prices which negatively affects domestic 
firms’ profit function.  
In terms of variables measuring absorptive capacity, the empirical finding suggests a 
positive and significant relationship between measure of human capital and TFP across 
all countries and sectors. In manufacturing sector ten percent increase in average wage 
leads to 3.1 per cent increase in productivity in Hungary and up to 5.1 per cent in 
Slovenia. Similarly, in service sector positive effect is smallest in Slovenia where ten 
percent increase in average wage leads to 2.9 per cent rise in productivity while strongest 
effect is experienced by services firms in the Czech Republic whose TFP increases by 
4.1 per cent. The effect is even stronger in the long run where expected increase in 
productivity of manufacturing firms range from 5.4 and 9.2 per cent in Slovakia and 
Slovenia, respectively. In service sector, long run effect is strongest in Estonia (7.5 per 
cent) and weakest in Slovakia (5.1 per cent) for every 10 percent increase in average 
wage.  
Similarly, the intensive use of intangible asset has positive and significant effects on both 
manufacturing and services firms in all countries, which is in line with other empirical 
studies examining the impact of intangibles on productivity (Marrocu et al., 2012; Hall 
et al., 2013; Battistini et al., 2014). Short term effects of intangible asset are strongest in 
the Czech Republic in both manufacturing and service sector where ten percent increase 
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leads to 0.4 and 0.5 per cent increase in productivity, respectively. On the other hand, 
weakest effects are noticeable in Hungary in both sectors where ten percent increase in 
use of intangibles leads to only 0.01 per cent increase in TFP.  
The effects of other firm level variable, namely age suggest a nonlinear relationship in 
almost all countries and sectors with the exception of manufacturing firms in Estonia and 
Hungary. In Slovenia there seems to be a negative linear effect of age in both sectors 
which is somewhat surprising given the results in the previous chapter. The findings for 
both sectors suggest that either very young or very old firms have positive effects on 
productivity. It seems that majority of firms need to accommodate to market conditions 
and are still in the learning process which negatively affects their productivity levels and 
only after a very long period of operation they are able to increase their productivity. 
Firm’s size has a positive and significant effect in all countries and sectors except 
Hungary which may be due to this country having a very large proportion of large firms 
in the sample. Inverse U shape effects can be found in both sectors in the Czech Republic 
and Estonia and in service sector for Slovakia suggesting that after firms achieve a certain 
size their effects on productivity starts to diminish. 
Competition has mostly positive effects on firm’s productivity in manufacturing sectors 
in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary. The effect is less pronounced in service 
sector where increased competition has beneficial effects only in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, while increased industry concentration negatively affects TFP of services firms 
in Estonia. This suggests that manufacturing firms are more responsive to changes in 
market conditions. Finally, when we look at the effects of demand the findings suggest a 
positive and significant effect on productivity of firms in service sector in the Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Hungary and negative effects in Slovakia. It seems that increased 
purchase of intermediate inputs by domestic firms partially offset negative effects of 
MNCs’ backward linkages in service sector in these countries. Similar reasoning can be 
applied to manufacturing firms in Hungary.  
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6.4.2 EFFECTS OF SERVICES FDI ON DOWNSTREAM MANUFACTURING 
FIRMS 
Following the discussion in Section 6.2.2 on the role of FDI in service sector and its 
possible channels of influence on manufacturing firms the aim of this section is to shed 
more light on the effects of MNCs on domestic firms’ TFP in manufacturing sector. To 
explore this alternative, we have split the total backward and forward linkages into two 
groups. First group consist of manufacturing backward and forward linkages defined in 
eq. (6.2 and 6.4) while the second group is related to services backward and forward 
linkages defined in eq. (6.3 and 6.5). In this way we are able to shed more light on the 
customer supplier relationship between domestic and foreign firms in two main sectors 
of economy. Furthermore, given the different timing of investments in these two sectors 
of economy as well as heterogeneous motives, strategies and sourcing behaviour the 
effects of vertical linkages may be different than one found in the previous section. The 
specific focus on manufacturing sector is important as successful integration of local 
manufacturing firms in GVCs provide opportunities to increase their competitiveness by 
upgrading their production. By entering MNCs’ network local firms may engage in 
production of high value added products, employ more efficient production strategies or 
increase the skill content (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Kaplinsky, 2000, Gereffi et al., 
2005). Therefore, it is important to analyse whether the presence of MNCs in different 
sectors provide local manufacturing suppliers and customers an opportunity to increase 
their productivity. The results of augmented baseline model (6.6) are presented in Table 
6.2 below.  
Starting with the diagnostics, Hansen test suggests that instruments and their subsets for 
each model are valid, i.e. exogenous. Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation confirms 
the absence of autocorrelation in second differences while rejecting null hypothesis of 
no first order autocorrelation. Furthermore, the assumptions of no cross sectional 
dependence and steady state hold which provide us with confidence that the models are 
correctly specified and that we can proceed with the explanation of results. 
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TABLE 6.2 DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVER EFFECTS ON PRODUCTIVITY 
(LN TFP) OF DOMESTIC FIRMS IN MANUFACTURING ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY SOURCE, 2002-2010 
Note: robust standard errors in brackets; 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
respectively. 
 
 
 
VARIABLES Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Slovakia Slovenia 
            
l.lnTFP 0.385*** 0.267*** 0.600*** 0.385*** 0.431*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0274) (0.114) (0.0432) (0.0571) 
Horizontal -0.167** -0.635*** -0.701** -0.383** 0.206 
 (0.0829) (0.158) (0.343) (0.198) (0.356) 
Backward_man 1.740*** -0.597* 2.765** 1.815* 1.841** 
 (0.599) (0.339) (1.355) (1.100) (0.933) 
Forward_man -2.573*** -1.331*** -3.082** -0.257 -0.333 
 (0.485) (0.409) (1.373) (0.495) (1.430) 
Backward_serv -7.576*** 1.286* -20.66*** 5.331* -9.719** 
 (2.158) (0.674) (6.324) (2.801) (4.698) 
Forward_serv 4.417*** 3.110*** 6.913* 6.150*** 13.60*** 
 (1.492) (0.710) (4.147) (1.752) (5.205) 
Ln Human capital 0.482*** 0.488*** 0.295*** 0.332*** 0.526*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0163) (0.0609) (0.0145) (0.0450) 
Ln Intangibles 0.0453*** 0.0766*** 0.00774* 0.0597*** 0.0289*** 
 (0.00254) (0.00585) (0.00410) (0.00521) (0.00552) 
Age -0.00877*** -0.0150*** -0.00491 -0.00930*** -0.0103*** 
 (0.00152) (0.00158) (0.00423) (0.00260) (0.00247) 
Age^2 7.68e-05* 0.000172*** -8.37e-05 9.16e-05* 6.29e-05 
 (4.13e-05) (2.51e-05) (0.000139) (4.83e-05) (6.01e-05) 
Ln Size 0.213*** 0.270*** 0.0800* 0.146*** -0.0265 
 (0.0183) (0.0243) (0.0485) (0.0321) (0.0590) 
Ln Size^2 -0.00427*** -0.00725*** 0.000436 -0.00269 0.0105** 
 (0.000934) (0.00203) (0.00297) (0.00203) (0.00474) 
HHI -0.232*** 0.241* -0.142 -0.159 -0.189 
 (0.0619) (0.136) (0.116) (0.106) (0.132) 
Ln Demand -0.0332 -0.0456 0.0655 -0.0204 0.0293 
 (0.0240) (0.0335) (0.0471) (0.0161) (0.100) 
Model diagnostics      
Observations 29,263 11,451 2,499 8,140 3,584 
Number of groups 9,712 2,870 1,278 3,074 1,136 
No. of Instruments 55 86 107 60 81 
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Region effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes 
AR(1) p-value 0 0 0.000564 0 0 
AR(2) p-value 0.562 0.788 0.569 0.722 0.343 
AR(3) p-value 0.850 0.983 0.455 0.0689 0.289 
AR(4) p-value 0.879 0.803 0.456 0.924 0.394 
Hansen Test p-value 0.106 0.107 0.682 0.755 0.353 
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For brevity, we will focus our attention on vertical linkages since horizontal spillovers 
and other control variables are fairly robust to changes in specification except the effects 
of industry concentration which now suggest that manufacturing firms in Estonia benefit 
from less competition. As far as backward linkages are concerned we can observe that 
presence of foreign firms in downstream manufacturing sectors with the exception of 
Estonia benefit domestic suppliers as the effects on local firms’ productivity range from 
1.7 per cent in the Czech Republic to 2.7 per cent in Hungary. The effects are even 
stronger in the long run where one percentage point increase of foreign firm’s output in 
downstream manufacturing sector leads to 3.23 per cent and 6.9 per cent increase in TFP 
in Slovenia and Hungary, respectively. These results are now more in line with most 
empirical studies (Havranek and Irsova, 2011) suggesting that countries which attracted 
large amount of FDI in tradable sectors such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia are able to benefit from entering MNCs’ production network. However, one 
must be careful in interpreting these results as our measure of backward linkages simply 
measure the extent of inputs bought by MNCs and its effects on local firm’s TFP. As 
shown by several studies focusing on automotive industry in CEE region which attracted 
significant amount of FDI, the transfer of knowledge is somewhat limited. For example, 
studies by Pavlinek and Zenka (2011) and Rugraff (2010) showed that the Czech 
automotive industry is almost entirely dominated by foreign firms which act as a Tier 1 
supplier whilst local firms are engaged in a system of “price-driven subcontracting” 
failing to develop and produce innovative products. Furthermore, it is found that local 
suppliers are mostly engaged in assembly of low to medium value-added parts finding it 
difficult to increase their value added. However, there is also evidence that interaction 
with MNCs lead to process and product upgrading (Domanski and Gwosdz, 2009; 
Pavlinek et al., 2009) and increased knowledge transfer by autonomous foreign 
subsidiaries and those which have longer presence in host economy (Gentile-Ludecke 
and Giroud, 2012; Jindra et al., 2009). 
Turning to backward services linkages, positive effects on local firm’s productivity are 
evident only in Estonia and Slovakia and are larger in magnitude in comparison to 
manufacturing backward linkages. These positive effects may reflect the change in 
economic structure of these economies where service sector share in economic activities 
is rising (ESCIP, 2014) which provide domestic suppliers an opportunity to increase their 
productivity. As shown by Javorcik and Li (2013) in the case of global retail chains 
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increased presence of MNCs create a strong competitive pressure which results in 
crowding out of local firms in service sector and at the same time increase the bargaining 
power of MNCs vis a vis local suppliers. Moreover, due to their global sourcing and 
increased use of ICT foreign firms have the ability to import some of their products thus 
creating incentives for local firms to increase the quality of products, reduce prices and 
improve efficiency. Furthermore, MNCs in certain service industries may help domestic 
suppliers to reduce their distribution costs and provide access to other regional or national 
markets stimulating economies of scale (Javorcik and Li, 2013). 
On the other hand, negative services backward linkages are experienced by 
manufacturing firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, offsetting any 
positive effect arising from increased domestic sourcing of MNCs in manufacturing 
sector. In addition, large negative effects of services backward linkages may explain 
negative backward linkages in Hungary presented in Table 6.1. These findings are in line 
with those obtained by Mariotti et al. (2013) who found that four service sectors exhibit 
negative effects on upstream manufacturing firms unless entry of MNCs in is able to 
increase demand for intermediate manufacturing inputs. Similar result is found in 
Ayyagari and Kosova (2010) when investigating the effects of services backward 
linkages on domestic firm’ entry. They explain this by the fact manufacturing firms 
usually supply only limited amount of intermediate inputs to services in form of 
communication and information technology and office automation equipment. Since in 
these industries barriers to entry may be high and foreign presence is significant services 
firms may be more inclined to source from their foreign suppliers. In addition, backward 
linkages are usually stronger within service sector as found in Nordas and Kim (2013) 
due to less reliance on inputs from other sectors. Inability of domestic suppliers to satisfy 
stringent quality requirements may pose certain difficulties to local suppliers in terms of 
input adaptation. As argued by Mariotti et al. (2013) adaptation requires additional costs 
evident in costs of training and investments which may negatively impact TFP.  
Furthermore, some services are characterised by buyer driven GSCs. The example of 
latter are large retailers or marketers of final products which require meeting high quality 
standards at reduced costs (Gereffi and Lee, 2012).  In certain cases, that can only be 
satisfied by large MNCs in manufacturing sector which have the ability to meet stringent 
and costly requirements. Iacovone et al. (2015), for example, showed that large retailers 
require substantial price reductions if suppliers do not come up with product innovation 
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in a given year. Only firms with very high performance and ability to invest in innovation 
become suppliers, while other firms face declining sales, productivity or even exit from 
the market. Recently, there has been a trend of consolidation in supply chain (Cattaneo 
et al., 2010). This has led to outsourcing being carried through a supplier tiering model 
where in most cases foreign supplier is a first tier supplier managing its own production 
or sourcing network (Farole and Winkler, 2014). This may explain the limited role of 
domestic manufacturing firms to enter GVC of MNCs in service sector either because 
they are involved in low value added activities with limited knowledge transfer or first 
tier supplier follows a more internalised process.  
The findings with respect to manufacturing client firms suggest that inputs supplied by 
MNCs in manufacturing sector have detrimental effects on TFP in all countries, but are 
only significant in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary. One percentage point 
increase in foreign firms’ output in upstream sector leads to decline in TFP levels 
between 1.3 per cent and 3 per cent in Estonia and Slovakia, respectively. This suggests 
that domestic firms do not have the capabilities to benefit from high quality inputs either 
due to their higher prices or inability to effectively use them in production process.  
Turning to forward spillovers from service sector the results indicate a strong positive 
and significant effect of foreign services inputs on downstream manufacturing 
productivity thus confirming previous findings on the beneficial effects of services FDI 
(Arnold et al., 2011; Fernandes and Paunov, 2012; Mariotti et al., 2013).  The short run 
effects range from 3.1 per cent in Estonia to 13.6 per cent in Slovenia. Long run effects 
are even stronger being smallest in Estonia (4.24 per cent) and largest in Hungary (17.3 
per cent) and Slovenia (23.9 per cent). Such large semi-elasticities may reflect the FDI 
penetration ratios in service sector due to recent liberalisation where effects are expected 
to be larger for an increase in foreign presence from small levels than in sectors where 
levels of FDI are already saturated (Gersl et al., 2007). The evidence suggests that 
productivity spillovers are more easily captured by manufacturing customers which buy 
inputs with high technological content from services MNCs than through backward 
linkages. This may be the results of stringent quality requirements imposed by MNCs in 
services which put pressure to lower the production costs and prices resulting in fewer 
financial resources to finance the necessary investment in technology and product 
upgrading. Positive effects of services forward linkages may also reflect market seeking 
motives of MNCs which initially followed their clients, but eventually expanded their 
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operation to local manufacturing firms which are in need of high quality inputs in order 
to be able to maintain and increase their international competitiveness.67 
 
6.4.3 THE MODERATING EFFECTS OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY 
As argued in Chapter 2, the occurrence of FDI spillovers is not an automatic process and 
not all firms benefit equally from FDI. As noted by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and later 
on by Zahra and George (2002) absorptive capacity helps firms identify, assimilate, 
transform and apply knowledge from external environment.  Therefore, it is expected 
that the benefits from FDI spillovers are more likely to occur in firms which are better 
able to evaluate the technology which comes with MNCs. Assimilation of external 
knowledge depends on firm’s prior knowledge base which can encourage or hinder 
knowledge absorption. As argued by Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) prior experience can 
facilitate knowledge absorption by defining the locus of knowledge search, but at the 
same time it can hinder firm’s search activities to familiar and proximate areas (Stuart 
and Podolny, 1996), thus ignoring other sources of knowledge (Cohen and Levintahl, 
1990). Finally, absorptive capacity enables firms to transform and apply the new 
technology. This in turn depends on organizational capabilities and routines which 
provide an opportunity to internally disseminate external information and incorporate 
technology into existing processes and routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi et al., 
2000; Blalock and Simon, 2009). 
Since absorptive capacity is a multidimensional concept its measurement in empirical 
research is somewhat difficult. Various measures of absorptive capacity have been used 
such as input indicators represented by R&D expenditure, R&D intensity or R&D human 
capital measured as R&D employees divided by total employees (Gao et al., 2008), 
percentage of higher-educated workforce (Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1992), number of 
doctorates in the R&D department (Veugelers,1997). The shortcoming of such indicators 
lies in their narrow focus which cannot explain the complex nature of absorptive capacity 
                                                 
67 Given the large heterogeneity of manufacturing and especially service sectors, we have run two 
additional models: (i) interacting FDI spillover variables in model 6.6 with a dummy variable indicating 
low and high tech manufacturing sectors; (ii) separating the effects of service linkages according to less 
and high knowledge intensive services using Eurostat classification. In both cases, the additional results 
confirmed the extreme heterogeneity of empirical results, thus no general pattern could be found across 
countries. 
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which relies on several capabilities that build on one another (Duchek, 2013). In addition, 
high R&D expenditure or intensity does not necessarily imply higher output or increased 
TFP as transformation from input to output depends on other variables as well. Similarly, 
output measures such as the number of patents filed by firms are used since they represent 
evolution or emergence of new knowledge within the firm (Duchek, 2013). Finally, some 
studies use technological gap measured as distance between the level of a local firm TFP 
and that of foreign firms (Girma, 2005; Nicolini and Resmini, 2010; Abraham et al., 
2010). However, the problem with technological gap is measurement error arising with 
TFP estimation and the fact that TFP reflects other factors besides technology. In 
addition, TFP gap may be affected by temporary shocks which do not affect absorptive 
capacity (Girma and Gorg, 2007). 
Keeping in mind these shortcomings of single quantitative measures of absorptive 
capacity and data availability, we test whether intensity of intangible asset use has a 
moderating effect on the occurrence of FDI spillovers within the manufacturing sector. 
The use of intangible asset has potentially several advantages over other measures of 
absorptive capacity.  First, intangible capital is found to be a strong determinant of firm 
productivity in many studies hence it helps to explain large productivity differences 
(Syverson, 2011). Second, intangible capital is a broader measure of absorptive capacity 
as it includes both innovation inputs and outputs developed either in house or acquired 
in arms-length transactions. For example, knowledge capital of the firm incorporated in 
intangible assets include R&D expenditure, software, patents, trademarks, organizational 
processes and firm specific skills that provide competitive advantages (Ragoussis, 2014). 
Third, in order to be classified as intangible asset, three criteria are used to classify 
expenses identified in International Accounting Standards (IAS).64F68 Intangible asset 
reported in Amadeus database conform to these criteria and empirical evidence have 
found that capitalized intangible asset is more productivity enhancing than intangible 
capital based on current expenses (Bontempi and Mairesse, 2015).  
However, our measure of absorptive capacity is not without drawbacks. First, we are not 
able to distinguish between different types of intangible capital. Second, only externally 
acquired assets can be capitalized and therefore recognized as intangible asset while 
                                                 
68 (i) identifiability: arising from ability of firms to separate, rent, licence and exchange the asset or the 
assets need to arise from legal right regardless if they are transferable or separable;  
(ii) control: arising from firm power to obtain the benefits from those assets; 
(iii) asset must bring future economic benefits (IFRS, 2012) 
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those assets generated internally is often expensed (Ragoussis, 2014). Furthermore, 
innovative capabilities and computerised information are reported in firm’s balance sheet 
while economic competencies such as marketing expenditure or costs related to 
employee training are often expensed. Bearing in mind these shortcomings we proceed 
with our estimation as our analysis is conducted within countries and any asymmetries 
in accounting standards and treatment of intangible asset are controlled for. 
The model presented by equation 6.2 is now augmented by the interaction terms between 
each FDI spillover measure and the log ratio of intangible over tangible asset: 
𝒍𝒏⁡𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝝆 𝒍𝒏 (𝑻𝑭𝑷𝒊𝒋,𝒕−𝟏)⁡+⁡⁡𝜹𝟏𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒛𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍𝒋𝒕 + ⁡𝜹𝟐𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒛𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒍𝒋𝒕 ∗ ⁡𝑰𝑨𝒊𝒕 +
𝜹𝟑𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈_𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒋𝒕 + ⁡𝜹𝟒𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈_𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒋𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑨𝒊𝒕 +
𝜹𝟓𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈_𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒋𝒕 + 𝜹𝟔𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈_𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒋𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑨𝒊𝒕 +
⁡𝜹𝟕𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒔_𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒋𝒕⁡ + 𝜹𝟖𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒔_𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒋𝒕 ∗
𝑰𝑨𝒊𝒕⁡⁡+⁡𝜹𝟗𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒔_𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒋𝒕 + ⁡𝜹𝟏𝟎𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒔_𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒋𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝟏𝟏𝑨𝑪𝒊𝒕 +
𝝀𝟏𝟐𝑰𝑻𝒋𝒕 +  𝜸𝒋 +  𝜸𝒓 + 𝜸𝒕 + ɛ𝒊𝒋𝒕                                                                                  (6.7) 
 
where definition of variables is the same as in eq. (6.6).  However, the interpretation of 
individual spillover terms is different due to presence of interaction terms. For example, 𝛅𝟏⁡ 
reflects the effect of horizontal spillovers when intangible asset ratio is zero (IAit =0) and the 
sum 𝛅𝟏⁡+⁡𝛅𝟐⁡∗ (IAit) reflects the effect of horizontal spillovers for different values of IAit 
included in the interaction terms (individual coefficient of IA is also included in AC 
vector). 
The estimation technique is the same as in the previous models. The number of 
instruments is higher due to inclusion of interaction terms in the instrument matrix. 
Turning to model diagnostics which are reported in full in Appendix IV (Tables IV.16-
IV.20), there is no sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis for validity of over 
identifying restrictions. In addition, there is insufficient evidence to reject second order 
autocorrelation in differences of residuals while first order autocorrelation is rejected in 
all cases. Difference in Hansen test for the exogeneity of instruments subset suggest 
instruments for endogenous variables are valid. Finally, difference in Hansen for levels 
equation and lagged dependent variable suggest that steady state assumption holds and 
there is no evidence of cross sectional dependence. 
Detailed interpretation of alternative model is not provided given that the main interest 
is to explain the effects of FDI spillovers on local firms’ TFP moderated by the measure 
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of absorptive capacity. However, we are confident in the robustness of results as the 
coefficients from model 6.2 and augmented model 6.6 are similar in sign and size while 
significance is now improved for variables controlling for competition and demand 
effects. Since interaction terms include two continuous variables we present marginal 
effects of FDI spillovers on TFP conditional on different values of intangible asset ratio. 
The values of intangible asset ratio taken are 1st and 99th percentile and deciles of 
respective distribution.  
Starting with interpretation of horizontal spillovers presented in Figure 6.3 we find that 
higher intensity of intangible asset ratio has beneficial effects on TFP of firms within 
manufacturing sectors as initial negative effects are attenuated in almost all countries. 
The beneficial effects are especially pronounced in Estonia and to a lesser extent in 
Slovakia where negative effects are diminishing with higher levels of intangible assets. 
Looking at more detail, beneficial effects of investment in intangible asset start at 
different levels in Estonia and Slovenia. In the former country, manufacturing firms with 
high levels of intangible asset are less likely to benefit from horizontal spillovers.  They 
may already possess high levels of technology and therefore have limited capacity to 
learn from MNCs (Grunfeld, 2006). In case of Slovenia investment in intangible asset 
has increasing positive effects on domestic firms’ ability to benefit from horizontal 
knowledge spillovers. Finally, it seems that moderating effects of absorptive capacity 
further increase the negative horizontal effects of manufacturing firms in the Czech 
Republic, but only for firms which have above median levels of intangible assets. One 
of the possible explanation of negative moderating effects of intangible asset is capability 
gap in which firms have the resources but not the capability to use them effectively 
(Teece, 1998). As argued by Teece and Pisano (1998) competences and capabilities are 
crucial for creation of new products and processes and enable firms to react to changes 
in market conditions. Since economic competencies (e.g. human capital and 
organizational structure) are regarded as the most important part of intangible asset which 
are most difficult to measure and therefore are not included in the balance sheet negative 
effect of other components may arise.  This is because investment in R&D, digitized 
information technology and similar intangible asset increase the costs of firms which is 
not translated into higher revenue.  
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FIGURE 6.3 AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF INTANGIBLE ASSET RATIO AND HORIZONTAL SPILLOVERS 
WITH 90% CI  
 
Turning to linkages arising from manufacturing sectors presented in Figure 6.4, empirical 
findings suggest that domestic suppliers with higher absorptive capacity benefit from 
backward linkages in almost all countries by either further increasing their TFP like in 
the Czech Republic and Slovenia or attenuating negative effects in Estonia, thus 
confirming the role of firm’s absorptive capacity as enabling factor for FDI spillovers 
(Crespo and Fontoura, 2007; Blalock and Gertler, 2009; Damijan et al., 2013a). In 
Hungary and Slovakia marginal effects are significant but have very little increasing 
effects on TFP. In the former country, domestic suppliers with higher absorptive capacity 
even experience a decline in TFP possibly indicating that firms are involved in low value 
added activities based on standardized processes and components. Hence any investment 
in intangible asset to increase the quality of inputs contribute to increased costs since 
MNCs mostly source their high quality inputs from first-tier suppliers (Rugraff, 2010). 
In case of forward linkages, the results suggest that firms in the Czech Republic 
experience a decline in TFP with higher levels of intangible asset possibly because of 
complexity of inputs and inability of firms to transform and implement the knowledge 
embodied in acquired inputs (Zahra and George, 2002). Similar finding is found in 
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Estonia where firms with very high levels of intangible asset ratio experience negative 
effects, while those with very low ratio are able to increase their productivity. In other 
countries the effects of manufacturing forward linkages are insignificant with the 
exception of Hungary where negative effects are slightly attenuated with higher levels of 
intangible asset. 
FIGURE 6.4 AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF INTANGIBLE ASSET RATIO AND MANUFACTURING LINKAGES 
WITH 90% CI  
 
Turning to backward linkages arising from service sector presented in Figure 6.5, one 
can notice a significant negative moderating effect of absorptive capacity in the Czech 
Republic and Estonia. In these two countries domestic manufacturing suppliers with 
medium or higher levels of intangible asset ratios are not able to benefit from vertical 
linkages with services MNCs. Possible reason is inability of domestic firms to combine 
an existing knowledge to increase their technological capabilities which would result in 
new processes, products and services that would partially replace imported components 
of MNCs. On the other hand, moderating effects of absorptive capacity seem to slightly 
attenuate large negative effects of services backward linkages in Hungary.  
Finally, it seems that positive effects of services forward linkages found in previous 
section are reinforced and become larger for higher levels of intangible asset ratios in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia while for firms in Estonia and Slovenia the 
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moderating effects are mostly insignificant. These results are in line with those obtained 
by Mariotti et al. (2013) and once again confirm the importance of services liberalization 
as newly available inputs with higher technological content favour the technological 
upgrading of the production process resulting in increased manufacturing productivity. 
FIGURE 6.5 AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF INTANGIBLE ASSET RATIO AND SERVICES LINKAGES WITH 
90% CI 
  
6.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter explored the effects of FDI spillovers on manufacturing and service sector. 
To the best of our knowledge no empirical analysis has been undertaken to this date on 
whether the increased presence of MNCs in service sector, encouraged by recent services 
liberalisation, lead to productivity improvements of domestic firms. Although, research 
on FDI spillovers in transition countries is vast it is mostly based on manufacturing sector 
alone. Given that services play an important role as a creator of value added and 
employment within country and promote the development of other sectors indirectly 
through intermediate inputs to manufacturing industries it is of great concern whether 
MNCs entry contribute to economy wide benefits such as improvements in productivity 
-3
0
-2
0
-1
0
0
1
0
2
0
E
ff
e
ct
s 
o
n
 F
itt
e
d
 V
a
lu
e
s
(p
1)
 R
D
(p
10
) R
D
(p
20
) R
D
(p
30
) R
D
(p
40
) R
D
(p
50
) R
D
(p
60
) R
D
(p
70
) R
D
(p
80
) R
D
(p
90
) R
D
(p
99
) R
D
at()
serv_link_back
serv_link_for
Czech Republic
-1
0
-5
0
5
1
0
E
ff
e
ct
s 
o
n
 F
itt
e
d
 V
a
lu
e
s
(p
1)
 R
D
(p
10
) R
D
(p
20
) R
D
(p
30
) R
D
(p
40
) R
D
(p
50
) R
D
(p
60
) R
D
(p
70
) R
D
(p
80
) R
D
(p
90
) R
D
(p
99
) R
D
at()
serv_link_back
serv_link_for
Estonia
-4
0
-2
0
0
2
0
E
ff
e
ct
s 
o
n
 F
itt
e
d
 V
a
lu
e
s
(p
1)
 R
D
(p
10
) R
D
(p
20
) R
D
(p
30
) R
D
(p
40
) R
D
(p
50
) R
D
(p
60
) R
D
(p
70
) R
D
(p
80
) R
D
(p
90
) R
D
(p
99
) R
D
at()
serv_link_back
serv_link_for
Hungary
-2
0
-1
0
0
1
0
2
0
E
ff
e
ct
s 
o
n
 F
itt
e
d
 V
a
lu
e
s
(p
1)
 R
D
(p
10
) R
D
(p
20
) R
D
(p
30
) R
D
(p
40
) R
D
(p
50
) R
D
(p
60
) R
D
(p
70
) R
D
(p
80
) R
D
(p
90
) R
D
(p
99
) R
D
at()
serv_link_back
serv_link_for
Slovakia
-2
0
-1
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
E
ff
e
ct
s 
o
n
 F
itt
e
d
 V
a
lu
e
s
(p
1)
 R
D
(p
10
) R
D
(p
20
) R
D
(p
30
) R
D
(p
40
) R
D
(p
50
) R
D
(p
60
) R
D
(p
70
) R
D
(p
80
) R
D
(p
90
) R
D
(p
99
) R
D
at()
serv_link_back
serv_link_for
Slovenia
 
266 
through provision of low costs and high quality inputs, increased competition and 
knowledge spillovers. 
Starting with the baseline model applied separately to manufacturing and service sectors, 
the empirical findings suggest negative horizontal effects of manufacturing FDI which 
are partially offset by positive knowledge spillovers in service sector in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. In case of backward linkages positive effects of FDI spillovers 
are found only in Hungary and Slovakia for service sector and in manufacturing sector 
in Slovenia casting some doubt on previous findings from the literature. Regarding 
forward linkages the results suggest negative effects of foreign suppliers on local firms’ 
productivity which are especially pronounced in service sector with the exception of 
Slovakia and Slovenia. 
In order to shed more light on the impact of vertical linkages we employed an empirical 
model disentangling backward and forward linkages according to industry source and 
measure their impact on productivity of domestic firms in manufacturing industries 
which are at the same time supplier and customer. The results suggest positive effects of 
backward manufacturing linkages in all countries except Estonia, thus confirming 
previous empirical findings which suggest that MNCs have a strong incentive to share 
the knowledge with their suppliers. Negative effect in Estonia may reflect declining share 
of manufacturing industries and increasing reliance on services. In addition, it seems that 
local manufacturing supplier firms do not benefit from increased presence of services 
MNCs acting as customers with the exception of firms in Slovakia and Estonia. The 
positive results for the latter two countries may be explained by increased specialisation 
in services and increased activity of MNCs which moved some of the headquarters and 
therefore require information and communication technology or office automation 
equipment. 
A closer investigation on the source of forward linkages effects within manufacturing 
sector reveal that presence of MNCs has dual effects on local firms’ productivity. On one 
side MNCs in manufacturing have negative effects on their local customers which 
outweigh positive effects on their suppliers. On the other hand, those inputs provided by 
services MNCs have strong and positive effects. The findings are consistent with the 
view that services liberalisation and their outcome such as increased MNCs’ presence is 
associated with improved availability, range and quality of services resulting in improved 
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performance of downstream manufacturing firms. It is worth noticing that total effects 
of vertical linkages calculated as the linear combination of four different channels is 
positive except in the Czech Republic and Hungary due to large negative effects from 
services MNCs in downstream markets. Finally, findings suggest that gains from MNCs 
presence do not accrue equally to all firms. Those firms which have higher intensity of 
intangible asset ratio as a proxy for absorptive capacity are more likely to benefit from 
manufacturing backward and forward services linkages while negative effects of intra 
industry spillovers are attenuated. 
In summary, given the positive correlation between services FDI and downstream 
manufacturing productivity policy makers should encourage entry of MNCs in service 
sector which could constitute an important means to improve the productivity of local 
firms and their competitiveness on international markets. Furthermore, the effects of 
direct or indirect technology transfer by MNCs are moderated by high levels of 
absorptive capacity which is crucial for assimilation and transformation of external 
knowledge. This is especially pronounced in case of backward manufacturing and 
forward services linkages, two channels of FDI spillovers with the highest potential for 
productivity spillovers. Therefore, policy makers should put more emphasis on 
improving the absorptive capacity of firms by encouraging and facilitating firms’ R&D 
investment, employee training, new software applications and organizational 
innovations. Finally, as FDI is the outcome of services liberalisation any remaining 
barriers limiting competition, conduct regulation or FDI restrictions should be reduced. 
Regarding the latter restriction, government should require that MNCs engage in supplier 
development programs given current large negative effects of services MNCs on local 
suppliers in some countries. 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this thesis, was to examine the potential spillover effects of FDI on 
productivity of domestic firms in five transition economies (the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) which are among the most developed New Member 
States of the EU.  The inflow of foreign direct investment at the beginning of transition 
from centrally planned to market economies was one of the main impetuses to economic 
and institutional restructuring in these countries.  MNCs played an important role in the 
privatisation process, the subsequent firm restructuring, changes in export and market 
structures, the development of service sector and technological upgrading. Apart from 
direct effects, MNCs are also a major source of technology spillovers to indigenous firms. 
These indirect effects are seen as an important factor for productivity catch up of 
domestic firms, their participation in Global Value Chains (GVC) and ultimately their 
survival in national and international markets. 
Although the investigation of FDI spillovers has gained momentum in the last two 
decades, empirical studies have still not reached a consensus on the indirect effects of 
foreign firm’s entry on productivity of local firms. Hence, this thesis has focused on 
several questions which are crucial for understanding the current ambiguous findings in 
the literature.   How, and through which channels, are domestic firms expected to benefit 
from technology spillovers from MNCs? What is the most appropriate method for 
measuring firm level productivity? What is the level of productivity of local and foreign 
firms? Are there any differences between the productivity of firms in the two major 
sectors of economy (manufacturing and services)? How FDI spillovers are measured and 
what is their effect on productivity of domestic firms? What is the role of MNCs’ 
geographic origin and the extent of foreign ownership on productivity of domestic firms?  
What are the factors influencing the ability of domestic firms to benefit from technology 
spillovers according to the channel through which they occur? Is there any systematic 
variation in FDI spillover effects across manufacturing and service sectors? Are there 
any intersectoral spillovers?   
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7.2 MAIN FINDINGS 
 
The surge of FDI after World War II resulted in various theories attempting to explain 
why firms decide to go abroad and incur sunk costs. An initial review of determinants of 
FDI in Chapter 1 has shown that the concept can be explained using insights from 
international trade and international production theory and its variants. Although many 
strands of the literature are concerned with the explanation of FDI and the emergence of 
MNCs, they differ in their underlying assumptions. The majority of theoretical concepts 
reviewed in Chapter 1 have failed to account for the complexity of MNCs’ decision to 
engage in cross border investments. OLI paradigm combined several strands of literature 
in an attempt to provide an explanation for internationalisation of production and hence 
provide a general framework for analysis of the effects of FDI. Recently, the network 
based theory of MNCs has emphasized the technological accumulation, firm specific 
learning and roles of MNCs’ subsidiaries and their embeddedness in local environment 
as a source of competitive advantages. An alternative approach explaining FDI has been 
adopted by scholars in the field of international economics which combined ownership 
and location advantages with technology, firm and country characteristics in explaining 
different forms of FDI.  
By evaluating the complementarities between different theories and incorporating recent 
advances in international business and international economics literature and having in 
mind data limitations, the investigation of FDI spillovers adopted in this study relied on 
a production function framework in order to be able to derive changes in firm level 
productivity as a proxy for technology spillovers. We argued that theoretical models of 
FDI spillovers developed by scholars in the field of international economics, growth 
theory and international business emphasizing both MNCs and local firms’ heterogeneity 
are best suited for our research needs. This is because the focus of our research is on the 
ability of local firms to benefit from variety of technologies and linkages made available 
by different MNCs located across the manufacturing and service sectors. Heterogeneity 
of MNCs can lead to different FDI spillovers potential and effect and thus productivity 
catch up of domestic firms and ultimately their success in international markets. 
Once the conceptual framework for investigating FDI spillovers was established in 
Chapter 2, our analysis moved on to investigate the role of FDI in the transition process. 
 
271 
We found that the entry of MNCs was facilitated by, and became part and parcel of, the 
wide ranging structural reforms pursued by transition countries. The structure of FDI 
across countries and industries, and the success of countries in attracting MNCs closely 
followed the government stance towards privatisation, speed of structural reforms and 
prospects for EU membership. While manufacturing sector was the initial focus of 
foreign investors, subsequent investments were more oriented towards underdeveloped 
service sectors and hence the share of manufacturing FDI started to decline. The 
exceptions were countries with strong manufacturing base such as the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia which continued to attract significant amounts of FDI in 
automotive and electronics sectors. 
NMS in general have witnessed strong income and productivity convergence towards the 
EU-15 and we argued that FDI has played an important role in this process. The 
contribution of foreign affiliates in total turnover, value added and employment, and the 
levels of technological sophistication have been increasing over time. As a consequence, 
FDI contributed to industry restructuring and increase in productivity, enabled the shift 
from low to high value added activities and intensified NMS’s integration in GVCs. 
Motivated by findings in Chapter 3 which suggested the importance of foreign firms for 
economic activity of NMS and their superior performance over domestic firms, the 
second part of the thesis was concerned with empirical analysis of FDI spillovers at micro 
level.  
The empirical part of the thesis is divided into three Chapters.  
Chapter 4 was concerned with the estimation of TFP at firm level as a first step in the 
investigation of FDI productivity spillovers. Given data limitations we focused on five 
NMS (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) during the 2002-
2010 period, the most recent year for which data were available at the time of writing the 
thesis. Although the concept of total factor productivity is well known in the literature, 
its estimation is far from simple due to its unobservable nature. Our starting point was a 
critical review of the various approaches available for the estimation of productivity. We 
argued that a semi-parametric methods based on control functions containing observable 
firm characteristics are the most appropriate when a researcher is interested in exploring 
the characteristics of factors of production such as ease of adjustment and observability 
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of all factors affecting output. In addition, they are able to control for simultaneity bias 
between factor inputs and unobserved productivity. 
Having in mind several methodological issues explained in Chapter 4, we resorted to 
estimation of TFP using OLS, Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) and Wooldridge (2009) 
estimators in order to test the data properties and compare empirical results across 
different estimators. After applying Cobb Douglas production framework for each 
country-industry pair and comparing the obtained TFP estimates across different 
estimators, we decided to choose Wooldridge TFP model as the preferred estimator as it 
is able to control for identification problems mentioned in Ackerberg et al. (2006) and 
are fairly similar when compared to other two estimation techniques. Our results are in 
line with similar studies comparing TFP estimates across different estimators and we 
may conclude that the choice of estimator is less crucial when one is interested in the 
non-deterministic part of the production function. These TFP estimates were then used 
as the dependent variable in the subsequent chapters.  
In Chapter 4 we also tested the necessary assumptions for the occurrence of FDI 
spillovers related to the productivity premium of foreign over domestic firms. We found 
that foreign firms in every country and main sectors of activity were more productive. 
These results hold both for non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and parametric 
estimation. We also found that MNCs’ heterogeneity in terms of their geographic origin 
and the extent of foreign ownership has important implications for potential productivity 
spillovers. Namely, fully owned foreign firms and firms coming from the EU were the 
most productive.  We also found that domestic firms have experienced an improvement 
in their productivity levels over time, especially those firms whose TFP is below median 
levels. However, there is a strong persistence in the position of domestic firms in TFP 
distribution which is the main feature of this sample.  
In Chapter 5, we developed an empirical model of FDI spillovers based on the conceptual 
framework and identified shortcomings of the current empirical studies applied to 
transition countries. The model was based on endogenous growth theory in which the 
main interest lies in the estimation of technology shock induced by factors internal and 
external to the firm. In this thesis the latter factors are represented by FDI spillover 
variables. The main aim was to investigate whether the heterogeneous nature of MNCs 
has different productivity spillovers effects on domestic firms in manufacturing and 
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service sectors. Rich micro panel data applied to the five countries under consideration 
allowed us to incorporate variables controlling for absorptive capacity of local firms such 
as the share of intangible assets in total fixed assets and a measure of human capital 
proxied by average firm-level wage. We also controlled for firm age and size and the 
squared terms of these factors, demand in downstream sectors and the level of 
competition in the industry. The main variables of interest were related to the 
construction of FDI spillovers within and across industries. For that purpose we relied 
on a combination of firm level data available from Amadeus database and yearly input 
output tables available from World Input Output tables thus providing us the opportunity 
to examine changes in economic structure and input sourcing behaviour of foreign firms 
over time.  
It should be noted that our main variables of interest, namely horizontal spillovers and 
vertical linkages capture different mechanisms of knowledge diffusion. In case of 
horizontal spillovers we capture the net effects of pure technological externalities such 
as imitation and reverse engineering reffered to as demonstration effects and competition 
effects arising from changes in market structure due to MNCs’ entry. In addition, 
knowledge spillovers may also arise due to worker mobility which can only be gauged 
by tracing the movement of workers between companies. In comparison to unintentional 
knowledge diffusion measured by demonstration effects and worker mobility, vertical 
linkages involve intentional knowledge transfer and pecuniary externalities.  Although, 
we may find positive correlation between productivity of domestic firms in upstream 
sectors with the presence of MNCs in downstream sectors or vice versa, the exisiting 
measures based on industry level proxies for vertical spillovers do not pinpoint which 
mechanisms are at play.  
For example, positive backward spillovers which influence domestic firms’ productivity 
may arise due to the direct linkage with foreign customers along the supply chain through 
various forms of assistance and knowledge transfer provided by foreign firms after the 
contract has been signed. Alternatively, domestic firms not direcly involved with foreign 
firms in downstream sectors may also experience productivity improvements due to the 
interest of foreign firms in improving the quality of sourced inputs and therefore provide 
help to local suppliers before they enter into contractual relationship. Alternatively, 
positive productivity shock may be the result of own firm effort motivated by lucrative 
contracts with MNCs or scale economies reflecting greater demand for domestically 
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produced inputs (Javorcik, 2004; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2009). All of these scenarios 
can broadly be regarded as spillovers, however, disentagling the exact mechanisms at 
play using industry level proxies is not possible.The result from dynamic panel model 
used to control for potential endogeneity of FDI spillover variables and TFP suggested 
that horizontal FDI spillovers have become more important over time, thus shedding new 
light on the role of MNCs in host countries. A closer investigation revealed that the 
positive effects were mainly driven by partially owned foreign firms indicating that 
domestic firms are well equipped to benefit from well diffused technology. On the other 
hand, the presence of fully owned foreign firms placed considerable pressure on local 
firms as they were not able to effectively imitate foreign technology causing reduction 
in their productivity levels. Alternatively, foreign firms may have been more successful 
in preventing the leakage of knowledge and technology to their potential competitors. 
When taking into account geographic heterogeneity of MNCs, we found that there was 
positive spillovers from European MNCs in all countries except Slovenia, thus 
supporting the premise that institutional and socio cultural proximity facilitated 
knowledge sharing, technology diffusion and learning by domestic firms. Non-European 
investors, the majority of which came from USA and China, also provided knowledge 
which was used by domestic competitors to increase their productivity. However, these 
results hold only for firms in Estonia and Slovenia.  
The findings for backward linkages confirmed previous findings in the literature 
suggesting that MNCs are more likely to share their knowledge with local suppliers. They 
imply increasing impact in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia and decreasing 
impact in Estonia. A new finding is that fully owned foreign firms are driving the positive 
effects. On the other hand, these positive effects were offset by negative effects from 
partially owned foreign firms. The exceptions were the Czech Republic and Slovenia. 
When accounting for geographic heterogeneity of MNCs, the results were more 
heterogeneous. While in Hungary and Slovakia EU investors were more inclined to 
engage in vertical linkages, the opposite was found in other countries, thus partially 
confirming the hypothesis that investors from distant countries were likely to source 
inputs locally to save on transport and trade costs, thus confirming theoretical model of 
Rodriguez-Clare (1996).  
Perhaps, the most interesting findings were related to forward linkages. Over time these 
linkages have gained more importance than backward linkages, exhibiting large 
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productivity gains/losses for domestic firms. Based on our results, forward linkages are 
more likely to influence the net benefits or costs of foreign presence in the local economy. 
Firms in Slovakia and Slovenia were able to benefit from increased variety and quality 
of inputs, thus increasing their productivity. These positive effects hold across different 
ownership structures of foreign firms and are mainly driven by EU investors. Firms in 
other countries experienced a decline in their productivity and these negative effects were 
driven by both partially and fully owned foreign firms with the exception of Estonia 
where partially owned foreign firms have a beneficial effect on local firms’ productivity. 
In addition, non-EU investors were responsible for large negative effects on productivity 
which completely offset any positive effects from EU MNCs.   
The empirical findings showed that other factors, such as the level of intangibles and 
human capital to positively influence local firms’ productivity in all countries. Increased 
competition in the industry was also found to positively influence TFP in all countries 
with the exception of Slovakia, while increased demand in downstream sectors exhibited 
mostly negative effects. We also found that productivity is negatively affected by firms’ 
age. Although after a certain period, the variable age becomes positive, the proportion of 
firms in our sample that were older than estimated turning point was negligible. Also, the 
findings suggested that larger firms were more likely to experience positive productivity 
gains. 
In Chapter 6 we explored further the different nature of FDI spillovers in firms in 
manufacturing and service sectors. We divided the sample and re-estimated the baseline 
model developed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, we investigated the intersectoral spillovers 
between manufacturing and services. The aim was to shed more light on the direction of 
vertical linkages between these two sectors and to explore their heterogeneity by 
constructing four types of vertical linkages. This included splitting total backward and 
forward linkages according to the main sector of MNCs’ activities. The empirical 
analysis then estimated the effects of manufacturing (services) linkages on local firms’ 
productivity in manufacturing sector which are at the same time supplier and customer 
of foreign firms located in the two main sectors of the economy. Since we found 
significant positive effects of knowledge capital variables in Chapter 5, we also tested 
their moderating effects by interacting them with FDI spillover variables. 
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Empirical analysis was based on a dynamic system GMM estimator as in Chapter 5 to 
make results comparable. Findings from the baseline model applied separately to firms 
in manufacturing and services suggested that the positive horizontal spillovers found in 
Chapter 5 were mostly driven by firms in services. The negative effects of horizontal 
spillovers in manufacturing sector are in line with the empirical results from other studies 
indicating that local firms do not have sufficient level of absorptive capacity. On the 
other hand, foreign firms in services require close interaction and communication thus 
giving domestic firms the opportunity to learn and imitate some of the best practices of 
MNCs. These positive effects were however observed only in Hungary and the Czech 
Republic. The findings suggested the importance for separating firms from different 
sectors.  
In the case of backward linkages, our findings suggested that MNCs in services were 
more likely to source inputs from local firms in Hungary and Slovakia while the opposite 
holds for firms in the Czech Republic and Estonia. The findings related to local 
manufacturing firms suggested that they were not able to enter the supply chain of MNCs 
expect those in Slovenia. The heterogeneity of findings across countries was further 
supported when analysing forward linkages. These have been found to be positive only 
in the service sector in Slovakia and Slovenia. On the other hand MNCs in services have 
large negative productivity effects as suppliers of inputs to local firms in the Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Hungary.  
By employing an augmented empirical model and disentangling vertical linkages 
according to industry source we found that our results for backward manufacturing 
linkages are in line with the current literature. In other words, local manufacturing 
suppliers were able to join the global supply chains of MNCs and increase their 
productivity through voluntary and involuntary knowledge transfer from foreign firms. 
We also found that MNCs in services were less keen to source their inputs from local 
manufacturing suppliers and more likely to resort to inputs sourced from abroad or from 
other foreign firms in upstream manufacturing sectors. Only local manufacturing firms 
in Slovakia and Hungary were able to benefit from engaging in backward linkages with 
MNCs in services. The most interesting findings are again related to forward linkages. 
Local manufacturing firms were not able to benefit from inputs bought from MNCs in 
the manufacturing sector. However, we have found significant and positive effects of 
services inputs for manufacturing productivity across all countries thus further 
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corroborating the notion that the liberalisation of services followed by increased foreign 
entry was expected to bring substantial positive effects to downstream clients.  
Further we investigated the interaction between firms’ investment in intangible asset and 
FDI spillover variables. This analysis was motivated by the notion that a minimum level 
of absorptive capacity is necessary for firms to identify, assimilate, transform and apply 
the knowledge from external environment. According to the findings, the moderating 
effects of firms’ absorptive capacity had beneficial impact on TFP of firms within the 
manufacturing sector as the initial negative horizontal effects were attenuated in almost 
all countries. Similar findings were found in the case of backward manufacturing 
linkages where firms in the Czech Republic and Slovenia were able to increase their TFP 
with higher levels of intangibles while firms in Estonia were able to attenuate initial 
negative effects. However, in case of backward services linkages, the moderating effects 
do not hold as manufacturing firms were not able to combine an existing knowledge to 
increase their technological capabilities which would result in new or improved 
intermediate inputs.  
The findings related to forward linkages implied that investing in intangible assets matter 
for manufacturing firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia seeking to 
improve their productivity by buying services inputs.  On the other hand, the moderating 
effect of absorptive capacity does not matter for forward linkages in manufacturing.  For 
firms in the Czech Republic and Estonia higher levels of intangible asset have detrimental 
effects on their ability to benefit from manufacturing inputs. This may be due to the 
complexity of inputs and their prices, or the inability of manufacturing firms to transform 
and implement the knowledge embodied in acquired inputs.  
In order to summarize our empirical findings on spillover effects of FDI explored in 
Chapters 5 and 6 and to better present the heterogeneity of results across countries, we 
have constructed a table showing all empirical models and associated signs and statistical 
significance (at least 10%) of FDI spilllover variables across countries. As can be seen 
from Table 7.1 below the findings for horizontal spillovers are mostly ambiguous which 
is in line with current empirical literature, further highlighting the need for better data 
which would allow researchers to disentangle different mechanisms of knowledge 
spillovers within industry. In general, horizontal spillovers across countries are mostly 
negative in the manufacturing sector and those from fully owned foreign firms while  
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positive  effects are limited to partially owned foreign firms and those coming from the 
EU.  
In case of backward linkages, the empirical results are in line with the exisiting  literature 
suggesting positive effects of MNCs on domestic suppliers’ TFP. The effect seems to be 
strongest in manufacturing sector and only when domestic suppliers are supplied by 
foreign firms from manufacturing sectors. Similarly, in the majority of cases positive 
effects of backward linkages across countries and two major sectors are found for non-
EU MNCs and fully owned foreign firms.  
Finally, the major finding in the thesis is related to positive and significant effects of 
forward linkages from the service sector to domestic clients in manufacturing, thus 
shedding new light on the role of MNCs in the service sector on indigenous firms’ 
productivity. In addition, the origin of foreign investors matters for forward spillovers as 
foreign firms from the EU have unambiguous positive effects on productivity of 
downstream clients while opposite holds for non-EU investors. 
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TABLE 7.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ACROSS COUNTRIES AND EMPIRICAL MODELS 
 
  SLOVENIA SLOVAKIA HUNGARY ESTONIA CZECH REPUBLIC 
Overall empirical 
sign 
Theoretical 
prediction 
  Baseline model all industries 
Horizontal negative negative positive positive positive Mixed positive 
Backward negative positive positive negative positive Mainly positive positive 
Forward positive positive negative negative negative Mixed positive 
  Manufacturing industries 
Horizontal positive negative negative negative negative Mainly negative positive 
Backward positive positive negative negative negative Mixed positive 
Forward positive positive negative negative negative Mainly negative positive 
  Service industries 
Horizontal negative negative positive positive positive Mixed positive 
Backward negative positive positive negative negative Mixed positive 
Forward positive positive negative negative negative Mixed positive 
  Ownership model 
Horizontal partial positive negative positive positive positive Mainly positive positive 
Horizontal full negative negative negative positive negative Mainly negative negative 
Backward partial positive negative negative negative positive Mixed positive 
Backward full negative positive positive positive positive Mainly positive ambiguous 
Forward partial positive positive negative positive negative Mixed positive 
Forward full positive positive negative negative negative Mixed ambiguous 
  Origin model 
  Slovenia Slovakia Hungary Estonia Czech Republic     
Horizontal EU negative negative positive positive positive Mainly positive positive 
Horizontal nonEU positive negative positive positive negative Mixed ambiguous 
Backward EU negative positive positive negative negative Mixed ambiguous 
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Backward nonEU positive negative positive positive positive Mainly positive positive 
Forward EU positive positive positive positive positive Strongly positive ambiguous 
Forward nonEU positive positive negative negative negative Mainly negative ambiguous 
  Cross sectoral-manufacturing 
  Slovenia Slovakia Hungary Estonia Czech Republic     
Horizontal  positive negative negative negative negative Strongly negative positive 
Backward 
manufacturing positive positive positive negative positive Mainly positive positive 
Backward services negative positive negative positive negative Mixed ambiguous 
Forward 
manufacturing negative negative negative negative negative Strongly negative positive 
Forward services positive positive positive positive positive Strongly positive positive 
  Absorptive capacity 
  Slovenia Slovakia Hungary Estonia Czech Republic     
Horizontal  
positive 
and 
increasing  
from 
median 
levels 
negative and 
decreasing 
with higher 
levels 
mostly negative 
with very little 
change 
negative and 
decreasing up 
to median 
level 
negative and 
increasing with 
higher levels Mixed positive 
Backward 
manufacturing 
positive 
and 
increasing 
with higher 
levels 
positive with 
very little 
change 
positive and 
decreasing with 
higher levels 
negative and 
decreasing up 
to median 
level 
positive for 
above median 
levels Mixed positive 
Backward services insignificant insignificant 
negative and 
decreasin with 
higher values 
negative at 
high levels 
negative and 
increasing with 
higher levels Mostly negative positive 
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Forward 
manufacturing insignificant insignificant 
mostly negative 
with very little 
change 
positive at 
very low and 
negative at 
very high 
levels 
negative and 
increasing with 
higher levels Mostly negative positive 
Forward services 
positive 
and 
decreasing 
up to 
median 
levels 
positive with 
higher levels 
positive for 
above median 
levels insignificant 
positive for 
above median 
levels Mostly positive positive 
Note: words marked in bold indicate effect at least at 10 percent significance level. Cells marked in green indicate empirical findings in line with theoretical prediction while 
those marked in red indicate the opposite. 
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7.3 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
 
This thesis has made several contributions to existing theoretical and empirical body of 
knowledge on FDI spillovers. Based on review of the literature on determinants of FDI 
we argued that varieties of theoretical concepts are not able to fully explain the complex 
and multidimensional nature of FDI. While international business literature assumes that 
MNCs possess superior firm specific advantages in comparison to domestic firms, early 
studies failed to explain MNCs’ heterogeneous nature in terms of investment motives, 
mode of entry, technology, knowledge or productivity. The early models of FDI 
spillovers were based on the neoclassical theory assuming that the intensity of MNCs’ 
activities is a measure of potential for FDI spillovers to host country firms. Therefore, to 
revise the assumption of MNCs’ homogeneity, commonly made in FDI spillovers studies 
conducted on transition economies, we have combined recent insights from international 
business and international economics literature emphasizing the heterogeneity of MNCs 
and their affiliates. We have proposed that the effects of FDI spillovers may differ 
according to MNCs’ observable characteristics available in the dataset and other non-
observable heterogeneities. Our conceptual framework emphasized that FDI spillovers 
are determined by both demand and supply side factors and shaped by external 
environment such as industry characteristics and institutional framework in which firms 
operate. 
We have also argued that existing theoretical models of vertical linkages between MNCs 
and local firms place too much emphasis on backward linkages occurring within 
manufacturing sector. Notwithstanding the importance of backward linkages for local 
firms’ development in manufacturing sector, forward linkages have received less 
attention. We have argued that liberalisation and deregulation of services followed by 
entry of MNCs in services are an important conduit to better quality and variety of inputs 
available at lower price, hence contributing to manufacturing productivity and better 
functioning of specialised and interdependent operations. Since services are often 
characterized by intangibility, inseparability and require frequent interaction and 
proximity between supplier and customer due to information asymmetries about quality, 
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we argued that MNCs are the main conduit for technology spillovers to downstream 
clients thus shedding new light on the role of forward linkages.  
Our first empirical contribution is related to the estimation of TFP at firm level. Most 
studies employing semi-parametric techniques lacked a critical examination of the data 
generating process of different estimators, the robustness checks for TFP estimates across 
different estimators was rarely performed, the elasticity of factor inputs was almost never 
discussed and the potential pitfalls arising from the violation of timing assumptions of 
inputs were ignored. In cases when authors extensively tested the assumptions of certain 
estimators they used data from only few industries in one country framework. Therefore, 
our contribution lies in the application of semi-parametric methods to a broad set of 
industries and countries. Another contribution to knowledge is related to the method 
employed when estimating TFP. We used Wooldridge (2009) application of semi-
parametric methods which corrects some of the problems discussed in Ackerberg et al. 
(2006) not previously addressed in estimation of TFP in transition countries. 
We also estimated both value added and gross output in a Cobb Douglas production 
function framework and tested the timing assumptions of labour input. We have found 
that value added production function treating labour as static input is suitable for our 
dataset. However, none of the existing studies using TFP as a dependent variable to 
evaluate the impact of policy measures such as FDI spillovers have acknowledged 
potential issues in TFP estimates arising from different timing assumptions of labour 
input. Thus, our findings may point to possible publication bias and be considered as 
additional contribution to knowledge.  
Our estimation of FDI spillovers has made several contributions to the existing literature. 
First, we expand our knowledge on the effects of MNCs on their local competitors, their 
suppliers and clients in transition countries by applying an empirical model to a set of 
advanced NMS, simultaneously taking into account both types of vertical linkages and 
horizontal spillovers. In addition, we add to the literature by employing the same 
dependent variable estimated by using the unique method previously not explored in the 
context of transition countries. Furthermore, by using time varying input-output tables 
we were able to take into account dynamic structural changes and differences in sourcing 
behaviour of MNCs in transition countries which has not been done in previous empirical 
work. Second, this is the first study which treats FDI spillovers in a dynamic framework 
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thus taking into account theoretical transmission channels of knowledge spillovers which 
differentiate between short and long run effects. With this in mind we used dynamic 
system GMM estimation which accounts for potential endogeneity of FDI spillover 
variables and the dynamics of firms’ productivity as implied by the control function 
approach used to derive it. Third, our study is the first one to include the service sector 
of these countries which has largely been ignored in the investigation of FDI spillovers. 
Fourth, we depart from the contemporary literature which has focused on issues such as 
the role of local firms’ absorptive capacity and demand size of FDI spillovers. Our 
augmented empirical model is the first study which takes into account the supply side of 
FDI spillovers by examining the geographic and ownership heterogeneity of MNCs in 
this set of countries.  
We have also separately examined FDI spillovers in manufacturing and services, adding 
to the current literature which has mainly focused on the manufacturing sector. Given the 
large inflows of FDI in services and the importance of its inputs for downstream clients 
this thesis addressed and clarified some of the misunderstandings related to the role of 
forward vertical linkages and their impact on productivity of downstream manufacturing 
firms. We showed that the current measurement of vertical linkages does not permit the 
measurement of overall spillover effects according to the channels through which they 
occur. Construction of four types of vertical linkages enabled us to shed more light on 
the customer-supplier relationship between domestic and foreign firms in the two main 
sectors of economy. 
The final contribution of this thesis is its temporal, sectoral and geographical coverage. 
Through a critical review of the literature in Chapter 2 we came to conclusion that 
existing studies investigating FDI spillovers in transition countries are mainly focused 
on the manufacturing sector. Moreover, most of these studies are conducted using data 
from the first decade of transition or early 2000s while the bulk of FDI inflow took place 
in the later period of transition. Our empirical analysis covers the period which coincided 
with the large inflows of FDI in services and changes in macroeconomic and business 
environment as well as the progress in institutions which further influenced the entry, 
type and motives of MNCs. Furthermore, it can be argued that in the second decade of 
transition domestic firms improved their absorptive capacity and the quality of their 
products. Finally, we were able to estimate the effects of FDI spillovers using common 
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data, methodology and empirical model for the five leading NMS, thus enabling us to 
provide more valid and comparable results across countries. 
 
7.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Throughout this thesis we have emphasized the relationship between heterogeneous 
nature of MNCs, sectoral heterogeneity and the differential impact of vertical linkages 
on the one hand and the ability of indigenous firms to increase their productivity and 
increase their competitiveness in national and international markets on the other. It was 
stressed that NMS have been successful in attracting FDI in medium high and high 
technology sectors which has enabled them to reduce the productivity gap vis-a-vis more 
advanced market economies and become more specialised in production of products with 
higher value added. By choosing export led strategies, NMS have successfully integrated 
in international trade and stimulated their economic growth (Rugraff, 2008). However, 
given the rising importance of GVCs and the prominent role played by MNCs in world 
production and distribution, further development and growth of NMS depends on their 
successful integration in MNCs’ networks and their orientation toward knowledge based 
economy.  
The main source of productivity improvements in the analysed countries emerged from 
vertical linkages with MNCs accompanied by high stock of knowledge capital, namely 
the share of intangible assets and high levels of human capital. However, the productivity 
effects largely depend on the type of vertical linkages and the heterogeneity of MNCs. 
Therefore, one of the most important issues for analysed countries is the identification of 
channels through which heterogeneous MNCs contribute to indigenous firms’ 
productivity and measures which can facilitate the inclusion of local firms in MNCs’ 
supply network.  In devising policy recommendations which can serve as a guideline to 
governments for raising prospects for indigenous firms’ integration in GVCs, we will 
primarily rely on findings from the empirical chapters. The set of policy 
recommendations are organized in three areas: (i) attracting the “right” type of foreign 
investors; (ii) establishing the right kind FDI incentives to promote linkages with MNCs; 
and (iii) increasing the capacity of local firms to benefit from FDI spillover potential. 
 
286 
7.4.1 ATTRACTING THE RIGHT TYPE OF FOREIGN INVESTORS 
One of the key messages of this thesis is that not all foreign investors are the same. 
Therefore, given the importance of spillovers, FDI promotion should be designed to 
allocate incentives depending on the motive and type of foreign investment as well as the 
sector of operation. So far, NMS have adopted the so-called ‘Irish model’, offering 
generous fiscal and financial incentives in order to attract large scale FDI with almost no 
performance requirements and without formulating sufficient incentives for the foreign 
firms to interact with the local environment (Rugraff, 2008; Jindra and Rojec, 2014).  
Therefore, further promotion and incentives should be based on active promotion of 
specific sectors and activities within the sector which can increase local firms’ 
participation in GVCs so as to emphasise the fragmentation of tasks and activities and 
not industries anymore. Incentives offered to foreign investors should be based on the 
promotion of R&D activities and the attraction of technologically more advanced, fully 
owned MNCs and those engaged in activities with high value added such as services. 
Although still limited, backward linkages in services are gaining importance suggesting 
that besides positive effects of efficiency seeking investors on local manufacturing 
suppliers, policy makers should put more emphasis on attracting market seeking 
investors in services as they are less sensitive to costs consideration than efficiency 
seeking investors. This is also suggested by findings in Chapter 6 where local firms were 
shown to benefit from backward linkages with MNCs in services in Estonia, Hungary 
and Slovakia. 
Furthermore, investment promotion strategies coordinated and implemented by 
investment promotion agencies should put emphasis not only on employment effects or 
the amount of investment, but also on potential for technology transfer, R&D activities 
and development of linkages. By attracting MNCs in services especially those in the 
energy sector, telecommunications, transport, logistics and ICT, the potential for 
spillovers is likely to be of cross-sectoral nature, thus improving productivity of 
downstream manufacturing clients by providing high quality inputs as suggested by 
findings in Chapter 6. The evaluation criteria for granting fiscal, financial or other type 
of incentives should include the strategy and commitment for technology transfer and 
creation of linkages with local firms. Investment incentives could take into account the 
degree of foreign ownership and the country of origin of MNCs given their differential 
impact on productivity of local firms across countries. 
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With increasing fragmentation of GVCs, Tier 1 suppliers followed their main customers 
to host countries, thus making it very difficult for local suppliers to directly supply 
MNCs, especially those in the service sector. Hence, promotion efforts should also be 
targeted at Tier 2 or Tier 3 suppliers with lower quality requirements and those who have 
already established contracts with Tier 1 suppliers. Although this may reduce the 
potential for technology transfer due to their lower knowledge capacity, their cooperation 
with local suppliers would enable the latter to learn and gradually improve the quality of 
their inputs and efficiency of operations (Farole and Winkler, 2014). To the extent that 
development of supplier linkages is important in a country, they should attract foreign 
investors from distant countries given their reliance on localised inputs.  
 
7.4.2 PROMOTION OF LINKAGES 
Another set of FDI promotion policies is related to the integration of MNCs into host 
country. The basic premise here is that the high integration of MNCs with local firms 
would result in higher potential for knowledge spillovers, transfer of technology and 
management know-how. One way in which the government can promote the 
development of linkages with MNCs is the provision of timely information to local firms 
about the technology characteristics and encouraging worker mobility in order to benefit 
from the potential tacit knowledge. As argued by Farole and Winkler (2014) one way of 
reducing information asymmetries is to encourage the establishment of Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ) in which both foreign and local firms can engage in mutual 
information sharing, exchange technology and facilitate greater integration of MNCs in 
the local economy. This in turn would lead to an increase in productivity of local firms 
through external economies of scale, assistance effects and knowledge diffusion. Given 
the findings in Chapter 5 which pointed out the beneficial effects of well diffused 
technology brought by partially owned foreign firms for local competitors and suppliers 
in some of the analysed countries, closer interaction between foreign and domestic firms 
in SEZ would be more likely to result in more intensive collaboration. This would enable 
some local supplier firms to offset some of negative productivity effects from partially 
owned foreign firms and learn about their requirements in order to establish deeper 
linkages with them. Similar reasoning applies to fully-owned foreign firms which in 
general are less keen to share knowledge with their competitors. However, the creation 
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of clusters which connect competitors and local suppliers or clients would be an 
important step towards more intensive knowledge sharing activities.   
The exchange of information aimed at matching investors’ needs with the absorptive 
capacity of domestic firms is an important role for governments. For example, investor 
promotion agencies could establish a database of MNCs’ requirements in terms of 
quality, delivery time, scale of production and required quality certificates and at the 
same time could offer to foreign investors information about domestic suppliers or 
clients. The organization of exhibitions in which domestic and foreign firms can present 
their product range or input and skill requirements is an alternative way of promoting 
active linkages (Farole and Winkler, 2014).  
Also, fiscal and financial incentives offered to MNCs could be linked to their sourcing 
strategies, the scale of their R&D investments and technology brought to host countries. 
In this regard, if the promotion of linkages is high on government agenda, attracting 
MNCs from distant countries in general brings more benefits for local suppliers while 
investors from the EU region are more likely to provide valuable inputs to downstream 
firms.  In addition, governments should develop supplier programmes which should 
encourage the development and upgrading of domestic firms in the medium and long 
term. One way to achieve this is to help domestic suppliers meet international quality 
standards such as ISO which are usually the first requirement of MNCs before engaging 
in vertical linkages. In addition, the government should provide information about any 
industry specific requirements needed by MNCs in order to facilitate the creation of 
vertical linkages and entry of indigenous firms into GVCs (Farole and Winkler, 2014). 
As suggested by findings in Chapter 6, the higher intensity of the use of intangible assets 
is more likely to benefit local customers in manufacturing sector buying more specialized 
and advanced inputs from MNCs in services and attenuate negative productivity effects 
from direct foreign competitors. Therefore, investing in R&D institutions and attracting 
R&D intensive MNCs, which could become embedded in national innovation system, 
would facilitate the creation of vertical linkages. As mentioned above, by focusing more 
on the creation of specialized clusters and by offering incentives to foreign subsidiaries 
to stimulate technological activities and cooperation between domestic and foreign firms, 
knowledge spillovers from FDI can be maximised. This would at the same time reduce 
the likelihood of disinvestment by MNCs and their reallocation to next low cost location 
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and encourage them to engage in asset augmenting activities characterised by higher 
technological content and deeper local embeddedness.   
Finally, an important role for the government is to establish the institutional framework 
with emphasis on the rule of law, contract enforcement to reduce hold-up problems, 
better protection of intellectual property rights and improvements in the bureaucratic 
apparatus. Furthermore, given beneficial effects of intermediate input from services, any 
remaining barriers limiting competition, conduct regulation or FDI restrictions in 
services should be reduced. 
 
7.4.3 INCREASING THE ABSOPRTIVE CAPACITY OF LOCAL FIRMS 
The degree to which local firms benefit from foreign investors and MNCs’ integration in 
host countries crucially depends on the absorptive capacity of local competitors, 
suppliers and customers. The empirical analysis demonstrated large heterogeneity among 
countries in terms of benefits they receive from MNCs. These findings raise several 
suggestions. Given the negative effects of horizontal spillovers in general, especially 
those arising in the manufacturing sector and fully owned foreign firms, governments 
should actively promote investment in absorptive capacity. While there is a potentially 
broad range of interventions that government may take to improve absorptive capacity 
they should primarily aim to build firms’ and workers’ ability to capture foreign 
technology and access opportunities arising from the presence of foreign firms.  
As suggested by the findings in Chapter 6, local firms will be more likely to benefit from 
joint cooperation with MNCs in the same sector. FDI in services may be particularly 
important in this regard as the latter often involves frequent interaction and exchange of 
ideas and generate high paid jobs, thus enabling local firms to benefit from worker 
mobility and improve their human capital.  
Improvements in absorptive capacity would result in the reduction of technology gap and 
in turn help indigenous firms to adopt state of the art technology brought by fully owned 
firms and MNCs located in high tech sectors. Provision of additional research grants to 
invest in new technology and management and technical training   through various 
government programmes is one way to improve absorptive capacity (Farole and Winkler, 
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2014). In addition, supplier development programmes mentioned above should take into 
account the heterogeneity of MNCs and local firms since successful matching 
programmes require compatibility in technology, skills and ability of local firms to 
upgrade in high-value added activities. Hence, any linkage promotion should be based 
on programmes with clearly defined criteria that participating firms must satisfy in terms 
of quality of human capital, the share of innovative products and services and the level 
of productivity.  
In addition, the successful adoption of foreign technologies depends on firms’ access to 
finance since investments in absorptive capacity usually entail sunk costs. Therefore, the 
government should put more efforts to promote affordable access to credit through 
financial sector reforms. One way to achieve this would be to offer better credit terms to 
local firms through loans available from private and state development banks and 
guarantees backed by either MNCs engaged in vertical linkages with local supplier or 
the state (Farole and Winkler, 2014).  
The findings from Chapters 5 and 6 uniformly confirmed the importance of knowledge 
capital for productivity and the ability of firms to attenuate possible negative FDI 
spillovers or further increase positive effects. We identified two channels through which 
local firms can increase their productivity. The first one is related to investments in 
human capital. While governments can in general improve the quality of human capital 
by improving the education system, raise the overall level of highly educated persons 
and pay attention to future skill requirements when devising national curriculum, 
increasing firms’ productivity also requires specific investments. One way to attract and 
keep highly qualified personnel is to offer them efficiency wages or similar pay 
incentives as they positively affect firms’ productivity. Additional attention should be 
paid to on the job training especially in the light of increased complexity of the 
technology brought in by more advanced MNCs. In order to benefit from FDI knowledge 
spillovers, local firms need to be able to retain their highly qualified employees and invest 
in training. One way to achieve this is through co-financing the salaries and various forms 
of training of employees working on the introduction of new technology or the provision 
of subsidies for requalification of employees (Jindra and Rojec, 2014). In addition, the 
organization of specific training courses by industry associations should be encouraged. 
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The second channel through which local firms are able to increase their productivity is 
related to investment in intangible asset. The relative importance of physical endowments 
has received less attention due to their relative abundance. However, the quality and 
availability of “soft” production factors such as intangible asset is becoming the driving 
force of firms’ productivity and economic growth (Corrado et al., 2009; Dettori et al., 
2009; Marrocu et al., 2010; Borgo et al., 2013). This has important implications for fiscal 
and financial incentives which should be designed to stimulate local firms to accumulate 
intangible assets such as software, R&D, patents, employee training and economic 
competences. In this regard, collaboration with research institutes and universities is 
crucial as the creation of research funds, promotion of high quality research and 
availability of grants can promote collaborative activities resulting in new products and 
processes, skill developments, new curriculum and technology transfer. 
In the long run policies should aim at improving financial markets, quality of education 
system and vocational training and infrastructure which should lay the foundations for a 
knowledge based economy. Improvements in physical infrastructure such as railways or 
roads would also lead to more even distribution of FDI across regions and encourage 
worker mobility, thus enabling employees to easily switch their jobs and employ the 
knowledge gained in foreign firms. Moreover, given the goal of NMS to become 
knowledge based economies, more emphasis should be placed on improvements in 
energy, telecommunications and ICT infrastructure in order to attract high technological 
MNCs.  
 
7.5 LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
 
This thesis made several contributions to the existing body of knowledge on FDI 
spillovers in general and in transition countries in particular. However, the research faced 
several constraints and limitations which deserve further discussion. Most of the 
limitations have resulted from the lack of appropriate data which had implications for the 
analysis in different chapters. Our initial goal was to include two additional Baltic 
countries but, because of the poor quality of output and employment data, it was not 
possible to estimate TFP and, therefore, Lithuania and Latvia had to be dropped from the 
 
292 
sample. Although the Amadeus database is an ideal, and much used, source of firm level 
information, it contains a large number of missing observations on input and output data 
- which makes it is less ideal for TFP estimation.  This is especially pronounced in the 
data for Hungary. We also faced another problem in Hungarian sample: the above 
average representation of large firms and the small number of observations in early years. 
The latter fact raises a question about the validity of results.  
It is important to note that our measure of TFP includes inputs which are not explicitly 
included in the production function such as management skills and human capital skills, 
capacity utilisation and intangible assets and thus is overestimated. Furthermore, our TFP 
measure is estimated using monetary values and does not control for other potential 
biases arising from using industry deflators to measure firm’s physical output and 
assumption that firms produce only one product. 
Throughout the thesis we have emphasized the importance of technology spillovers as 
they are the main conduit for economic growth according to new growth theories. Since 
technology is difficult to measure, we resorted to the second best solution and estimated 
TFP-raising spillovers which are basically the effects of technology.  
The quantitative analysis of FDI spillovers relied heavily on industry level data obtained 
from input-output tables to measure the inter-industry linkages between foreign and 
domestic firms- instead of the more accurate, but not available, firm level sourcing data.  
Although we have contributed to the literature by using time varying input-output 
coefficients, this came at the expense of using somewhat aggregated industry 
classification. A consequence of this is that vertical linkages may not be fully identified 
if they occur at lower levels of aggregation and thus the effects of horizontal spillovers 
may be overestimated. There are two other limitations with regard to how FDI spillovers 
are estimated. We adopted a conventional approach based on production function. 
However, this approach did not allow us to distinguish gains from technology spillovers 
and potential losses arising from increased competitive pressure, and thus what we 
observed is a net effect. In addition, the effects of FDI spillovers are limited to only one 
variable. However, it may be argued that FDI spillovers may affect the innovative 
activities of firms as well.  
In Chapter 5, in order to identify MNCs’ heterogeneity we took a headquarter-centred 
perspective in which foreign firms’ superior advantage arises from the exploitation of 
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existing ownership advantages. This conceptual view ignores strategic and technological 
developments where foreign subsidiaries play an important role in MNCs’ network by 
increasing their capabilities, innovation activities and functional scope over time, 
creating new knowledge and contributing to diversification of products and market. As 
a consequence of frequent interaction with local partners and greater local embeddedness 
in host economies, the potential for technology spillovers may be higher. However, the 
Amadeus data did not allow us to distinguish between different types of MNCs’ 
subsidiaries and to incorporate the recent theoretical development in international 
business literature. Due to space constraints of this thesis, the heterogeneity of service 
and manufacturing sectors in Chapter 6 was not further explored to find out if the results 
for vertical linkages were driven by specific service or manufacturing sectors. 
Furthermore, additional heterogeneity in terms of firms’ size, technology intensity of 
industries, productivity levels of both foreign and domestic firms was not explored. 
Finally, limitations were also present in modelling other firm characteristics. This was 
particularly true for variables controlling for absorptive capacity. The latter is a 
multidimensional concept which can hardly be captured with only two variables 
measured in a rather crude way. First, human capital is proxied by average wage which 
may not reflect the level of education, occupational structure, the number of workers that 
received training or the level of cognitive skills. Second, intangibles comprise a variety 
of assets grouped as digitalized information, innovative property and economic 
competences. Again, the Amadeus database does not provide detailed information on 
these different groups. Furthermore, innovative capabilities and computerised 
information are reported in firm’s balance sheet while economic competencies such as 
costs related to employee training are not. 
 
 
 
7.6 DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
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Although this research has addressed some specific research questions related to the 
effects of FDI spillovers on productivity of local firms in transition countries, it also 
raises new questions for research. Some important areas together with limitations 
discussed in the previous section worth considering for future research are discussed 
below.   
First, future research may explore scenarios in which foreign subsidiaries are an 
important part of the mechanism for transferring knowledge from MNCs’ headquarters. 
A subsidiary adopts different roles within MNCs’ network and has been argued that their 
autonomy on production and technology decisions enables them to develop their 
independence, use a wider range of local inputs and generate higher levels of linkages 
with their host economy (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; 
Blomkvist et al., 2010; Marin and Sasidsharan, 2010; Giroud et al., 2012). Specially 
designed firm level surveys could be used as a basis for this type of research. In addition, 
this type of data could better describe the quality of linkages in terms of transferred 
technology, products and skills; duration of such linkages; extent of learning which 
occurs due to interactions between foreign and local firms and their employees (Giroud 
and Scott-Kennel, 2009). 
Second, very few studies have focused on the effects of knowledge spillovers and vertical 
linkages on the export propensity and intensity of local firms and possible factors within 
the transmission channels which may influence export spillovers from FDI. Although the 
Amadeus database contains data on the share of export in total sales they are confined 
only to two countries from our sample. However, more detailed data could be obtained 
from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) 65F69 which 
also has the advantage of providing additional factors influencing the transmission 
channels. 
Third, our empirical analysis investigated the net effects arising from benefits of 
technology spillovers and potential losses arising from increased competitive pressure. 
                                                 
69 BEEPS is a firm level survey carried out by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) whose aim is to gain understanding of firm’s perception of the environment in which they operate. 
It includes questions from several broad areas such as access to finance, innovation, competition, 
infrastructure and firms’ financial data. 
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One way to disentangle these two effects is to resort to estimation of entrepreneurial 
spillovers usually measured by entry of new and exit of existing firms from the market. 
Finally, future research on FDI spillovers may take more direct approach to trace the 
flow of knowledge and technology across firms instead of relying on industry level 
proxies (Driffield et al., 2010). In this regard, the use of Community Innovation Surveys 
(CIS)66F70 data can be exploited to a greater extent by using survey questions concerning 
knowledge spillovers and flows between various firms in the economy. In addition, one 
may investigate different stages of innovation process. Using the model developed by 
Crepon et al. (1998), future research will be able to examine the impact of FDI spillovers 
on the decision of firms to innovate and the amount of innovation expenditure, the 
transformation of innovation input to innovation output and document the detailed 
mechanism through which FDI spillovers affect performance of firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 CIS is a survey of innovation activities of enterprises carried out by EU member states’ statistical offices 
every two years. Its main aim is to collect detailed information on different types of innovation and other 
various aspect related to development of an innovation. 
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1.1 INCOME AND PRODUCTIVITY CONVERGENCE IN NMS 
 
TABLE I.1 GDP PER CAPITA (PPP) GROWTH RATES IN NMS AND EU 15 
GEO/TIME 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013   Average    
1996-2013 
EU 15 4.71 5.62 4.26 4.59 7.32 3.18 3.08 0.43 4.26 3.67 4.72 4.89 -0.72 -6.50 3.86 2.23 1.45 0.36 2.86 
Bulgaria -15.22 5.13 14.63 4.26 10.20 9.26 10.17 6.15 8.70 9.33 9.76 11.11 9.00 -5.50 4.85 8.33 3.42 -0.83 5.71 
Czech Republic 8.04 1.65 0.00 4.07 5.47 6.67 4.17 5.33 6.96 5.33 6.18 8.99 -1.94 -3.96 1.55 3.05 1.97 -0.48 3.50 
Estonia 9.43 17.24 5.88 5.56 13.16 6.98 10.87 10.78 9.73 11.29 13.04 12.18 -1.71 -13.37 6.04 9.49 5.78 2.73 7.51 
Croatia 13.43 7.89 4.88 0.00 10.47 5.26 11.00 5.41 6.84 5.60 6.82 10.64 3.85 -8.02 -1.34 3.40 2.63 0.00 4.93 
Latvia 8.70 12.00 10.71 3.23 7.81 10.14 10.53 8.33 10.99 9.90 12.61 14.40 2.10 -13.01 6.30 11.11 9.33 5.49 7.82 
Lithuania 7.69 10.71 9.68 1.47 8.70 10.67 9.64 13.19 7.77 10.81 10.57 13.97 3.87 -15.53 11.03 11.92 8.28 4.37 7.71 
Hungary 5.33 7.59 7.06 4.40 8.42 11.65 8.70 3.20 5.43 4.41 4.93 2.68 3.92 -3.77 5.23 4.97 0.59 1.18 4.77 
Poland 9.52 10.14 6.58 6.17 6.98 2.17 5.32 2.02 7.92 5.50 6.96 10.57 3.68 0.71 8.45 6.49 4.27 2.34 5.88 
Romania 6.25 -7.84 -4.26 4.44 6.38 10.00 9.09 8.33 15.38 6.67 15.00 16.30 14.02 -4.10 5.98 4.03 5.43 2.21 6.30 
Slovenia 7.34 8.55 5.51 7.46 5.56 3.95 6.33 2.98 8.09 4.81 5.61 6.76 2.71 -11.01 1.98 2.91 0.94 -0.47 3.89 
Slovakia 8.57 9.21 6.02 2.27 5.56 8.42 7.77 3.60 6.96 9.76 10.37 13.42 7.10 -6.08 6.47 4.42 2.65 1.03 5.97 
Average NMS 5.95 7.12 5.68 4.10 7.90 6.84 7.41 5.12 7.76 6.75 8.38 9.81 3.31 -7.30 4.86 5.58 3.57 1.39 5.23 
Source: Eurostat; author’s calculations  
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TABLE I.2 GDP PER CAPITA (PPP) GAP, PERCENTAGE OF  EU 15 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
1995-2013 
Bulgaria 27 22 22 24 24 25 26 28 29 31 32 34 36 39 40 40 43 43 43 32 
Czech Republic 66 68 65 63 62 61 63 64 67 69 70 71 74 73 75 73 74 74 74 69 
Estonia 31 33 36 37 37 39 41 44 48 51 54 59 63 62 58 59 63 66 67 50 
Croatia 39 43 44 44 42 43 44 47 50 51 52 53 56 58 58 55 55 56 56 50 
Latvia 27 28 30 32 31 31 33 36 39 41 44 47 51 53 49 50 55 59 62 42 
Lithuania 31 31 33 35 34 34 37 39 44 45 48 51 56 58 53 56 61 66 68 46 
Hungary 44 44 45 46 46 47 51 53 55 56 56 56 55 57 59 60 61 61 61 53 
Poland 37 39 40 41 42 42 41 42 43 44 45 46 49 51 55 57 60 61 63 47 
Romania 28 29 25 23 23 23 24 26 28 31 31 35 38 44 45 46 47 49 50 34 
Slovenia 64 66 68 68 70 69 70 72 74 76 77 78 79 82 78 77 77 77 76 74 
Slovakia 41 43 44 45 44 43 45 47 49 50 53 56 61 65 66 67 69 70 70 54 
Average NMS  40 40 41 42 41 42 43 45 48 50 51 53 56 58 58 58 60 62 63 50 
Source: Eurostat; author’s calculations 
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TABLE I.3 LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH PER PERSON EMPLOYED  (CONVERTED TO 2013 PRICE LEVEL WITH 2005 PPP, 1995=100) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
1996-2013 
EU 15 1.72 2.42 1.39 1.91 2.42 0.41 0.99 1.20 2.13 1.13 1.69 1.39 -1.28 -2.62 2.25 0.87 -0.08 0.45 1.02 
Lithuania 4.29 7.49 8.49 1.25 7.90 10.92 3.11 7.88 7.39 5.19 5.87 6.82 3.59 -8.61 15.31 5.55 1.85 1.99 5.35 
Estonia 8.44 11.68 8.85 4.39 11.35 5.42 5.12 6.29 6.36 6.71 4.48 6.64 -4.31 -4.54 7.70 2.42 1.66 0.98 4.98 
Latvia 5.99 5.04 5.93 4.77 8.81 6.07 4.09 5.60 7.53 8.40 5.77 6.18 -3.66 -5.23 3.65 14.65 3.36 2.03 4.94 
Poland 4.98 5.58 3.77 8.81 5.93 3.50 4.60 5.09 4.07 1.43 2.95 2.19 1.23 1.22 3.40 3.49 5.56 1.22 3.83 
Slovakia 4.76 5.53 4.85 2.64 3.39 2.89 4.49 3.65 5.30 4.96 6.14 8.23 2.45 -3.04 6.03 1.19 1.75 0.85 3.67 
Romania 5.26 -5.89 -0.23 0.33 3.21 6.81 16.97 5.29 10.32 5.76 7.14 5.93 7.34 -4.69 -0.88 2.99 -0.58 1.67 3.71 
Bulgaria -11.46 1.47 5.95 6.57 8.30 4.95 4.41 2.47 4.05 3.56 3.07 3.17 3.74 -3.83 4.44 4.13 3.36 0.65 2.72 
Croatia 5.92 23.10 -7.43 0.34 4.33 3.14 4.03 1.44 2.61 3.54 1.04 1.55 1.00 -5.21 3.00 2.36 1.98 0.14 2.60 
Czech Republic 3.99 -0.14 1.56 3.95 5.04 3.41 1.51 4.60 5.08 4.57 5.61 3.54 0.77 -2.78 3.53 1.85 -1.41 -0.37 2.46 
Slovenia 5.76 6.91 3.62 3.74 2.69 2.36 2.22 3.24 3.99 4.49 4.24 3.51 0.78 -6.24 3.49 2.37 -1.73 -1.04 2.47 
Hungary 0.08 2.97 2.48 0.38 3.21 3.88 4.59 3.85 5.81 4.27 3.45 -0.60 2.74 -4.39 0.21 1.26 -1.80 0.19 1.81 
Average NMS 3.46 5.80 3.44 3.38 5.83 4.85 5.01 4.49 5.68 4.81 4.52 4.29 1.42 -4.30 4.53 3.84 1.27 0.76 3.50 
Source: Total Economy Database™; authors’ calculations. 
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TABLE I.4 TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
1996-2013 
EU15   0.68 1.24 1.12 0.99 1.53 0.47 -0.03 0.29 1.09 0.54 1.42 0.93 -1.01 -3.84 1.97 1.11 -0.62 -0.15 0.43 
Latvia   7.43 10.69 9.08 5.75 8.23 5.90 5.84 7.19 5.06 4.26 5.77 0.26 -7.04 -7.15 2.79 5.32 3.92 2.79 4.23 
Lithuania   4.52 6.48 5.88 -1.36 4.91 7.14 3.14 6.54 4.75 3.78 3.10 4.38 -0.93 -12.17 3.61 4.32 1.73 1.15 2.83 
Romania   6.34 -4.97 0.16 0.92 3.00 5.99 11.89 5.22 8.50 3.45 4.88 0.80 1.92 -7.85 -2.45 -0.22 1.71 2.70 2.33 
Slovakia   2.75 2.89 0.26 -1.14 0.86 1.06 2.96 3.85 4.18 3.75 4.76 6.64 1.47 -4.95 4.76 0.68 1.31 1.94 2.11 
Poland   4.55 4.52 2.14 4.42 2.90 0.99 2.10 3.29 3.44 1.13 2.76 2.22 -0.88 -0.09 2.80 1.81 -0.53 -0.30 2.07 
Estonia   4.50 8.20 3.86 -0.36 7.47 2.59 2.10 1.84 2.51 3.57 2.27 2.37 -8.50 -10.81 4.26 2.79 1.52 -1.12 1.62 
Slovenia   3.78 4.97 1.90 2.38 1.62 1.16 1.55 1.62 2.60 2.71 2.71 2.47 -0.66 -7.55 2.39 1.64 -1.88 0.06 1.30 
Czech Republic  1.94 -1.82 -0.76 1.44 3.47 1.86 0.14 2.78 3.75 4.04 4.66 2.59 -0.05 -5.02 1.77 1.14 -1.77 -1.36 1.04 
Bulgaria   1.16 -0.14 3.28 -4.17 6.04 2.38 2.70 2.20 3.08 1.28 0.90 1.16 -0.97 -7.34 0.85 1.43 0.00 -0.37 0.75 
Hungary   -0.62 2.40 2.12 0.45 2.22 2.22 2.57 1.94 3.17 2.31 1.82 -1.70 0.09 -6.40 0.18 1.42 -1.70 0.64 0.73 
Croatia   0.00 14.23 -4.83 -1.31 3.10 2.52 3.39 1.21 1.27 1.36 -0.03 1.64 -2.51 -8.01 0.35 0.24 -0.69 -1.03 0.61 
Average NMS 3.30 4.31 2.10 0.64 3.98 3.08 3.49 3.43 3.85 2.88 3.06 2.08 -1.64 -7.03 1.94 1.87 0.33 0.46 1.78 
Source: AMECO database; authors’ calculation 
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1.2 MEASURING GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN PARTICIPATION (GVC) 
 
Hummels et al. (2001) proposed vertical specialisation index based on import content of 
exports. However, this measure does not include the steps of production utilising foreign 
inputs, thus giving only a partial measure of GVC participation. Therefore, Koopman et 
al. (2011) developed GVC participation index which decompose gross exports into five 
different components presented below.   
 
FIGURE I.1 DECOMPOSITION OF GROSS EXPORTS INTO VALUE ADDED COMPONENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Source: Koopman et al. (2011) and Rahman and Zhao (2013) 
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Components (1) and (2) reflect the export of countries not included in GVCs. Upstream 
segments of the GVCs are presented by components (3) and (4) i.e. domestic value added 
processed for further export while downstream segment of GVC is presented by 
component (5). The larger is the share of FVA in country’s exports, the more likely is that 
country will be specialising in processing and assembly of parts and components. 
Based on this, Koopman et al. (2011) developed two indicators of GVC participation. The 
first one is related to backward participation measured as the value of foreign value added 
in total gross exports, while forward participation is measured as value of domestic value 
added, i.e. value of inputs produced domestically which are used in third country’s exports 
as a share of home country gross exports.  
The following example taken from WTO World Trade Report (2014, p.83) illustrates the 
concept of GVC participation between reporting and partner countries. 
FIGURE I.2 VISUALISATION OF VALUE ADDED COMPONENTS OF GROSS EXPORTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      Double counting value added components 
      Source: WTO World Trade Report (2014, p.83) 
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By taking an example of manufacturing process of cars we can illustrate the concept of 
GVCs’ participation and the valued added components of gross export. The central node 
in GVC is country A which for example export tyres in country B. If country A imports 
rubber from a third country C the value of rubber embedded in the export of tyres is 
included in FVA component of gross export indicating the extent of backward 
participation in GVC. If tyres imported by country B are used in the production of cars 
which are then exported in country C value added in the production of tyres in country A 
is then represented by the angled green arrow. This is a measure of forward participation 
in GVCs. By combining FVA and indirect DVA and dividing it by gross export of country 
A we are able to measure participation of the latter in GVC. If instead imported tyres by 
country B are used to produce cars for home market, the value of the tyres is the DVA of 
direct exports from country A to country B represented by solid blue line. Finally, if cars 
produced in country B are exported to country A the value added in the production of tyres 
is part of Country A re-imports. 
1.3 INDUSTRY PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS AND GROWTH RATES IN 
NMS 
 
FIGURE I.3 AVERAGE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES OF NMS-
8 VS. EU-15, 1995-2009 
 
Source: WIOD Database and GGDC Productivity Level Database 1997 benchmark; Author’s calculations 
Note: Labour productivity is calculated as gross output divided by number of hours worked. We use 
industry level  PPP conversion rates to transform gross nominal output in country c sub-sector j and year t 
expressed in local currency units into real output in 1997 PPP Euros. 
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FIGURE I.4 AVERAGE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES OF  NMS-
8 VS. EU-15, 1995-2009 
 
Source: WIOD Database and GGDC Productivity Level Database 1997 benchmark; Author’s calculations 
Note: Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel industry is excluded from the Figure. 
Labour productivity is calculated as gross output divided by number of hours worked. We use industry 
level  PPP conversion rates to transform gross nominal output in country c sub-sector j and year t 
expressed in local currency units into real output in 1997 PPP Euros. 
 
 
FIGURE I.5 AVERAGE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN SERVICE INDUSTRIES OF NMS-8 VS. EU-
15, 1995-2009 
 
Source: WIOD Database and GGDC Productivity Level Database 1997 benchmark; Author’s calculations 
Note: Labour productivity is calculated as gross output divided by number of hours worked. We use 
industry level  PPP conversion rates to transform gross nominal output in country c sub-sector j and year t 
expressed in local currency units into real output in 1997 PPP Euros. 
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FIGURE I.6 AVERAGE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS IN SERVICES INDUSTRIES OF NMS-8 VS. EU-
15, 1995-2009 
 
Source: WIOD Database and GGDC Productivity Level Database 1997 benchmark; Author’s calculations 
Note:   Real estate activities industry is excluded from the Figure. 
Labour productivity is calculated as gross output divided by number of hours worked. We use industry level 
PPP conversion rates to transform gross nominal output in country c sub-sector j and year t expressed in 
local currency units into real output in 1997 PPP Euros. 
 
FIGURE I.7 TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY AND INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTIONS TO VALUE ADDED 
GROWTH, 1996–2009  
Source: Benkovskis et al. (2013, p.19) 
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2.1 CLEANING PROCEDURE 
A unique firm level dataset was constructed using Amadeus database published by Bureau 
van Dijk. This comprehensive database covers around 19.514.770 companies in Europe, 
both public and private 67F71. In this thesis the focus is on a subset of firms from five countries 
in Central Europe for which financial information is available in the period 2002-2010. In 
November 2011 update, Amadeus included 454.738 firms from the Czech Republic, 
107.052 firms from Estonia, 377.414 firms from Hungary, 234.761 firms from Slovakia 
and 62.254 firms from Slovenia resulting in 11,125,971 firm level observations.  
 
In conducting econometric estimation, we did not apply firm’s size threshold as Eapen 
(2013) suggests that in incomplete datasets such as Amadeus the effects of FDI 
productivity spillovers may be overestimated due to selection effects if one exclude small 
firms from the sample. Since we are interested in estimating TFP for manufacturing and 
services firms, our cleaning procedure starts with eliminating certain industries from the 
sample or firms for which industry code is not provided. These are Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing (NACE 1.1 codes 01-03), Mining and quarrying (NACE 1.1 codes 05-09), 
Public administration and defence, compulsory social security (NACE 1.1 code 84), 
Education (NACE 1.1 code 85), Human health services (NACE 1.1 code 86), Residential 
care and social work activities (NACE 1.1 codes 87-88), Arts, entertainment and recreation 
(NACE 1.1 codes 90-93), Other services (NACE 1.1 codes 94-96). 
 
For the construction of TFP sample we need information on firms’ sales, tangible fixed 
assets, number of employees and expenditure on materials. Firms with missing 
observations on either of the variables of interest are dropped from the sample. 
Furthermore, firms reporting zero or negative sales, value added, total assets, total fixed 
assets, tangible fixed assets, number of employees, expenditure of materials and cost of 
employees from the balance sheet are deleted.  We have also eliminated observations for 
which accounting rules are violated such as situations where total and individual 
components of fixed assets are larger than total assets or when the date of incorporation 
appears after the year in which firms have reported their financial information.  
                                                 
71 The database was accessed in November 2011. 
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In order to avoid the extreme effects of outliers and aberrant values due to typing errors 
during data entry we have computed output to labour ratio, value added to labour ratio, 
capital to output ratio, labour to output ratio and dropped firms below the 1st percentile and 
above 99th percentile of their respective distributions. Finally, in order to exploit the 
advantages of panel data the sample is restricted to include at least two consecutive 
observations per firm. The table below shows the deletion procedure per country. 
TABLE II.1 NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS AFTER CLEANING STEPS 
2.2 FOREIGN OWNERSHIP CALCULATIONS  
In order to construct time and firm specific ownership information we rely on Amadeus 
database. The Amadeus-Ownership database contains detailed information on owners of 
both listed and private firms including name, country of residence, percentage of 
ownership and type (e.g., bank, industrial company, fund, individual, and so on). Usually 
Amadeus reports information on ownership only for last year. However, at the time of our 
access to the database Amadeus introduced new feature which enable to track the 
ownership changes in the last five years. Since we have financial data for nine years, we 
used this new available option and gained information for two sub periods. First sub period 
 Czech 
Republic 
Estonia Hungary Slovakia Slovenia 
Original sample - number of obs. 
 
4,092,642 963,468 3,396,726 2,112,849 560,286 
Firms with NACE codes missing 
or not corresponding to 
manufacturing and service activities 
 
840,411 291,942 490,851 449,280 39,798 
Firms with missing values on 
production function variables 
 
2,889,204 509,001 2,881,808 1,584,712 492,972 
Firms with zero or negative values 
of production function variables or 
having erroneous accounting data 
 
93,244 52,865 3,978 12,599 4,993 
Firms with O/L, VA/L, K/O, L/O 
below 1 or above 99 percentile of 
distribution 
 
16,627 6,466 1,114 3,917 1,259 
Firms with less than two consecutive 
observations 
 
19,711 8,564 6,232 13,044 1,393 
Total deleted - number of obs. 3,859,197 868,838 3,383,983 2,063,552 540,415 
TFP sample - number of obs. 233,445 94,630 12,743 49,297 19,871 
      
 
355 
covers the period 2002-2006 and the second sub period covers the period 2007-2011.68F72 
Both files were merged using BvD ID number, country ISO code and Shareholder BvD 
ID number to obtain the ownership changes over the analysed period. 
Amadeus ownership database provide several indicators divided in three dimensions: 
1. Independence indicator – measure of independence of firm with regard to its 
shareholders 
2. Ultimate owner – an entity which is the ultimate owner of the company obtained by 
analysing shareholder’s structures of companies which according to independent indicator 
are classified as independent. The company to be independent it must have an indicator of 
A+, A or A- indicating that no other entity has more than 25% of shares. 
3. Shareholders – provides a list of all the shareholders in the company and their 
corresponding shares in company’s capital, both total and direct ownership. 
In our analysis of identifying foreign owner we rely on direct ownership for several 
reasons. Ultimate owner category is calculated by finding at least one owner that has more 
than 25% of controlling interest in the company. The figure below is taken from Amadeus 
manual and shows how ultimate owner is calculated. The ownership path of minimum 
25% is followed from Company 1 to Company 3 and from Company 3 to Company 5. 
Company 5 is independent and said to be the UO of Company 1. Company 5 is also the 
UO of Company 3. 
 
 
 
The problem with identifying ultimate owner is also admitted by BvD saying“even if the 
scope of the BvD ownership database is very wide, BvD cannot absolutely assert that all 
the existing links are recorded in the database. More importantly, because certain 
ownership structures can be very complex, trying to evaluate a controlling ultimate owner 
could be misleading” (Bureau van Dijk, 2010). Moreover, since we are interested in 
continuous ownership over time calculated total percentage of ultimate owner cannot be 
                                                 
72 Ownership information was accessed in September 2012. 
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related to any specific date as it relies on information valid at different dates. Finally, as 
we follow international definition of foreign ownership which states that foreign owner is 
the firm which owns at least 10% of other firms’ capital, the definition of ultimate owner 
clearly does not correspond to it.  
Amadeus ownership database records the ownership link indicating that company A owns 
a certain share of company B as direct ownership even if the percentage of foreign 
ownership is 1% except for listed firms where usually the small stock holders are 
unknown. Sometimes, direct ownership link does not contain actual number but indicates 
if the company is WO (“wholly owned”), MO (“majority owned”), JO (“jointly owned”), 
NQ (“negligible”) and CQP1 (“50% + 1 share). In this cases we have recoded these values 
to 100% if WO, 51% if MO, 50% if JO and 50% if CQP1.  
In order to identify foreign owner, we have relied on a variable containing the country 
codes and in cases where country code is different than home country of firm, firm is 
identified as foreign if it owns more than 10%. If the country code is missing, firms are 
classified as domestic. The latter is especially problematic if shareholder is a private 
individual as in these cases country code is almost always missing. Furthermore, as argued 
by Lesher and Mirodout (2008) even if the shareholder is from foreign country they are 
less likely to have an active role in the management and therefore are less relevant for 
estimation of productivity spillovers which is the main research question of this thesis. 
After identifying foreign owners, foreign ownership variable is calculated by summing all 
the percentages owned by foreigners. For a firm i, FOit is the sum of all percentages of 
direct ownership by foreigners in year t. For example, if a Company A has three foreign 
owners, Italian investor with stakes of 10 percent, French investor owning 20 percent, and 
German investor owning 30 percent, FO for this company is 60 percent. If foreign owner 
is identified, but ownership share is missing it is set to zero. If foreign ownership share is 
missing for all years up to year t, it is assumed as it was domestic. For missing observations 
between years, missing values are replaced with non-missing observations from time t-1 
and previous periods. The assumption behind this procedure as it like there was no 
ownership change. 
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2.3 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
 
TABLE II.2 DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN FIRMS ACROSS TECHNOLOGY AND KNOWLEDGE INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES BY COUNTRY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Cleaned dataset      Original dataset   
  Czech Republic      Czech Republic  
 partially owned fully owned EU non EU   partially owned fully owned EU non EU 
Construction and utilities 200 150 346 4   1131 1419 1998 552 
High tech  83 224 263 44   143 481 532 92 
Medium high tech 335 1228 1451 112   592 2242 2545 289 
Medium low tech 402 1115 1495 22   803 2098 2789 112 
Low tech 266 558 803 21   617 1289 1722 184 
High tech knowledge intensive services 117 397 466 48   350 1230 1371 209 
Market knowledge intensive services 283 943 1153 73   4299 9912 11029 3182 
Less knowledge intensive services 939 2753 3502 190   4754 9813 11866 2701 
Total 2625 7368 9479 514   12689 28484 33852 7321 
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  Estonia      Estonia   
 partially owned fully owned EU non EU   partially owned fully owned EU non EU 
Construction and utilities 143 94 218 19   1672 2485 3530 627 
High tech  44 115 134 25   100 192 246 46 
Medium high tech 126 170 278 18   302 388 616 74 
Medium low tech 143 249 367 25   393 559 863 89 
Low tech 251 417 658 10   695 1071 1646 120 
High tech knowledge intensive services 81 128 180 29   522 1111 1300 333 
Market knowledge intensive services 202 382 542 42   2082 4725 5703 1104 
Less knowledge intensive services 916 1365 2065 216   3311 5297 6954 1654 
Total 1906 2920 4442 384   9077 15828 20858 4047 
  Hungary      Hungary   
 partially owned fully owned EU non EU   partially owned fully owned EU non EU 
Construction and utilities 47 33 80 -   417 292 666 43 
High tech  14 26 40 -   45 108 143 10 
Medium high tech 26 108 130 4   109 369 469 9 
Medium low tech 54 146 194 6   230 472 668 34 
Low tech 30 74 102 2   257 299 530 26 
High tech knowledge intensive services 8 29 37 -   125 225 328 22 
Market knowledge intensive services 15 51 66 -   683 1008 1599 92 
Less knowledge intensive services 115 382 478 19   899 1659 2362 196 
Total 309 849 1127 31   2765 4432 6765 432 
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  Slovakia      Slovakia   
 partially owned fully owned EU non EU   partially owned fully owned EU non EU 
Construction and utilities 26 61 82 5   245 314 511 48 
High tech  5 45 40 10   20 108 95 33 
Medium high tech 57 225 219 63   155 528 526 157 
Medium low tech 103 183 236 50   260 427 558 129 
Low tech 100 136 175 61   216 357 436 137 
High tech knowledge intensive services 23 57 73 7   112 208 295 25 
Market knowledge intensive services 44 128 168 4   339 913 1150 102 
Less knowledge intensive services 150 538 625 63   969 2435 3111 293 
Total 508 1373 1618 263   2316 5290 6682 924 
  Slovenia      Slovenia   
 partially owned fully owned EU non EU   partially owned fully owned EU non EU 
Construction and utilities 2 8 10 -   40 114 141 13 
High tech  2 - 2 -   5 2 7 - 
Medium high tech 24 7 31 -   40 24 61 3 
Medium low tech 3 1 3 1   26 24 46 4 
Low tech 8 10 18 -   35 33 67 1 
High tech knowledge intensive services 1 10 5 6   118 114 202 30 
Market knowledge intensive services 7 14 21 -   126 189 294 21 
Less knowledge intensive services 37 189 219 7   232 829 992 69 
Total 84 239 309 14   622 1329 1810 141 
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TABLE II.3 IN SAMPLE DATA COVERAGE OF FIRMS 
 Slovenia  Slovakia  Hungary  Estonia  Czech Republic  
Ti Obs. Firms Obs. Firms Obs. Firms Obs. Firms Obs. Firms 
2 2629 1211 14648 6336 2901 1284 10811 4699 38018 15776 
3 3020 955 10419 3130 6909 2190 12059 3420 41770 11813 
4 6004 1466 7847 1854 1887 464 11118 2437 41913 9186 
5 2545 500 7103 1379 765 153 10041 1878 28351 5304 
6 1962 325 2975 483 252 42 9604 1569 34326 5470 
7 1486 212 2849 407 21 3 28230 3988 17843 2549 
8 1568 196 3456 432 8 1 4352 544 31224 3903 
9 657 73 - - - - 8415 935 - - 
Total 19871 4938 49297 14021 12743 4137 94630 19470 233445 54001 
Note: The number of observations does not exactly match the quotient of firm year multiplication as some firms have gaps in the data. For example, firms with available data for 
years 2002 and 2003 satisfy the condition of two consecutive observations, however they may have missing information for year 2004 and then report data for subsequent years 
up to 2010. That will give them maximum number of consecutive observations equal to 6. Therefore, the initial two years would not be counted in the table. 
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TABLE II.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF PRODUCTION FUNCTION VARIABLES USED IN TFP 
ESTIMATION OF DOMESTIC FIRMS 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real sales  (€, '000) 223452 3,650 25,718 9 3,432,214 
Real material costs (€, '000) 223452 2,329 20,077 1 3,379,536 
Real tangible fixed assets (€, '000) 223452 1,043 14,480 1 2,616,399 
No of employees 223452 47 340 1 65,232 
Real value added (€, '000) 223452 1,322 9,449 1 1,077,106 
ESTONIA 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real sales  (€, '000) 89804 748 4,194 3 314,437 
Real material costs (€, '000) 89804 493 2,774 1 190,386 
Real tangible fixed assets (€, '000) 89804 204 3,573 1 409,350 
No of employees 89804 13 58 1 4,809 
Real value added (€, '000) 89804 254 1,851 1 202,071 
HUNGARY 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real sales  (€, '000) 11585 20,652 80,596 36 2,227,868 
Real material costs (€, '000) 11585 6,532 38,463 1 1,358,042 
Real tangible fixed assets (€, '000) 11585 7,379 62,231 1 2,766,798 
No of employees 11585 189 1,077 1 44,553 
Real value added (€, '000) 11585 14,120 62,317 10 2,117,166 
SLOVAKIA 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real sales  (€, '000) 47416 4,439 20,062 3 1,537,052 
Real material costs (€, '000) 47416 2,816 13,908 1 816,008 
Real tangible fixed assets (€, '000) 47416 1,724 27,216 1 2,520,726 
No of employees 47416 61 320 1 30,000 
Real value added (€, '000) 47416 1,623 8,901 1 946,590 
SLOVENIA 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real sales  (€, '000) 19548 2,135 7,992 15 192,065 
Real material costs (€, '000) 19548 1,156 5,824 1 184,152 
Real tangible fixed assets (€, '000) 19548 968 7,390 1 335,625 
No of employees 19548 19 61 1 1,429 
Real value added (€, '000) 19548 980 3,459 7 100,940 
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2.4 OUTPUT OF COBB-DOUGLAS VALUE ADDED PRODUCTION FUNCTION PER INDUSTRY AND COUNTRY 
TABLE II.5 ESTIMATION OF VALUE ADDED PRODUCTION FUNCTION BY INDUSTRIES USING WOOLDRIDGE ESTIMATOR (2009), LEVINSOHN-PETRIN ESTIMATOR 
(2003) AND OLS IN CZECH REPUBLIC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OLS LP WLP WLP versus OLS 
NACE 
GROUP 
labour capital Observations 
Returns 
to scale 
labour capital Observations 
Returns 
to scale 
labour capital Observations 
Returns 
to scale 
labour capital 
returns 
to 
scale  
1516 0.727*** 0.281*** 5,066 1.01 0.474*** 0.175*** 5,066 0.65 0.518*** 0.172*** 3,740 0.69*** - - - 
1718 0.722*** 0.196*** 2,712 0.92*** 0.546*** 0.157*** 2,712 0.70*** 0.554*** 0.154*** 1,964 0.708*** - - - 
19 0.659*** 0.234*** 386 0.89* 0.589*** 0.472*** 386 1.06 0.652*** 0.521*** 274 1.173 - + + 
20 0.837*** 0.200*** 3,625 1.04* 0.514*** 0.140*** 3,625 0.65*** 0.554*** 0.145*** 2,547 0.699*** - - - 
2122 0.794*** 0.169*** 4,448 0.96* 0.698*** 0.0947*** 4,448 0.79*** 0.725*** 0.102*** 3,127 0.827*** - - - 
2324 0.680*** 0.241*** 1,776 0.92*** 0.404*** 0.0899** 1,776 0.49*** 0.421*** 0.107** 1,315 0.528*** - - - 
25 0.706*** 0.236*** 4,103 0.94*** 0.469*** 0.154*** 4,103 0.62*** 0.490*** 0.166*** 2,990 0.656*** - - - 
26 0.573*** 0.370*** 2,575 0.94*** 0.369*** 0.106*** 2,575 0.48*** 0.353*** 0.102*** 1,864 0.455*** - - - 
2728 0.717*** 0.219*** 13,267 0.94*** 0.538*** 0.207*** 13,267 0.75*** 0.570*** 0.209*** 9,565 0.779*** - - - 
29 0.764*** 0.174*** 9,010 0.94*** 0.530*** 0.136*** 9,010 0.67*** 0.550*** 0.138*** 6,568 0.689*** - - - 
3033 0.691*** 0.212*** 7,045 0.90*** 0.538*** 0.168*** 7,045 0.71*** 0.567*** 0.169*** 5,080 0.736*** - - - 
3435 0.685*** 0.258*** 1,719 0.94** 0.510*** 0.224*** 1,719 0.73*** 0.482*** 0.239*** 1,278 0.721*** - - - 
3637 0.667*** 0.257*** 3,525 0.92*** 0.429*** 0.200*** 3,525 0.63*** 0.448*** 0.199*** 2,556 0.647*** - - - 
4041 0.825*** 0.200*** 2,096 1.03 0.674*** 0.0439 2,096 0.72*** 0.711*** 0.0456* 1,561 0.756*** - - - 
45 0.899*** 0.218*** 27,589 1.12*** 0.773*** 0.188*** 27,589 0.96*** 0.839*** 0.192*** 19,382 1.031* - - - 
50 0.882*** 0.169*** 8,071 1.05*** 0.559*** 0.140*** 8,071 0.70*** 0.615*** 0.143*** 5,670 0.757*** - - - 
51 0.900*** 0.169*** 39,117 1.07*** 0.473*** 0.132*** 39,117 0.61*** 0.516*** 0.136*** 26,856 0.652*** - - - 
52 0.842*** 0.169*** 20,581 1.01 0.488*** 0.151*** 20,581 0.64*** 0.513*** 0.154*** 13,950 0.667*** - - - 
55 0.945*** 0.171*** 7,685 1.12*** 0.702*** 0.0866*** 7,685 0.79*** 0.818*** 0.0823*** 5,130 0.9*** - - - 
6063 0.932*** 0.102*** 9,870 1.03** 1.024*** 0.131*** 9,870 1.16*** 1.069*** 0.120*** 6,847 1.189*** + + + 
64 0.882*** 0.164*** 740 1.05 1.045*** 0.0882 740 1.13 1.128*** 0.0914 507 1.219** + - + 
6567 0.906*** 0.237*** 282 1.14 0.975*** 0.0205 282 1.00 1.117*** 0.0245 196 1.141 + - + 
70 0.902*** 0.180*** 11,975 1.08*** 0.725*** 0.152*** 11,975 0.88*** 0.748*** 0.136*** 7,841 0.884*** - - + 
7174 0.923*** 0.175*** 36,189 1.10*** 0.882*** 0.138*** 36,189 1.02** 0.906*** 0.142*** 24,297 1.048*** - - - 
Mean  0.791 0.211   0.622 0.149   0.661 0.153      
St dev. 0.106 0.053   0.194 0.084   0.218 0.092      
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TABLE II.6 ESTIMATION OF VALUE ADDED PRODUCTION FUNCTION BY INDUSTRIES USING WOOLDRIDGE ESTIMATOR (2009), LEVINSOHN-PETRIN ESTIMATOR 
(2003) AND OLS IN ESTONIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OLS LP WLP WLP versus OLS 
NACE 
GROUP labour capital Observations 
Returns 
to scale labour capital Observations 
Returns 
to scale labour capital Observations 
Returns 
to scale labour capital 
returns 
to 
scale 
1516 0.703*** 0.299*** 1,299 1.00 0.518*** 0.128*** 1,299 0.65*** 0.497*** 0.140*** 1,013 0.637*** - - - 
1718 0.789*** 0.156*** 1,542 0.95** 0.689*** 0.0473 1,542 0.74*** 0.695*** 0.042 1,190 0.737*** - - - 
19 0.684*** 0.260*** 167 0.95 0.526*** -0.00699 167 0.52*** 0.596*** 0.0193 123 0.615*** - - - 
20 0.822*** 0.219*** 2,593 1.04** 0.493*** 0.217*** 2,593 0.71*** 0.520*** 0.221*** 2,000 0.741*** - + - 
2122 0.844*** 0.177*** 1,676 1.02 0.558*** 0.0934*** 1,676 0.65*** 0.556*** 0.104*** 1,298 0.66*** - - - 
2324 0.836*** 0.251*** 163 1.09 0.667*** 0.0437 163 0.71** 0.776*** 0.0631 122 0.839 - - - 
25 0.888*** 0.188*** 508 1.08* 0.620*** 0.113* 508 0.73*** 0.693*** 0.140*** 387 0.833** - - - 
26 0.817*** 0.296*** 456 1.11** 0.555*** 0.253*** 456 0.81** 0.565*** 0.269*** 353 0.835* - - - 
2728 0.858*** 0.187*** 2,508 1.05*** 0.708*** 0.151*** 2,508 0.86*** 0.732*** 0.154*** 1,927 0.886*** - - - 
29 0.839*** 0.152*** 948 0.99 0.599*** 0.159*** 948 0.76*** 0.578*** 0.178*** 706 0.757*** - + - 
3033 0.850*** 0.205*** 718 1.06 0.607*** 0.188*** 718 0.80*** 0.657*** 0.178*** 533 0.835*** - - - 
3435 0.906*** 0.121*** 503 1.03 0.627*** 0.107* 503 0.73*** 0.719*** 0.114** 372 0.832 - - - 
3637 0.821*** 0.216*** 1,951 1.04* 0.520*** 0.181*** 1,951 0.70*** 0.529*** 0.182*** 1,482 0.711*** - - - 
4041 0.796*** 0.251*** 696 1.05 0.469*** 0.0402 696 0.51*** 0.466*** 0.0522 555 0.518*** - - - 
45 0.853*** 0.208*** 13,727 1.06*** 0.688*** 0.226*** 13,727 0.92*** 0.731*** 0.223*** 9,950 0.953** - + - 
50 0.965*** 0.214*** 4,942 1.18*** 0.572*** 0.115*** 4,942 0.69*** 0.631*** 0.113*** 3,772 0.744*** - - - 
51 0.880*** 0.180*** 10,453 1.06*** 0.456*** 0.150*** 10,453 0.61*** 0.502*** 0.150*** 7,743 0.652*** - - - 
52 0.877*** 0.172*** 10,405 1.05*** 0.598*** 0.153*** 10,405 0.75*** 0.642*** 0.150*** 7,835 0.792*** - - - 
55 0.932*** 0.168*** 4,680 1.10*** 0.663*** 0.0773*** 4,680 0.74*** 0.719*** 0.0779*** 3,543 0.797*** - - - 
6063 0.807*** 0.248*** 9,569 1.06*** 0.651*** 0.220*** 9,569 0.87*** 0.677*** 0.220*** 7,153 0.897*** - - - 
64 0.892*** 0.192*** 390 1.08 0.528*** 0.0345 390 0.56*** 0.493*** 0.0528 289 0.546*** - - - 
6567 1.013*** 0.0982 180 1.11 1.003*** -0.0521 180 0.95 1.258*** -0.0814 125 1.177 + - + 
70 0.734*** 0.178*** 5,680 0.91*** 0.493*** 0.0746*** 5,680 0.57*** 0.544*** 0.0798*** 4,055 0.623*** - - - 
7174 0.872*** 0.201*** 14,050 1.07*** 0.757*** 0.166*** 14,050 0.92*** 0.817*** 0.161*** 10,099 0.978 - - - 
Mean   0.844 0.201   0.606 0.120   0.649 0.125      
St dev. 0.074 0.049   0.116 0.077   0.163 0.078      
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TABLE II.7 ESTIMATION OF VALUE ADDED PRODUCTION FUNCTION BY INDUSTRIES USING WOOLDRIDGE ESTIMATOR (2009), LEVINSOHN-PETRIN ESTIMATOR 
(2003) AND OLS IN HUNGARY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OLS LP WLP WLP versus OLS 
NACE 
GROUP labour capital Observations 
Returns 
to scale labour capital Observations 
Returns 
to scale labour capital Observations 
Returns 
to scale labour capital 
returns 
to 
scale 
1516 0.579*** 0.434*** 816 1.01 0.516*** 0.173 816 0.69** 0.538*** 0.192* 496 0.73** - - - 
1719 0.656*** 0.238** 171 0.89 0.711*** 0.275* 171 0.99 0.732*** 0.18 107 0.91 + - + 
20 0.354 0.429*** 67 0.78 0.675*** 0.662*** 67 1.34 0.413 0.288 39 0.70 + - - 
2122 0.853*** 0.142*** 309 1.00 0.775*** 0.012 309 0.79 0.848*** 0.109 196 0.96 - - - 
2324 0.633*** 0.306*** 247 0.94 0.529*** 0.0614 247 0.59** 0.535*** 0.0933 156 0.63*** - - - 
25 0.615*** 0.412*** 465 1.03 0.581*** 0.304** 465 0.89 0.550*** 0.283** 298 0.83 - - - 
26 0.493*** 0.445*** 224 0.94 0.518*** 0.258 224 0.78 0.487*** 0.292** 141 0.78 - - - 
2728 0.631*** 0.323*** 746 0.95 0.639*** 0.281** 746 0.92 0.609*** 0.348*** 474 0.96 - + + 
29 0.609*** 0.279*** 432 0.89*** 0.580*** 0.206 432 0.79 0.541*** 0.243 281 0.78 - - - 
3033 0.786*** 0.330*** 429 1.12** 0.713*** 0.192 429 0.91 0.726*** 0.218 263 0.94 - - - 
3435 0.612*** 0.420*** 209 1.03 0.621*** 0.447*** 209 1.07 0.676*** 0.385*** 128 1.06 + - + 
3637 0.750*** 0.245*** 176 1.00 0.815*** 0.0928 176 0.91 0.789*** -0.00057 114 0.79 + - - 
4041 0.297*** 0.461*** 264 0.76*** 0.341*** -0.265 264 0.08*** 0.354** -0.353* 160 0.00*** + - - 
45 0.832*** 0.180*** 616 1.01 0.783*** 0.228 616 1.01 0.803*** 0.133 384 0.94 - - - 
50 0.858*** 0.0285 947 0.89** 0.667*** -0.0111 947 0.66*** 0.733*** -0.0114 597 0.72*** - - - 
51 0.761*** 0.0968*** 2,986 0.86*** 0.554*** 0.118*** 2,986 0.67*** 0.596*** 0.119*** 1,876 0.72*** - + - 
52 0.670*** 0.207*** 856 0.88*** 0.453*** 0.307** 856 0.76 0.481*** 0.207* 530 0.69** - 0 - 
55 0.632*** 0.143*** 115 0.78*** 0.503*** 0.0971 115 0.60 0.526*** 0.0893 67 0.62*** - - - 
6063 0.702*** 0.0709 415 0.77*** 0.667*** 0.213 415 0.88 0.682*** 0.161 251 0.84 - + + 
6467 0.687*** 0.270** 90 0.96 0.539** 0.0805 90 0.62 0.479*** 0.0679 57 0.55*** - - - 
70 0.658*** 0.0836 297 0.74*** 0.663*** -0.194 297 0.47*** 0.655*** -0.142 176 0.51*** - - - 
7174 0.671*** 0.158*** 708 0.83*** 0.656*** 0.245** 708 0.90 0.661*** 0.192** 435 0.85 - + + 
Mean  0.651 0.259   0.613 0.172   0.609 0.140      
St dev. 0.139 0.136   0.115 0.195   0.131 0.164      
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TABLE II.8 ESTIMATION OF VALUE ADDED PRODUCTION FUNCTION BY INDUSTRIES USING WOOLDRIDGE ESTIMATOR (2009), LEVINSOHN-PETRIN ESTIMATOR 
(2003) AND OLS IN SLOVAKIA 
OLS LP WLP WLP versus OLS 
NACE 
GROUP labour capital Observations 
Returns 
to scale labour capital Observations 
Returns 
to scale labour capital Observations 
Returns 
to scale labour capital 
returns 
to 
scale 
1516 0.492*** 0.437*** 1,360 0.93*** 0.327*** 0.294*** 1,360 0.62*** 0.366*** 0.322*** 967 0.69*** - - - 
1718 0.482*** 0.315*** 640 0.80*** 0.485*** 0.211** 640 0.70*** 0.503*** 0.246*** 440 0.75*** + - - 
19 0.420*** 0.548*** 163 0.97 0.353*** 0.309* 163 0.66* 0.379*** 0.342* 105 0.72 - - - 
20 0.431*** 0.351*** 762 0.78*** 0.242*** 0.326*** 762 0.57*** 0.272*** 0.305*** 497 0.58*** - - - 
2122 0.584*** 0.237*** 785 0.82*** 0.502*** 0.197** 785 0.70*** 0.577*** 0.177** 525 0.75** - - - 
2324 0.273*** 0.382*** 343 0.66*** 0.209*** 0.219 343 0.43*** 0.160** 0.218* 249 0.38*** - - - 
25 0.454*** 0.370*** 833 0.82*** 0.358*** 0.359*** 833 0.72*** 0.384*** 0.324*** 564 0.71*** - - - 
26 0.264*** 0.574*** 641 0.84*** 0.171*** 0.642*** 641 0.81 0.151*** 0.603*** 447 0.75** - + - 
2728 0.437*** 0.315*** 2,527 0.75*** 0.322*** 0.400*** 2,527 0.72*** 0.367*** 0.403*** 1,680 0.77*** - + + 
29 0.451*** 0.305*** 1,705 0.76*** 0.299*** 0.347*** 1,705 0.65*** 0.341*** 0.322*** 1,185 0.66*** - + - 
3033 0.499*** 0.285*** 1,043 0.78*** 0.347*** 0.255*** 1,043 0.60*** 0.396*** 0.267*** 697 0.66*** - - - 
3435 0.448*** 0.309*** 420 0.76*** 0.207*** 0.277** 420 0.48*** 0.197*** 0.308*** 291 0.51*** - - - 
3637 0.461*** 0.395*** 768 0.86*** 0.320*** 0.395*** 768 0.72*** 0.381*** 0.381*** 521 0.76** - - - 
4041 0.580*** 0.218*** 662 0.80*** 0.427*** 0.165* 662 0.59*** 0.479*** 0.121*** 497 0.60*** - - - 
45 0.464*** 0.370*** 5,209 0.83*** 0.301*** 0.354*** 5,209 0.65*** 0.347*** 0.351*** 3,460 0.70*** - - - 
50 0.528*** 0.287*** 1,730 0.82*** 0.312*** 0.179*** 1,730 0.49*** 0.344*** 0.189*** 1,139 0.53*** - - - 
51 0.544*** 0.262*** 10,386 0.81*** 0.299*** 0.207*** 10,386 0.51*** 0.355*** 0.211*** 6,706 0.57*** - - - 
52 0.491*** 0.265*** 4,998 0.76*** 0.257*** 0.270*** 4,998 0.53*** 0.281*** 0.272*** 3,038 0.55*** - + - 
55 0.661*** 0.252*** 1,129 0.91*** 0.404*** 0.360*** 1,129 0.76*** 0.510*** 0.339*** 705 0.85* - + - 
6063 0.501*** 0.238*** 2,549 0.74*** 0.564*** 0.339*** 2,549 0.90*** 0.609*** 0.350*** 1,652 0.96 + + + 
64 0.631*** 0.325*** 143 0.96 0.719*** 0.219 143 0.94 0.697*** 0.213 95 0.91 + - - 
6567 0.696*** 0.389*** 67 1.09 0.551** 0.376 67 0.93 0.528** 0.275 40 0.80 - - - 
70 0.515*** 0.230*** 1,974 0.75*** 0.316*** 0.285*** 1,974 0.60*** 0.371*** 0.288*** 1,242 0.66*** - + - 
7174 0.622*** 0.277*** 6,579 0.90*** 0.552*** 0.240*** 6,579 0.79*** 0.611*** 0.245*** 3,977 0.86*** - - - 
Mean  0.497 0.330   0.368 0.301   0.400 0.294      
St dev. 0.103 0.092   0.133 0.101   0.141 0.095      
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TABLE II.9 ESTIMATION OF VALUE ADDED PRODUCTION FUNCTION BY INDUSTRIES USING WOOLDRIDGE ESTIMATOR (2009), LEVINSOHN-PETRIN ESTIMATOR 
(2003) AND OLS IN SLOVENIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OLS LP WLP WLP versus OLS 
NACE 
GROUP labour capital Observations 
Returns 
to scale labour capital Observations 
Returns 
to scale labour capital Observations 
Returns 
to scale labour capital 
returns 
to 
scale 
1516 0.829*** 0.178*** 288 1.01 0.548*** 0.0637 288 0.61*** 0.582*** 0.0508 207 0.63*** - - - 
1719 0.797*** 0.115*** 239 0.91** 0.564*** -0.0166 239 0.55*** 0.548*** -0.0218 176 0.52*** - - - 
20 0.612*** 0.251*** 305 0.86*** 0.401*** 0.112** 305 0.51*** 0.346*** 0.169*** 219 0.51*** - - - 
2122 0.891*** 0.0981*** 745 0.99 0.882*** 0.113** 745 1.00 0.928*** 0.0942** 558 1.02 + - + 
2324 0.615*** 0.347*** 68 0.96 0.537*** 0.135 68 0.67* 0.484*** -0.161*** 53 0.32*** - - - 
25 0.603*** 0.230*** 490 0.83*** 0.390*** 0.143** 490 0.53*** 0.431*** 0.147* 364 0.57*** - - - 
26 1.124*** -0.00103 172 1.12* 0.577*** 0.0222 172 0.60** 0.559*** -0.0113 125 0.54*** - + - 
2728 0.767*** 0.169*** 1,562 0.94*** 0.578*** 0.238*** 1,562 0.82*** 0.595*** 0.228*** 1,163 0.82*** - + - 
29 0.764*** 0.120*** 538 0.88*** 0.505*** 0.144*** 538 0.65*** 0.543*** 0.147*** 403 0.69*** - + - 
3033 0.698*** 0.175*** 386 0.87*** 0.449*** 0.135 386 0.58*** 0.445*** 0.149** 283 0.59*** - - - 
3435 0.815*** 0.0905 92 0.91 0.510*** 0.352*** 92 0.86 0.400*** 0.385*** 69 0.78** - + - 
3637 0.648*** 0.245*** 420 0.89** 0.292*** 0.149** 420 0.44*** 0.237*** 0.156** 308 0.39*** - - - 
4041 0.819*** 0.0877 87 0.91 0.806*** -0.0548 87 0.75 0.947*** -0.0804 66 0.86 + - - 
45 0.793*** 0.226*** 2,577 1.02 0.601*** 0.154*** 2,577 0.76*** 0.635*** 0.159*** 1,873 0.79*** - - - 
50 1.011*** 0.0572** 674 1.07** 0.855*** 0.0514 674 0.91 0.890*** 0.0484 499 0.93 - - - 
51 0.834*** 0.119*** 3,773 0.95** 0.550*** 0.118*** 3,773 0.67*** 0.590*** 0.115*** 2,777 0.70*** - - - 
52 0.871*** 0.0765*** 1,596 0.95** 0.633*** 0.0946*** 1,596 0.73*** 0.668*** 0.0967*** 1,157 0.76*** - + - 
55 0.846*** 0.119*** 525 0.97 0.558*** 0.063 525 0.62*** 0.575*** 0.083 373 0.65*** - - - 
6063 0.853*** 0.132*** 2,504 0.98 0.788*** 0.0830** 2,504 0.87** 0.860*** 0.0626* 1,786 0.92 + - - 
64 0.976*** 0.222** 97 1.20 0.818*** 0.352** 97 1.17 0.915*** 0.353** 68 1.26 - + + 
6567 1.108*** 0.0112 87 1.12 1.018*** -0.151 87 0.87 0.910*** -0.0685 64 0.84 - - - 
70 0.761*** 0.039 145 0.80*** 0.683*** -0.0393 145 0.64*** 0.640*** -0.0177 97 0.62*** - - - 
7174 0.798*** 0.142*** 2,178 0.94** 0.781*** 0.0656** 2,178 0.85*** 0.803*** 0.0499* 1,569 0.85*** + - - 
Mean  0.818 0.141   0.622 0.102   0.631 0.093      
St dev. 0.140 0.084   0.179 0.113   0.203 0.126      
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TABLE II.10 DIAGNOSTICS TESTS FOR WLP ESTIMATOR  
Notes: Columns numbers indicate KP weak identification test, KP under identification test (p-value) and Stock and Wright weak instrument test (p-value), respectively. In case of 
Hungary, industry with NACE code 19 is merged with NACE codes 17 and 18; and NACE 64 is merged with 65, 66 and 67. In case of Slovenia industry with NACE code 19 is 
merged with NACE codes 17 and 18. 
  CZECH REPUBLIC ESTONIA HUNGARY SLOVAKIA SLOVENIA 
NACE_GROUP 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
1516 6696 0 0 1491 0 0 942.9 0 0 1456 0 0 547.3 0 0 
1718 6577 0 0 7148 0 0 571.1 0 0 536.4 0 0 341.4 0 0 
19 1172 0 0 438 0 0 \ \ \ 111.6 0 0 \ \ \ 
20 2334 0 0 3240 0 0 42.97 0 0.28 354.3 0 0 564.7 0 0 
2122 4584 0 0 2639 0 0 221.8 0 0 645.2 0 0 1930 0 0 
2324 1636 0 0 752.9 0 0 1020 0 0 982.6 0 0.03 38.99 0.15 0.11 
25 3583 0 0 339.1 0 0 1914 0 0 337.5 0 0 821.1 0 0 
26 4978 0 0 922.8 0 0 980.6 0 0 719.4 0 0 426.7 0 0 
2728 13571 0 0 5495 0 0 1556 0 0 1185 0 0 2080 0 0 
29 9635 0 0 2689 0 0 1904 0 0 1360 0 0 1268 0 0 
3033 12065 0 0 1381 0 0 1788 0 0 473.7 0 0 1617 0 0 
3435 1388 0 0 1263 0 0 138.7 0 0 559.2 0 0.01 163.3 0 0.01 
3637 3249 0 0 1269 0 0 238.9 0 0 561.5 0 0 1260 0 0.01 
4041 4816 0 0 2674 0 0 2504 0 0.01 1588 0 0 46.24 0.03 0.07 
45 33095 0 0 11928 0 0 724.1 0 0 3476 0 0 3239 0 0 
50 8202 0 0 5276 0 0 602.6 0 0 492.9 0 0 1132 0 0 
51 38350 0 0 10779 0 0 2785 0 0 4670 0 0 6486 0 0 
52 21603 0 0 12844 0 0 2649 0 0 1986 0 0 2809 0 0 
55 3886 0 0 4265 0 0 415.5 0 0 356.2 0 0 627.6 0 0 
6063 15227 0 0 11806 0 0 1843 0 0 2032 0 0 2331 0 0 
64 1062 0 0 345.3 0 0 \ \ \ 55.03 0.02 0.01 135.3 0 0.02 
6567 351.5 0 0.01 478.4 0 0 511.8 0 0.02 68.58 0.02 0.02 821.4 0.03 0.01 
70 11825 0 0 6518 0 0 657.6 0 0 1035 0 0 363 0 0 
7174 87986 0 0 27013 0 0 2194 0 0 7611 0 0 6674 0 0 
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2.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS OF TFP ESTIMATES 
TABLE II.11 CORRELATION MATRICES OF TFP ESTIMATION ALGORITHMS IN CZECH REPUBLIC  
 
      RAW    |  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9970   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.8658   0.8566   1.0000 
 
     WITHIN  | WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9995   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.9845   0.9806   1.0000 
 
    DEMEANED | WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9970   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.8657   0.8565   1.0000 
 
 
GROWTH RATES |  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9996   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.9892   0.9864   1.0000 
 
 
MANUFACTURING|  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9970   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.7842   0.7833   1.0000 
 
 
    SERVICES |  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9969   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.8963   0.8836   1.0000 
 
TABLE II.12 CORRELATION MATRICES OF TFP ESTIMATION ALGORITHMS IN ESTONIA  
 
       RAW   |  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9977   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.8900   0.8751   1.0000 
 
    WITHIN   | WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9992   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.9774   0.9710   1.0000 
 
   DEMEANED  | WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9977   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.8904   0.8757   1.0000 
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GROWTH RATES |  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 1.0000 
      LP_TFP | 0.9995   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP | 0.9864   0.9824   1.0000 
 
 
MANUFACTURING|  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9945   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.8444   0.8307   1.0000 
 
 
 SERVICES    |  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9982   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.9019   0.8863   1.0000 
 
TABLE II.13 CORRELATION MATRICES OF TFP ESTIMATION ALGORITHMS IN HUNGARY 
       RAW   |  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9371   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.4983   0.4947   1.0000 
 
     WITHIN  | WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP  
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9974   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.9838   0.9784   1.0000 
 
    DEMEANED | WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9368   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.4980   0.4943   1.0000 
 
 
 GROWTH RATES|  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 1.0000 
      LP_TFP | 0.9977   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP | 0.9859   0.9809   1.0000 
 
 
MANUFACTURING|  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.8401   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.5710   0.5147   1.0000 
 
  SERVICES   |  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9732   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.4270   0.4703   1.0000 
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 TABLE II.14 CORRELATION MATRICES OF TFP ESTIMATION ALGORITHMS IN SLOVAKIA 
      RAW    |  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9931   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.8760   0.8680   1.0000 
 
      WITHIN | WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9981   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.9818   0.9730   1.0000 
 
    DEMEANED | WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP  
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9930   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.8751   0.8672   1.0000 
 
 
 GROWTH RATES|  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 1.0000 
      LP_TFP | 0.9984   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP | 0.9852   0.9779   1.0000 
    
MANUFACTURING|  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9818   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.8384   0.8077   1.0000 
 
 SERVICES    |  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9962   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.8862   0.8841   1.0000 
 
TABLE II.15 CORRELATION MATRICES OF TFP ESTIMATION ALGORITHMS IN SLOVENIA 
      RAW    |  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9790   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.7880   0.7992   1.0000 
 
    WITHIN   | WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9982   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.9669   0.9635   1.0000 
 
   DEMEANED  | WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9789   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.7879   0.7990   1.0000 
 
 GROWTH RATES|  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 1.0000 
      LP_TFP | 0.9988   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP | 0.9799   0.9775   1.0000 
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MANUFACTURING|  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9503   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.5072   0.5740   1.0000 
 
   SERVICES  |  WLP_TFP   LP_TFP  OLS_TFP 
-------------+--------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP |   1.0000 
      LP_TFP |   0.9951   1.0000 
     OLS_TFP |   0.9112   0.8831   1.0000 
 
TABLE II.16 TRANSITION MATRICES OF INTER-QUARTILE MOVEMENTS IN TFP DISTRIBUTION OF 
LOCAL FIRMS IN CZECH REPUBLIC 
SERVICE SECTOR 
 Quartiles |         1          2          3          4 |     Total 
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     1     |     74.58      20.47       3.87       1.08 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     2     |     19.46      56.75      20.66       3.14 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     3     |      4.09      19.12      57.47      19.32 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     4     |      1.13       3.05      15.04      80.79 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
 Total     |     28.21      25.86      22.69      23.24 |    100.00 
 
Manufacturing sector 
 Quartiles |         1          2          3          4 |     Total 
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    1      |     59.87      30.77       7.18       2.19 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    2      |     10.82      58.06      28.14       2.98 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    3      |      1.58      14.03      63.82      20.58 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    4      |      0.34       1.40      14.87      83.39 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
Total      |      8.94      21.24      33.68      36.13 |    100.00 
 
 
TABLE II.17 TRANSITION MATRICES OF INTER-QUARTILE MOVEMENTS IN TFP DISTRIBUTION OF 
LOCAL FIRMS IN ESTONIA 
Service sector 
Quartiles |         1          2          3          4 |     Total 
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    1      |     68.60      23.67       6.09       1.64 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    2      |     24.07      51.27      21.01       3.65 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    3      |      6.28      22.93      54.36      16.43 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    4      |      1.68       3.92      17.04      77.36 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
Total      |     24.78      25.46      24.67      25.09 |    100.00  
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Manufacturing sector 
Quartiles |         1          2          3          4 |     Total 
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     1     |     64.23      26.95       7.47       1.34 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     2     |     16.62      52.40      27.57       3.41 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     3     |      4.03      17.97      60.90      17.11 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     4     |      1.05       2.35      15.45      81.15 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
Total      |     18.65      24.76      30.29      26.30 |    100.00 
 
TABLE II.18 TRANSITION MATRICES OF INTER-QUARTILE MOVEMENTS IN TFP DISTRIBUTION OF 
LOCAL FIRMS IN HUNGARY 
Service sector 
 Quartiles |         1          2          3          4 |     Total 
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    1      |     85.17      11.86       2.26       0.71 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    2      |     22.27      63.82      12.27       1.64 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    3      |      2.58      28.65      61.19       7.58 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    4      |      0.44       2.86      19.47      77.23 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
  Total    |     19.62      26.79      27.54      26.06 |    100.00  
 
Manufacturing sector 
 Quartiles |         1          2          3          4 |     Total 
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     1     |     89.47      10.21       0.33       0.00 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     2     |     22.59      65.96      10.69       0.75 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     3     |      1.08      22.20      66.97       9.75 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     4     |      0.18       0.36      15.37      84.09 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
Total      |     36.44      24.41      19.69      19.47 |    100.00 
 
TABLE II.19 TRANSITION MATRICES OF INTER-QUARTILE MOVEMENTS IN TFP DISTRIBUTION OF 
LOCAL FIRMS IN SLOVAKIA 
Service sector 
Quartiles |         1          2          3          4 |     Total 
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    1      |     77.45      18.49       3.03       1.03 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    2      |     19.85      56.11      21.10       2.94 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    3      |      4.42      20.28      57.09      18.21 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    4      |      1.05       2.93      18.20      77.82 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
 Total     |     22.42      22.33      25.65      29.60 |    100.00 
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Manufacturing sector 
Quartiles |         1          2          3          4 |     Total 
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     1     |     72.81      23.39       3.29       0.51 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     2     |     18.07      60.28      20.56       1.09 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     3     |      3.62      22.11      58.40      15.87 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
     4     |      1.12       3.13      18.64      77.11 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
 Total     |     26.19      31.72      25.02      17.07 |    100.00  
 
TABLE II.20 TRANSITION MATRICES OF INTER-QUARTILE MOVEMENTS IN TFP DISTRIBUTION OF 
LOCAL FIRMS IN SLOVENIA 
Service sector 
 Quartiles |         1          2          3          4 |     Total 
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    1      |     71.40      22.68       4.87       1.05 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    2      |     20.60      56.65      20.09       2.67 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    3      |      3.56      19.57      59.69      17.18 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    4      |      0.59       2.89      17.96      78.57 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
 Total     |     21.46      25.10      27.07      26.36 |    100.00  
 
Manufacturing sector 
 Quartiles |         1          2          3          4 |     Total 
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    1      |     79.08      18.20       2.31       0.41 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    2      |     21.95      54.88      21.44       1.73 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    3      |      3.33      22.19      56.72      17.76 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
    4      |      0.54       1.96      12.84      84.66 |    100.00  
-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 
Total      |     30.75      24.41      20.80      24.03 |    100.00 
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2.6 NON PARAMETRIC KOLMOGOROV SMIRNOV TEST OF FOREIGN 
OWNERSHIP PREMIUM 
TABLE II.21 KOLMOGOROV SMIRNOV TEST PER INDUSTRY AND FOREIGN OWNERSHIP TYPE IN 
SLOVENIA, PRINTOUT FROM STATA 
. ksmirnov WLP_TFPall, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3870    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0007    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.3870    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 19831 unique values out of 19871 observations. 
 
 
MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
. ksmirnov WLP_TFPall if man==1, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.4452    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0117    0.985 
 Combined K-S:       0.4452    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 5359 unique values out of 5360 observations. 
 
SERVICE SECTOR 
. ksmirnov WLP_TFPall if man==0, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3644    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0016    0.999 
 Combined K-S:       0.3644    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 14491 unique values out of 14511 observations. 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FULL AND PARTIAL ONWERSHIP OF MNCs 
. ksmirnov WLP_for if for_own!=., by( for_own ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.1531    0.054 
 
375 
 1:                 -0.2207    0.002 
 Combined K-S:       0.2207    0.005      0.003 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FULL AND PARTIAL ONWERSHIP OF MNCs - MANUFACTURING 
. ksmirnov WLP_for if for_own!=. & man==1, by( for_own ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2417    0.243 
 1:                 -0.4054    0.019 
 Combined K-S:       0.4054    0.037      0.020 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FULL AND PARTIAL ONWERSHIP OF MNCs - SERVICES 
. ksmirnov WLP_for if for_own!=. & man==0, by( for_own ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2994    0.001 
 1:                 -0.0960    0.490 
 Combined K-S:       0.2994    0.002      0.001 
 
 
TABLE II.22 KOLMOGOROV SMIRNOV TEST PER INDUSTRY AND FOREIGN OWNERSHIP TYPE IN 
SLOVAKIA, PRINTOUT FROM STATA 
. ksmirnov WLP_TFPall, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2118    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0008    0.998 
 Combined K-S:       0.2118    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 49142 unique values out of 49297 observations. 
 
MANUFACTURING 
. ksmirnov WLP_TFPall if man==1, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.1822    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0026    0.989 
 Combined K-S:       0.1822    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 12836 unique values out of 12844 observations. 
 
SERVICES 
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. ksmirnov WLP_TFPall if man==0, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3554    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0009    0.998 
 Combined K-S:       0.3554    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 36329 unique values out of 36453 observations. 
 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FULL AND PARTIAL ONWERSHIP OF MNCs 
. ksmirnov WLP_for if for_own!=., by( for_own ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.0801    0.009 
 1:                 -0.0067    0.967 
 Combined K-S:       0.0801    0.017      0.014 
 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FULL AND PARTIAL ONWERSHIP OF MNCs - MANUFACTURING 
. ksmirnov WLP_for if for_own!=. & man==1, by( for_own ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.0536    0.350 
 1:                 -0.1071    0.015 
 Combined K-S:       0.1071    0.030      0.024 
  
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FULL AND PARTIAL ONWERSHIP OF MNCs - SERVICES 
. ksmirnov WLP_for if for_own!=. & man==0, by( for_own ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.1297    0.002 
 1:                 -0.0035    0.995 
 Combined K-S:       0.1297    0.004      0.003 
 
TABLE II.23 KOLMOGOROV SMIRNOV TEST PER INDUSTRY AND FOREIGN OWNERSHIP TYPE IN 
HUNGARY, PRINTOUT FROM STATA  
. ksmirnov WLP_TFPall, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
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 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3085    0.000 
 1:                  0.0000    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.3085    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 12737 unique values out of 12743 observations. 
  
MANUFACTURING 
. ksmirnov WLP_TFPall if man==1, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2981    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0002    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.2981    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 4768 unique values out of 4769 observations. 
 
SERVICES 
. ksmirnov WLP_TFPall if man==0, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3334    0.000 
 1:                  0.0000    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.3334    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 7972 unique values out of 7974 observations. 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FULL AND PARTIAL ONWERSHIP OF MNCs 
. ksmirnov WLP_for if for_own!=., by( for_own ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2069    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0118    0.939 
 Combined K-S:       0.2069    0.000      0.000 
 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FULL AND PARTIAL ONWERSHIP OF MNCs - MANUFACTURING 
. ksmirnov WLP_for if for_own!=. & man==1, by( for_own ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.1772    0.003 
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 1:                 -0.0100    0.982 
 Combined K-S:       0.1772    0.006      0.004 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FULL AND PARTIAL ONWERSHIP OF MNCs - SERVICES 
. ksmirnov WLP_for if for_own!=. & man==0, by( for_own ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2406    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0196    0.902 
 Combined K-S:       0.2406    0.000      0.000 
 
TABLE II.24 TABLE 4 18 KOLMOGOROV SMIRNOV TEST PER INDUSTRY AND FOREIGN OWNERSHIP 
TYPE IN ESTONIA, PRINTOUT FROM STATA  
. ksmirnov WLP_TFPall, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.4333    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0002    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.4333    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 93528 unique values out of 94630 observations. 
 
MANUFACTURING 
. ksmirnov WLP_TFPall if man==1, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3808    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0003    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.3808    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 16512 unique values out of 16547 observations. 
 
SERVICES 
. ksmirnov WLP_TFPall if man==0, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.4557    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0002    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.4557    0.000      0.000 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
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      there are 77136 unique values out of 78083 observations. 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FULL AND PARTIAL ONWERSHIP OF MNCs 
. ksmirnov WLP_for if for_own!=., by( for_own ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.1884    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0002    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.1884    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 4823 unique values out of 4826 observations. 
  
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FULL AND PARTIAL ONWERSHIP OF MNCs - MANUFACTURING 
. ksmirnov WLP_for if for_own!=. & man==1, by( for_own ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2439    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0011    0.999 
 Combined K-S:       0.2439    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 1514 unique values out of 1515 observations. 
 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FULL AND PARTIAL ONWERSHIP OF MNCs - SERVICES 
. ksmirnov WLP_for if for_own!=. & man==0, by( for_own ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.1620    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0003    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.1620    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 3310 unique values out of 3311 observations. 
 
 
TABLE II.25 KOLMOGOROV SMIRNOV TEST PER INDUSTRY AND FOREIGN OWNERSHIP TYPE IN 
THE CZECH REPUBLIC, PRINTOUT FROM STATA  
. ksmirnov WLP_TFPall, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.4479    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0001    1.000 
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 Combined K-S:       0.4479    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 230509 unique values out of 233445 observations. 
 
MANUFACTURING 
. ksmirnov WLP_TFPall if man==1, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.4266    0.000 
 1:                  0.0000    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.4266    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 63268 unique values out of 63468 observations. 
  
 
SERVICES 
. ksmirnov WLP_TFPall if man==0, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.4316    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0001    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.4316    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 167937 unique values out of 169977 observations. 
  
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FULL AND PARTIAL ONWERSHIP OF MNCs 
. ksmirnov WLP_for if for_own!=., by( for_own ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.1478    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0011    0.995 
 Combined K-S:       0.1478    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 9990 unique values out of 9993 observations. 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FULL AND PARTIAL ONWERSHIP OF MNCs - MANUFACTURING 
. ksmirnov WLP_for if for_own!=. & man==1, by( for_own ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.1013    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0027    0.988 
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 Combined K-S:       0.1013    0.000      0.000 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FULL AND PARTIAL ONWERSHIP OF MNCs - SERVICES 
. ksmirnov WLP_for if for_own!=. & man==0, by( for_own ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.1828    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0036    0.971 
 Combined K-S:       0.1828    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; there are 5781 unique values out 
of 5782 observations. 
 
 
 
TABLE II.26 KOLMOGOROV SMIRNOV TEST FOR EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTIONS IN CZECH REPUBLIC 
USING OLS ESTIMATION OF TFP 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2002, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.1993    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0006    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.1993    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 12890 unique values out of 12901 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2003, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2671    0.000 
 1:                  0.0000    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.2671    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 19317 unique values out of 19331 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2004, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3294    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0006    0.999 
 Combined K-S:       0.3294    0.000      0.000 
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Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 27764 unique values out of 27796 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2005, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3002    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0001    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.3002    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 28820 unique values out of 30043 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2006, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3425    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0002    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.3425    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 36971 unique values out of 37024 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2007, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3453    0.000 
 1:                  0.0000    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.3453    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 40533 unique values out of 40602 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2008, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3233    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0002    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.3233    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 32956 unique values out of 33005 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2009, by( for_dom ) 
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Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3209    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0002    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.3209    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 32701 unique values out of 32743 observations. 
 
 
TABLE II.27 KOLMOGOROV SMIRNOV TEST FOR EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTIONS IN ESTONIA USING 
OLS ESTIMATION OF TFP 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2002, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3270    0.006 
 1:                 -0.0020    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.3270    0.012      0.006 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 9069 unique values out of 9082 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2003, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3434    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0018    0.998 
 Combined K-S:       0.3434    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 10595 unique values out of 10620 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2004, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3182    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0016    0.998 
 Combined K-S:       0.3182    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 11679 unique values out of 11699 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2005, by( for_dom ) 
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Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3200    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0019    0.996 
 Combined K-S:       0.3200    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 11935 unique values out of 12597 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2006, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2907    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0003    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.2907    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 13932 unique values out of 13958 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2007, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3097    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0022    0.994 
 Combined K-S:       0.3097    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 15519 unique values out of 15553 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2008, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2969    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0004    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.2969    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 14401 unique values out of 14428 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2009, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 
385 
 0:                  0.2095    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0075    0.950 
 Combined K-S:       0.2095    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 3552 unique values out of 3557 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2010, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2546    0.000 
 1:                  0.0000    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.2546    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 3133 unique values out of 3136 observations. 
 
TABLE II.28 KOLMOGOROV SMIRNOV TEST FOR EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTIONS IN HUNGARY USING 
OLS ESTIMATION OF TFP 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2004, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.4051    0.008 
 1:                 -0.0123    0.996 
 Combined K-S:       0.4051    0.017      0.008 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2005, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2194    0.007 
 1:                 -0.0051    0.997 
 Combined K-S:       0.2194    0.015      0.009 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2006, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.1657    0.037 
 1:                 -0.0083    0.992 
 Combined K-S:       0.1657    0.075      0.055 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2007, by( for_dom ) 
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Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2009    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0062    0.981 
 Combined K-S:       0.2009    0.000      0.000 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2008, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.1800    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0028    0.995 
 Combined K-S:       0.1800    0.000      0.000 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2009, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.1684    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0006    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.1684    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 3609 unique values out of 3610 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2010, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2326    0.046 
 1:                 -0.0323    0.942 
 Combined K-S:       0.2326    0.092      0.062 
 
TABLE II.29 KOLMOGOROV SMIRNOV TEST FOR EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTIONS IN SLOVAKIA USING 
OLS ESTIMATION OF TFP 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2002, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.1584    0.199 
 1:                 -0.0446    0.880 
 Combined K-S:       0.1584    0.395      0.318 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2003, by( for_dom ) 
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Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.1265    0.169 
 1:                 -0.0321    0.892 
 Combined K-S:       0.1265    0.337      0.280 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2004, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2546    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0149    0.968 
 Combined K-S:       0.2546    0.000      0.000 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2005, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2142    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0063    0.987 
 Combined K-S:       0.2142    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 5560 unique values out of 5561 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2006, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2720    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0044    0.991 
 Combined K-S:       0.2720    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 9946 unique values out of 9977 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2007, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3204    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0021    0.998 
 Combined K-S:       0.3204    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
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      there are 11073 unique values out of 11107 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2008, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3271    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0023    0.998 
 Combined K-S:       0.3271    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 8123 unique values out of 8133 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2009, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2174    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0012    0.998 
 Combined K-S:       0.2174    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 8205 unique values out of 8232 observations. 
 
 
TABLE II.30 KOLMOGOROV SMIRNOV TEST FOR EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTIONS IN SLOVENIA USING 
OLS ESTIMATION OF TFP 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2002, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.6136    0.024 
 1:                 -0.1258    0.855 
 Combined K-S:       0.6136    0.048      0.020 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2003, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.5632    0.006 
 1:                 -0.0123    0.998 
 Combined K-S:       0.5632    0.013      0.005 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 1067 unique values out of 1068 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2004, by( for_dom ) 
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Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.6320    0.004 
 1:                 -0.0247    0.992 
 Combined K-S:       0.6320    0.008      0.003 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2005, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.5258    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0337    0.965 
 Combined K-S:       0.5258    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 2302 unique values out of 2309 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2006, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.5153    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0130    0.990 
 Combined K-S:       0.5153    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in combined dataset; 
      there are 3270 unique values out of 3273 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2007, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.4687    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0037    0.999 
 Combined K-S:       0.4687    0.000      0.000 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2008, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3379    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0100    0.988 
 Combined K-S:       0.3379    0.000      0.000 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2009, by( for_dom ) 
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Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.3393    0.000 
 1:                 -0.0077    0.986 
 Combined K-S:       0.3393    0.000      0.000 
 
. ksmirnov OLS_TFPall if year==2010, by( for_dom ) 
 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution 
functions 
 
 Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                  0.2724    0.007 
 1:                 -0.0158    0.983 
 Combined K-S:       0.2724    0.014      0.008 
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3.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR THE BASELINE MODEL OF 
PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVERS FROM FDI PRESENTED IN 
SECTION 5.6.1 
TABLE III.1 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN THE 
CZECH REPUBLIC FOR ENTIRE ECONOMY, 2002-2009 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP l2.WLP_TFP hor_tot back_tot for_tot humcap1 RD 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year, 
gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)coll) gmm(l2.WLP_TFP, lag(1 2)coll) gmm(hor_tot, lag(5 
5)coll) gmm(back_tot, lag(4 4)coll) gmm(for_tot, lag(3 3)coll) iv(humcap1 RD 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two 
robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     97891 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =     36700 
Number of instruments = 62                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(55) = 167552.41                                      avg =      2.67 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         6 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .4004412   .0121284    33.02   0.000     .3766699    .4242125 
         L2. |   .0774718   .0074724    10.37   0.000     .0628261    .0921175 
             | 
     hor_tot |   .3044098   .2252638     1.35   0.177    -.1370992    .7459187 
    back_tot |   .4594201   .0784107     5.86   0.000     .3057378    .6131023 
     for_tot |  -3.883384   .4497637    -8.63   0.000    -4.764905   -3.001863 
     humcap1 |    .427409   .0083709    51.06   0.000     .4110023    .4438157 
          RD |   .0512461   .0017515    29.26   0.000     .0478133    .0546789 
   hhi_sales |  -.3257232   .0662346    -4.92   0.000    -.4555407   -.1959057 
         age |  -.0106061   .0010317   -10.28   0.000    -.0126281   -.0085841 
        age2 |   .0000847   .0000336     2.52   0.012     .0000187    .0001506 
       logta |   .2012549   .0129466    15.54   0.000       .17588    .2266298 
      logta2 |   -.004944    .000827    -5.98   0.000    -.0065649   -.0033231 
      demand |  -.0070572   .0140818    -0.50   0.616     -.034657    .0205426 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |   .8691183   .1094553     7.94   0.000     .6545899    1.083647 
         23  |    1.83654   .2036709     9.02   0.000     1.437352    2.235728 
         24  |   1.711917   .1169152    14.64   0.000     1.482767    1.941067 
         25  |   1.616547   .1348435    11.99   0.000     1.352258    1.880835 
         26  |   1.227997   .1832233     6.70   0.000     .8688863    1.587108 
         29  |   1.072375   .1182887     9.07   0.000     .8405334    1.304217 
         45  |    .109741   .1279512     0.86   0.391    -.1410388    .3605208 
         50  |   1.027582   .1232817     8.34   0.000     .7859539    1.269209 
         51  |   1.189422   .1151633    10.33   0.000     .9637059    1.415138 
         52  |   1.343126   .0997478    13.47   0.000     1.147624    1.538628 
         55  |   .5891138   .0988794     5.96   0.000     .3953138    .7829138 
         60  |   .4907669   .1070081     4.59   0.000      .281035    .7004989 
         61  |   .7331621   .1663649     4.41   0.000     .4070929    1.059231 
         62  |   .4647323   .2210088     2.10   0.035      .031563    .8979017 
         63  |   .2376622   .1402796     1.69   0.090    -.0372808    .5126052 
         64  |   .1674991    .213603     0.78   0.433    -.2511551    .5861533 
         70  |   .6866308   .1079913     6.36   0.000     .4749718    .8982898 
       1516  |   .4791926   .1600912     2.99   0.003     .1654197    .7929655 
       1718  |   1.117832   .0990488    11.29   0.000     .9236997    1.311964 
       2122  |   .6796293   .1290942     5.26   0.000     .4266093    .9326492 
       2728  |   .7397055    .125974     5.87   0.000     .4928009      .98661 
       3033  |   .6451619   .1632237     3.95   0.000     .3252494    .9650744 
       3435  |   .3444385   .2297693     1.50   0.134    -.1059011     .794778 
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       3637  |   1.014858   .1107811     9.16   0.000     .7977309    1.231985 
       4041  |   .5884436   .1634334     3.60   0.000       .26812    .9087672 
       6567  |   .5046571   .2140132     2.36   0.018     .0851989    .9241153 
       7174  |   .2036159   .1288091     1.58   0.114    -.0488453    .4560771 
             | 
 region_code | 
          4  |  -.0273446   .0173882    -1.57   0.116    -.0614249    .0067356 
          5  |  -.0241492   .0169629    -1.42   0.155    -.0573959    .0090975 
          6  |  -.0467679   .0181099    -2.58   0.010    -.0822626   -.0112731 
          7  |  -.0021429   .0161978    -0.13   0.895      -.03389    .0296041 
          8  |  -.0304769    .017412    -1.75   0.080    -.0646037      .00365 
          9  |  -.0211048   .0172131    -1.23   0.220    -.0548418    .0126321 
         10  |  -.0077954   .0172893    -0.45   0.652    -.0416818    .0260911 
         11  |   .0121333   .0158227     0.77   0.443    -.0188785    .0431451 
         13  |  -.0077648   .0151043    -0.51   0.607    -.0373687    .0218391 
         14  |  -.0394854    .016693    -2.37   0.018    -.0722031   -.0067677 
             | 
        year | 
       2004  |  -.1741713   .0359903    -4.84   0.000     -.244711   -.1036317 
       2005  |  -.0657536   .0297827    -2.21   0.027    -.1241265   -.0073806 
       2006  |  -.0588609   .0309974    -1.90   0.058    -.1196146    .0018929 
       2007  |  -.0398565   .0311755    -1.28   0.201    -.1009594    .0212463 
       2008  |   .0170925   .0089953     1.90   0.057     -.000538    .0347231 
             | 
       _cons |  -.0794507   .1453476    -0.55   0.585    -.3643268    .2054255 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand 19b.nace_short 
    20.nace_short 23.nace_short 24.nace_short 25.nace_short 26.nace_short 
    29.nace_short 45.nace_short 50.nace_short 51.nace_short 52.nace_short 
    55.nace_short 60.nace_short 61.nace_short 62.nace_short 63.nace_short 
    64.nace_short 70.nace_short 1516.nace_short 1718.nace_short 
    2122.nace_short 2728.nace_short 3033.nace_short 3435.nace_short 
    3637.nace_short 4041.nace_short 6567.nace_short 7174.nace_short 
    3b.region_code 4.region_code 5.region_code 6.region_code 7.region_code 
    8.region_code 9.region_code 10.region_code 11.region_code 13.region_code 
    14.region_code 2002b.year 2003.year 2004.year 2005.year 2006.year 
    2007.year 2008.year 2009.year) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L3.for_tot collapsed 
    L4.back_tot collapsed 
    L5.hor_tot collapsed 
    L(1/2).L2.WLP_TFP collapsed 
    L.L.WLP_TFP collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand 19b.nace_short 
    20.nace_short 23.nace_short 24.nace_short 25.nace_short 26.nace_short 
    29.nace_short 45.nace_short 50.nace_short 51.nace_short 52.nace_short 
    55.nace_short 60.nace_short 61.nace_short 62.nace_short 63.nace_short 
    64.nace_short 70.nace_short 1516.nace_short 1718.nace_short 
    2122.nace_short 2728.nace_short 3033.nace_short 3435.nace_short 
    3637.nace_short 4041.nace_short 6567.nace_short 7174.nace_short 
    3b.region_code 4.region_code 5.region_code 6.region_code 7.region_code 
    8.region_code 9.region_code 10.region_code 11.region_code 13.region_code 
    14.region_code 2002b.year 2003.year 2004.year 2005.year 2006.year 
    2007.year 2008.year 2009.year 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL2.for_tot collapsed 
    DL3.back_tot collapsed 
    DL4.hor_tot collapsed 
    D.L2.WLP_TFP collapsed 
    D.L.WLP_TFP collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -31.01  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.12  Pr > z =  0.261 
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Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =   0.87  Pr > z =  0.382 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.72  Pr > z =  0.469 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =  16.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.014 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   8.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.193 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.173 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   6.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.235 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   8.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.088 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.749 
  gmm(L2.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   5.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.123 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.408 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(5 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   8.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.076 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.904 
  gmm(back_tot, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   6.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.192 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.276 
  gmm(for_tot, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   5.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.211 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.244 
 
LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_back:_b[back_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))  
(LR_for:_b[for_tot]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_age:_b[age]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(
1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |    .507723   .3775394     1.34   0.179    -.2322407    1.247687 
         LR_back |   .7662635   .1333288     5.75   0.000      .504944    1.027583 
          LR_for |  -6.477069   .7997264    -8.10   0.000    -8.044504   -4.909634 
LR_human_capital |   .7128725   .0090626    78.66   0.000     .6951102    .7306348 
  LR_intangibles |    .085473   .0021769    39.26   0.000     .0812064    .0897396 
          LR_HHI |  -.5432714   .1108451    -4.90   0.000    -.7605238   -.3260191 
          LR_age |  -.0176898   .0016893   -10.47   0.000    -.0210008   -.0143789 
        LR_agesq |   .0001413   .0000563     2.51   0.012     .0000308    .0002517 
         LR_size |   .3356717   .0187608    17.89   0.000     .2989012    .3724422 
       LR_sizesq |  -.0082461   .0013491    -6.11   0.000    -.0108903   -.0056018 
       LR_demand |  -.0117707   .0234809    -0.50   0.616    -.0577925     .034251 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
  
TABLE III.2 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
ESTONIA FOR ENTIRE ECONOMY, 2002-2010 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP l2.WLP_TFP hor_tot back_tot for_tot humcap1 RD 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year, 
gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)coll) gmm(l2.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)coll) gmm(hor_tot, lag(4 
4)coll) gmm(back_tot, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(for_tot, lag(4 5)coll) iv(humcap1 RD 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two 
robust ar(4) 
 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     46368 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =     13978 
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Number of instruments = 57                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(50) =  68825.07                                      avg =      3.32 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .4020706   .0143753    27.97   0.000     .3738956    .4302457 
         L2. |   .0512044   .0114014     4.49   0.000      .028858    .0735508 
             | 
     hor_tot |   4.117834   1.008713     4.08   0.000     2.140793    6.094874 
    back_tot |  -.9454669   .1996697    -4.74   0.000    -1.336812   -.5541215 
     for_tot |  -4.918265   1.256692    -3.91   0.000    -7.381336   -2.455194 
     humcap1 |    .368289   .0105128    35.03   0.000     .3476843    .3888937 
          RD |   .0928872   .0040246    23.08   0.000     .0849992    .1007752 
   hhi_sales |   -4.38157   1.056969    -4.15   0.000    -6.453192   -2.309949 
         age |   -.007443   .0014646    -5.08   0.000    -.0103137   -.0045724 
        age2 |   .0000939   .0000126     7.44   0.000     .0000692    .0001186 
       logta |   .3605523   .0401258     8.99   0.000     .2819073    .4391973 
      logta2 |  -.0191272   .0038602    -4.95   0.000    -.0266932   -.0115613 
      demand |  -.1047016   .0349181    -3.00   0.003    -.1731397   -.0362635 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |   2.348868   .6989497     3.36   0.001     .9789516    3.718784 
         23  |    274.916   64.57678     4.26   0.000     148.3479    401.4842 
         24  |   1.412645   .6555408     2.15   0.031     .1278083    2.697481 
         25  |   2.822841   .7544113     3.74   0.000     1.344222     4.30146 
         26  |   1.625253   .6368524     2.55   0.011     .3770455    2.873461 
         29  |   2.581484   .6928311     3.73   0.000     1.223561    3.939408 
         45  |   3.073993   .8562026     3.59   0.000     1.395866    4.752119 
         50  |   3.018263    .760916     3.97   0.000     1.526895    4.509631 
         51  |   4.423449   .9750819     4.54   0.000     2.512324    6.334575 
         52  |   3.795149   .9225396     4.11   0.000     1.987005    5.603294 
         55  |   3.687772   .8865344     4.16   0.000     1.950196    5.425347 
         60  |   4.644521   1.091097     4.26   0.000     2.506009    6.783032 
         61  |   2.738497   .9267006     2.96   0.003     .9221974    4.554797 
         62  |   2.219392   .8846724     2.51   0.012     .4854658    3.953318 
         63  |   3.667283   .9195223     3.99   0.000     1.865053    5.469514 
         64  |   5.150309   1.206627     4.27   0.000     2.785364    7.515255 
         70  |   4.418441   1.006413     4.39   0.000     2.445907    6.390975 
       1516  |   1.963859   .6135502     3.20   0.001     .7613227    3.166395 
       1718  |   2.669324   .7057763     3.78   0.000     1.286027     4.05262 
       2122  |   2.927144   .7371982     3.97   0.000     1.482262    4.372026 
       2728  |   2.601357   .7402582     3.51   0.000     1.150477    4.052236 
       3033  |   1.037442   .6097973     1.70   0.089    -.1577388    2.232623 
       3435  |   3.278107   .8523508     3.85   0.000      1.60753    4.948684 
       3637  |   2.565004   .6967136     3.68   0.000      1.19947    3.930538 
       4041  |   6.413858    1.47664     4.34   0.000     3.519697    9.308019 
       6567  |   4.438247   1.169659     3.79   0.000     2.145758    6.730736 
       7174  |   4.308536   1.026774     4.20   0.000     2.296096    6.320976 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |  -.0380578   .0086314    -4.41   0.000     -.054975   -.0211405 
          3  |  -.0496247   .0102656    -4.83   0.000    -.0697449   -.0295045 
          4  |  -.1517806   .0248965    -6.10   0.000    -.2005769   -.1029843 
          5  |  -.0349341   .0072661    -4.81   0.000    -.0491754   -.0206929 
             | 
        year | 
       2004  |  -.2927213   .1238711    -2.36   0.018    -.5355042   -.0499384 
       2005  |  -.0769728    .071195    -1.08   0.280    -.2165125    .0625669 
       2006  |  -.1069835   .0688956    -1.55   0.120    -.2420163    .0280493 
       2007  |   -.193283   .0786422    -2.46   0.014    -.3474189   -.0391472 
       2008  |  -.3424189   .0539256    -6.35   0.000    -.4481112   -.2367266 
       2009  |  -.4227557   .0373395   -11.32   0.000    -.4959397   -.3495717 
             | 
       _cons |  -1.882269   .8175833    -2.30   0.021    -3.484703   -.2798353 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(19b.nace_short 20.nace_short 23.nace_short 24.nace_short 25.nace_short 
    26.nace_short 29.nace_short 45.nace_short 50.nace_short 51.nace_short 
    52.nace_short 55.nace_short 60.nace_short 61.nace_short 62.nace_short 
    63.nace_short 64.nace_short 70.nace_short 1516.nace_short 1718.nace_short 
    2122.nace_short 2728.nace_short 3033.nace_short 3435.nace_short 
    3637.nace_short 4041.nace_short 6567.nace_short 7174.nace_short 
    1b.region_code 2.region_code 3.region_code 4.region_code 5.region_code 
    2002b.year 2003.year 2004.year 2005.year 2006.year 2007.year 2008.year 
    2009.year 2010.year) 
    D.(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(4/5).for_tot collapsed 
    L3.back_tot collapsed 
    L4.hor_tot collapsed 
    L.L2.WLP_TFP collapsed 
    L.L.WLP_TFP collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    19b.nace_short 20.nace_short 23.nace_short 24.nace_short 25.nace_short 
    26.nace_short 29.nace_short 45.nace_short 50.nace_short 51.nace_short 
    52.nace_short 55.nace_short 60.nace_short 61.nace_short 62.nace_short 
    63.nace_short 64.nace_short 70.nace_short 1516.nace_short 1718.nace_short 
    2122.nace_short 2728.nace_short 3033.nace_short 3435.nace_short 
    3637.nace_short 4041.nace_short 6567.nace_short 7174.nace_short 
    1b.region_code 2.region_code 3.region_code 4.region_code 5.region_code 
    2002b.year 2003.year 2004.year 2005.year 2006.year 2007.year 2008.year 
    2009.year 2010.year 
    humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL3.for_tot collapsed 
    DL2.back_tot collapsed 
    DL3.hor_tot collapsed 
    D.L2.WLP_TFP collapsed 
    D.L.WLP_TFP collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -28.70  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.04  Pr > z =  0.298 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.80  Pr > z =  0.421 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =   0.90  Pr > z =  0.367 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =  43.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   9.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.155 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   9.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.096 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   4.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.297 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   4.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.109 
  gmm(L2.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   6.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.140 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.297 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   4.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.289 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   4.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.113 
  gmm(back_tot, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   6.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.149 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.275 
  gmm(for_tot, collapse lag(4 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   6.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.077 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.474 
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LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_back:_b[back_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))  
(LR_for:_b[for_tot]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_age:_b[age]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(
1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |   6.886823   1.658566     4.15   0.000     3.636093    10.13755 
         LR_back |  -1.581235    .328903    -4.81   0.000    -2.225873   -.9365971 
          LR_for |  -8.225495   2.085196    -3.94   0.000     -12.3124   -4.138586 
LR_human_capital |   .6159407   .0123263    49.97   0.000     .5917815    .6400998 
  LR_intangibles |   .1553481   .0059565    26.08   0.000     .1436737    .1670226 
          LR_HHI |  -7.327906   1.760122    -4.16   0.000    -10.77768    -3.87813 
          LR_age |   -.012448   .0024076    -5.17   0.000    -.0171668   -.0077292 
        LR_agesq |    .000157   .0000206     7.63   0.000     .0001167    .0001974 
         LR_size |   .6030014    .065337     9.23   0.000     .4749432    .7310597 
       LR_sizesq |  -.0319891   .0064384    -4.97   0.000    -.0446081   -.0193701 
       LR_demand |   -.175107   .0584642    -3.00   0.003    -.2896948   -.0605192 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
TABLE III.3 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
HUNGARY FOR ENTIRE ECONOMY, 2002-2010 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP hor_tot back_tot for_tot humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 
logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) 
gmm(hor_tot, lag(2 4)coll) gmm(back_tot, lag(3 5)coll) gmm(for_tot, lag(3 3)coll) 
iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) iv(i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      6910 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      3635 
Number of instruments = 86                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(65) =  20239.28                                      avg =      1.90 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .4628177   .0635733     7.28   0.000     .3382163    .5874192 
             | 
     hor_tot |   3.834854   .7218798     5.31   0.000     2.419996    5.249712 
    back_tot |   1.907728   1.063455     1.79   0.073     -.176606    3.992063 
     for_tot |  -5.465031   5.023408    -1.09   0.277    -15.31073    4.380669 
     humcap1 |   .3479531   .0306634    11.35   0.000     .2878539    .4080523 
          RD |   .0116799   .0035862     3.26   0.001     .0046512    .0187087 
   hhi_sales |  -.1722894   .1106604    -1.56   0.119    -.3891798     .044601 
         age |  -.0109282   .0020271    -5.39   0.000    -.0149013   -.0069551 
        age2 |   .0000429   .0000156     2.75   0.006     .0000124    .0000734 
       logta |   .1114902   .0686357     1.62   0.104    -.0230334    .2460137 
      logta2 |   .0011727   .0041883     0.28   0.779    -.0070363    .0093816 
      demand |   .1010379   .1080639     0.93   0.350    -.1107635    .3128394 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |  -.2055486   .3340902    -0.62   0.538    -.8603534    .4492562 
         23  |  -2.268544   .7469586    -3.04   0.002    -3.732556    -.804532 
         24  |  -.6179579   .4586733    -1.35   0.178    -1.516941    .2810253 
         25  |   -.697873   .3226821    -2.16   0.031    -1.330318   -.0654276 
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         26  |  -1.001788   .3534915    -2.83   0.005    -1.694619   -.3089574 
         29  |  -.1907323   .5130719    -0.37   0.710    -1.196335      .81487 
         45  |  -.3297669   .3663165    -0.90   0.368    -1.047734    .3882003 
         50  |  -.3228549   .3587953    -0.90   0.368    -1.026081    .3803711 
         51  |  -1.360118   .4113481    -3.31   0.001    -2.166346   -.5538909 
         52  |  -.5937078   .3286188    -1.81   0.071    -1.237789    .0503733 
         55  |   .6610898   .2851557     2.32   0.020     .1021949    1.219985 
         60  |  -.2343265   .2641967    -0.89   0.375    -.7521424    .2834895 
         61  |   1.095198   .7917709     1.38   0.167     -.456645     2.64704 
         62  |   1.302303   .3262851     3.99   0.000     .6627964     1.94181 
         63  |  -.1687007     .45361    -0.37   0.710     -1.05776    .7203586 
         64  |  -1.102578   .7208162    -1.53   0.126    -2.515352    .3101954 
         70  |    .633838   .3670541     1.73   0.084    -.0855749    1.353251 
       1516  |  -.3150564   .7555876    -0.42   0.677    -1.795981    1.165868 
       1718  |  -.6795939   .3833254    -1.77   0.076    -1.430898    .0717101 
       2122  |   -.397425    .418152    -0.95   0.342    -1.216988    .4221378 
       2728  |   -.783869   .2633819    -2.98   0.003    -1.300088   -.2676501 
       3033  |  -1.592503   .4000386    -3.98   0.000    -2.376564   -.8084418 
       3435  |  -3.028337   .6562235    -4.61   0.000    -4.314511   -1.742163 
       3637  |   1.004958   .2622871     3.83   0.000     .4908851    1.519032 
       4041  |   1.637037   .6420791     2.55   0.011     .3785852    2.895489 
       6567  |   -.313951   .5149386    -0.61   0.542    -1.323212    .6953102 
       7174  |  -1.835442   .6598554    -2.78   0.005    -3.128735   -.5421495 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |  -.1119225   .0594145    -1.88   0.060    -.2283727    .0045277 
          3  |  -.0742801   .0521679    -1.42   0.154    -.1765273    .0279671 
          4  |  -.0579786   .0511344    -1.13   0.257    -.1582003    .0422431 
          5  |   .0057032   .0339442     0.17   0.867    -.0608261    .0722326 
          6  |  -.0660226   .0471241    -1.40   0.161    -.1583842     .026339 
          7  |  -.0460653   .0450842    -1.02   0.307    -.1344287     .042298 
          8  |  -.0606415    .041331    -1.47   0.142    -.1416489    .0203658 
          9  |  -.0629448   .0464101    -1.36   0.175    -.1539069    .0280174 
         10  |  -.0051584   .0573093    -0.09   0.928    -.1174825    .1071657 
         11  |  -.0880364   .0480707    -1.83   0.067    -.1822531    .0061804 
         12  |   .0258385   .0541552     0.48   0.633    -.0803036    .1319807 
         13  |  -.1534642   .0643621    -2.38   0.017    -.2796116   -.0273167 
         14  |  -.0069602   .0367353    -0.19   0.850    -.0789601    .0650397 
         15  |  -.0516931   .0571186    -0.91   0.365    -.1636435    .0602573 
         16  |     -.0808   .0490153    -1.65   0.099    -.1768683    .0152683 
         17  |  -.0705602    .086974    -0.81   0.417    -.2410262    .0999058 
         18  |  -.0757368   .0523796    -1.45   0.148     -.178399    .0269254 
         19  |  -.0150905   .0550186    -0.27   0.784    -.1229249     .092744 
         20  |  -.1020345   .0549722    -1.86   0.063    -.2097779     .005709 
             | 
        year | 
       2003  |   .0962872   .8140349     0.12   0.906    -1.499192    1.691766 
       2004  |   .3632323   .2086345     1.74   0.082    -.0456838    .7721484 
       2005  |   .3569313    .167919     2.13   0.034     .0278162    .6860464 
       2006  |     .29908   .1373523     2.18   0.029     .0298744    .5682856 
       2007  |   .2311862   .1504571     1.54   0.124    -.0637043    .5260766 
       2008  |   .1728373   .1874535     0.92   0.357    -.1945648    .5402395 
       2009  |   .0926708    .191066     0.49   0.628    -.2818117    .4671532 
             | 
       _cons |  -.0063773   .7791163    -0.01   0.993    -1.533417    1.520663 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.85  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.36  Pr > z =  0.173 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.95  Pr > z =  0.344 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.10  Pr > z =  0.918 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(20)   =  40.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.004 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(20)   =  20.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.431 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
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  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =  12.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.249 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(10)   =   7.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.642 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   7.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.263 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  12.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.546 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =  14.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.577 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   6.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.189 
  gmm(back_tot, collapse lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =  13.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.670 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   7.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.116 
  gmm(for_tot, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(18)   =  18.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.421 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.386 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =  13.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.324 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   6.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.559 
 
LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_back:_b[back_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))  
(LR_for:_b[for_tot]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_age:_b[age]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(
1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |   7.138832   1.655764     4.31   0.000     3.893593    10.38407 
         LR_back |   3.551361   1.872844     1.90   0.058    -.1193451    7.222067 
          LR_for |  -10.17351   9.680953    -1.05   0.293    -29.14783    8.800807 
LR_human_capital |   .6477374   .0407618    15.89   0.000     .5678458    .7276291 
  LR_intangibles |    .021743   .0061803     3.52   0.000     .0096298    .0338561 
          LR_HHI |   -.320728   .2047735    -1.57   0.117    -.7220767    .0806207 
          LR_age |  -.0203435   .0032841    -6.19   0.000    -.0267803   -.0139068 
        LR_agesq |   .0000799    .000028     2.85   0.004     .0000249    .0001348 
         LR_size |   .2075463   .1278656     1.62   0.105    -.0430656    .4581582 
       LR_sizesq |    .002183   .0077629     0.28   0.779     -.013032    .0173981 
       LR_demand |   .1880887   .2098072     0.90   0.370    -.2231259    .5993034 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
TABLE III.4 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
SLOVAKIA FOR ENTIRE ECONOMY, 2002-2009 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP) 
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP hor_tot back_tot for_tot humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 
logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(2 
2)coll) gmm(hor_tot, lag(4 4)coll) gmm(back_tot, lag(3 5)coll) gmm(for_tot, lag(3 
3)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     30490 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =     13595 
Number of instruments = 59                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(52) =  49549.62                                      avg =      2.24 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .6583275   .0648368    10.15   0.000     .5312496    .7854053 
             | 
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     hor_tot |  -3.082445   .6138517    -5.02   0.000    -4.285573   -1.879318 
    back_tot |   .2026982   .0936737     2.16   0.030     .0191011    .3862953 
     for_tot |   5.599042   1.278966     4.38   0.000     3.092314     8.10577 
     humcap1 |    .283401   .0153208    18.50   0.000     .2533728    .3134292 
          RD |   .0592413   .0067165     8.82   0.000     .0460772    .0724054 
   hhi_sales |   .7736867   .2235261     3.46   0.001     .3355837     1.21179 
         age |  -.0104226   .0014847    -7.02   0.000    -.0133325   -.0075126 
        age2 |   .0002089   .0000286     7.30   0.000     .0001528     .000265 
       logta |   .1594498   .0388146     4.11   0.000     .0833746    .2355249 
      logta2 |  -.0063172   .0018293    -3.45   0.001    -.0099027   -.0027318 
      demand |  -.0868262   .0228071    -3.81   0.000    -.1315272   -.0421252 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |    -.20696   .1139086    -1.82   0.069    -.4302168    .0162968 
         23  |   1.409192   .5264923     2.68   0.007     .3772861    2.441098 
         24  |   .4425923   .1419753     3.12   0.002     .1643259    .7208587 
         25  |  -.5503192   .1280798    -4.30   0.000     -.801351   -.2992874 
         26  |  -.3019585   .1002041    -3.01   0.003    -.4983548   -.1055621 
         29  |  -.2820129   .0965521    -2.92   0.003    -.4712514   -.0927743 
         45  |   .5203278   .1665664     3.12   0.002     .1938636    .8467919 
         50  |   .1123333    .094656     1.19   0.235    -.0731891    .2978557 
         51  |   -.472137    .176342    -2.68   0.007     -.817761   -.1265131 
         52  |  -.6662163    .181598    -3.67   0.000    -1.022142   -.3102908 
         55  |  -.7568514   .1055398    -7.17   0.000    -.9637055   -.5499972 
         60  |  -.6914636   .1351342    -5.12   0.000    -.9563218   -.4266054 
         61  |   -1.78086   .3229327    -5.51   0.000    -2.413796   -1.147923 
         62  |  -1.542998   .4241249    -3.64   0.000    -2.374268   -.7117289 
         63  |  -.0145324   .1368391    -0.11   0.915     -.282732    .2536672 
         64  |   2.073486   .4362048     4.75   0.000      1.21854    2.928431 
         70  |  -.2789785   .1053444    -2.65   0.008    -.4854498   -.0725072 
       1516  |   .8254433   .2275615     3.63   0.000      .379431    1.271456 
       1718  |  -.4571465   .1120001    -4.08   0.000    -.6766626   -.2376304 
       2122  |  -.1639623   .1125681    -1.46   0.145    -.3845917    .0566671 
       2728  |  -.2195525    .089848    -2.44   0.015    -.3956513   -.0434537 
       3033  |   1.302874   .2194685     5.94   0.000     .8727237    1.733025 
       3435  |   2.576932   .4554945     5.66   0.000     1.684179    3.469685 
       3637  |  -.2690155   .0824976    -3.26   0.001    -.4307078   -.1073233 
       4041  |   1.066272   .2431102     4.39   0.000     .5897844    1.542759 
       6567  |   .1991943   .2464095     0.81   0.419    -.2837594    .6821481 
       7174  |  -.1699989   .1179512    -1.44   0.150     -.401179    .0611812 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |   .0312532   .0198874     1.57   0.116    -.0077254    .0702318 
          3  |  -.0152078   .0158433    -0.96   0.337    -.0462602    .0158445 
          4  |   .0090949   .0147301     0.62   0.537    -.0197755    .0379654 
          5  |  -.0068624   .0158636    -0.43   0.665    -.0379544    .0242297 
          6  |  -.0145014   .0144755    -1.00   0.316    -.0428729    .0138701 
          7  |   .0061695    .014164     0.44   0.663    -.0215915    .0339304 
          8  |   .0008741   .0145836     0.06   0.952    -.0277094    .0294575 
             | 
        year | 
       2003  |   .3692608    .083602     4.42   0.000     .2054038    .5331177 
       2004  |   .2975516    .066481     4.48   0.000     .1672512    .4278519 
       2005  |   .4641672   .0917948     5.06   0.000     .2842528    .6440816 
       2006  |    .583335   .1052983     5.54   0.000     .3769541    .7897159 
       2007  |   .1509266   .0348403     4.33   0.000     .0826409    .2192123 
       2008  |   .2960467   .0436126     6.79   0.000     .2105677    .3815258 
             | 
       _cons |   .2226542   .1292149     1.72   0.085    -.0306024    .4759108 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -9.59  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.22  Pr > z =  0.827 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =   3.11  Pr > z =  0.002 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -2.02  Pr > z =  0.044 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   7.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.250 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
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Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   8.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.236 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.430 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   6.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.175 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   3.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.435 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   4.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.121 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   4.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.356 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.163 
  gmm(back_tot, collapse lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   3.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.188 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   4.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.322 
  gmm(for_tot, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   6.70  Prob > chi2 =  0.152 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.517 
 
LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_back:_b[back_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))  
(LR_for:_b[for_tot]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_age:_b[age]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(
1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |  -9.021637   2.929108    -3.08   0.002    -14.76258   -3.280691 
         LR_back |    .593253   .3278504     1.81   0.070    -.0493219    1.235828 
          LR_for |   16.38716   5.375934     3.05   0.002     5.850522     26.9238 
LR_human_capital |   .8294521   .1181762     7.02   0.000      .597831    1.061073 
  LR_intangibles |   .1733862   .0163517    10.60   0.000     .1413374     .205435 
          LR_HHI |    2.26441   .9359424     2.42   0.016     .4299966    4.098824 
          LR_age |  -.0305046   .0050278    -6.07   0.000    -.0403589   -.0206503 
        LR_agesq |   .0006114   .0001314     4.65   0.000     .0003539    .0008689 
         LR_size |   .4666742   .0487146     9.58   0.000     .3711954     .562153 
       LR_sizesq |  -.0184891   .0033598    -5.50   0.000    -.0250742   -.0119041 
       LR_demand |  -.2541212   .0877737    -2.90   0.004    -.4261544    -.082088 
 
TABLE III.5 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
SLOVENIA FOR ENTIRE ECONOMY, 2002-2010 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP) 
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP hor_tot back_tot for_tot humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 
logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(2 
5)coll) gmm(hor_tot, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(back_tot, lag(3 5)coll) gmm(for_tot, lag(3 
5)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) iv(i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     12884 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      4335 
Number of instruments = 69                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(57) =   1702.37                                      avg =      2.97 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .5717098   .1019355     5.61   0.000       .37192    .7714997 
             | 
     hor_tot |  -1.208292   .4333519    -2.79   0.005    -2.057646   -.3589381 
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    back_tot |  -.0693661   .1068533    -0.65   0.516    -.2787947    .1400624 
     for_tot |   4.863913   1.629256     2.99   0.003      1.67063    8.057195 
     humcap1 |   .3173406   .0429852     7.38   0.000     .2330911      .40159 
          RD |   .0319693   .0059041     5.41   0.000     .0203974    .0435412 
   hhi_sales |  -.2587784   .1159904    -2.23   0.026    -.4861154   -.0314414 
         age |    .031558   .0129971     2.43   0.015     .0060841    .0570319 
        age2 |  -.0017937   .0006045    -2.97   0.003    -.0029784    -.000609 
       logta |   .0910366   .0276663     3.29   0.001     .0368117    .1452616 
      logta2 |   .0003955   .0015309     0.26   0.796    -.0026051     .003396 
      demand |  -.3875461   .2714775    -1.43   0.153    -.9196323    .1445401 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |   9.740354   3.180528     3.06   0.002     3.506633    15.97407 
         23  |   .7251854   5.633267     0.13   0.898    -10.31582    11.76619 
         24  |   10.87912   3.377413     3.22   0.001      4.25951    17.49873 
         25  |   9.602245   3.102772     3.09   0.002     3.520923    15.68357 
         26  |   10.19529   3.236857     3.15   0.002     3.851164    16.53941 
         29  |   9.570389   3.220144     2.97   0.003     3.259023    15.88176 
         45  |   10.43473   3.236882     3.22   0.001     4.090555     16.7789 
         50  |   10.37311   3.295715     3.15   0.002     3.913629    16.83259 
         51  |   10.60996   3.249951     3.26   0.001     4.240178    16.97975 
         52  |   10.51507   3.249323     3.24   0.001     4.146511    16.88362 
         55  |   10.00411   3.191597     3.13   0.002     3.748693    16.25952 
         60  |    10.4191   3.202909     3.25   0.001     4.141512    16.69668 
         61  |   32.93995   10.58225     3.11   0.002     12.19911    53.68078 
         62  |   9.813074   3.289496     2.98   0.003      3.36578    16.26037 
         63  |   10.38334   3.279004     3.17   0.002      3.95661    16.81007 
         64  |   9.471135   3.179406     2.98   0.003     3.239615    15.70266 
         70  |   10.38975   3.189148     3.26   0.001     4.139131    16.64036 
       1516  |   10.17559   3.218222     3.16   0.002     3.867987    16.48319 
       1718  |   10.20259   3.252018     3.14   0.002     3.828752    16.57643 
       2122  |   9.894403   3.210852     3.08   0.002     3.601249    16.18756 
       2728  |   10.00382   3.179732     3.15   0.002     3.771655    16.23598 
       3033  |   10.01745   3.195984     3.13   0.002     3.753436    16.28146 
       3435  |   9.456383    3.38237     2.80   0.005     2.827059    16.08571 
       3637  |    9.96133   3.249104     3.07   0.002     3.593204    16.32946 
       4041  |   10.70867   3.327237     3.22   0.001     4.187401    17.22993 
       6567  |   10.42947    3.23688     3.22   0.001     4.085298    16.77363 
       7174  |   10.93683   3.307067     3.31   0.001     4.455095    17.41856 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |  -.0273115   .0195971    -1.39   0.163    -.0657212    .0110982 
          3  |  -.0055709    .019232    -0.29   0.772    -.0432649    .0321231 
          4  |   .0627412   .0253755     2.47   0.013     .0130061    .1124763 
          5  |   -.050154   .0248677    -2.02   0.044    -.0988939   -.0014141 
          6  |  -.1583262   .0577699    -2.74   0.006    -.2715531   -.0450992 
          7  |   .0365276   .0144129     2.53   0.011     .0082788    .0647764 
          8  |  -.0011711   .0150639    -0.08   0.938    -.0306959    .0283537 
          9  |   .0834473   .0445656     1.87   0.061    -.0038997    .1707942 
         10  |   .0212408    .015514     1.37   0.171     -.009166    .0516477 
         11  |  -.0127006   .0238907    -0.53   0.595    -.0595255    .0341243 
         12  |  -.0608891   .0368069    -1.65   0.098    -.1330293     .011251 
             | 
        year | 
       2003  |   .6032539   .2033118     2.97   0.003     .2047702    1.001738 
       2004  |   .2729232   .1166117     2.34   0.019     .0443685    .5014779 
       2005  |   .1901328   .1194995     1.59   0.112    -.0440819    .4243475 
       2006  |   .2675073   .1305059     2.05   0.040     .0117204    .5232941 
       2007  |   .2436445   .1201532     2.03   0.043     .0081487    .4791404 
       2008  |   .2342361   .1094841     2.14   0.032     .0196512     .448821 
       2009  |  -.1084826   .0681565    -1.59   0.111     -.242067    .0251017 
             | 
       _cons |  -7.347184   3.732304    -1.97   0.049    -14.66236    -.032003 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -5.86  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.72  Pr > z =  0.085 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =   0.06  Pr > z =  0.953 
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Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =   1.07  Pr > z =  0.287 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  24.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.011 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  15.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.154 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =  10.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.187 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   5.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.228 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(2 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   6.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.353 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   9.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.109 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  14.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.113 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.496 
  gmm(back_tot, collapse lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =  13.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.054 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.770 
  gmm(for_tot, collapse lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   9.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.224 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   6.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.182 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   1.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.768 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  14.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.069 
 
 
LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_back:_b[back_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))  
(LR_for:_b[for_tot]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_age:_b[age]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(
1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |    -2.8212   .9201598    -3.07   0.002     -4.62468    -1.01772 
         LR_back |  -.1619606   .2531728    -0.64   0.522    -.6581703     .334249 
          LR_for |   11.35658   3.632986     3.13   0.002     4.236062     18.4771 
LR_human_capital |   .7409476   .1115201     6.64   0.000     .5223722    .9595231 
  LR_intangibles |    .074644   .0091424     8.16   0.000     .0567251    .0925628 
          LR_HHI |  -.6042128   .2851575    -2.12   0.034    -1.163111   -.0453145 
          LR_age |   .0736836    .027844     2.65   0.008     .0191105    .1282568 
        LR_agesq |  -.0041881   .0012988    -3.22   0.001    -.0067337   -.0016425 
         LR_size |   .2125583   .0424961     5.00   0.000     .1292675    .2958491 
       LR_sizesq |   .0009234   .0035341     0.26   0.794    -.0060034    .0078501 
       LR_demand |  -.9048681   .5790172    -1.56   0.118    -2.039721    .2299848 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
3.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF MNCS’ ORIGIN ON 
PRODUCTIVITY OF LOCAL FIRMS PRESENTED IN SECTION 5.6.3 
TABLE III.6 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN THE 
CZECH REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO MNC’S ORIGIN , 2002-2009 (DEP. VARIABLE TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP  l2.WLP_TFP hor_EU hor_nonEU back_EU back_nonEU 
for_EU for_nonEU humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 2)coll) gmm(l2.WLP_TFP, lag(1 
1)coll) gmm(hor_EU, lag(3 4)coll) gmm(hor_nonEU, lag(2 2)coll)  gmm(back_EU, 
lag(3 3)coll) gmm(back_nonEU, lag(4 4)coll) gmm(for_EU, lag(2 2)coll) 
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gmm(for_nonEU, lag(4 4)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2  
demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     97891 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =     36700 
Number of instruments = 68                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(58) = 163480.57                                      avg =      2.67 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         6 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .3867443   .0122666    31.53   0.000     .3627022    .4107863 
         L2. |   .0680729   .0074617     9.12   0.000     .0534482    .0826976 
             | 
      hor_EU |   .4636075   .1028814     4.51   0.000     .2619637    .6652514 
   hor_nonEU |   -2.95881   .5057317    -5.85   0.000    -3.950026   -1.967594 
     back_EU |  -1.963876   .2816985    -6.97   0.000    -2.515994   -1.411757 
  back_nonEU |   11.13578   1.604228     6.94   0.000     7.991551    14.28001 
      for_EU |   1.910089   .5277166     3.62   0.000     .8757839    2.944395 
   for_nonEU |  -12.03661   1.971361    -6.11   0.000    -15.90041   -8.172814 
     humcap1 |   .4383052    .008362    52.42   0.000      .421916    .4546944 
          RD |   .0525092    .001767    29.72   0.000      .049046    .0559724 
   hhi_sales |  -.3165572   .0625763    -5.06   0.000    -.4392046   -.1939098 
         age |  -.0106267   .0010665    -9.96   0.000     -.012717   -.0085364 
        age2 |   .0000848   .0000351     2.41   0.016     .0000159    .0001536 
       logta |   .2078478   .0131873    15.76   0.000     .1820012    .2336944 
      logta2 |  -.0049956   .0008403    -5.95   0.000    -.0066425   -.0033487 
      demand |   .0840185   .0191514     4.39   0.000     .0464824    .1215545 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |   1.054221    .092366    11.41   0.000     .8731867    1.235255 
         23  |   1.615949   .2300302     7.02   0.000     1.165098      2.0668 
         24  |   1.439816   .1282456    11.23   0.000     1.188459    1.691173 
         25  |   .9949897   .1462664     6.80   0.000     .7083128    1.281666 
         26  |   1.651396   .1091032    15.14   0.000     1.437558    1.865235 
         29  |    1.18529   .1013099    11.70   0.000     .9867267    1.383854 
         45  |   .8690088   .0994775     8.74   0.000     .6740365    1.063981 
         50  |   .8159457   .1152225     7.08   0.000     .5901138    1.041778 
         51  |   1.700288   .1080256    15.74   0.000     1.488561    1.912014 
         52  |   1.235096   .1080546    11.43   0.000     1.023313     1.44688 
         55  |   .7342845   .0873004     8.41   0.000      .563179    .9053901 
         60  |   .6381451   .1085025     5.88   0.000     .4254841    .8508061 
         61  |   .5830411   .1947942     2.99   0.003     .2012515    .9648306 
         62  |   .9238705   .2441319     3.78   0.000     .4453807     1.40236 
         63  |     .28657   .1397231     2.05   0.040     .0127179    .5604222 
         64  |   .3928325   .1228693     3.20   0.001      .152013    .6336519 
         70  |   1.059451   .0943744    11.23   0.000     .8744802    1.244421 
       1516  |   1.222051   .0947393    12.90   0.000     1.036365    1.407736 
       1718  |   1.178546   .0914225    12.89   0.000     .9993615    1.357731 
       2122  |   1.052318    .091326    11.52   0.000     .8733227    1.231314 
       2728  |   .9826873   .1033888     9.50   0.000     .7800491    1.185326 
       3033  |   1.183201   .1025608    11.54   0.000     .9821858    1.384217 
       3435  |   1.020143   .1082401     9.42   0.000     .8079966     1.23229 
       3637  |   1.307574   .0877882    14.89   0.000     1.135513    1.479636 
       4041  |    1.00218   .1100217     9.11   0.000     .7865413    1.217818 
       6567  |   .7562094   .1737694     4.35   0.000     .4156276    1.096791 
       7174  |    1.31642   .1199315    10.98   0.000     1.081359    1.551482 
             | 
 region_code | 
          4  |  -.0273686   .0176365    -1.55   0.121    -.0619354    .0071983 
          5  |  -.0214129   .0172582    -1.24   0.215    -.0552383    .0124124 
          6  |  -.0449394   .0184355    -2.44   0.015    -.0810723   -.0088064 
          7  |  -.0009908   .0164975    -0.06   0.952    -.0333254    .0313438 
          8  |  -.0309211   .0176742    -1.75   0.080    -.0655618    .0037196 
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          9  |  -.0196525   .0175301    -1.12   0.262    -.0540107    .0147058 
         10  |  -.0061059   .0175969    -0.35   0.729    -.0405953    .0283835 
         11  |    .016848    .016106     1.05   0.296    -.0147192    .0484152 
         13  |  -.0069688   .0153898    -0.45   0.651    -.0371322    .0231946 
         14  |  -.0365081   .0170002    -2.15   0.032    -.0698279   -.0031884 
             | 
        year | 
       2004  |   .0572053   .0340067     1.68   0.093    -.0094466    .1238572 
       2005  |    .103776   .0276672     3.75   0.000     .0495492    .1580028 
       2006  |   .1263278   .0285299     4.43   0.000     .0704102    .1822453 
       2007  |   .1456909   .0283015     5.15   0.000     .0902209    .2011608 
       2008  |   .0652287   .0090316     7.22   0.000      .047527    .0829304 
             | 
       _cons |  -1.773812   .1771658   -10.01   0.000     -2.12105   -1.426573 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -30.77  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.29  Pr > z =  0.198 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =   0.71  Pr > z =  0.475 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -1.64  Pr > z =  0.102 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(9)    =  36.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(9)    =  21.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.010 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =  11.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.001 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  10.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.254 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =  15.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.026 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   5.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.054 
  gmm(L2.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =  20.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.005 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.431 
  gmm(hor_EU, collapse lag(3 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =  16.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.011 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   5.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.165 
  gmm(hor_nonEU, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =  21.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.003 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.817 
  gmm(back_EU, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =  20.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.004 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.96  Prob > chi2 =  0.619 
  gmm(back_nonEU, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =  21.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.004 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.728 
  gmm(for_EU, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =  19.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.007 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.294 
  gmm(for_nonEU, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =  20.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.004 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.580 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.885 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  21.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.005 
 
TABLE III.7 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
ESTONIA ACCORDING TO MNC’S ORIGIN, 2002-2010 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP) 
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP  hor_EU hor_nonEU back_EU back_nonEU for_EU for_nonEU 
humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code 
i.year, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(hor_EU, lag(4 4)coll) gmm(hor_nonEU, 
lag(3 4)coll)  gmm(back_EU, lag(4 5)coll) gmm(back_nonEU, lag(4 4)coll) 
gmm(for_EU, lag(3 5)coll) gmm(for_nonEU, lag(4 4)coll)  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales 
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age age2 logta logta2  demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year)  two robust 
ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     66194 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =     18684 
Number of instruments = 65                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(53) =  90747.87                                      avg =      3.54 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .5397097   .0358424    15.06   0.000     .4694598    .6099595 
             | 
      hor_EU |   2.122868   .4186632     5.07   0.000     1.302303    2.943433 
   hor_nonEU |   6.976797   1.084044     6.44   0.000      4.85211    9.101484 
     back_EU |   -1.51022   .2121416    -7.12   0.000     -1.92601    -1.09443 
  back_nonEU |   6.131187    .945056     6.49   0.000     4.278911    7.983463 
      for_EU |   .6678111   .9448292     0.71   0.480     -1.18402    2.519642 
   for_nonEU |  -22.32216   5.529855    -4.04   0.000    -33.16048   -11.48385 
     humcap1 |   .3316521   .0132046    25.12   0.000     .3057716    .3575327 
          RD |   .0856262   .0035247    24.29   0.000      .078718    .0925344 
   hhi_sales |    -3.0738   .6713938    -4.58   0.000    -4.389707   -1.757892 
         age |  -.0112066   .0010793   -10.38   0.000     -.013322   -.0090912 
        age2 |   .0001285   .0000109    11.78   0.000     .0001071    .0001498 
       logta |    .279298   .0239451    11.66   0.000     .2323664    .3262296 
      logta2 |  -.0135191   .0023748    -5.69   0.000    -.0181737   -.0088645 
      demand |  -.0834589   .0272965    -3.06   0.002    -.1369591   -.0299587 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |   2.051327   .5086046     4.03   0.000      1.05448    3.048174 
         23  |   127.2922   27.58956     4.61   0.000     73.21761    181.3667 
         24  |    .404393   .4350706     0.93   0.353    -.4483298    1.257116 
         25  |   2.244727   .5242109     4.28   0.000     1.217292    3.272161 
         26  |   1.878908    .569681     3.30   0.001     .7623536    2.995462 
         29  |   2.392412   .5530252     4.33   0.000     1.308503    3.476322 
         45  |   2.670666    .587264     4.55   0.000      1.51965    3.821683 
         50  |   2.525673   .5691728     4.44   0.000     1.410115    3.641231 
         51  |   3.135089   .6205568     5.05   0.000      1.91882    4.351358 
         52  |   2.845715   .6281384     4.53   0.000     1.614586    4.076843 
         55  |   3.011074   .5741419     5.24   0.000     1.885777    4.136372 
         60  |   3.314857   .6591673     5.03   0.000     2.022913    4.606801 
         61  |   2.028286   .7097946     2.86   0.004     .6371145    3.419458 
         62  |    2.67894   .8484972     3.16   0.002     1.015916    4.341964 
         63  |    3.18914   .6614868     4.82   0.000      1.89265     4.48563 
         64  |   4.385969   .8599237     5.10   0.000      2.70055    6.071389 
         70  |   3.403302   .6259059     5.44   0.000     2.176549    4.630055 
       1516  |   2.251057   .5363136     4.20   0.000     1.199901    3.302212 
       1718  |   2.510638   .5709056     4.40   0.000     1.391684    3.629592 
       2122  |   2.583795   .5374468     4.81   0.000     1.530419    3.637172 
       2728  |    2.03353    .529003     3.84   0.000     .9967036    3.070357 
       3033  |   1.645447   .5951617     2.76   0.006     .4789512    2.811942 
       3435  |    2.36377   .5763356     4.10   0.000     1.234173    3.493367 
       3637  |   2.297197   .5202662     4.42   0.000     1.277494      3.3169 
       4041  |    4.67945   .9448669     4.95   0.000     2.827545    6.531355 
       6567  |    3.68272   .7758298     4.75   0.000     2.162121    5.203318 
       7174  |   3.177785   .6611825     4.81   0.000     1.881891    4.473678 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |  -.0276117   .0079788    -3.46   0.001    -.0432498   -.0119736 
          3  |   -.035418    .009538    -3.71   0.000    -.0541122   -.0167238 
          4  |   -.096738   .0177933    -5.44   0.000    -.1316123   -.0618636 
          5  |  -.0211885   .0070139    -3.02   0.003    -.0349355   -.0074415 
             | 
 
407 
        year | 
       2003  |  -.1511706   .1045634    -1.45   0.148     -.356111    .0537699 
       2004  |  -.1593799   .0883035    -1.80   0.071    -.3324516    .0136917 
       2005  |  -.1519803   .0615353    -2.47   0.014    -.2725874   -.0313733 
       2006  |   -.171171   .0578515    -2.96   0.003    -.2845579   -.0577841 
       2007  |  -.2054769   .0601869    -3.41   0.001    -.3234409   -.0875128 
       2008  |  -.3766558   .0427463    -8.81   0.000     -.460437   -.2928746 
       2009  |  -.3525483   .0263649   -13.37   0.000    -.4042226   -.3008741 
             | 
       _cons |  -1.773718   .5305261    -3.34   0.001     -2.81353   -.7339061 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -16.14  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   2.02  Pr > z =  0.044 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -1.38  Pr > z =  0.167 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =   2.14  Pr > z =  0.032 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  42.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  14.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.233 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   3.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.534 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(7)    =  10.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.145 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  12.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.173 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.542 
  gmm(hor_EU, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =   6.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.705 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   7.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.022 
  gmm(hor_nonEU, collapse lag(3 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =  12.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.131 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.677 
  gmm(back_EU, collapse lag(4 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =   7.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.491 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   6.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.087 
  gmm(back_nonEU, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =   9.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.357 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   4.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.130 
  gmm(for_EU, collapse lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =  10.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.154 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   3.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.505 
  gmm(for_nonEU, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  11.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.236 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.302 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   5.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.161 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   8.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.356 
 
 
TABLE III.8 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
HUNGARY ACCORDING TO MNC’S ORIGIN, 2002-2010 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP  hor_EU hor_nonEU back_EU back_nonEU for_EU for_nonEU 
humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code 
i.year, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 3)) gmm(hor_EU, lag(2 5)coll) gmm(hor_nonEU, lag(2 
3)coll)  gmm(back_EU, lag(4 4)coll) gmm(back_nonEU, lag(4 4)coll) gmm(for_EU, 
lag(2 3)coll) gmm(for_nonEU, lag(3 3)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta 
logta2  demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      6910 
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Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      3635 
Number of instruments = 104                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(68) =  20611.24                                      avg =      1.90 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |    .361733   .0671313     5.39   0.000     .2301581    .4933078 
             | 
      hor_EU |   1.564565    .456128     3.43   0.001     .6705702    2.458559 
   hor_nonEU |   .7011953   .6209977     1.13   0.259    -.5159379    1.918328 
     back_EU |   2.499622   1.250722     2.00   0.046     .0482525    4.950991 
  back_nonEU |   3.368784   3.195139     1.05   0.292    -2.893573     9.63114 
      for_EU |   6.218142   1.708433     3.64   0.000     2.869674     9.56661 
   for_nonEU |  -7.255255   3.577859    -2.03   0.043    -14.26773   -.2427797 
     humcap1 |    .383537    .031415    12.21   0.000     .3219646    .4451093 
          RD |   .0138398    .003618     3.83   0.000     .0067486    .0209309 
   hhi_sales |  -.3276325   .1117312    -2.93   0.003    -.5466215   -.1086434 
         age |  -.0126063   .0020002    -6.30   0.000    -.0165266    -.008686 
        age2 |   .0000523   .0000151     3.46   0.001     .0000227     .000082 
       logta |   .1362314   .0595797     2.29   0.022     .0194573    .2530054 
      logta2 |   .0013778   .0036284     0.38   0.704    -.0057338    .0084894 
      demand |   .0743514   .1234954     0.60   0.547     -.167695    .3163979 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |   .1811904   .2000006     0.91   0.365    -.2108037    .5731844 
         23  |  -.4472407   .4958476    -0.90   0.367    -1.419084    .5246028 
         24  |  -.1842551    .455823    -0.40   0.686    -1.077652    .7091415 
         25  |  -1.105561   .3238434    -3.41   0.001    -1.740283   -.4708398 
         26  |   -.695387   .2662464    -2.61   0.009     -1.21722   -.1735537 
         29  |  -1.240053   .4269056    -2.90   0.004    -2.076773   -.4033338 
         45  |   -.611202   .3744838    -1.63   0.103    -1.345177    .1227728 
         50  |  -.9051297    .447893    -2.02   0.043    -1.782984   -.0272756 
         51  |  -2.086685   .3637574    -5.74   0.000    -2.799637   -1.373734 
         52  |  -1.587585   .3455198    -4.59   0.000    -2.264792   -.9103791 
         55  |    .539488   .3178364     1.70   0.090    -.0834598    1.162436 
         60  |  -1.115609   .3412836    -3.27   0.001    -1.784513   -.4467059 
         61  |  -.3305602   .5928338    -0.56   0.577    -1.492493    .8313728 
         62  |   .8292188   .2979787     2.78   0.005     .2451913    1.413246 
         63  |  -.2194126   .5066875    -0.43   0.665    -1.212502    .7736765 
         64  |    .282759   .4870645     0.58   0.562    -.6718699    1.237388 
         70  |   .2616159   .3463996     0.76   0.450    -.4173149    .9405466 
       1516  |   .5058921   .4361339     1.16   0.246    -.3489146    1.360699 
       1718  |    -.31589   .2217939    -1.42   0.154     -.750598     .118818 
       2122  |  -.3945745   .3321738    -1.19   0.235    -1.045623    .2564743 
       2728  |  -1.736598   .2926987    -5.93   0.000    -2.310277   -1.162919 
       3033  |  -1.430851   .3922632    -3.65   0.000    -2.199673   -.6620295 
       3435  |  -1.743731   .3082379    -5.66   0.000    -2.347866   -1.139595 
       3637  |   .1002497   .2484548     0.40   0.687    -.3867126    .5872121 
       4041  |   2.142076   .5530671     3.87   0.000     1.058085    3.226068 
       6567  |  -.3324346   .3487591    -0.95   0.340     -1.01599    .3511207 
       7174  |  -2.955447   .7320644    -4.04   0.000    -4.390267   -1.520627 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |  -.1325332   .0606726    -2.18   0.029    -.2514493   -.0136172 
          3  |  -.0818082   .0529617    -1.54   0.122    -.1856112    .0219948 
          4  |  -.0711605   .0526636    -1.35   0.177    -.1743794    .0320583 
          5  |   .0099827   .0338818     0.29   0.768    -.0564245    .0763899 
          6  |   -.084116   .0477289    -1.76   0.078    -.1776628    .0094309 
          7  |  -.0582475   .0460969    -1.26   0.206    -.1485957    .0321007 
          8  |  -.0605945   .0412746    -1.47   0.142    -.1414913    .0203022 
          9  |  -.0769624   .0462025    -1.67   0.096    -.1675176    .0135929 
         10  |  -.0207101   .0586232    -0.35   0.724    -.1356094    .0941892 
         11  |  -.1044642   .0490764    -2.13   0.033    -.2006521   -.0082763 
         12  |    .018681   .0537917     0.35   0.728    -.0867488    .1241107 
         13  |  -.1961369   .0653256    -3.00   0.003    -.3241726   -.0681012 
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         14  |    -.01526   .0363294    -0.42   0.674    -.0864643    .0559442 
         15  |  -.0762463   .0577188    -1.32   0.187     -.189373    .0368803 
         16  |  -.1101879   .0498985    -2.21   0.027    -.2079872   -.0123886 
         17  |  -.1272752   .0889998    -1.43   0.153    -.3017117    .0471613 
         18  |   -.093764   .0511347    -1.83   0.067    -.1939861    .0064582 
         19  |   -.017173   .0557805    -0.31   0.758    -.1265009    .0921548 
         20  |  -.1331277   .0542153    -2.46   0.014    -.2393878   -.0268676 
             | 
        year | 
       2003  |  -.0571037   .2533825    -0.23   0.822    -.5537242    .4395168 
       2004  |   .1369293   .2109256     0.65   0.516    -.2764773    .5503359 
       2005  |   .0224152   .2166416     0.10   0.918    -.4021945     .447025 
       2006  |   -.144037   .1868525    -0.77   0.441    -.5102611    .2221872 
       2007  |  -.4350382   .2118302    -2.05   0.040    -.8502177   -.0198588 
       2008  |  -.5803595   .2271847    -2.55   0.011    -1.025633   -.1350856 
       2009  |  -.4907859   .2540436    -1.93   0.053    -.9887023    .0071305 
             | 
       _cons |   .0174931   1.001784     0.02   0.986    -1.945967    1.980954 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.42  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.53  Pr > z =  0.125 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -1.24  Pr > z =  0.215 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =   0.09  Pr > z =  0.928 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(35)   =  44.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.124 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(35)   =  22.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.948 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  13.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.932 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(13)   =   9.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.732 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, lag(1 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   8.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.554 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(25)   =  13.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.965 
  gmm(hor_EU, collapse lag(2 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(30)   =  20.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.911 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   2.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.797 
  gmm(hor_nonEU, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(32)   =  15.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.992 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   6.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.084 
  gmm(back_EU, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(33)   =  18.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.976 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.165 
  gmm(back_nonEU, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(33)   =  19.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.975 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.168 
  gmm(for_EU, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(32)   =  22.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.901 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.952 
  gmm(for_nonEU, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(33)   =  21.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.929 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.729 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(27)   =  15.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.965 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   7.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.510 
 
TABLE III.9 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
SLOVAKIA ACCORDING TO MNC’S ORIGIN, 2002-2009 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP l2.WLP_TFP hor_EU hor_nonEU back_EU back_nonEU for_EU 
for_nonEU humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)coll)  gmm(l2.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)coll) 
gmm(hor_EU, lag(3 5)coll) gmm(hor_nonEU, lag(4 4)coll)  gmm(back_EU, lag(3 
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3)coll) gmm(back_nonEU, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(for_EU, lag(2 3)coll) gmm(for_nonEU, 
lag(2 2)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2  demand) 
iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     16440 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      7326 
Number of instruments = 67                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(55) =  33428.59                                      avg =      2.24 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         6 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .5459904   .0289945    18.83   0.000     .4891622    .6028185 
         L2. |   .0779585   .0200809     3.88   0.000     .0386007    .1173164 
             | 
      hor_EU |  -.1902562   .3201752    -0.59   0.552    -.8177881    .4372757 
   hor_nonEU |  -1.046677   .5167058    -2.03   0.043    -2.059401   -.0339519 
     back_EU |   2.048379   .5819804     3.52   0.000     .9077189     3.18904 
  back_nonEU |  -5.132732   1.536052    -3.34   0.001    -8.143338   -2.122126 
      for_EU |    2.56245   .4803094     5.33   0.000     1.621061    3.503839 
   for_nonEU |   1.037034   .9926848     1.04   0.296    -.9085921    2.982661 
     humcap1 |   .2823919   .0143896    19.62   0.000     .2541887    .3105951 
          RD |   .0547732   .0047133    11.62   0.000     .0455353     .064011 
   hhi_sales |   .0289473   .1588277     0.18   0.855    -.2823494    .3402439 
         age |  -.0087532   .0019182    -4.56   0.000    -.0125128   -.0049936 
        age2 |   .0001598   .0000317     5.03   0.000     .0000976     .000222 
       logta |   .1475888   .0333697     4.42   0.000     .0821854    .2129923 
      logta2 |  -.0047053   .0018478    -2.55   0.011    -.0083269   -.0010837 
      demand |   .0019693   .0107589     0.18   0.855    -.0191177    .0230563 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |  -.0500397    .121236    -0.41   0.680    -.2876579    .1875785 
         23  |   .5409354   .2124482     2.55   0.011     .1245445    .9573263 
         24  |   .3992833   .1245076     3.21   0.001      .155253    .6433136 
         25  |  -.1696908   .1461543    -1.16   0.246     -.456148    .1167665 
         26  |   -.392111   .1068835    -3.67   0.000    -.6015988   -.1826233 
         29  |  -.1155975   .0844529    -1.37   0.171    -.2811221     .049927 
         45  |   .1966155   .1081441     1.82   0.069    -.0153431    .4085741 
         50  |  -.0127159   .0935241    -0.14   0.892    -.1960198     .170588 
         51  |  -.2204608   .1307601    -1.69   0.092    -.4767459    .0358242 
         52  |  -.2288854   .1395984    -1.64   0.101    -.5024932    .0447224 
         55  |  -.4778109   .1221797    -3.91   0.000    -.7172788   -.2383431 
         60  |  -.7427398   .1356063    -5.48   0.000    -1.008523   -.4769562 
         61  |    -.66451   .2924814    -2.27   0.023    -1.237763    -.091257 
         62  |  -.3755205   .5249448    -0.72   0.474    -1.404393    .6533523 
         63  |  -.1699911    .124933    -1.36   0.174    -.4148553     .074873 
         64  |   .1370583   .1713891     0.80   0.424    -.1988582    .4729748 
         70  |  -.2629596   .1129788    -2.33   0.020     -.484394   -.0415253 
       1516  |   .0796228   .0982739     0.81   0.418    -.1129905    .2722361 
       1718  |  -.1169984   .0889438    -1.32   0.188     -.291325    .0573282 
       2122  |   .0654519   .1196595     0.55   0.584    -.1690765    .2999802 
       2728  |  -.2866786   .0956845    -3.00   0.003    -.4742168   -.0991404 
       3033  |   .5686124   .1859048     3.06   0.002     .2042456    .9329792 
       3435  |   .8191594    .170504     4.80   0.000     .4849777    1.153341 
       3637  |  -.1673406   .0948046    -1.77   0.078    -.3531542    .0184731 
       4041  |  -.1480285   .1731062    -0.86   0.392    -.4873103    .1912534 
       6567  |  -.7813201   .1767422    -4.42   0.000    -1.127729   -.4349116 
       7174  |  -.5473339   .1252893    -4.37   0.000    -.7928965   -.3017714 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |   .0252574   .0211627     1.19   0.233    -.0162208    .0667356 
          3  |  -.0083889   .0203403    -0.41   0.680    -.0482551    .0314773 
          4  |   .0074328   .0178064     0.42   0.676     -.027467    .0423326 
          5  |   .0106587   .0188818     0.56   0.572    -.0263489    .0476663 
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          6  |  -.0159401   .0175856    -0.91   0.365    -.0504072     .018527 
          7  |   .0073188   .0177036     0.41   0.679    -.0273796    .0420172 
          8  |   .0011712   .0179299     0.07   0.948    -.0339707    .0363131 
             | 
        year | 
       2004  |   .2714758    .044016     6.17   0.000      .185206    .3577456 
       2005  |   .4023952   .0554791     7.25   0.000     .2936581    .5111322 
       2006  |   .3174389   .0467495     6.79   0.000     .2258115    .4090663 
       2007  |   .4408074   .0715708     6.16   0.000     .3005312    .5810837 
       2008  |   .3522496   .0479151     7.35   0.000     .2583378    .4461615 
             | 
       _cons |  -.3712672   .1648466    -2.25   0.024    -.6943605   -.0481739 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -12.83  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.51  Pr > z =  0.132 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.77  Pr > z =  0.442 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.16  Pr > z =  0.875 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  16.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.139 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  14.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.198 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   4.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.227 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  10.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.242 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  13.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.133 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.616 
  gmm(L2.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  12.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.211 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.268 
  gmm(hor_EU, collapse lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   8.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.297 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   6.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.180 
  gmm(hor_nonEU, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  13.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.152 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.487 
  gmm(back_EU, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  11.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.233 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.222 
  gmm(back_nonEU, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  13.70  Prob > chi2 =  0.133 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.614 
  gmm(for_EU, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =   8.50  Prob > chi2 =  0.386 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   6.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.103 
  gmm(for_nonEU, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  13.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.127 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.668 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.413 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  11.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.160 
 
TABLE III.10 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
SLOVENIA ACCORDING TO MNC’S ORIGIN, 2002-2010 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP  hor_EU hor_nonEU back_EU back_nonEU for_EU for_nonEU 
humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code 
i.year, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(2 .)coll) gmm(hor_EU, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(hor_nonEU, 
lag(2 2)coll)  gmm(back_EU, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(back_nonEU, lag(3 4)coll) 
gmm(for_EU, lag(3 4)coll) gmm(for_nonEU, lag(2 2)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales 
age age2 logta logta2  demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two robust 
ar(4) 
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Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     12884 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      4335 
Number of instruments = 75                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(60) =    325.58                                      avg =      2.97 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .5555752   .1018935     5.45   0.000     .3558676    .7552827 
             | 
      hor_EU |  -1.299304      .2685    -4.84   0.000    -1.825554   -.7730533 
   hor_nonEU |   2.976953   1.442834     2.06   0.039       .14905    5.804856 
     back_EU |  -1.815617   .5024354    -3.61   0.000    -2.800373   -.8308622 
  back_nonEU |   3.014502   .9254596     3.26   0.001     1.200635     4.82837 
      for_EU |   4.173428   1.256146     3.32   0.001     1.711427    6.635429 
   for_nonEU |   7.674522   20.26835     0.38   0.705    -32.05072    47.39977 
     humcap1 |   .3843973   .0503896     7.63   0.000     .2856356     .483159 
          RD |   .0324215   .0052188     6.21   0.000     .0221928    .0426502 
   hhi_sales |   .3376329   .1601546     2.11   0.035     .0237356    .6515302 
         age |   .0128379   .0094555     1.36   0.175    -.0056945    .0313703 
        age2 |   -.000901   .0004335    -2.08   0.038    -.0017507   -.0000513 
       logta |   .0717881   .0268885     2.67   0.008     .0190877    .1244885 
      logta2 |   .0020664   .0013297     1.55   0.120    -.0005398    .0046725 
      demand |  -.8363578   .2359936    -3.54   0.000    -1.298897   -.3738189 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |   .5257132   2.699013     0.19   0.846    -4.764254    5.815681 
         23  |  -17.94016   5.619507    -3.19   0.001    -28.95419   -6.926132 
         24  |   1.327058   2.770442     0.48   0.632    -4.102909    6.757025 
         25  |   1.001878   2.686521     0.37   0.709    -4.263606    6.267361 
         26  |   1.009892   2.679858     0.38   0.706    -4.242534    6.262318 
         29  |   .0470328   2.788621     0.02   0.987    -5.418563    5.512629 
         45  |   2.032557   2.667816     0.76   0.446    -3.196267    7.261381 
         50  |   .8962521   2.851273     0.31   0.753     -4.69214    6.484644 
         51  |   2.716471    2.69819     1.01   0.314    -2.571884    8.004827 
         52  |   2.447512   2.665756     0.92   0.359    -2.777273    7.672298 
         55  |   1.078592   2.760465     0.39   0.696     -4.33182    6.489004 
         60  |   2.044163   2.713446     0.75   0.451    -3.274093    7.362418 
         61  |   9.950941   8.438568     1.18   0.238    -6.588348    26.49023 
         62  |  -.7213488   3.032495    -0.24   0.812     -6.66493    5.222233 
         63  |    1.36599   2.800895     0.49   0.626    -4.123664    6.855644 
         64  |   .3965788   2.762136     0.14   0.886    -5.017108    5.810266 
         70  |   1.744897   2.910778     0.60   0.549    -3.960123    7.449917 
       1516  |   1.152245   2.695879     0.43   0.669    -4.131581    6.436071 
       1718  |   .8359997   2.725576     0.31   0.759    -4.506032    6.178031 
       2122  |   .8846084   2.747689     0.32   0.747    -4.500763     6.26998 
       2728  |   1.700874   2.641088     0.64   0.520    -3.475563    6.877311 
       3033  |   .9121065   2.728715     0.33   0.738    -4.436076    6.260289 
       3435  |  -.6529355   2.901349    -0.23   0.822    -6.339475    5.033604 
       3637  |   .4429731   2.728935     0.16   0.871    -4.905641    5.791587 
       4041  |   1.747058   2.772919     0.63   0.529    -3.687763    7.181878 
       6567  |   1.813205   2.765563     0.66   0.512    -3.607198    7.233608 
       7174  |   3.036749   2.717974     1.12   0.264    -2.290383    8.363881 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |  -.0075048   .0181335    -0.41   0.679    -.0430457    .0280361 
          3  |    .031893    .019276     1.65   0.098    -.0058873    .0696734 
          4  |   .0628492   .0221786     2.83   0.005     .0193799    .1063184 
          5  |  -.0104155   .0235631    -0.44   0.658    -.0565983    .0357673 
          6  |  -.0394438    .046276    -0.85   0.394    -.1301431    .0512555 
          7  |   .0431697   .0140736     3.07   0.002      .015586    .0707534 
          8  |   .0288409   .0148779     1.94   0.053    -.0003193    .0580011 
          9  |    .145524   .0345587     4.21   0.000     .0777902    .2132577 
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         10  |   .0465577    .015528     3.00   0.003     .0161234    .0769919 
         11  |   .0302706   .0246285     1.23   0.219    -.0180005    .0785417 
         12  |  -.0427334   .0346372    -1.23   0.217    -.1106211    .0251543 
             | 
        year | 
       2003  |   .4833689   .1566845     3.08   0.002     .1762729     .790465 
       2004  |  -.1206243   .1184034    -1.02   0.308    -.3526907     .111442 
       2005  |  -.2117742   .1220458    -1.74   0.083    -.4509796    .0274313 
       2006  |   -.192464   .1335642    -1.44   0.150     -.454245     .069317 
       2007  |  -.1680285   .1195307    -1.41   0.160    -.4023043    .0662473 
       2008  |  -.1046415   .1104421    -0.95   0.343     -.321104     .111821 
       2009  |  -.2995262   .1450602    -2.06   0.039     -.583839   -.0152134 
             | 
       _cons |   5.040377   3.464963     1.45   0.146    -1.750825    11.83158 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -5.79  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.38  Pr > z =  0.167 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.03  Pr > z =  0.974 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =   1.52  Pr > z =  0.128 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(14)   =  40.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(14)   =  18.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.189 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =  10.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.169 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(7)    =   8.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.329 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(2 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =  10.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.160 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(7)    =   7.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.345 
  gmm(hor_EU, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =  15.50  Prob > chi2 =  0.215 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.234 
  gmm(hor_nonEU, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =  15.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.192 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.299 
  gmm(back_EU, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =  16.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.179 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.345 
  gmm(back_nonEU, collapse lag(3 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(11)   =  13.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.293 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   5.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.145 
  gmm(for_EU, collapse lag(3 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(11)   =  12.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.314 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   5.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.126 
  gmm(for_nonEU, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =  17.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.120 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.762 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   5.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.541 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  13.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.099 
 
3.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF MNCS’ OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE ON PRODUCTIVITY OF LOCAL FIRMS PRESENTED 
IN SECTION 5.6.2 
TABLE III.11 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
THE CZECH REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO MNC’S OWNERSHIP, 2002-2009 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP) 
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP l2.WLP_TFP hor_full hor_part back_full back_part 
for_full for_part humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)coll) gmm(l2.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)coll) 
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gmm(hor_full, lag(5 5)coll) gmm(hor_part, lag(4 4)coll)  gmm(back_full, lag(4 
4)coll) gmm(back_part, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(for_full, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(for_part, 
lag(4 4)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2  demand) 
iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     97891 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =     36700 
Number of instruments = 67                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(58) = 165684.97                                      avg =      2.67 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         6 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .3892673   .0125925    30.91   0.000     .3645865    .4139481 
         L2. |   .0708338   .0076634     9.24   0.000     .0558138    .0858539 
             | 
    hor_full |  -.3559641   .3466775    -1.03   0.305     -1.03544    .3235114 
    hor_part |   .5678079   .1921664     2.95   0.003     .1911686    .9444471 
   back_full |   .0591373   .0918997     0.64   0.520    -.1209827    .2392574 
   back_part |   1.868385   .8660111     2.16   0.031     .1710344    3.565736 
    for_full |  -1.784608   .5534377    -3.22   0.001    -2.869326   -.6998897 
    for_part |  -6.071363   2.067413    -2.94   0.003    -10.12342   -2.019308 
     humcap1 |   .4350822   .0085197    51.07   0.000      .418384    .4517804 
          RD |   .0524158   .0017984    29.15   0.000      .048891    .0559406 
   hhi_sales |  -.2533555   .0744184    -3.40   0.001    -.3992129   -.1074981 
         age |  -.0108153   .0010441   -10.36   0.000    -.0128618   -.0087688 
        age2 |   .0000843   .0000338     2.49   0.013      .000018    .0001507 
       logta |   .2091355   .0132915    15.73   0.000     .1830847    .2351863 
      logta2 |  -.0051975   .0008403    -6.19   0.000    -.0068445   -.0035504 
      demand |  -.0597447   .0381841    -1.56   0.118    -.1345841    .0150948 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |   1.239587   .1819726     6.81   0.000     .8829276    1.596247 
         23  |   2.055919   .2795342     7.35   0.000     1.508042    2.603796 
         24  |   2.098231   .2408572     8.71   0.000      1.62616    2.570303 
         25  |   1.827497   .2474142     7.39   0.000     1.342574     2.31242 
         26  |   1.827052   .2758456     6.62   0.000     1.286405      2.3677 
         29  |   1.470154   .2102508     6.99   0.000      1.05807    1.882238 
         45  |   .5517895   .1962148     2.81   0.005     .1672156    .9363634 
         50  |   1.467288   .2532753     5.79   0.000     .9708779    1.963699 
         51  |   1.560413   .1808381     8.63   0.000     1.205977    1.914849 
         52  |   1.610459   .1816287     8.87   0.000     1.254474    1.966445 
         55  |   .8977338   .1649574     5.44   0.000     .5744232    1.221044 
         60  |   .7425994   .1579369     4.70   0.000     .4330487     1.05215 
         61  |    .607498   .1826684     3.33   0.001     .2494745    .9655216 
         62  |   .5450643   .2235091     2.44   0.015     .1069944    .9831341 
         63  |    .698008   .2313322     3.02   0.003     .2446053    1.151411 
         64  |   .5486424   .2662716     2.06   0.039     .0267596    1.070525 
         70  |   1.053935   .1824914     5.78   0.000     .6962582    1.411611 
       1516  |   1.012936   .2337119     4.33   0.000     .5548695    1.471003 
       1718  |   1.423117   .1637252     8.69   0.000     1.102221    1.744012 
       2122  |   1.113354   .2032615     5.48   0.000     .7149685    1.511739 
       2728  |    1.13773   .2164712     5.26   0.000      .713454    1.562006 
       3033  |   1.254273   .2772942     4.52   0.000     .7107863     1.79776 
       3435  |   1.159926   .3682529     3.15   0.002     .4381638    1.881689 
       3637  |   1.338485   .1606098     8.33   0.000     1.023696    1.653275 
       4041  |   1.136231   .2592844     4.38   0.000      .628043    1.644419 
       6567  |     1.1719   .3320895     3.53   0.000     .5210167    1.822784 
       7174  |   .6663217   .1854007     3.59   0.000     .3029431      1.0297 
             | 
 region_code | 
          4  |  -.0284042   .0175372    -1.62   0.105    -.0627764    .0059681 
          5  |  -.0250068   .0171057    -1.46   0.144    -.0585334    .0085197 
          6  |  -.0484409   .0182837    -2.65   0.008    -.0842763   -.0126055 
 
415 
          7  |  -.0033284    .016341    -0.20   0.839    -.0353562    .0286994 
          8  |  -.0318684   .0175714    -1.81   0.070    -.0663076    .0025708 
          9  |  -.0203444   .0173787    -1.17   0.242     -.054406    .0137172 
         10  |  -.0068211   .0174119    -0.39   0.695    -.0409478    .0273056 
         11  |   .0142344   .0159506     0.89   0.372    -.0170282     .045497 
         13  |  -.0076572   .0152253    -0.50   0.615    -.0374982    .0221838 
         14  |  -.0390346   .0168367    -2.32   0.020    -.0720339   -.0060352 
             | 
        year | 
       2004  |  -.1586069    .045387    -3.49   0.000    -.2475638   -.0696499 
       2005  |  -.0517255   .0369308    -1.40   0.161    -.1241085    .0206575 
       2006  |  -.0007966   .0366748    -0.02   0.983    -.0726779    .0710847 
       2007  |    .018346   .0372031     0.49   0.622    -.0545707    .0912627 
       2008  |   .0254687    .009814     2.60   0.009     .0062336    .0447037 
             | 
       _cons |  -.1629038   .2408272    -0.68   0.499    -.6349165    .3091089 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -30.15  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.84  Pr > z =  0.399 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =   0.87  Pr > z =  0.382 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.92  Pr > z =  0.360 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  24.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =  12.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.114 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  12.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.114 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =  10.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.108 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.283 
  gmm(L2.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   7.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.306 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   5.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.056 
  gmm(hor_full, collapse lag(5 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =  11.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.066 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.579 
  gmm(hor_part, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =  11.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.087 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.390 
  gmm(back_full, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =  11.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.064 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.596 
  gmm(back_part, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   9.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.151 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.173 
  gmm(for_full, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =  10.70  Prob > chi2 =  0.098 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.327 
  gmm(for_part, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =  11.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.076 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.475 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  12.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.114 
 
TABLE III.12 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
ESTONIA ACCORDING TO MNC’S OWNERSHIP, 2002-2010 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP  hor_full hor_part back_full back_part for_full 
for_part humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(hor_full, lag(3 3)coll) 
 
416 
gmm(hor_part, lag(3 3)coll)  gmm(back_full, lag(4 4)coll) gmm(back_part, lag(4 
4)coll) gmm(for_full, lag(4 4)coll) gmm(for_part, lag(3 3)coll) iv(humcap1 RD 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2  demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) 
two robust ar(4) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     66194 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =     18684 
Number of instruments = 61                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(53) =  90031.53                                      avg =      3.54 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .5302716   .0363676    14.58   0.000     .4589924    .6015508 
             | 
    hor_full |   .7210959   .5699513     1.27   0.206     -.395988     1.83818 
    hor_part |   1.438225   .7268392     1.98   0.048     .0136462    2.862803 
   back_full |   .5226227   .2408655     2.17   0.030      .050535    .9947104 
   back_part |  -2.382896   .6426598    -3.71   0.000    -3.642486   -1.123306 
    for_full |  -4.766868   1.252898    -3.80   0.000    -7.222504   -2.311233 
    for_part |   7.145351   2.192716     3.26   0.001     2.847707      11.443 
     humcap1 |   .3354093    .013352    25.12   0.000     .3092398    .3615788 
          RD |   .0826397   .0034835    23.72   0.000     .0758122    .0894673 
   hhi_sales |  -1.298192   .5636372    -2.30   0.021    -2.402901   -.1934838 
         age |  -.0125318   .0010554   -11.87   0.000    -.0146004   -.0104633 
        age2 |   .0001386   .0000109    12.67   0.000     .0001172    .0001601 
       logta |   .2358141    .021505    10.97   0.000     .1936652    .2779631 
      logta2 |  -.0087182   .0020565    -4.24   0.000    -.0127489   -.0046876 
      demand |  -.0338529   .0411225    -0.82   0.410    -.1144516    .0467457 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |   .6791729   .3709281     1.83   0.067    -.0478328    1.406179 
         23  |   62.54415   23.41483     2.67   0.008     16.65192    108.4364 
         24  |   .4949647   .5577795     0.89   0.375    -.5982629    1.588192 
         25  |   .8773287   .3835155     2.29   0.022     .1256522    1.629005 
         26  |    .537078   .4185088     1.28   0.199    -.2831841     1.35734 
         29  |   .8092176   .3836191     2.11   0.035     .0573379    1.561097 
         45  |   .7794912   .4041144     1.93   0.054    -.0125585    1.571541 
         50  |   1.097383   .4248291     2.58   0.010     .2647336    1.930033 
         51  |   1.689547   .4548951     3.71   0.000     .7979692    2.581125 
         52  |    1.28107   .4625226     2.77   0.006     .3745426    2.187598 
         55  |    .918677   .3810952     2.41   0.016     .1717442     1.66561 
         60  |   1.404214   .4579027     3.07   0.002     .5067408    2.301686 
         61  |    .322591   .7191665     0.45   0.654    -1.086949    1.732131 
         62  |   .1264703   .7689516     0.16   0.869    -1.380647    1.633588 
         63  |   1.628992   .4815221     3.38   0.001     .6852264    2.572758 
         64  |   1.829356     .63881     2.86   0.004     .5773112    3.081401 
         70  |   1.453286   .4346695     3.34   0.001      .601349    2.305222 
       1516  |     .82843   .3674258     2.25   0.024     .1082886    1.548571 
       1718  |   .8759508   .3883521     2.26   0.024     .1147947    1.637107 
       2122  |   1.036989   .3729725     2.78   0.005     .3059761    1.768002 
       2728  |   .7903398   .4088212     1.93   0.053     -.010935    1.591615 
       3033  |   .4897804   .4875653     1.00   0.315    -.4658301    1.445391 
       3435  |   .5170436   .5060033     1.02   0.307    -.4747045    1.508792 
       3637  |    .827229   .3585759     2.31   0.021     .1244331    1.530025 
       4041  |    2.18388    .727289     3.00   0.003       .75842    3.609341 
       6567  |   1.228408   .5546519     2.21   0.027       .14131    2.315506 
       7174  |     1.6496   .4696793     3.51   0.000     .7290452    2.570154 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |  -.0304358    .007976    -3.82   0.000    -.0460685   -.0148031 
          3  |  -.0390979   .0095302    -4.10   0.000    -.0577768    -.020419 
          4  |  -.0727287   .0170323    -4.27   0.000    -.1061114    -.039346 
 
417 
          5  |  -.0246426   .0069664    -3.54   0.000    -.0382965   -.0109886 
             | 
        year | 
       2003  |  -.3505737   .1617891    -2.17   0.030    -.6676746   -.0334728 
       2004  |  -.3380964   .1298402    -2.60   0.009    -.5925784   -.0836143 
       2005  |  -.2070292   .0846399    -2.45   0.014    -.3729203    -.041138 
       2006  |   -.188537   .0810478    -2.33   0.020    -.3473877   -.0296862 
       2007  |  -.1860047   .0855155    -2.18   0.030    -.3536121   -.0183973 
       2008  |  -.2949558   .0416695    -7.08   0.000    -.3766267    -.213285 
       2009  |  -.3803397   .0304127   -12.51   0.000    -.4399476   -.3207319 
             | 
       _cons |  -.1007989   .6542783    -0.15   0.878    -1.383161    1.181563 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -15.87  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   2.03  Pr > z =  0.042 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.77  Pr > z =  0.441 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =   1.47  Pr > z =  0.141 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(7)    =  24.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.001 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(7)    =  10.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.153 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(7)    =  10.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.153 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =  10.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.068 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.810 
  gmm(hor_full, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   6.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.293 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   4.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.103 
  gmm(hor_part, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   4.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.422 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   5.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.057 
  gmm(back_full, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =  10.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.067 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.839 
  gmm(back_part, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   8.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.114 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.408 
  gmm(for_full, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   9.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.080 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.656 
  gmm(for_part, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   8.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.144 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.296 
 
TABLE III.13 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
HUNGARY ACCORDING TO MNC’S OWNERSHIP, 2002-2010 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP) 
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP  hor_full hor_part back_full back_part for_full 
for_part humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)coll) gmm(hor_full, lag(3 3)) 
gmm(hor_part, lag(3 3))  gmm(back_full, lag(2 3)coll) gmm(back_part, lag(2 
4)coll) gmm(for_full, lag(3 3)) gmm(for_part, lag(2 3)) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales 
age age2 logta logta2  demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two robust 
ar(4) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      6910 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      3635 
Number of instruments = 119                     Obs per group: min =         1 
 
418 
Wald chi2(68) =  25303.89                                      avg =      1.90 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .5591379   .0826019     6.77   0.000     .3972413    .7210346 
             | 
    hor_full |  -.4801596   .3827038    -1.25   0.210    -1.230245     .269926 
    hor_part |   1.620323   .8787358     1.84   0.065     -.101967    3.342614 
   back_full |   1.558281    .854456     1.82   0.068    -.1164214    3.232984 
   back_part |  -3.800701   1.546225    -2.46   0.014    -6.831247   -.7701556 
    for_full |  -7.678721   2.089753    -3.67   0.000    -11.77456    -3.58288 
    for_part |  -5.630146   2.514815    -2.24   0.025    -10.55909    -.701199 
     humcap1 |    .307247   .0380677     8.07   0.000     .2326357    .3818583 
          RD |   .0104234   .0033699     3.09   0.002     .0038184    .0170283 
   hhi_sales |   -.130873   .0998433    -1.31   0.190    -.3265623    .0648162 
         age |  -.0095395   .0019377    -4.92   0.000    -.0133374   -.0057417 
        age2 |   .0000369   .0000132     2.80   0.005     .0000111    .0000627 
       logta |   .1321182   .0580668     2.28   0.023     .0183095     .245927 
      logta2 |  -.0014534   .0032191    -0.45   0.652    -.0077627    .0048559 
      demand |   .1130658   .0673085     1.68   0.093    -.0188564     .244988 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |  -.2511708   .1745865    -1.44   0.150     -.593354    .0910123 
         23  |  -1.033579   .8674365    -1.19   0.233    -2.733724    .6665651 
         24  |  -.1460306   .3844316    -0.38   0.704    -.8995027    .6074415 
         25  |  -.0057752   .2950481    -0.02   0.984    -.5840587    .5725084 
         26  |   -.484965   .2147759    -2.26   0.024     -.905918    -.064012 
         29  |   .5688524   .4009544     1.42   0.156    -.2170039    1.354709 
         45  |  -.5404089   .2733077    -1.98   0.048    -1.076082   -.0047357 
         50  |   .1646882   .3155322     0.52   0.602    -.4537436      .78312 
         51  |  -.0925181    .365131    -0.25   0.800    -.8081618    .6231256 
         52  |   -.026807   .3256977    -0.08   0.934    -.6651628    .6115488 
         55  |  -.0491335   .2209935    -0.22   0.824    -.4822728    .3840057 
         60  |  -.3046459   .3026681    -1.01   0.314    -.8978645    .2885727 
         61  |   .2627028    .717333     0.37   0.714    -1.143244     1.66865 
         62  |   .3955597   .2693591     1.47   0.142    -.1323745    .9234939 
         63  |  -.3382546   .3139596    -1.08   0.281    -.9536042     .277095 
         64  |  -.3806858   .5142164    -0.74   0.459    -1.388531    .6271598 
         70  |    .358751   .3417654     1.05   0.294    -.3110969    1.028599 
       1516  |  -.9121696   .3222848    -2.83   0.005    -1.543836    -.280503 
       1718  |  -.7846027   .1859122    -4.22   0.000    -1.148984   -.4202215 
       2122  |  -.9090375   .2550814    -3.56   0.000    -1.408988   -.4090871 
       2728  |  -.6894288   .3459137    -1.99   0.046    -1.367407   -.0114504 
       3033  |  -.3929607   .2822334    -1.39   0.164    -.9461281    .1602067 
       3435  |   -1.40993   .2903187    -4.86   0.000    -1.978944   -.8409154 
       3637  |   .3236693   .2034667     1.59   0.112     -.075118    .7224566 
       4041  |   1.842067   .6268292     2.94   0.003     .6135042     3.07063 
       6567  |  -.5038259   .3338792    -1.51   0.131    -1.158217    .1505654 
       7174  |  -.3141554   .3864728    -0.81   0.416    -1.071628    .4433174 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |  -.0897807   .0533838    -1.68   0.093    -.1944111    .0148497 
          3  |  -.0515521   .0481924    -1.07   0.285    -.1460074    .0429033 
          4  |  -.0278367   .0460695    -0.60   0.546    -.1181313    .0624579 
          5  |   -.002147   .0303705    -0.07   0.944    -.0616721     .057378 
          6  |  -.0477298   .0453521    -1.05   0.293    -.1366183    .0411586 
          7  |  -.0512306   .0408787    -1.25   0.210    -.1313513    .0288901 
          8  |  -.0393384   .0363499    -1.08   0.279    -.1105828    .0319061 
          9  |  -.0537958   .0422564    -1.27   0.203    -.1366168    .0290253 
         10  |   .0024354   .0499583     0.05   0.961    -.0954811     .100352 
         11  |  -.0640727   .0447167    -1.43   0.152    -.1517159    .0235705 
         12  |   .0094323   .0491027     0.19   0.848    -.0868072    .1056719 
         13  |   -.142834   .0600206    -2.38   0.017    -.2604723   -.0251957 
         14  |  -.0093019   .0323451    -0.29   0.774    -.0726972    .0540933 
         15  |  -.0260722   .0504132    -0.52   0.605    -.1248801    .0727358 
 
419 
         16  |  -.0631844   .0454598    -1.39   0.165    -.1522839    .0259151 
         17  |  -.0790768   .0852281    -0.93   0.353    -.2461208    .0879672 
         18  |  -.0557938   .0449019    -1.24   0.214    -.1437998    .0322122 
         19  |   -.008445   .0480341    -0.18   0.860    -.1025902    .0857001 
         20  |   -.085713   .0494791    -1.73   0.083    -.1826902    .0112642 
             | 
        year | 
       2003  |   -.464365   .3158103    -1.47   0.141    -1.083342    .1546119 
       2004  |  -.2666064   .1914405    -1.39   0.164    -.6418229    .1086101 
       2005  |   .0033082   .1512251     0.02   0.983    -.2930875    .2997038 
       2006  |   .0679006   .1226053     0.55   0.580    -.1724014    .3082025 
       2007  |   .1371081   .1198633     1.14   0.253    -.0978196    .3720358 
       2008  |   .1486006   .1229125     1.21   0.227    -.0923036    .3895047 
       2009  |   .0324953      .1244     0.26   0.794    -.2113241    .2763147 
             | 
       _cons |   .7364508   .6631861     1.11   0.267    -.5633702    2.036272 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.09  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.40  Pr > z =  0.161 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.91  Pr > z =  0.364 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =   0.09  Pr > z =  0.926 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(50)   = 103.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(50)   =  54.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.317 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(23)   =  18.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.757 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(27)   =  36.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.111 
  gmm(hor_full, lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(42)   =  44.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.348 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   9.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.324 
  gmm(hor_part, lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(37)   =  40.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.327 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(13)   =  13.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.381 
  gmm(back_full, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(48)   =  52.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.311 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.383 
  gmm(back_part, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(46)   =  46.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.442 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   7.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.113 
  gmm(for_full, lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(38)   =  40.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.343 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =  13.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.349 
  gmm(for_part, lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(32)   =  36.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.259 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =  17.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.492 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(42)   =  45.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.336 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   8.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.351 
 
TABLE III.14 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
SLOVAKIA ACCORDING TO MNC’S OWNERSHIP, 2002-2009 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP) 
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP  hor_full hor_part back_full back_part for_full 
for_part humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)coll) gmm(hor_full, lag(2 2)coll) 
gmm(hor_part, lag(3 3)coll)  gmm(back_full, lag(3 4)coll) gmm(back_part, lag(3 
3)coll) gmm(for_full, lag(3 4)coll) gmm(for_part, lag(3 3)coll) iv(humcap1 RD 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2  demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) 
two robust ar(4) 
 
420 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     30490 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =     13595 
Number of instruments = 65                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(55) =  39641.52                                      avg =      2.24 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |    .434749   .0241908    17.97   0.000     .3873358    .4821622 
             | 
    hor_full |  -1.112986   .2742083    -4.06   0.000    -1.650425   -.5755479 
    hor_part |  -2.579578   .7759796    -3.32   0.001     -4.10047   -1.058686 
   back_full |   .2869311   .1134852     2.53   0.011     .0645041     .509358 
   back_part |  -3.069953   .8546643    -3.59   0.000    -4.745064   -1.394842 
    for_full |   2.223056   .8358983     2.66   0.008     .5847252    3.861386 
    for_part |   5.508839   3.128624     1.76   0.078    -.6231518    11.64083 
     humcap1 |   .3239875   .0084832    38.19   0.000     .3073608    .3406143 
          RD |   .0816958   .0035157    23.24   0.000     .0748053    .0885864 
   hhi_sales |   .1956906   .1394546     1.40   0.161    -.0776354    .4690165 
         age |   -.013219   .0014205    -9.31   0.000    -.0160031   -.0104349 
        age2 |   .0002141   .0000302     7.09   0.000     .0001549    .0002733 
       logta |    .282871   .0227045    12.46   0.000     .2383711    .3273709 
      logta2 |  -.0111974   .0014571    -7.68   0.000    -.0140532   -.0083416 
      demand |  -.0580833   .0229467    -2.53   0.011    -.1030579   -.0131086 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |  -.0956544   .1116373    -0.86   0.392    -.3144595    .1231508 
         23  |   1.347679   .3083591     4.37   0.000     .7433057    1.952051 
         24  |   .7812698   .1321436     5.91   0.000     .5222731    1.040266 
         25  |  -.0716322   .0946774    -0.76   0.449    -.2571966    .1139321 
         26  |  -.5331535   .1013062    -5.26   0.000      -.73171    -.334597 
         29  |  -.1826606   .1229253    -1.49   0.137    -.4235897    .0582685 
         45  |   .4382771   .1423997     3.08   0.002     .1591788    .7173754 
         50  |   .1621329   .1158579     1.40   0.162    -.0649443    .3892101 
         51  |   .5405399   .2168423     2.49   0.013     .1155368    .9655431 
         52  |   .1825867   .1983134     0.92   0.357    -.2061004    .5712739 
         55  |  -.8792783   .1279143    -6.87   0.000    -1.129986   -.6285708 
         60  |  -.2616448   .1818819    -1.44   0.150    -.6181269    .0948372 
         61  |  -1.372825   .3861126    -3.56   0.000    -2.129592   -.6160581 
         62  |  -1.246268   .4785824    -2.60   0.009    -2.184272   -.3082635 
         63  |  -.0559849   .1368072    -0.41   0.682    -.3241222    .2121523 
         64  |   1.322441   .3739387     3.54   0.000     .5895342    2.055347 
         70  |  -.2285896   .1461981    -1.56   0.118    -.5151326    .0579533 
       1516  |   .2669648   .1622589     1.65   0.100    -.0510567    .5849864 
       1718  |  -.3051212   .1182132    -2.58   0.010    -.5368149   -.0734276 
       2122  |   .0188182   .1078845     0.17   0.862    -.1926315    .2302678 
       2728  |  -.1587526   .1100202    -1.44   0.149    -.3743882     .056883 
       3033  |   .5881038    .128543     4.58   0.000     .3361642    .8400434 
       3435  |   1.356042   .2451929     5.53   0.000     .8754724    1.836611 
       3637  |  -.4357316   .1566952    -2.78   0.005    -.7428486   -.1286146 
       4041  |   1.539651   .3027967     5.08   0.000     .9461805    2.133122 
       6567  |  -.4591432   .2031227    -2.26   0.024    -.8572563   -.0610301 
       7174  |   .4472227   .1865786     2.40   0.017     .0815354      .81291 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |   .0791554   .0183319     4.32   0.000     .0432256    .1150853 
          3  |  -.0188309    .019146    -0.98   0.325    -.0563564    .0186945 
          4  |   .0007798   .0171532     0.05   0.964    -.0328399    .0343995 
          5  |  -.0122348   .0185523    -0.66   0.510    -.0485965     .024127 
          6  |  -.0225917   .0167782    -1.35   0.178    -.0554763    .0102929 
          7  |   .0101132   .0166095     0.61   0.543    -.0224408    .0426671 
          8  |   .0007597   .0174676     0.04   0.965    -.0334762    .0349957 
             | 
        year | 
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       2003  |   .2637031   .1077481     2.45   0.014     .0525207    .4748855 
       2004  |    .219949   .0754251     2.92   0.004     .0721185    .3677794 
       2005  |   .3343723   .0855432     3.91   0.000     .1667107     .502034 
       2006  |   .3500378   .1121109     3.12   0.002     .1303044    .5697712 
       2007  |   .2272266   .0727671     3.12   0.002     .0846056    .3698475 
       2008  |   .2560636   .0592414     4.32   0.000     .1399526    .3721747 
             | 
       _cons |   .4945084    .223637     2.21   0.027     .0561879     .932829 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -16.77  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.20  Pr > z =  0.229 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =   1.42  Pr > z =  0.155 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -1.24  Pr > z =  0.217 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(9)    =  14.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.107 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(9)    =  10.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.316 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.645 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(7)    =   9.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.215 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   8.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.332 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.297 
  gmm(hor_full, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   9.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.242 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.526 
  gmm(hor_part, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   5.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.640 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   5.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.072 
  gmm(back_full, collapse lag(3 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   9.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.129 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.910 
  gmm(back_part, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   8.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.278 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.411 
  gmm(for_full, collapse lag(3 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   8.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.212 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.561 
  gmm(for_part, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   7.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.373 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.238 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.255 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   9.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.331 
 
TABLE III.15 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
SLOVENIA ACCORDING TO MNC’S OWNERSHIP, 2002-2010 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP) 
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP  hor_full hor_part back_full back_part for_full 
for_part humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(2 4)coll) gmm(hor_full, lag(2 2)coll) 
gmm(hor_part, lag(2 2)coll)  gmm(back_full, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(back_part, lag(3 
3)coll) gmm(for_full, lag(3 4)coll) gmm(for_part, lag(3 3)coll) iv(humcap1 RD 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2  demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) 
two robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     12884 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      4335 
Number of instruments = 71                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(60) =    684.35                                      avg =      2.97 
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Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .5234803   .1014861     5.16   0.000     .3245712    .7223893 
             | 
    hor_full |  -.7850001   .3203075    -2.45   0.014    -1.412791   -.1572089 
    hor_part |   .5488629   .4413376     1.24   0.214    -.3161428    1.413869 
   back_full |  -.2399256   .1481363    -1.62   0.105    -.5302674    .0504162 
   back_part |   1.035774    .393355     2.63   0.008     .2648128    1.806736 
    for_full |   4.723631   1.565403     3.02   0.003     1.655498    7.791765 
    for_part |   2.712053   1.384235     1.96   0.050    -.0009978    5.425104 
     humcap1 |   .3690418   .0400614     9.21   0.000     .2905229    .4475607 
          RD |   .0356342   .0055475     6.42   0.000     .0247613     .046507 
   hhi_sales |   .0101016   .0993342     0.10   0.919    -.1845898    .2047929 
         age |   .0252001   .0093811     2.69   0.007     .0068136    .0435867 
        age2 |  -.0014885   .0004363    -3.41   0.001    -.0023437   -.0006333 
       logta |   .0804659    .028708     2.80   0.005     .0241992    .1367326 
      logta2 |    .002304   .0015297     1.51   0.132    -.0006941    .0053021 
      demand |  -.9539151   .2372875    -4.02   0.000     -1.41899   -.4888401 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |    4.94301   1.877052     2.63   0.008     1.264056    8.621964 
         23  |  -13.53727   3.838353    -3.53   0.000     -21.0603   -6.014236 
         24  |    5.22591   1.979721     2.64   0.008     1.345728    9.106092 
         25  |   5.382328   1.844382     2.92   0.004     1.767406     8.99725 
         26  |   5.414316   1.931966     2.80   0.005     1.627732      9.2009 
         29  |   4.355571    1.86944     2.33   0.020     .6915352    8.019607 
         45  |   6.500171   1.982898     3.28   0.001     2.613762    10.38658 
         50  |   5.845834   1.940889     3.01   0.003     2.041761    9.649907 
         51  |   7.040581   2.020938     3.48   0.000     3.079616    11.00155 
         52  |   6.754575   1.998961     3.38   0.001     2.836683    10.67247 
         55  |   5.557951   1.905588     2.92   0.004     1.823067    9.292835 
         60  |   6.491786   1.955714     3.32   0.001     2.658657    10.32492 
         61  |   21.80991   6.340983     3.44   0.001     9.381809    34.23801 
         62  |   4.316491   1.924394     2.24   0.025     .5447474    8.088234 
         63  |   5.907131    1.96395     3.01   0.003     2.057859    9.756403 
         64  |   4.934626   1.865733     2.64   0.008     1.277856    8.591395 
         70  |   6.275639   1.926646     3.26   0.001     2.499481     10.0518 
       1516  |    5.63809   1.923315     2.93   0.003     1.868463    9.407718 
       1718  |   5.313738   1.941122     2.74   0.006      1.50921    9.118266 
       2122  |   5.307023    1.89699     2.80   0.005     1.588991    9.025056 
       2728  |   6.027251   1.923186     3.13   0.002     2.257875    9.796626 
       3033  |   5.448158   1.903274     2.86   0.004     1.717809    9.178506 
       3435  |   3.198709   1.912997     1.67   0.095    -.5506959    6.948114 
       3637  |    4.77822    1.91318     2.50   0.013     1.028455    8.527985 
       4041  |   6.399882   2.021903     3.17   0.002     2.437024    10.36274 
       6567  |   6.380415    1.96786     3.24   0.001     2.523479    10.23735 
       7174  |   7.570889   2.084423     3.63   0.000     3.485495    11.65628 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |  -.0152944   .0186134    -0.82   0.411    -.0517761    .0211872 
          3  |   .0170521   .0174485     0.98   0.328    -.0171463    .0512506 
          4  |   .0728746    .024432     2.98   0.003     .0249888    .1207605 
          5  |  -.0270859   .0240974    -1.12   0.261    -.0743159    .0201441 
          6  |  -.1056451   .0400826    -2.64   0.008    -.1842055   -.0270847 
          7  |   .0429514    .014728     2.92   0.004     .0140851    .0718178 
          8  |   .0154572   .0143524     1.08   0.281     -.012673    .0435874 
          9  |   .1381229   .0414335     3.33   0.001     .0569147     .219331 
         10  |   .0304589   .0150717     2.02   0.043     .0009189    .0599989 
         11  |   .0066596   .0218246     0.31   0.760    -.0361158     .049435 
         12  |   -.057601   .0355636    -1.62   0.105    -.1273043    .0121024 
             | 
        year | 
       2003  |   .9261481   .1965061     4.71   0.000     .5410033    1.311293 
       2004  |   .1964089   .1062125     1.85   0.064    -.0117638    .4045817 
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       2005  |   .0733293   .1058648     0.69   0.489    -.1341619    .2808205 
       2006  |   .1217861   .1138809     1.07   0.285    -.1014164    .3449886 
       2007  |   .1324273   .1057407     1.25   0.210    -.0748206    .3396752 
       2008  |   .1381718   .0959664     1.44   0.150    -.0499189    .3262624 
       2009  |  -.2882952   .0721995    -3.99   0.000    -.4298037   -.1467867 
             | 
       _cons |   1.257602   2.300818     0.55   0.585    -3.251918    5.767121 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -5.66  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.97  Pr > z =  0.333 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =   0.01  Pr > z =  0.990 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =   2.02  Pr > z =  0.044 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  26.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.004 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  13.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.223 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   3.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.274 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(7)    =   9.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.243 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =  10.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.115 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   2.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.595 
  gmm(hor_full, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =  11.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.200 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.371 
  gmm(hor_part, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =  11.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.197 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.381 
  gmm(back_full, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =  10.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.230 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.288 
  gmm(back_part, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =   8.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.343 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   4.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.133 
  gmm(for_full, collapse lag(3 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   7.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.345 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   5.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.161 
  gmm(for_part, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =  10.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.230 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.288 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.996 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  13.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.111 
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TABLE III.16 COMPARISON OF VALUES OF LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLE BETWEEN OLS, FE AND 
SYSTEM GMM 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
  BASELINE OWNERSHIP MNC ORIGIN 
FE 0.090 0.080 0.080 
OLS 0.620 0.620 0.620 
GMM 0.400 0.389 0.387 
ESTONIA 
  BASELINE OWNERSHIP MNC ORIGIN 
FE 0.060 0.060 0.060 
OLS 0.510 0.510 0.510 
GMM 0.402 0.530 0.540 
HUNGARY 
  BASELINE OWNERSHIP MNC ORIGIN 
FE -0.100 -0.100 -0.110 
OLS 0.810 0.810 0.810 
GMM 0.463 0.559 0.362 
SLOVAKIA 
  BASELINE OWNERSHIP MNC ORIGIN 
FE 0.090 0.090 0.090 
OLS 0.680 0.680 0.680 
GMM 0.415 0.435 0.546 
SLOVENIA 
  BASELINE OWNERSHIP MNC ORIGIN 
FE 0.100 0.100 0.100 
OLS 0.700 0.700 0.700 
GMM 0.572 0.523 0.556 
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4.1 DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN FIRMS’ OUTPUT  IN SERVICES AND 
FOREIGN SERVICES INPUTS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
 
FIGURE IV.1 DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN FIRMS’ OUTPUT IN SERVICES
 
FIGURE IV.2 AVERAGE SHARE OF FOREIGN SERVICES INPUTS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES  
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4.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR THE BASELINE MODEL OF 
PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVERS FROM FDI IN MANUFACTURING 
SECTOR PRESENTED IN SECTION 6.4.1 
TABLE IV.1 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN THE 
CZECH REPUBLIC FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 2002-2009 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP) 
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP l2.WLP_TFP hor_tot back_tot for_tot humcap1 RD 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if 
man==1, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)coll) gmm(l2.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)coll) gmm(hor_tot, 
lag(4 4)coll) gmm(back_tot, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(for_tot, lag(3 3)coll) iv(humcap1 
RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) 
two robust ar(4) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     29263 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      9712 
Number of instruments = 47                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(41) =  51123.50                                      avg =      3.01 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         6 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .3925197   .0218542    17.96   0.000     .3496863     .435353 
         L2. |   .0636378   .0132634     4.80   0.000      .037642    .0896336 
             | 
     hor_tot |  -.6708867   .1863039    -3.60   0.000    -1.036036   -.3057378 
    back_tot |   -.275951   .3710011    -0.74   0.457      -1.0031    .4511978 
     for_tot |  -2.791898   .6227806    -4.48   0.000    -4.012525    -1.57127 
     humcap1 |   .4781354    .014006    34.14   0.000     .4506843    .5055866 
          RD |   .0449014   .0025638    17.51   0.000     .0398764    .0499264 
   hhi_sales |  -.1911537   .0587091    -3.26   0.001    -.3062215   -.0760859 
         age |  -.0091495   .0014733    -6.21   0.000    -.0120371   -.0062618 
        age2 |   .0000805   .0000398     2.02   0.043     2.49e-06    .0001584 
       logta |   .2126773   .0182006    11.69   0.000     .1770048    .2483499 
      logta2 |  -.0044626   .0009291    -4.80   0.000    -.0062836   -.0026416 
      demand |  -.0093027    .026721    -0.35   0.728     -.061675    .0430696 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |   1.178272   .1144024    10.30   0.000     .9540478    1.402497 
         23  |   2.144024    .202082    10.61   0.000     1.747951    2.540098 
         24  |   2.022489   .1458955    13.86   0.000     1.736539    2.308439 
         25  |   2.116363   .1737815    12.18   0.000     1.775758    2.456969 
         26  |   1.861833    .134903    13.80   0.000     1.597428    2.126238 
         29  |   1.405433   .1196823    11.74   0.000      1.17086    1.640006 
       1516  |   .9832033   .1279775     7.68   0.000      .732372    1.234035 
       1718  |   1.351406   .1088952    12.41   0.000     1.137975    1.564836 
       2122  |    1.07093   .1147976     9.33   0.000     .8459305    1.295929 
       2728  |   1.272423   .1227184    10.37   0.000     1.031899    1.512947 
       3033  |   1.223825   .1134627    10.79   0.000     1.001443    1.446208 
       3435  |   1.230608    .118932    10.35   0.000     .9975054     1.46371 
       3637  |    1.28161   .1163911    11.01   0.000     1.053488    1.509733 
             | 
 region_code | 
          4  |  -.0582088   .0241892    -2.41   0.016    -.1056188   -.0107988 
          5  |  -.0815118   .0239856    -3.40   0.001    -.1285228   -.0345008 
          6  |  -.0689571    .024756    -2.79   0.005    -.1174781   -.0204361 
          7  |  -.0219346   .0230522    -0.95   0.341    -.0671161    .0232468 
          8  |  -.0662169   .0240615    -2.75   0.006    -.1133766   -.0190572 
          9  |   -.040673   .0237358    -1.71   0.087    -.0871942    .0058483 
         10  |  -.0269293   .0247529    -1.09   0.277    -.0754442    .0215855 
         11  |  -.0300984   .0236204    -1.27   0.203    -.0763935    .0161968 
         13  |  -.0458918   .0212784    -2.16   0.031    -.0875967    -.004187 
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         14  |  -.0746142   .0234976    -3.18   0.001    -.1206687   -.0285597 
             | 
        year | 
       2004  |  -.2639856   .0728375    -3.62   0.000    -.4067445   -.1212267 
       2005  |  -.1401693   .0652612    -2.15   0.032    -.2680789   -.0122596 
       2006  |  -.1265405   .0696048    -1.82   0.069    -.2629634    .0098824 
       2007  |  -.1718016   .0722193    -2.38   0.017    -.3133487   -.0302544 
       2008  |   .0545478   .0231976     2.35   0.019     .0090814    .1000141 
             | 
       _cons |  -.3816861   .2651916    -1.44   0.150    -.9014521    .1380798 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -15.88  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.57  Pr > z =  0.570 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.82  Pr > z =  0.411 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.09  Pr > z =  0.925 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(5)    =  19.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.001 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(5)    =   6.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.277 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   6.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.277 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.396 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.188 
  gmm(L2.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.529 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   4.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.129 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   5.50  Prob > chi2 =  0.139 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.664 
  gmm(back_tot, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   3.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.280 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.288 
  gmm(for_tot, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   5.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.131 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.709 
 
LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_back:_b[back_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))  
(LR_for:_b[for_tot]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_age:_b[age]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(
1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |  -1.104376   .3142836    -3.51   0.000    -1.720361   -.4883914 
         LR_back |   -.454255   .6092875    -0.75   0.456    -1.648437    .7399266 
          LR_for |  -4.595865   1.054562    -4.36   0.000    -6.662768   -2.528962 
LR_human_capital |   .7870797   .0179202    43.92   0.000     .7519568    .8222027 
  LR_intangibles |   .0739142   .0031458    23.50   0.000     .0677484    .0800799 
          LR_HHI |  -.3146665   .0963677    -3.27   0.001    -.5035437   -.1257893 
          LR_age |  -.0150613   .0023489    -6.41   0.000    -.0196651   -.0104575 
        LR_agesq |   .0001324   .0000656     2.02   0.043     3.92e-06    .0002609 
         LR_size |   .3500974   .0237839    14.72   0.000     .3034818     .396713 
       LR_sizesq |  -.0073461   .0014874    -4.94   0.000    -.0102613   -.0044308 
       LR_demand |  -.0153136   .0440215    -0.35   0.728    -.1015943     .070967 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE IV.2 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
ESTONIA FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 2002-2010 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP)  
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xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP hor_tot back_tot for_tot humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 
logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if man==1, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, 
lag(2 2)coll) gmm(hor_tot, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(back_tot, lag(2 3)coll) gmm(for_tot, 
lag(3 3)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) iv( 
i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     11451 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      2870 
Number of instruments = 42                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(36) =  15814.34                                      avg =      3.99 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .3449443   .1089459     3.17   0.002     .1314141    .5584744 
             | 
     hor_tot |  -1.773618   .8341122    -2.13   0.033    -3.408448   -.1387886 
    back_tot |  -1.935952    .882441    -2.19   0.028    -3.665504    -.206399 
     for_tot |  -1.374246   1.056993    -1.30   0.194    -3.445914    .6974232 
     humcap1 |   .4203326   .0393683    10.68   0.000     .3431721    .4974931 
          RD |   .1006591   .0148214     6.79   0.000     .0716097    .1297085 
   hhi_sales |  -3.523549   1.297593    -2.72   0.007    -6.066785   -.9803125 
         age |  -.0016731   .0043819    -0.38   0.703    -.0102615    .0069152 
        age2 |   .0000565   .0000426     1.33   0.185    -.0000271      .00014 
       logta |   .6377572   .1471909     4.33   0.000     .3492684     .926246 
      logta2 |  -.0457454   .0135823    -3.37   0.001    -.0723663   -.0191245 
      demand |   .0626452   .0694452     0.90   0.367    -.0734649    .1987553 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |   .3931776     .49383     0.80   0.426    -.5747114    1.361067 
         23  |   92.40565   31.98779     2.89   0.004     29.71074    155.1006 
         24  |   2.129813   .8867199     2.40   0.016     .3918743    3.867752 
         25  |   .7043336   .5074959     1.39   0.165    -.2903401    1.699007 
         26  |   .9508257   .6327068     1.50   0.133    -.2892568    2.190908 
         29  |   .8925063   .5139831     1.74   0.082     -.114882    1.899895 
       1516  |   .9761453   .5391692     1.81   0.070    -.0806068    2.032897 
       1718  |    1.14088    .559784     2.04   0.042     .0437232    2.238036 
       2122  |   .6971443   .5124362     1.36   0.174    -.3072122    1.701501 
       2728  |    .908417   .5594952     1.62   0.104    -.1881734    2.005007 
       3033  |   1.912958    .820874     2.33   0.020     .3040744    3.521841 
       3435  |    1.33666   .7186743     1.86   0.063     -.071916    2.745235 
       3637  |    .578158   .4825936     1.20   0.231     -.367708    1.524024 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |   -.026187   .0191503    -1.37   0.171     -.063721     .011347 
          3  |   -.044536   .0218318    -2.04   0.041    -.0873257   -.0017464 
          4  |  -.2720266   .0848677    -3.21   0.001    -.4383643   -.1056889 
          5  |  -.0475457   .0202552    -2.35   0.019    -.0872451   -.0078462 
             | 
        year | 
       2003  |  -.6807995   .3509911    -1.94   0.052    -1.368729    .0071305 
       2004  |  -.6000888   .2990628    -2.01   0.045    -1.186241   -.0139365 
       2005  |  -.5488359   .2657045    -2.07   0.039    -1.069607   -.0280647 
       2006  |  -.4908083   .2300777    -2.13   0.033    -.9417524   -.0398642 
       2007  |  -.5523806   .2116948    -2.61   0.009    -.9672947   -.1374664 
       2008  |  -.5258489   .1592791    -3.30   0.001    -.8380303   -.2136675 
       2009  |  -.3714523   .0821932    -4.52   0.000    -.5325479   -.2103566 
             | 
       _cons |   .3154618   .5217162     0.60   0.545    -.7070831    1.338007 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -5.10  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.36  Pr > z =  0.718 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.41  Pr > z =  0.684 
 
430 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.29  Pr > z =  0.771 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(5)    =  19.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(5)    =   5.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.307 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   5.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.200 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   5.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.126 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.872 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   4.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.260 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.371 
  gmm(back_tot, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.900 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   5.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.123 
  gmm(for_tot, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   4.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.181 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.571 
 
LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_back:_b[back_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))  
(LR_for:_b[for_tot]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_age:_b[age]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(
1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |  -2.707584   1.352003    -2.00   0.045     -5.35746   -.0577074 
         LR_back |    -2.9554   1.510739    -1.96   0.050    -5.916394    .0055943 
          LR_for |  -2.097906   1.682613    -1.25   0.212    -5.395767    1.199954 
LR_human_capital |   .6416746   .0582413    11.02   0.000     .5275237    .7558254 
  LR_intangibles |   .1536649   .0192419     7.99   0.000     .1159515    .1913782 
          LR_HHI |  -5.379006   1.984529    -2.71   0.007    -9.268612     -1.4894 
          LR_age |  -.0025542   .0067164    -0.38   0.704    -.0157181    .0106097 
        LR_agesq |   .0000862   .0000671     1.28   0.199    -.0000453    .0002178 
         LR_size |   .9735923   .2134501     4.56   0.000     .5552379    1.391947 
       LR_sizesq |  -.0698344   .0212338    -3.29   0.001    -.1114518    -.028217 
       LR_demand |   .0956333   .1105415     0.87   0.387     -.121024    .3122906 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
TABLE IV.3 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
HUNGARY FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 2002-2010 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP hor_tot back_tot for_tot humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 
logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if man==1, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, 
lag(1 2)coll) gmm(hor_tot, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(back_tot, lag(2 5)coll) gmm(for_tot, 
lag(2 5)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      2499 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      1278 
Number of instruments = 63                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(51) =  15501.40                                      avg =      1.96 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .5467549    .103385     5.29   0.000     .3441241    .7493857 
             | 
     hor_tot |  -1.144667   .3881924    -2.95   0.003     -1.90551   -.3838241 
    back_tot |  -2.414232   .8535465    -2.83   0.005    -4.087152   -.7413114 
     for_tot |   -2.03704   1.838051    -1.11   0.268    -5.639554    1.565473 
     humcap1 |   .3106084   .0526446     5.90   0.000     .2074269      .41379 
          RD |   .0095635   .0046169     2.07   0.038     .0005144    .0186125 
   hhi_sales |  -.2027423   .1135242    -1.79   0.074    -.4252457    .0197612 
         age |  -.0072496   .0041451    -1.75   0.080    -.0153737    .0008746 
        age2 |  -.0000159   .0001317    -0.12   0.904     -.000274    .0002421 
       logta |   .0865239   .0600711     1.44   0.150    -.0312132    .2042611 
      logta2 |   .0009974    .003495     0.29   0.775    -.0058527    .0078475 
      demand |   .0925491   .0529855     1.75   0.081    -.0113005    .1963987 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |   .1121933   .1900081     0.59   0.555    -.2602158    .4846024 
         23  |   1.679487   .4888636     3.44   0.001     .7213319    2.637642 
         24  |   .6456333   .3164467     2.04   0.041     .0254092    1.265857 
         25  |   .0211933   .2407701     0.09   0.930    -.4507075    .4930941 
         26  |  -.0444133   .1942293    -0.23   0.819    -.4250958    .3362692 
         29  |   .3516929   .3261931     1.08   0.281    -.2876338    .9910195 
       1516  |  -.2017612   .2995775    -0.67   0.501    -.7889223       .3854 
       1718  |  -.4274033   .1605491    -2.66   0.008    -.7420738   -.1127329 
       2122  |  -.4457008   .1845901    -2.41   0.016    -.8074908   -.0839108 
       2728  |  -.2980135   .2453809    -1.21   0.225    -.7789511    .1829241 
       3033  |   -.111165   .2596011    -0.43   0.668    -.6199737    .3976438 
       3435  |  -.6473702   .2627441    -2.46   0.014    -1.162339   -.1324013 
       3637  |   .0780932   .1953294     0.40   0.689    -.3047454    .4609318 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |    .008569   .0571744     0.15   0.881    -.1034908    .1206288 
          3  |  -.0882057   .0545473    -1.62   0.106    -.1951164    .0187049 
          4  |  -.0440056   .0525348    -0.84   0.402    -.1469719    .0589608 
          5  |   .0203461   .0324303     0.63   0.530     -.043216    .0839083 
          6  |   .0404167    .055375     0.73   0.465    -.0681162    .1489497 
          7  |  -.0568529   .0422917    -1.34   0.179    -.1397431    .0260373 
          8  |  -.0212948   .0383726    -0.55   0.579    -.0965036    .0539141 
          9  |  -.0177322   .0467138    -0.38   0.704    -.1092896    .0738252 
         10  |   .0197028   .0614724     0.32   0.749    -.1007809    .1401865 
         11  |  -.0322004   .0510389    -0.63   0.528    -.1322349    .0678341 
         12  |   .0120419   .0475222     0.25   0.800    -.0810999    .1051837 
         13  |  -.0591242   .0635442    -0.93   0.352    -.1836686    .0654201 
         14  |  -.0011042    .037942    -0.03   0.977    -.0754692    .0732609 
         15  |  -.0070629   .0550538    -0.13   0.898    -.1149664    .1008405 
         16  |  -.0220889   .0588969    -0.38   0.708    -.1375246    .0933469 
         17  |  -.0212165    .081157    -0.26   0.794    -.1802813    .1378482 
         18  |  -.0537406   .0611146    -0.88   0.379    -.1735231    .0660419 
         19  |   -.000207   .0572298    -0.00   0.997    -.1123754    .1119615 
         20  |   -.047876   .0534366    -0.90   0.370    -.1526097    .0568577 
             | 
        year | 
       2004  |  -.0684947   .1508805    -0.45   0.650     -.364215    .2272256 
       2005  |  -.2968794   .1565715    -1.90   0.058    -.6037538    .0099951 
       2006  |  -.2723051   .1562098    -1.74   0.081    -.5784708    .0338606 
       2007  |  -.2535934   .1667643    -1.52   0.128    -.5804454    .0732585 
       2008  |  -.2699415   .1738068    -1.55   0.120    -.6105964    .0707135 
       2009  |  -.3788334   .1672376    -2.27   0.023    -.7066131   -.0510538 
       2010  |   -.343618   .1512133    -2.27   0.023    -.6399907   -.0472454 
             | 
       _cons |   .8563584   .5647456     1.52   0.129    -.2505227     1.96324 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.27  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.16  Pr > z =  0.869 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.95  Pr > z =  0.342 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -1.29  Pr > z =  0.196 
 
432 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  20.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.043 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  13.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.278 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   5.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.554 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   7.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.118 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =  12.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.120 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.925 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =   9.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.393 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.153 
  gmm(back_tot, collapse lag(2 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   4.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.662 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   9.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.104 
  gmm(for_tot, collapse lag(2 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   8.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.224 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   5.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.410 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   1.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.778 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  12.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.145 
LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_back:_b[back_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))  
(LR_for:_b[for_tot]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_age:_b[age]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(
1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |  -2.525493    .934928    -2.70   0.007    -4.357918   -.6930674 
         LR_back |  -5.326548   2.138356    -2.49   0.013    -9.517648   -1.135448 
          LR_for |  -4.494346   4.581995    -0.98   0.327    -13.47489    4.486199 
LR_human_capital |    .685299   .0753282     9.10   0.000     .5376585    .8329395 
  LR_intangibles |      .0211   .0086685     2.43   0.015     .0041101    .0380898 
          LR_HHI |  -.4473126   .2750489    -1.63   0.104    -.9863985    .0917732 
          LR_age |  -.0159948   .0081924    -1.95   0.051    -.0320516     .000062 
        LR_agesq |  -.0000351   .0002923    -0.12   0.904    -.0006081    .0005378 
         LR_size |   .1908988   .1350971     1.41   0.158    -.0738867    .4556843 
       LR_sizesq |   .0022006   .0075825     0.29   0.772    -.0126609    .0170621 
       LR_demand |   .2041922   .1278687     1.60   0.110    -.0464258    .4548102 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
TABLE IV.4 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
SLOVAKIA FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 2002-2009 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP hor_tot back_tot for_tot humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 
logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if man==1, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, 
lag(1 2)) gmm(hor_tot, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(back_tot, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(for_tot, 
lag(3 5)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      8140 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      3074 
Number of instruments = 60                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(38) =  10085.65                                      avg =      2.65 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
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     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .3807744   .0407335     9.35   0.000     .3009382    .4606106 
             | 
     hor_tot |  -.4006397   .1787159    -2.24   0.025    -.7509165    -.050363 
    back_tot |   .8735587   .8192449     1.07   0.286    -.7321318    2.479249 
     for_tot |   .2469473   .3823793     0.65   0.518    -.5025024    .9963969 
     humcap1 |   .3386129   .0144199    23.48   0.000     .3103505    .3668753 
          RD |   .0608208    .005165    11.78   0.000     .0506975    .0709441 
   hhi_sales |  -.0942838   .1085733    -0.87   0.385    -.3070836     .118516 
         age |  -.0092094   .0025658    -3.59   0.000    -.0142382   -.0041806 
        age2 |   .0000876   .0000476     1.84   0.066    -5.69e-06     .000181 
       logta |   .1422287   .0315067     4.51   0.000     .0804768    .2039806 
      logta2 |  -.0024373   .0019909    -1.22   0.221    -.0063395    .0014649 
      demand |   -.011462   .0151008    -0.76   0.448     -.041059     .018135 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |  -.1312321   .1149867    -1.14   0.254    -.3566018    .0941376 
         23  |   1.206204   .2306547     5.23   0.000      .754129    1.658279 
         24  |   .7981141   .1127308     7.08   0.000     .5771658    1.019062 
         25  |  -.2464845   .1087551    -2.27   0.023    -.4596406   -.0333283 
         26  |  -.7631435   .1042753    -7.32   0.000    -.9675194   -.5587676 
         29  |   .0125764   .0856359     0.15   0.883    -.1552669    .1804197 
       1516  |  -.1646652   .1097999    -1.50   0.134    -.3798691    .0505387 
       1718  |  -.1088201    .082653    -1.32   0.188     -.270817    .0531768 
       2122  |   .0663854   .1010117     0.66   0.511    -.1315939    .2643646 
       2728  |  -.5091928   .1737019    -2.93   0.003    -.8496423   -.1687433 
       3033  |   .4719134   .0946705     4.98   0.000     .2863626    .6574641 
       3435  |   .7779109   .1347215     5.77   0.000     .5138615     1.04196 
       3637  |  -.2267976    .090157    -2.52   0.012    -.4035021    -.050093 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |   .0980831   .0377262     2.60   0.009     .0241411     .172025 
          3  |  -.0163304   .0352365    -0.46   0.643    -.0853927    .0527318 
          4  |   .0335529   .0292936     1.15   0.252    -.0238615    .0909674 
          5  |   .0279928   .0323347     0.87   0.387     -.035382    .0913676 
          6  |  -.0009168   .0273793    -0.03   0.973    -.0545792    .0527456 
          7  |   .0298911   .0282688     1.06   0.290    -.0255147    .0852969 
          8  |  -.0006193   .0291924    -0.02   0.983    -.0578354    .0565969 
             | 
        year | 
       2003  |   .1232193   .0736173     1.67   0.094    -.0210679    .2675065 
       2004  |    .130122   .0626031     2.08   0.038     .0074222    .2528219 
       2005  |   .1232039    .065043     1.89   0.058     -.004278    .2506858 
       2006  |   .1661935    .071075     2.34   0.019     .0268891     .305498 
       2007  |   .1758382   .0410664     4.28   0.000     .0953495    .2563268 
       2008  |   .2158678   .0377681     5.72   0.000     .1418438    .2898918 
             | 
       _cons |   .9189749   .1784835     5.15   0.000     .5691537    1.268796 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -10.51  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.33  Pr > z =  0.742 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =   1.90  Pr > z =  0.058 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.31  Pr > z =  0.756 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(21)   =  22.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.372 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(21)   =  13.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.883 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =   7.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.848 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =   6.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.686 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   4.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.369 
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    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(17)   =   9.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.927 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(19)   =  13.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.824 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.825 
  gmm(back_tot, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(19)   =  13.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.813 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.914 
  gmm(for_tot, collapse lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =  10.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.870 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   2.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.569 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(13)   =   7.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.876 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   6.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.625 
 
 
LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_back:_b[back_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))  
(LR_for:_b[for_tot]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_age:_b[age]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(
1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |  -.6470012   .2935254    -2.20   0.028      -1.2223   -.0717021 
         LR_back |   1.410728   1.325428     1.06   0.287    -1.187064    4.008519 
          LR_for |   .3988001   .6145715     0.65   0.516    -.8057378    1.603338 
LR_human_capital |   .5468329   .0279556    19.56   0.000     .4920408    .6016249 
  LR_intangibles |   .0982207   .0071763    13.69   0.000     .0841553    .1122861 
          LR_HHI |  -.1522608   .1740006    -0.88   0.382    -.4932958    .1887741 
          LR_age |  -.0148724   .0041474    -3.59   0.000    -.0230011   -.0067438 
        LR_agesq |   .0001415   .0000778     1.82   0.069    -.0000109     .000294 
         LR_size |    .229688   .0473672     4.85   0.000     .1368499    .3225261 
       LR_sizesq |   -.003936   .0031885    -1.23   0.217    -.0101853    .0023132 
       LR_demand |  -.0185102    .024365    -0.76   0.447    -.0662647    .0292443 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
TABLE IV.5 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
SLOVENIA FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 2002-2010 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP) 
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP hor_tot back_tot for_tot humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 
logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if man==1, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, 
lag(1 2)) gmm(hor_tot, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(back_tot, lag(3 4)coll) gmm(for_tot, 
lag(2 3)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand0 iv( 
i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      3584 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      1136 
Number of instruments = 68                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(43) =   6159.85                                      avg =      3.15 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .4425096   .0591313     7.48   0.000     .3266143    .5584048 
             | 
     hor_tot |   1.948354   .9454084     2.06   0.039     .0953882    3.801321 
    back_tot |     1.7311   .8979263     1.93   0.054    -.0288034    3.491003 
     for_tot |   .7626071   1.168297     0.65   0.514    -1.527214    3.052428 
     humcap1 |   .5168935    .049528    10.44   0.000     .4198205    .6139665 
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          RD |   .0290221   .0057209     5.07   0.000     .0178094    .0402349 
   hhi_sales |  -.1347725   .1530708    -0.88   0.379    -.4347857    .1652406 
         age |  -.0103004     .00283    -3.64   0.000    -.0158472   -.0047537 
        age2 |    .000045   .0000847     0.53   0.595     -.000121    .0002111 
       logta |   -.018502   .0606706    -0.30   0.760    -.1374142    .1004102 
      logta2 |   .0097217   .0049485     1.96   0.049     .0000227    .0194207 
      demand |  -.0779417   .1783277    -0.44   0.662    -.4274577    .2715742 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         20  |  -.3659174   .1798576    -2.03   0.042    -.7184318   -.0134029 
         23  |  -.2432156   1.894091    -0.13   0.898    -3.955566    3.469135 
         24  |   .0218688   .3837448     0.06   0.955    -.7302571    .7739947 
         25  |  -.6628558   .2408833    -2.75   0.006    -1.134978   -.1907332 
         26  |   -.074303    .187815    -0.40   0.692    -.4424137    .2938076 
         29  |  -.7371707   .2311942    -3.19   0.001    -1.190303   -.2840384 
       1516  |   -.281934   .1925926    -1.46   0.143    -.6594085    .0955406 
       1718  |   -.002745   .1803845    -0.02   0.988    -.3562922    .3508022 
       2122  |   -.826935   .2092614    -3.95   0.000     -1.23708   -.4167901 
       2728  |  -.9167497   .2958357    -3.10   0.002    -1.496577   -.3369222 
       3033  |  -.2979411   .1755386    -1.70   0.090    -.6419905    .0461082 
       3435  |  -1.965703   .6502606    -3.02   0.003     -3.24019   -.6912153 
       3637  |  -.2159023   .2141865    -1.01   0.313       -.6357    .2038955 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |  -.0227627   .0458429    -0.50   0.620    -.1126131    .0670877 
          3  |    .064433   .0448825     1.44   0.151     -.023535     .152401 
          4  |   .0189333   .0477101     0.40   0.691    -.0745768    .1124434 
          5  |   .0054825   .0502483     0.11   0.913    -.0930023    .1039673 
          6  |   .0384147   .0530029     0.72   0.469     -.065469    .1422985 
          7  |   .0333082   .0325578     1.02   0.306    -.0305039    .0971204 
          8  |   .0151727   .0394005     0.39   0.700    -.0620508    .0923962 
          9  |   .0229111   .0630454     0.36   0.716    -.1006555    .1464778 
         10  |   .0154764   .0413461     0.37   0.708    -.0655605    .0965133 
         11  |   .0624112    .053754     1.16   0.246    -.0429448    .1677672 
         12  |  -.0343209   .0756912    -0.45   0.650    -.1826729    .1140311 
             | 
        year | 
       2003  |   .5375263     .20297     2.65   0.008     .1397124    .9353402 
       2004  |   .3835903   .1261885     3.04   0.002     .1362654    .6309152 
       2005  |    .332181   .1176597     2.82   0.005     .1015723    .5627897 
       2006  |   .3974388   .1284319     3.09   0.002     .1457169    .6491607 
       2007  |   .3282541   .1184943     2.77   0.006     .0960095    .5604988 
       2008  |   .2762468   .1086694     2.54   0.011     .0632588    .4892349 
       2009  |  -.2302258   .0709097    -3.25   0.001    -.3692062   -.0912455 
             | 
       _cons |   1.393855    1.28487     1.08   0.278    -1.124444    3.912154 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -8.59  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.21  Pr > z =  0.228 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.44  Pr > z =  0.663 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.03  Pr > z =  0.977 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(24)   =  48.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(24)   =  23.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.481 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(14)   =  13.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.512 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(10)   =  10.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.400 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   2.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.694 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(20)   =  21.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.372 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  23.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.373 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.935 
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  gmm(back_tot, collapse lag(3 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(21)   =  21.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.415 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.590 
  gmm(for_tot, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(21)   =  21.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.442 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.498 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =  17.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.331 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   5.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.672 
 
LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_back:_b[back_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))  
(LR_for:_b[for_tot]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_age:_b[age]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(
1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |   3.494866   1.704031     2.05   0.040     .1550272    6.834705 
         LR_back |   3.105165    1.59528     1.95   0.052    -.0215254    6.231856 
          LR_for |   1.367929   2.109792     0.65   0.517    -2.767188    5.503045 
LR_human_capital |   .9271791   .0708491    13.09   0.000     .7883174    1.066041 
  LR_intangibles |   .0520585   .0087712     5.94   0.000     .0348674    .0692497 
          LR_HHI |  -.2417486   .2761538    -0.88   0.381    -.7830002     .299503 
          LR_age |  -.0184764   .0056723    -3.26   0.001    -.0295939   -.0073589 
        LR_agesq |   .0000808   .0001549     0.52   0.602    -.0002228    .0003844 
         LR_size |   -.033188    .108654    -0.31   0.760    -.2461458    .1797699 
       LR_sizesq |   .0174383   .0085685     2.04   0.042     .0006444    .0342323 
       LR_demand |  -.1398082     .31344    -0.45   0.656    -.7541393    .4745229 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
4.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR THE BASELINE MODEL OF 
PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVERS FROM FDI IN SERVICE SECTOR 
PRESENTED IN SECTION 6.4.1 
TABLE IV.6 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN THE 
CZECH REPUBLIC FOR SERVICES SECTOR, 2002-2009 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP) 
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP l2.WLP_TFP hor_tot back_tot for_tot humcap1 RD 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if 
man==0, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 2)coll) gmm(l2.WLP_TFP,lag(1 1)coll) gmm(hor_tot, 
lag(2 2)coll) gmm(back_tot, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(for_tot, lag(2 2)coll) iv(humcap1 
RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) 
two robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     68628 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =     26988 
Number of instruments = 47                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(41) = 112015.62                                      avg =      2.54 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         6 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .4096403   .0144477    28.35   0.000     .3813234    .4379573 
         L2. |   .0818678   .0090795     9.02   0.000     .0640724    .0996633 
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             | 
     hor_tot |    1.69027   .2148659     7.87   0.000     1.269141      2.1114 
    back_tot |  -.7743065   .1298834    -5.96   0.000    -1.028873   -.5197396 
     for_tot |  -5.041915   .5419953    -9.30   0.000    -6.104206   -3.979624 
     humcap1 |   .4137492   .0100627    41.12   0.000     .3940266    .4334718 
          RD |   .0526286   .0022361    23.54   0.000      .048246    .0570112 
   hhi_sales |  -1.326875    .237236    -5.59   0.000    -1.791849   -.8619014 
         age |  -.0097676   .0015477    -6.31   0.000     -.012801   -.0067342 
        age2 |   .0000338   .0000616     0.55   0.583    -.0000869    .0001545 
       logta |   .2093268   .0173085    12.09   0.000     .1754027    .2432509 
      logta2 |  -.0062714   .0011654    -5.38   0.000    -.0085556   -.0039872 
      demand |   .1977529   .0290606     6.80   0.000     .1407952    .2547106 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         45  |  -.3655451   .0681419    -5.36   0.000    -.4991008   -.2319894 
         50  |   .2116272   .0630227     3.36   0.001     .0881049    .3351495 
         51  |   .9677945   .0397166    24.37   0.000     .8899513    1.045638 
         52  |   1.057776   .0579624    18.25   0.000     .9441715     1.17138 
         55  |   .1357055   .0623536     2.18   0.030     .0134946    .2579164 
         60  |   .1841448   .0499421     3.69   0.000     .0862601    .2820295 
         61  |   1.890148   .2842885     6.65   0.000     1.332952    2.447343 
         62  |   1.103922   .2460288     4.49   0.000      .621714    1.586129 
         63  |    -.65656   .0941384    -6.97   0.000    -.8410678   -.4720522 
         64  |  -.8937918   .1678507    -5.32   0.000    -1.222773   -.5648104 
         70  |    .286106   .0371807     7.70   0.000     .2132332    .3589787 
       4041  |  -.3457341   .1062587    -3.25   0.001    -.5539973   -.1374708 
       6567  |  -.5222784   .1710057    -3.05   0.002    -.8574433   -.1871135 
             | 
 region_code | 
          4  |   -.020808   .0233017    -0.89   0.372    -.0664786    .0248625 
          5  |   .0039841   .0223241     0.18   0.858    -.0397702    .0477385 
          6  |   -.039214   .0240423    -1.63   0.103    -.0863362    .0079081 
          7  |   .0072933   .0211213     0.35   0.730    -.0341036    .0486902 
          8  |  -.0153223   .0232276    -0.66   0.509    -.0608475     .030203 
          9  |  -.0160648   .0230202    -0.70   0.485    -.0611836     .029054 
         10  |  -.0074217   .0226598    -0.33   0.743    -.0518341    .0369908 
         11  |     .02487   .0204751     1.21   0.225    -.0152605    .0650004 
         13  |   .0053727   .0198324     0.27   0.786    -.0334982    .0442435 
         14  |  -.0242532   .0221896    -1.09   0.274     -.067744    .0192375 
             | 
        year | 
       2004  |  -.4570998   .0740754    -6.17   0.000     -.602285   -.3119146 
       2005  |  -.3039608   .0583317    -5.21   0.000    -.4182888   -.1896328 
       2006  |  -.3374211   .0640139    -5.27   0.000     -.462886   -.2119562 
       2007  |  -.3249541   .0668977    -4.86   0.000    -.4560711   -.1938371 
       2008  |  -.0882397   .0170111    -5.19   0.000    -.1215809   -.0548986 
             | 
       _cons |  -.9327803   .2025605    -4.60   0.000    -1.329792   -.5357689 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -26.34  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.54  Pr > z =  0.588 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =   1.31  Pr > z =  0.189 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.03  Pr > z =  0.979 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(5)    =   8.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.117 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(5)    =   5.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.412 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   5.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.412 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   4.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.219 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.737 
  gmm(L2.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
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    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   3.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.298 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.508 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   1.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.780 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.139 
  gmm(back_tot, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   3.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.303 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.499 
  gmm(for_tot, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   3.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.334 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.443 
 
LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_back:_b[back_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))  
(LR_for:_b[for_tot]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_age:_b[age]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(
1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |   2.863119   .3867104     7.40   0.000     2.105181    3.621058 
         LR_back |  -1.311584   .2320193    -5.65   0.000    -1.766334   -.8568349 
          LR_for |  -8.540412   1.017607    -8.39   0.000    -10.53489   -6.545939 
LR_human_capital |   .7008426   .0105661    66.33   0.000     .6801334    .7215519 
  LR_intangibles |   .0891466   .0028233    31.58   0.000      .083613    .0946802 
          LR_HHI |  -2.247571   .4095308    -5.49   0.000    -3.050237   -1.444906 
          LR_age |  -.0165452   .0026296    -6.29   0.000    -.0216991   -.0113913 
        LR_agesq |   .0000573   .0001046     0.55   0.584    -.0001477    .0002623 
         LR_size |   .3545751   .0255549    13.88   0.000     .3044884    .4046617 
       LR_sizesq |  -.0106231   .0019135    -5.55   0.000    -.0143735   -.0068726 
       LR_demand |   .3349702   .0519509     6.45   0.000     .2331482    .4367922 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
TABLE IV.7 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
ESTONIA FOR SERVICES SECTOR, 2002-2010 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP hor_tot back_tot for_tot humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 
logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if man==0, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, 
lag(2 2)coll) gmm(hor_tot, lag(4 6)coll) gmm(back_tot, lag(3 4)coll) gmm(for_tot, 
lag(4 6)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     54743 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =     15814 
Number of instruments = 46                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(36) =  78015.01                                      avg =      3.46 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .5901357   .0414605    14.23   0.000     .5088746    .6713968 
             | 
     hor_tot |   .1604103    .320256     0.50   0.616    -.4672799    .7881005 
    back_tot |  -.3501051   .1212107    -2.89   0.004    -.5876737   -.1125365 
     for_tot |  -5.723594   1.239521    -4.62   0.000    -8.153011   -3.294177 
     humcap1 |   .3080943   .0147712    20.86   0.000     .2791434    .3370453 
          RD |   .0801159   .0038511    20.80   0.000     .0725679    .0876639 
   hhi_sales |   .4893748   .1565213     3.13   0.002     .1825988    .7961509 
         age |   -.012556   .0009678   -12.97   0.000    -.0144528   -.0106592 
        age2 |   .0001315   .0000104    12.70   0.000     .0001112    .0001518 
       logta |   .1688141   .0159583    10.58   0.000     .1375363    .2000918 
      logta2 |  -.0030695   .0011094    -2.77   0.006    -.0052438   -.0008951 
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      demand |   .2234348   .0753608     2.96   0.003     .0757304    .3711392 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         45  |  -.3745669   .1068185    -3.51   0.000    -.5839274   -.1652064 
         50  |   .4660656   .0937708     4.97   0.000     .2822781     .649853 
         51  |   .7388933   .1076528     6.86   0.000     .5278977    .9498889 
         52  |   .5610951   .1271296     4.41   0.000     .3119257    .8102646 
         55  |   .3958085    .126243     3.14   0.002     .1483768    .6432403 
         60  |   .5268563    .116946     4.51   0.000     .2976464    .7560661 
         61  |  -.1105922   .2794766    -0.40   0.692    -.6583563     .437172 
         62  |   .4858292   .2879202     1.69   0.092    -.0784839    1.050142 
         63  |  -.3342459   .0732653    -4.56   0.000    -.4778432   -.1906485 
         64  |  -.0065716   .1342619    -0.05   0.961    -.2697201    .2565769 
         70  |   .3566814   .0708458     5.03   0.000     .2178261    .4955367 
       4041  |  -.0642846   .1163342    -0.55   0.581    -.2922954    .1637262 
       6567  |  -.4507117   .1225269    -3.68   0.000      -.69086   -.2105635 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |  -.0232228    .008841    -2.63   0.009    -.0405509   -.0058947 
          3  |  -.0298868   .0108414    -2.76   0.006    -.0511355    -.008638 
          4  |  -.0339187   .0166614    -2.04   0.042    -.0665745   -.0012629 
          5  |  -.0208578   .0075182    -2.77   0.006    -.0355932   -.0061225 
             | 
        year | 
       2003  |  -.6379444   .1562541    -4.08   0.000    -.9441967    -.331692 
       2004  |  -.5189491   .1263639    -4.11   0.000    -.7666178   -.2712804 
       2005  |  -.2951318   .0750607    -3.93   0.000    -.4422481   -.1480154 
       2006  |  -.3585103   .0793966    -4.52   0.000    -.5141247   -.2028959 
       2007  |  -.3842661   .0849188    -4.53   0.000    -.5507039   -.2178282 
       2008  |  -.2865788   .0301165    -9.52   0.000     -.345606   -.2275516 
       2009  |  -.4468583   .0308118   -14.50   0.000    -.5072483   -.3864683 
             | 
       _cons |   .0415914   .6106317     0.07   0.946    -1.155225    1.238408 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -14.37  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   2.55  Pr > z =  0.011 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.81  Pr > z =  0.418 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =   0.91  Pr > z =  0.361 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(9)    =  10.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.277 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(9)    =  10.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.286 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   8.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.147 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   2.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.615 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   6.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.465 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   4.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.123 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(4 6)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.766 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   8.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.082 
  gmm(back_tot, collapse lag(3 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   9.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.148 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.715 
  gmm(for_tot, collapse lag(4 6)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   4.50  Prob > chi2 =  0.480 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   6.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.175 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.593 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  10.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.228 
 
 
LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
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nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_back:_b[back_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))  
(LR_for:_b[for_tot]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_age:_b[age]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(
1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |    .391374   .7783643     0.50   0.615    -1.134192     1.91694 
         LR_back |  -.8541976   .3077914    -2.78   0.006    -1.457458   -.2509376 
          LR_for |  -13.96461   3.353516    -4.16   0.000    -20.53738   -7.391837 
LR_human_capital |   .7516983   .0451368    16.65   0.000     .6632318    .8401649 
  LR_intangibles |   .1954694    .013533    14.44   0.000     .1689451    .2219936 
          LR_HHI |   1.193992   .4042285     2.95   0.003      .401719    1.986266 
          LR_age |  -.0306345   .0020666   -14.82   0.000    -.0346849    -.026584 
        LR_agesq |   .0003209   .0000278    11.54   0.000     .0002664    .0003754 
         LR_size |   .4118779   .0305735    13.47   0.000      .351955    .4718008 
       LR_sizesq |   -.007489   .0028377    -2.64   0.008    -.0130508   -.0019273 
       LR_demand |   .5451433   .1976908     2.76   0.006     .1576763    .9326102 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
TABLE IV.8 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
HUNGARY FOR SERVICES SECTOR, 2002-2010 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP hor_tot back_tot for_tot humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 
logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if man==0, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, 
lag(1 3)) gmm(hor_tot, lag(2 2)) gmm(back_tot, lag(2 3)coll) gmm(for_tot, lag(3 
3)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) iv(i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      4411 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      2357 
Number of instruments = 86                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(51) =  14268.75                                      avg =      1.87 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         6 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .4863216   .0821365     5.92   0.000      .325337    .6473061 
             | 
     hor_tot |   1.074539   .5940016     1.81   0.070    -.0896826    2.238761 
    back_tot |   1.565045   .6244017     2.51   0.012     .3412399     2.78885 
     for_tot |  -23.13061   4.903054    -4.72   0.000    -32.74042    -13.5208 
     humcap1 |   .3275966    .038535     8.50   0.000     .2520694    .4031237 
          RD |   .0102987   .0044132     2.33   0.020      .001649    .0189485 
   hhi_sales |  -.1231828   .1926446    -0.64   0.523    -.5007593    .2543937 
         age |  -.0109792   .0024885    -4.41   0.000    -.0158565   -.0061019 
        age2 |   .0000351   .0000181     1.94   0.052    -2.83e-07    .0000705 
       logta |   .1212183   .0956648     1.27   0.205    -.0662813    .3087179 
      logta2 |     .00066   .0057359     0.12   0.908    -.0105821    .0119021 
      demand |   .4469405    .231733     1.93   0.054    -.0072479    .9011288 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         45  |   1.213581   .3977521     3.05   0.002     .4340014    1.993161 
         50  |   2.769296   .6371469     4.35   0.000     1.520511    4.018081 
         51  |   1.694628   .4382706     3.87   0.000     .8356332    2.553622 
         52  |   2.047254   .4302085     4.76   0.000     1.204061    2.890448 
         55  |    2.58031   .6403135     4.03   0.000     1.325319    3.835302 
         60  |    2.20442   .4912589     4.49   0.000      1.24157     3.16727 
         61  |   5.592956   1.450953     3.85   0.000     2.749141    8.436771 
         62  |   4.414333   1.251522     3.53   0.000     1.961394    6.867272 
         63  |     1.4551   .4551395     3.20   0.001     .5630434    2.347157 
         64  |   1.246844   .6057693     2.06   0.040     .0595578     2.43413 
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         70  |   1.960987   .3575921     5.48   0.000     1.260119    2.661855 
       4041  |   3.157311   .5803485     5.44   0.000     2.019849    4.294773 
       6567  |   .4473823   .3817384     1.17   0.241    -.3008112    1.195576 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |  -.1883178   .0769393    -2.45   0.014    -.3391161   -.0375195 
          3  |  -.0295932   .0768539    -0.39   0.700    -.1802242    .1210377 
          4  |   -.046539   .0715235    -0.65   0.515    -.1867226    .0936446 
          5  |  -.0194239   .0459677    -0.42   0.673    -.1095188    .0706711 
          6  |  -.1136715   .0633516    -1.79   0.073    -.2378383    .0104953 
          7  |  -.0385425    .066669    -0.58   0.563    -.1692113    .0921263 
          8  |   -.073705   .0615724    -1.20   0.231    -.1943846    .0469746 
          9  |  -.0896902   .0622165    -1.44   0.149    -.2116324     .032252 
         10  |  -.0308271   .0801629    -0.38   0.701    -.1879435    .1262894 
         11  |  -.1305749    .073358    -1.78   0.075     -.274354    .0132041 
         12  |   .0129786   .0805328     0.16   0.872    -.1448629      .17082 
         13  |  -.3132104   .0921117    -3.40   0.001    -.4937459   -.1326749 
         14  |  -.0225427   .0492312    -0.46   0.647     -.119034    .0739486 
         15  |  -.0904657   .0768296    -1.18   0.239    -.2410489    .0601175 
         16  |  -.1216052   .0636549    -1.91   0.056    -.2463666    .0031562 
         17  |  -.1727057   .1206606    -1.43   0.152     -.409196    .0637847 
         18  |  -.0820498    .066578    -1.23   0.218    -.2125403    .0484408 
         19  |  -.0892265    .078472    -1.14   0.256    -.2430287    .0645758 
         20  |  -.1515744   .0796189    -1.90   0.057    -.3076246    .0044759 
             | 
        year | 
       2003  |  -1.710372   .5235024    -3.27   0.001    -2.736418   -.6843262 
       2004  |  -.7907017   .2334605    -3.39   0.001    -1.248276   -.3331274 
       2005  |  -.0823408   .1573496    -0.52   0.601    -.3907404    .2260587 
       2006  |  -.1550889   .1370791    -1.13   0.258     -.423759    .1135812 
       2007  |   .0705042   .1410904     0.50   0.617    -.2060279    .3470363 
       2008  |    .314872   .1868292     1.69   0.092    -.0513065    .6810505 
       2009  |   .2455149   .2079703     1.18   0.238    -.1620994    .6531293 
             | 
       _cons |  -2.186255   1.802716    -1.21   0.225    -5.719514    1.347003 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.80  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.68  Pr > z =  0.093 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.72  Pr > z =  0.474 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =   1.35  Pr > z =  0.178 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(34)   =  78.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(34)   =  35.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.402 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(20)   =  19.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.509 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  16.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.301 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, lag(1 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(13)   =  12.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.497 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(21)   =  23.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.343 
  gmm(hor_tot, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  20.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.538 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =  14.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.260 
  gmm(back_tot, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(31)   =  34.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.295 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.876 
  gmm(for_tot, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(32)   =  35.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.314 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.964 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(26)   =  26.96  Prob > chi2 =  0.412 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   8.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.391 
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LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_back:_b[back_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))  
(LR_for:_b[for_tot]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_age:_b[age]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(
1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |   2.091852   1.253776     1.67   0.095    -.3655029    4.549207 
         LR_back |   3.046741   1.328398     2.29   0.022     .4431274    5.650354 
          LR_for |  -45.02935   11.23402    -4.01   0.000    -67.04762   -23.01107 
LR_human_capital |   .6377464    .050637    12.59   0.000     .5384996    .7369932 
  LR_intangibles |    .020049   .0079432     2.52   0.012     .0044807    .0356173 
          LR_HHI |  -.2398053    .371676    -0.65   0.519     -.968277    .4886663 
          LR_age |  -.0213737   .0042379    -5.04   0.000    -.0296799   -.0130675 
        LR_agesq |   .0000683   .0000341     2.00   0.045     1.51e-06    .0001352 
         LR_size |   .2359809    .179494     1.31   0.189    -.1158208    .5877827 
       LR_sizesq |   .0012848    .011177     0.11   0.908    -.0206218    .0231914 
       LR_demand |   .8700781   .4465447     1.95   0.051    -.0051333     1.74529 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
TABLE IV.9 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
SLOVAKIA FOR SERVICES SECTOR, 2002-2009 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP) 
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP hor_tot back_tot for_tot humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 
logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if man==0, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, 
lag(4 4)coll) gmm(hor_tot, lag(2 5)coll) gmm(back_tot, lag(3 .)coll) gmm(for_tot, 
lag(2 5)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     22350 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =     10521 
Number of instruments = 53                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(38) =  27518.10                                      avg =      2.12 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |    .325111   .1056186     3.08   0.002     .1181023    .5321197 
             | 
     hor_tot |  -1.770856   .2584203    -6.85   0.000     -2.27735   -1.264361 
    back_tot |   .7582404   .1202703     6.30   0.000     .5225149    .9939659 
     for_tot |   .7121091   .4298617     1.66   0.098    -.1304044    1.554623 
     humcap1 |   .3474347    .024366    14.26   0.000     .2996782    .3951913 
          RD |   .1032786    .011761     8.78   0.000     .0802274    .1263298 
   hhi_sales |  -.3060941   .1438634    -2.13   0.033    -.5880613    -.024127 
         age |  -.0183129   .0023358    -7.84   0.000    -.0228911   -.0137348 
        age2 |   .0003368   .0000446     7.55   0.000     .0002493    .0004242 
       logta |   .3863502   .0687798     5.62   0.000     .2515442    .5211562 
      logta2 |  -.0157882   .0033531    -4.71   0.000    -.0223603   -.0092162 
      demand |   -.172336   .0332565    -5.18   0.000    -.2375176   -.1071544 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         45  |   1.380723   .4456739     3.10   0.002     .5072183    2.254228 
         50  |   1.591276   .4286694     3.71   0.000     .7510991    2.431452 
         51  |   1.232233   .4343764     2.84   0.005     .3808705    2.083595 
         52  |   1.117508   .4187471     2.67   0.008     .2967791    1.938237 
         55  |   .1320041   .3776684     0.35   0.727    -.6082123    .8722204 
         60  |   .7096223   .3989855     1.78   0.075    -.0723749    1.491619 
         61  |  -.1374885   .5584888    -0.25   0.806    -1.232106    .9571294 
         63  |   1.121689   .4413757     2.54   0.011      .256609     1.98677 
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         64  |   2.258598   .4585127     4.93   0.000     1.359929    3.157266 
         70  |   .8106643   .4010333     2.02   0.043     .0246535    1.596675 
       4041  |   1.980914   .4812106     4.12   0.000     1.037759     2.92407 
       6567  |   .6950131   .4236266     1.64   0.101    -.1352799    1.525306 
       7174  |   1.059597   .4203793     2.52   0.012     .2356684    1.883525 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |   .0819584   .0317036     2.59   0.010     .0198206    .1440962 
          3  |  -.0230882   .0243882    -0.95   0.344    -.0708882    .0247117 
          4  |   -.023124   .0231623    -1.00   0.318    -.0685214    .0222733 
          5  |  -.0278515   .0245346    -1.14   0.256    -.0759385    .0202355 
          6  |  -.0327809    .022234    -1.47   0.140    -.0763586    .0107969 
          7  |   .0100558   .0214703     0.47   0.640    -.0320252    .0521368 
          8  |  -.0045052   .0227852    -0.20   0.843    -.0491633    .0401529 
             | 
        year | 
       2004  |  -.1146604   .0272548    -4.21   0.000    -.1680788    -.061242 
       2005  |   .0381737   .0333808     1.14   0.253    -.0272515    .1035989 
       2006  |   .0590172   .0354323     1.67   0.096    -.0104289    .1284633 
       2007  |  -.2417373   .0578237    -4.18   0.000    -.3550697    -.128405 
       2008  |  -.0568972   .0523279    -1.09   0.277     -.159458    .0456635 
       2009  |  -.2861224   .0837031    -3.42   0.001    -.4501775   -.1220674 
             | 
       _cons |    .931371   .4353895     2.14   0.032     .0780233    1.784719 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -5.45  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.54  Pr > z =  0.591 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.70  Pr > z =  0.484 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =   0.19  Pr > z =  0.852 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(14)   =  22.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.075 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(14)   =  20.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.110 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =  11.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.338 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   9.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.051 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =  14.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.245 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   5.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.056 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(2 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  18.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.033 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   2.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.775 
  gmm(back_tot, collapse lag(3 .)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =  15.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.046 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   4.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.556 
  gmm(for_tot, collapse lag(2 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  14.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.110 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   6.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.277 
 
LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_back:_b[back_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))  
(LR_for:_b[for_tot]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_age:_b[age]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(
1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |  -2.623922   .6628254    -3.96   0.000    -3.923036   -1.324808 
         LR_back |   1.123504   .2358862     4.76   0.000     .6611754    1.585832 
          LR_for |    1.05515   .5698714     1.85   0.064    -.0617776    2.172077 
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LR_human_capital |   .5148027   .0473593    10.87   0.000     .4219802    .6076253 
  LR_intangibles |   .1530305   .0086824    17.63   0.000     .1360132    .1700478 
          LR_HHI |  -.4535473   .1840472    -2.46   0.014    -.8142732   -.0928215 
          LR_age |  -.0271347   .0031465    -8.62   0.000    -.0333018   -.0209677 
        LR_agesq |    .000499   .0000748     6.67   0.000     .0003523    .0006457 
         LR_size |   .5724648   .0362925    15.77   0.000     .5013329    .6435967 
       LR_sizesq |  -.0233938   .0028296    -8.27   0.000    -.0289398   -.0178478 
       LR_demand |  -.2553546   .0465701    -5.48   0.000    -.3466302   -.1640789 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
TABLE IV.10 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
SLOVENIA FOR SERVICES SECTOR, 2002-2010 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP) 
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP l2.WLP_TFP hor_tot back_tot for_tot humcap1 RD 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if 
man==0, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) gmm(l2.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) gmm(hor_tot, lag(3 
3)coll) gmm(back_tot, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(for_tot, lag(2 3)coll) iv(humcap1 RD 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two 
robust ar(4) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      6016 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      2394 
Number of instruments = 71                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(43) =  16975.95                                      avg =      2.51 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     WLP_TFP | 
         L1. |   .6013771   .0335787    17.91   0.000     .5355641    .6671901 
         L2. |   .1022724   .0299121     3.42   0.001     .0436458     .160899 
             | 
     hor_tot |  -.8333048   .3111269    -2.68   0.007    -1.443102   -.2235073 
    back_tot |  -.1126106   .1443883    -0.78   0.435    -.3956064    .1703851 
     for_tot |    4.98527   2.817598     1.77   0.077    -.5371193    10.50766 
     humcap1 |    .295767   .0277644    10.65   0.000     .2413498    .3501843 
          RD |   .0185743   .0032232     5.76   0.000      .012257    .0248916 
   hhi_sales |   .0904097   .1301803     0.69   0.487    -.1647389    .3455583 
         age |  -.0032778   .0019762    -1.66   0.097     -.007151    .0005954 
        age2 |  -.0000375   .0000659    -0.57   0.569    -.0001666    .0000916 
       logta |   .0906169   .0264871     3.42   0.001      .038703    .1425307 
      logta2 |  -.0025897   .0016738    -1.55   0.122    -.0058702    .0006909 
      demand |  -.0857527   .3080787    -0.28   0.781    -.6895758    .5180705 
             | 
  nace_short | 
         45  |  -.0344639   .4341162    -0.08   0.937     -.885316    .8163881 
         50  |  -.1153615    .534718    -0.22   0.829     -1.16339    .9326667 
         51  |  -.1559678   .0952343    -1.64   0.101    -.3426236    .0306881 
         52  |  -.1553431   .2085627    -0.74   0.456    -.5641184    .2534322 
         55  |  -.2482463   .6158451    -0.40   0.687     -1.45528     .958788 
         60  |  -.0923177   .3494483    -0.26   0.792    -.7772237    .5925884 
         61  |  -.0115002   1.358412    -0.01   0.993     -2.67394    2.650939 
         62  |  -.1752398   1.018447    -0.17   0.863    -2.171358    1.820879 
         63  |    -.12828   .5919111    -0.22   0.828    -1.288404    1.031845 
         64  |  -.6600363   .6526763    -1.01   0.312    -1.939258    .6191857 
         70  |  -.0993368   .3477449    -0.29   0.775    -.7809044    .5822308 
       4041  |   .0046821   .4626176     0.01   0.992    -.9020318     .911396 
       6567  |  -.1902912   .3201852    -0.59   0.552    -.8178426    .4372602 
             | 
 region_code | 
          2  |   .0133398   .0272706     0.49   0.625    -.0401096    .0667892 
          3  |   .0240105   .0257923     0.93   0.352    -.0265415    .0745625 
          4  |  -.0128287   .0308525    -0.42   0.678    -.0732984    .0476411 
          5  |   .0058236   .0358894     0.16   0.871    -.0645183    .0761654 
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          6  |   .0253619   .0246638     1.03   0.304    -.0229782    .0737021 
          7  |   .0397563   .0180257     2.21   0.027     .0044266    .0750859 
          8  |   .0128587   .0196838     0.65   0.514    -.0257208    .0514382 
          9  |  -.0022933   .0265221    -0.09   0.931    -.0542757    .0496891 
         10  |   .0310275   .0230742     1.34   0.179     -.014197     .076252 
         11  |    .019704   .0403384     0.49   0.625    -.0593579    .0987659 
         12  |  -.0037796   .0603058    -0.06   0.950    -.1219768    .1144177 
             | 
        year | 
       2004  |   .4548752   .3402772     1.34   0.181    -.2120559    1.121806 
       2005  |   .3635069   .3404271     1.07   0.286    -.3037179    1.030732 
       2006  |   .4567151   .3557858     1.28   0.199    -.2406122    1.154042 
       2007  |   .4047157   .3220541     1.26   0.209    -.2264988     1.03593 
       2008  |   .3352668   .2701869     1.24   0.215    -.1942898    .8648234 
       2009  |  -.0025891   .1432996    -0.02   0.986    -.2834512    .2782731 
             | 
       _cons |   .2586498     3.2541     0.08   0.937    -6.119268    6.636568 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -8.09  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.60  Pr > z =  0.546 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =   1.62  Pr > z =  0.106 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.11  Pr > z =  0.913 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(27)   =  55.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.001 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(27)   =  25.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.555 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(11)   =  14.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.213 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(16)   =  10.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.812 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(14)   =  14.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.424 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(13)   =  11.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.611 
  gmm(L2.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(15)   =  19.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.208 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =   6.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.905 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(25)   =  22.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.604 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.246 
  gmm(back_tot, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(25)   =  22.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.616 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.223 
  gmm(for_tot, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(24)   =  21.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.608 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.282 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(19)   =  20.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.377 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   5.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.752 
 
 
LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_back:_b[back_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))  
(LR_for:_b[for_tot]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_age:_b[age]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(
1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |  -1.974176   .7376705    -2.68   0.007    -3.419984   -.5283685 
         LR_back |  -.2393546   .3399233    -0.70   0.481     -.905592    .4268829 
          LR_for |   11.59739   6.700439     1.73   0.083    -1.535229    24.73001 
LR_human_capital |   .7392165   .0541009    13.66   0.000     .6331806    .8452523 
  LR_intangibles |   .0466021   .0069164     6.74   0.000     .0330461    .0601581 
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          LR_HHI |   .1942563   .3145012     0.62   0.537    -.4221547    .8106672 
          LR_age |  -.0080936   .0049047    -1.65   0.099    -.0177066    .0015194 
        LR_agesq |  -.0001029   .0001612    -0.64   0.523    -.0004188     .000213 
         LR_size |   .2271995   .0608852     3.73   0.000     .1078668    .3465323 
       LR_sizesq |  -.0063687   .0041637    -1.53   0.126    -.0145293     .001792 
       LR_demand |  -.3049067   .7259413    -0.42   0.674    -1.727725    1.117912 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE EFFECTS OF SERVICES AND 
MANUFACTURING FDI LINKAGES ON PRODUCTIVITY OF 
LOCAL FIRMS IN MANUFACTURING SECTOR PRESENTED IN 
SECTION 6.4.2 
TABLE IV.11 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
THE CZECH REPUBLIC FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY SOURCE, 2002-
2009 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP) 
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP l2.WLP_TFP hor_tot man_link_back man_link_for 
serv_link_back serv_link_for humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand 
i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if man==1, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)coll) 
gmm(l2.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)coll) gmm(hor_tot, lag(2 5)coll) gmm(man_link_back, lag(4 
4)coll) gmm(man_link_for, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(serv_link_back, lag(2 2)coll) 
gmm(serv_link_for, lag(4 5)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 
demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     29263 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      9712 
Number of instruments = 55                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(43) =  50229.16                                      avg =      3.01 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         6 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |              Corrected 
       WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       WLP_TFP | 
           L1. |   .3846379   .0218807    17.58   0.000     .3417524    .4275234 
           L2. |   .0620989   .0133581     4.65   0.000     .0359176    .0882802 
               | 
       hor_tot |  -.1670993   .0828592    -2.02   0.044    -.3295004   -.0046982 
 man_link_back |    1.73955    .599065     2.90   0.004     .5654042    2.913696 
  man_link_for |  -2.572901   .4854003    -5.30   0.000    -3.524268   -1.621534 
serv_link_back |   -7.57644   2.158493    -3.51   0.000    -11.80701   -3.345871 
 serv_link_for |   4.416947    1.49179     2.96   0.003     1.493093    7.340801 
       humcap1 |   .4822277   .0140919    34.22   0.000      .454608    .5098474 
            RD |   .0453483   .0025427    17.83   0.000     .0403646     .050332 
     hhi_sales |  -.2315009   .0619267    -3.74   0.000     -.352875   -.1101267 
           age |  -.0087719    .001519    -5.77   0.000    -.0117491   -.0057946 
          age2 |   .0000768   .0000413     1.86   0.063    -4.11e-06    .0001577 
         logta |   .2126285   .0182529    11.65   0.000     .1768534    .2484036 
        logta2 |  -.0042681   .0009337    -4.57   0.000     -.006098   -.0024381 
        demand |  -.0331898   .0239656    -1.38   0.166    -.0801614    .0137819 
               | 
    nace_short | 
           20  |   1.025257   .1318084     7.78   0.000     .7669171    1.283597 
           23  |   2.021413   .2056856     9.83   0.000     1.618276    2.424549 
           24  |    1.84296   .1560536    11.81   0.000     1.537101     2.14882 
           25  |   1.816765   .1603278    11.33   0.000     1.502528    2.131001 
           26  |   1.555596   .1710512     9.09   0.000     1.220342     1.89085 
           29  |   1.321963   .1310747    10.09   0.000     1.065061    1.578865 
         1516  |   1.213025    .114428    10.60   0.000     .9887501      1.4373 
         1718  |   1.365707   .1174849    11.62   0.000     1.135441    1.595974 
         2122  |   .9747992   .1287999     7.57   0.000     .7223561    1.227242 
         2728  |   .9891598   .1493787     6.62   0.000     .6963829    1.281937 
         3033  |   1.249703   .1209557    10.33   0.000     1.012635    1.486772 
         3435  |   1.500181    .140191    10.70   0.000     1.225412    1.774951 
         3637  |   1.308005   .1200369    10.90   0.000     1.072738    1.543273 
               | 
   region_code | 
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            4  |  -.0603947   .0245472    -2.46   0.014    -.1085063   -.0122831 
            5  |  -.0835096    .024402    -3.42   0.001    -.1313365   -.0356826 
            6  |  -.0695771   .0252423    -2.76   0.006    -.1190512   -.0201031 
            7  |  -.0242176   .0234653    -1.03   0.302    -.0702087    .0217736 
            8  |  -.0703168   .0245071    -2.87   0.004    -.1183498   -.0222838 
            9  |  -.0421014   .0241569    -1.74   0.081    -.0894481    .0052453 
           10  |  -.0269572    .025277    -1.07   0.286    -.0764991    .0225847 
           11  |  -.0293338   .0240207    -1.22   0.222    -.0764136    .0177459 
           13  |   -.047132   .0217012    -2.17   0.030    -.0896656   -.0045984 
           14  |  -.0775366   .0239243    -3.24   0.001    -.1244273   -.0306459 
               | 
          year | 
         2004  |   .0241877   .0472107     0.51   0.608    -.0683436    .1167189 
         2005  |   .1266076   .0459174     2.76   0.006     .0366111    .2166041 
         2006  |   .1875472   .0538759     3.48   0.000     .0819523    .2931421 
         2007  |   .1435483   .0521808     2.75   0.006     .0412757    .2458209 
         2008  |   .1443496   .0179318     8.05   0.000     .1092039    .1794954 
               | 
         _cons |  -.7746253   .1730724    -4.48   0.000    -1.113841   -.4354097 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -15.81  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.58  Pr > z =  0.562 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.19  Pr > z =  0.850 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.15  Pr > z =  0.879 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  34.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  17.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.106 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   4.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.389 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(7)    =  12.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.073 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  13.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.144 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.162 
  gmm(L2.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  13.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.142 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.167 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(2 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   9.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.126 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   7.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.212 
  gmm(man_link_back, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  13.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.155 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.143 
  gmm(man_link_for, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  14.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.114 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.243 
  gmm(serv_link_back, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  15.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.079 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.442 
  gmm(serv_link_for, collapse lag(4 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =  14.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.071 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.454 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   5.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.119 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  11.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.190 
 
 
LONG RUN EFFECTS 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_man_back:_b[man_link_back]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_man_for:_b[man_link_for]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_serv_back:_b[serv_link_back]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) (LR_serv_for:_b[serv_link_for]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1 
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_age:_b[age]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_size:_b[logta]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |  -.2715464   .1350781    -2.01   0.044    -.5362945   -.0067982 
     LR_man_back |   2.826872   .9937898     2.84   0.004       .87908    4.774664 
      LR_man_for |  -4.181117    .809132    -5.17   0.000    -5.766987   -2.595248 
    LR_serv_back |  -12.31217    3.61671    -3.40   0.001    -19.40079   -5.223544 
     LR_serv_for |   7.177801   2.484574     2.89   0.004     2.308127    12.04748 
LR_human_capital |   .7836487   .0176038    44.52   0.000     .7491459    .8181514 
  LR_intangibles |   .0736937   .0030944    23.82   0.000     .0676289    .0797585 
          LR_HHI |  -.3762027   .1013085    -3.71   0.000    -.5747637   -.1776416 
          LR_age |  -.0142548   .0023738    -6.01   0.000    -.0189073   -.0096023 
        LR_agesq |   .0001248   .0000669     1.86   0.062    -6.44e-06     .000256 
         LR_size |    .345534   .0235862    14.65   0.000     .2993058    .3917622 
       LR_sizesq |  -.0069359   .0014755    -4.70   0.000    -.0098278   -.0040439 
       LR_demand |  -.0539353   .0389647    -1.38   0.166    -.1303046     .022434 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
TABLE IV.12 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
ESTONIA FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY SOURCE, 2002-2010 (DEP. 
VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP hor_tot man_link_back man_link_for serv_link_back 
serv_link_for humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year if man==1, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) gmm(hor_tot, lag(2 2)) 
gmm(man_link_back, lag(3 5)coll) gmm(man_link_for, lag(3 5)coll) 
gmm(serv_link_back, lag(2 3)coll) gmm(serv_link_for, lag(2 2)) iv(humcap1 RD 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two 
robust ar(4) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     11451 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      2870 
Number of instruments = 86                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(38) =  12711.20                                      avg =      3.99 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |              Corrected 
       WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       WLP_TFP | 
           L1. |   .2671068   .0273702     9.76   0.000     .2134623    .3207514 
               | 
       hor_tot |  -.6347624   .1583157    -4.01   0.000    -.9450555   -.3244693 
 man_link_back |  -.5970995   .3386729    -1.76   0.078    -1.260886    .0666871 
  man_link_for |  -1.331032   .4089995    -3.25   0.001    -2.132656   -.5294076 
serv_link_back |   1.285845   .6737904     1.91   0.056    -.0347603     2.60645 
 serv_link_for |   3.109686   .7103007     4.38   0.000     1.717522     4.50185 
       humcap1 |   .4877283    .016275    29.97   0.000     .4558299    .5196267 
            RD |   .0765912   .0058506    13.09   0.000     .0651241    .0880583 
     hhi_sales |   .2413764   .1364489     1.77   0.077    -.0260586    .5088114 
           age |  -.0149599    .001577    -9.49   0.000    -.0180508   -.0118691 
          age2 |   .0001723   .0000251     6.86   0.000     .0001231    .0002215 
         logta |    .270384   .0243495    11.10   0.000       .22266    .3181081 
        logta2 |  -.0072472   .0020291    -3.57   0.000    -.0112241   -.0032703 
        demand |  -.0455697   .0334629    -1.36   0.173    -.1111558    .0200165 
               | 
    nace_short | 
           20  |  -.4102839    .107854    -3.80   0.000    -.6216738   -.1988939 
           23  |  -.5651945   1.695896    -0.33   0.739     -3.88909    2.758701 
           24  |  -.0787823   .1222515    -0.64   0.519     -.318391    .1608263 
           25  |  -.3710252   .0994556    -3.73   0.000    -.5659545   -.1760958 
           26  |  -.5809854   .1101502    -5.27   0.000    -.7968759   -.3650949 
           29  |  -.1977956   .1016779    -1.95   0.052    -.3970806    .0014893 
         1516  |  -.0629308   .0974073    -0.65   0.518    -.2538455    .1279839 
         1718  |  -.1537217   .0901471    -1.71   0.088    -.3304067    .0229633 
         2122  |  -.3579954   .0987684    -3.62   0.000     -.551578   -.1644128 
         2728  |  -.3067345   .1082114    -2.83   0.005    -.5188249   -.0946441 
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         3033  |  -.2369483   .1081191    -2.19   0.028    -.4488579   -.0250387 
         3435  |  -.4389201   .1133585    -3.87   0.000    -.6610987   -.2167415 
         3637  |  -.3092319   .0963035    -3.21   0.001    -.4979834   -.1204804 
               | 
   region_code | 
            2  |  -.0532419   .0178145    -2.99   0.003    -.0881577   -.0183261 
            3  |  -.0704711    .020236    -3.48   0.000     -.110133   -.0308093 
            4  |  -.0723041   .0230133    -3.14   0.002    -.1174093    -.027199 
            5  |  -.0607318   .0152432    -3.98   0.000    -.0906078   -.0308557 
               | 
          year | 
         2003  |   .2045107   .0511638     4.00   0.000     .1042315    .3047899 
         2004  |   .1405731   .0422368     3.33   0.001     .0577905    .2233556 
         2005  |   .2103482   .0437232     4.81   0.000     .1246523    .2960442 
         2006  |   .1943175   .0400909     4.85   0.000     .1157407    .2728943 
         2007  |   .0841551   .0351088     2.40   0.017     .0153431    .1529671 
         2008  |  -.0720072   .0280361    -2.57   0.010     -.126957   -.0170574 
         2009  |  -.1670312   .0250264    -6.67   0.000    -.2160821   -.1179803 
               | 
         _cons |   1.071369   .1524679     7.03   0.000     .7725372      1.3702 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -14.38  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.27  Pr > z =  0.788 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.02  Pr > z =  0.983 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.25  Pr > z =  0.803 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(47)   = 114.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(47)   =  59.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.107 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(21)   =  27.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.144 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(26)   =  31.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.213 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(34)   =  40.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.210 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(13)   =  18.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.125 
  gmm(hor_tot, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(33)   =  47.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.052 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  12.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.600 
  gmm(man_link_back, collapse lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(43)   =  55.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.104 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   4.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.367 
  gmm(man_link_for, collapse lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(43)   =  54.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.104 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   4.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.362 
  gmm(serv_link_back, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(44)   =  59.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.063 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.984 
  gmm(serv_link_for, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(32)   =  45.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.058 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(15)   =  13.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.536 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(39)   =  37.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.535 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  21.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.005 
  iv(19b.nace_short 20.nace_short 23.nace_short 24.nace_short 25.nace_short 
26.nace_short 29.nace_short 45.nace_short 50.nace_short 51.nace_short 52.nace_short 
55.nace_short 60.nace_short 61.nace_short 62.nace_short 63.nace_short 64.nace_short 
70.nace_short 1516.nace_short 1718.nace_short 2122.nace_short 2728.nace_short 
3033.nace_short 3435.nace_short 3637.nace_short 4041.nace_short 6567.nace_short 
7174.nace_short 1b.region_code 2.region_code 3.region_code 4.region_code 
5.region_code 2002b.year 2003.year 2004.year 2005.year 2006.year 2007.year 2008.year 
2009.year 2010.year) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  32.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.068 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(25)   =  26.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.368 
 
LONG RUN EFFECTS 
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nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_man_back:_b[man_link_back]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_man_for:_b[man_link_for]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_serv_back:_b[serv_link_back]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) (LR_serv_for:_b[serv_link_for]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_age:_b[age]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1 _b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_size:_b[logta]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |   -.866105   .2169488    -3.99   0.000    -1.291317   -.4408931 
     LR_man_back |  -.8147156   .4583389    -1.78   0.075    -1.713043    .0836121 
      LR_man_for |  -1.816134   .5647152    -3.22   0.001    -2.922955    -.709312 
    LR_serv_back |   1.754478   .9283338     1.89   0.059    -.0650232    3.573978 
     LR_serv_for |   4.243028   .9960953     4.26   0.000     2.290717    6.195339 
LR_human_capital |   .6654835   .0208036    31.99   0.000     .6247092    .7062578 
  LR_intangibles |   .1045053   .0070701    14.78   0.000     .0906482    .1183624 
          LR_HHI |   .3293473   .1866027     1.76   0.078    -.0363873    .6950819 
          LR_age |  -.0204122   .0021808    -9.36   0.000    -.0246864   -.0161379 
        LR_agesq |   .0002351   .0000348     6.75   0.000     .0001668    .0003033 
         LR_size |   .3689269   .0296007    12.46   0.000     .3109106    .4269433 
       LR_sizesq |  -.0098885   .0027437    -3.60   0.000    -.0152661   -.0045109 
       LR_demand |  -.0621778   .0461044    -1.35   0.177    -.1525408    .0281853 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
TABLE IV.13 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
HUNGARY FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY SOURCE, 2002-2010 (DEP. 
VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP hor_tot man_link_back man_link_for serv_link_back 
serv_link_for humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year if man==1, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 4)) gmm(hor_tot, lag(2 
2)coll) gmm(man_link_back, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(man_link_for, lag(2 2)coll) 
gmm(serv_link_back, lag(2 5)coll) gmm(serv_link_for, lag(2 5)) iv(humcap1 RD 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two 
robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      2499 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      1278 
Number of instruments = 107                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(53) =  24118.32                                      avg =      1.96 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |              Corrected 
       WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       WLP_TFP | 
           L1. |   .6004511   .1136943     5.28   0.000     .3776145    .8232878 
               | 
       hor_tot |  -.7012282    .342772    -2.05   0.041    -1.373049   -.0294075 
 man_link_back |   2.764828   1.355095     2.04   0.041     .1088899    5.420766 
  man_link_for |  -3.081534   1.373139    -2.24   0.025    -5.772838   -.3902309 
serv_link_back |  -20.66204   6.324234    -3.27   0.001    -33.05731   -8.266766 
 serv_link_for |   6.912752    4.14672     1.67   0.096     -1.21467    15.04017 
       humcap1 |   .2950236   .0609052     4.84   0.000     .1756516    .4143956 
            RD |   .0077406   .0041003     1.89   0.059    -.0002959    .0157771 
     hhi_sales |  -.1420545   .1162953    -1.22   0.222    -.3699892    .0858801 
           age |   -.004914   .0042258    -1.16   0.245    -.0131963    .0033684 
          age2 |  -.0000837   .0001389    -0.60   0.547    -.0003559    .0001886 
         logta |   .0799771   .0485061     1.65   0.099    -.0150932    .1750474 
        logta2 |   .0004362   .0029702     0.15   0.883    -.0053852    .0062577 
        demand |   .0655378   .0470871     1.39   0.164    -.0267513    .1578269 
               | 
    nace_short | 
           20  |    -.15101   .2214968    -0.68   0.495    -.5851357    .2831157 
           23  |    1.65124   .4879397     3.38   0.001     .6948953    2.607584 
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           24  |   .2827353     .26769     1.06   0.291    -.2419274    .8073981 
           25  |  -.1322473   .2134351    -0.62   0.536    -.5505724    .2860777 
           26  |  -.1441225   .2051445    -0.70   0.482    -.5461984    .2579534 
           29  |   .2503679   .2762906     0.91   0.365    -.2911517    .7918874 
         1516  |   .0680478   .2436611     0.28   0.780    -.4095191    .5456148 
         1718  |  -.4841685   .1825574    -2.65   0.008    -.8419745   -.1263625 
         2122  |  -.1833159    .240854    -0.76   0.447    -.6553811    .2887493 
         2728  |  -.5639588   .2399405    -2.35   0.019    -1.034233   -.0936841 
         3033  |  -.2585052   .2461601    -1.05   0.294    -.7409702    .2239598 
         3435  |  -.6538227   .2824443    -2.31   0.021    -1.207403   -.1002421 
         3637  |   .0265696   .1827552     0.15   0.884    -.3316239    .3847632 
               | 
   region_code | 
            2  |   .0154358   .0472086     0.33   0.744    -.0770913     .107963 
            3  |  -.0639111   .0450209    -1.42   0.156    -.1521505    .0243283 
            4  |  -.0548757   .0503335    -1.09   0.276    -.1535277    .0437762 
            5  |   .0060461   .0281788     0.21   0.830    -.0491834    .0612756 
            6  |   .0270338   .0500088     0.54   0.589    -.0709818    .1250493 
            7  |  -.0537229   .0372589    -1.44   0.149    -.1267489    .0193031 
            8  |  -.0292578   .0341895    -0.86   0.392    -.0962681    .0377524 
            9  |  -.0134415   .0387508    -0.35   0.729    -.0893917    .0625087 
           10  |   .0189047   .0515294     0.37   0.714    -.0820912    .1199005 
           11  |  -.0260782   .0458754    -0.57   0.570    -.1159923     .063836 
           12  |   .0271702   .0423896     0.64   0.522    -.0559119    .1102523 
           13  |  -.0484336   .0598391    -0.81   0.418    -.1657161    .0688489 
           14  |  -.0108443   .0327385    -0.33   0.740    -.0750106    .0533219 
           15  |  -.0051451   .0497206    -0.10   0.918    -.1025956    .0923055 
           16  |  -.0188697   .0544027    -0.35   0.729    -.1254971    .0877577 
           17  |  -.0168478   .0647549    -0.26   0.795     -.143765    .1100694 
           18  |  -.0453781   .0624058    -0.73   0.467    -.1676913    .0769351 
           19  |  -.0092264   .0491331    -0.19   0.851    -.1055255    .0870727 
           20  |  -.0447472   .0515516    -0.87   0.385    -.1457865     .056292 
               | 
          year | 
         2004  |  -.2782549    .288997    -0.96   0.336    -.8446786    .2881688 
         2005  |  -.3612938   .2954865    -1.22   0.221    -.9404367    .2178491 
         2006  |    -.32197   .2999488    -1.07   0.283    -.9098589     .265919 
         2007  |  -.3435352   .3019839    -1.14   0.255    -.9354129    .2483424 
         2008  |  -.3618675   .3095764    -1.17   0.242    -.9686262    .2448911 
         2009  |   -.493285    .305643    -1.61   0.107    -1.092334    .1057643 
         2010  |  -.3243021   .2910432    -1.11   0.265    -.8947362     .246132 
               | 
         _cons |   .7985405   .5496932     1.45   0.146    -.2788383    1.875919 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.45  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.57  Pr > z =  0.569 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.75  Pr > z =  0.455 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.75  Pr > z =  0.456 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(53)   =  58.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.292 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(53)   =  47.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.682 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(36)   =  30.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.717 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(17)   =  16.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.460 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, lag(1 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(27)   =  30.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.306 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(26)   =  17.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.894 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(52)   =  45.96  Prob > chi2 =  0.709 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   1.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.195 
  gmm(man_link_back, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(51)   =  46.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.634 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.715 
  gmm(man_link_for, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(51)   =  46.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.637 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.694 
  gmm(serv_link_back, collapse lag(2 5)) 
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    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(48)   =  45.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.563 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   1.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.872 
  gmm(serv_link_for, lag(2 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(30)   =  24.65  Prob > chi2 =  0.742 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  22.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.461 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(45)   =  33.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.904 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  14.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.071 
  iv(19b.nace_short 20.nace_short 23.nace_short 24.nace_short 25.nace_short 
26.nace_short 29.nace_short 45.nace_short 50.nace_short 51.nace_short 52.nace_short 
55.nace_short 60.nace_short 61.nace_short 62.nace_short 63.nace_short 64.nace_short 
70.nace_short 1516.nace_short 1718.nace_short 2122.nace_short 2728.nace_short 
3033.nace_short 3435.nace_short 3637.nace_short 4041.nace_short 6567.nace_short 
7174.nace_short 1b.region_code 2.region_code 3.region_code 4.region_code 
5.region_code 6.region_code 7.region_code 8.region_code 9.region_code 10.region_code 
11.region_code 12.region_code 13.region_code 14.region_code 15.region_code 
16.region_code 17.region_code 18.region_code 19.region_code 20.region_code 2002b.year 
2003.year 2004.year 2005.year 2006.year 2007.year 2008.year 2009.year 2010.year) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(13)   =  11.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.559 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(40)   =  36.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.650 
 
LONG RUN EFFECTS 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_man_back:_b[man_link_back]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_man_for:_b[man_link_for]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_serv_back:_b[serv_link_back]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) (LR_serv_for:_b[serv_link_for]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_age:_b[age]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1 _b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_size:_b[logta]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |   -1.75505   .9993716    -1.76   0.079    -3.713782    .2036825 
     LR_man_back |   6.919875   4.042248     1.71   0.087    -1.002785    14.84253 
      LR_man_for |  -7.712534   4.258412    -1.81   0.070    -16.05887    .6337997 
    LR_serv_back |  -51.71342   18.63043    -2.78   0.006    -88.22839   -15.19844 
     LR_serv_for |   17.30139   10.12352     1.71   0.087    -2.540338    37.14312 
LR_human_capital |   .7383917   .0890054     8.30   0.000     .5639444     .912839 
  LR_intangibles |   .0193734   .0091037     2.13   0.033     .0015305    .0372164 
          LR_HHI |  -.3555373   .2634132    -1.35   0.177    -.8718176     .160743 
          LR_age |  -.0122988   .0093486    -1.32   0.188    -.0306217    .0060241 
        LR_agesq |  -.0002094   .0003651    -0.57   0.566    -.0009251    .0005062 
         LR_size |   .2001685   .1312992     1.52   0.127    -.0571733    .4575102 
       LR_sizesq |   .0010918   .0073087     0.15   0.881    -.0132331    .0154167 
       LR_demand |   .1640295   .1128866     1.45   0.146    -.0572242    .3852832 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
TABLE IV.14 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
SLOVAKIA FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY SOURCE, 2002-2009 (DEP. 
VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP hor_tot man_link_back man_link_for serv_link_back 
serv_link_for humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year if man==1, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) gmm(hor_tot, lag(3 
5)coll) gmm(man_link_back, lag(3 3)coll) gmm(man_link_for, lag(2 2)coll) 
gmm(serv_link_back, lag(4 5)coll) gmm(serv_link_for, lag(3 3)coll) iv(humcap1 RD 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) iv( i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) 
two robust ar(4) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      8140 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      3074 
Number of instruments = 60                      Obs per group: min =         1 
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Wald chi2(40) =   9889.98                                      avg =      2.65 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |              Corrected 
       WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       WLP_TFP | 
           L1. |   .3846809   .0432201     8.90   0.000      .299971    .4693908 
               | 
       hor_tot |  -.3825155   .1984508    -1.93   0.054    -.7714719     .006441 
 man_link_back |   1.815416   1.100319     1.65   0.099    -.3411692       3.972 
  man_link_for |  -.2566443   .4952639    -0.52   0.604    -1.227344    .7140551 
serv_link_back |     5.3311   2.801113     1.90   0.057    -.1589812    10.82118 
 serv_link_for |   6.150009   1.751681     3.51   0.000     2.716777     9.58324 
       humcap1 |   .3317319   .0144672    22.93   0.000     .3033766    .3600871 
            RD |   .0597222   .0052113    11.46   0.000     .0495082    .0699362 
     hhi_sales |  -.1594395   .1062015    -1.50   0.133    -.3675907    .0487117 
           age |  -.0093001   .0025965    -3.58   0.000    -.0143891   -.0042111 
          age2 |   .0000916   .0000483     1.90   0.058    -2.98e-06    .0001863 
         logta |   .1457716   .0320562     4.55   0.000     .0829426    .2086005 
        logta2 |  -.0026921   .0020256    -1.33   0.184    -.0066623    .0012781 
        demand |  -.0203586   .0161039    -1.26   0.206    -.0519217    .0112046 
               | 
    nace_short | 
           20  |  -.0894081   .1478983    -0.60   0.545    -.3792835    .2004673 
           23  |    1.04788   .2025965     5.17   0.000      .650798    1.444962 
           24  |   .8704738   .1294081     6.73   0.000     .6168385    1.124109 
           25  |  -.0892498    .105258    -0.85   0.396    -.2955516     .117052 
           26  |  -.9029285   .1201293    -7.52   0.000    -1.138378   -.6674794 
           29  |   .0096495   .0934676     0.10   0.918    -.1735435    .1928426 
         1516  |  -.1240662    .133921    -0.93   0.354    -.3865465     .138414 
         1718  |  -.0959543   .0891851    -1.08   0.282    -.2707539    .0788452 
         2122  |  -.1775133   .1246049    -1.42   0.154    -.4217344    .0667078 
         2728  |  -.6077228   .2124156    -2.86   0.004     -1.02405   -.1913959 
         3033  |   .3585049   .0942968     3.80   0.000     .1736867    .5433231 
         3435  |   .7869858   .1564073     5.03   0.000     .4804331    1.093538 
         3637  |  -.4335699   .1174009    -3.69   0.000    -.6636715   -.2034683 
               | 
   region_code | 
            2  |   .0920868   .0377191     2.44   0.015     .0181587    .1660149 
            3  |  -.0177059   .0357651    -0.50   0.621    -.0878041    .0523923 
            4  |   .0296187   .0297522     1.00   0.319    -.0286945    .0879318 
            5  |   .0272623    .032481     0.84   0.401    -.0363992    .0909239 
            6  |  -.0052346   .0274741    -0.19   0.849    -.0590828    .0486136 
            7  |   .0233605   .0285068     0.82   0.413    -.0325118    .0792328 
            8  |  -.0025515   .0295808    -0.09   0.931    -.0605288    .0554258 
               | 
          year | 
         2003  |   .4399959   .1316755     3.34   0.001     .1819167    .6980751 
         2004  |   .4095664    .111389     3.68   0.000     .1912479    .6278849 
         2005  |   .2720633   .0959636     2.84   0.005     .0839781    .4601485 
         2006  |   .4450775   .1227256     3.63   0.000     .2045397    .6856153 
         2007  |   .3792597   .0746986     5.08   0.000     .2328532    .5256662 
         2008  |   .3648488   .0657229     5.55   0.000     .2360344    .4936633 
               | 
         _cons |   .5748605   .2134887     2.69   0.007     .1564303    .9932906 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -10.72  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.36  Pr > z =  0.722 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =   1.82  Pr > z =  0.069 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.10  Pr > z =  0.924 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(19)   =  28.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.071 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(19)   =  14.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.755 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =   8.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.348 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(11)   =   5.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.902 
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  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   7.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.369 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =   6.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.865 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(15)   =  10.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.762 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   3.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.461 
  gmm(man_link_back, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =  13.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.721 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.533 
  gmm(man_link_for, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =  12.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.798 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.294 
  gmm(serv_link_back, collapse lag(4 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =  11.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.763 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.430 
  gmm(serv_link_for, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =  13.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.735 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.482 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(11)   =   9.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.606 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   5.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.724 
 
LONG RUN EFFECTS 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_man_back:_b[man_link_back]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_man_for:_b[man_link_for]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_serv_back:_b[serv_link_back]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) (LR_serv_for:_b[serv_link_for]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_age:_b[age]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_size:_b[logta]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |  -.6216538   .3280177    -1.90   0.058    -1.264557    .0212491 
     LR_man_back |   2.950364    1.82127     1.62   0.105    -.6192586    6.519987 
      LR_man_for |  -.4170913    .811213    -0.51   0.607     -2.00704    1.172857 
    LR_serv_back |    8.66396   4.499136     1.93   0.054    -.1541852     17.4821 
     LR_serv_for |   9.994828   2.932414     3.41   0.001     4.247403    15.74225 
LR_human_capital |   .5391217   .0290838    18.54   0.000     .4821184    .5961249 
  LR_intangibles |   .0970589   .0072254    13.43   0.000     .0828973    .1112205 
          LR_HHI |  -.2591167   .1706649    -1.52   0.129    -.5936138    .0753804 
          LR_age |  -.0151143    .004222    -3.58   0.000    -.0233893   -.0068393 
        LR_agesq |   .0001489   .0000794     1.88   0.061    -6.72e-06    .0003046 
         LR_size |    .236904   .0482573     4.91   0.000     .1423214    .3314866 
       LR_sizesq |  -.0043751   .0032622    -1.34   0.180    -.0107689    .0020186 
       LR_demand |  -.0330862   .0262245    -1.26   0.207    -.0844852    .0183128 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
TABLE IV.15 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
SLOVENIA FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY SOURCE, 2002-2010 (DEP. 
VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP hor_tot man_link_back man_link_for serv_link_back 
serv_link_for humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year if man==1, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) gmm(hor_tot, lag(3 
5)coll) gmm(man_link_back, lag(2 5)coll) gmm(man_link_for,lag(3 3)coll) 
gmm(serv_link_back, lag(2 2)coll) gmm(serv_link_for, lag(2 2)) iv(humcap1 RD 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two 
robust ar(4) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      3584 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      1136 
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Number of instruments = 81                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(45) =   4738.71                                      avg =      3.15 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |              Corrected 
       WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       WLP_TFP | 
           L1. |   .4312347   .0571397     7.55   0.000      .319243    .5432264 
               | 
       hor_tot |   .2058365    .355617     0.58   0.563    -.4911601     .902833 
 man_link_back |   1.841391   .9333412     1.97   0.049     .0120763    3.670707 
  man_link_for |  -.3326346   1.430031    -0.23   0.816    -3.135443    2.470174 
serv_link_back |  -9.718623   4.697618    -2.07   0.039    -18.92579   -.5114603 
 serv_link_for |   13.59875   5.204723     2.61   0.009     3.397679    23.79982 
       humcap1 |   .5260964   .0450079    11.69   0.000     .4378826    .6143103 
            RD |   .0288811    .005519     5.23   0.000      .018064    .0396982 
     hhi_sales |  -.1889508   .1324064    -1.43   0.154    -.4484625    .0705609 
           age |  -.0103037   .0024727    -4.17   0.000      -.01515   -.0054574 
          age2 |   .0000629   .0000601     1.05   0.295    -.0000548    .0001807 
         logta |  -.0264658   .0589938    -0.45   0.654    -.1420916      .08916 
        logta2 |   .0105402   .0047363     2.23   0.026     .0012571    .0198232 
        demand |   .0293393   .1002046     0.29   0.770     -.167058    .2257367 
               | 
    nace_short | 
           20  |  -.3265792   .1808931    -1.81   0.071    -.6811233    .0279648 
           23  |   .4484003   1.042669     0.43   0.667    -1.595192    2.491993 
           24  |     .56129   .2433595     2.31   0.021     .0843142    1.038266 
           25  |  -.5620158   .2291894    -2.45   0.014    -1.011219   -.1128128 
           26  |  -.0063058   .2050838    -0.03   0.975    -.4082626    .3956509 
           29  |  -.5443099   .1480004    -3.68   0.000    -.8343853   -.2542344 
         1516  |  -.2379968   .2070516    -1.15   0.250    -.6438104    .1678168 
         1718  |   .1231618   .1903703     0.65   0.518    -.2499571    .4962808 
         2122  |  -.7544544   .2077133    -3.63   0.000    -1.161565   -.3473439 
         2728  |  -.8796663   .2894022    -3.04   0.002    -1.446884   -.3124484 
         3033  |  -.2978654   .1919752    -1.55   0.121    -.6741299    .0783991 
         3435  |  -1.078376   .2555874    -4.22   0.000    -1.579318    -.577434 
         3637  |  -.0112375   .1754357    -0.06   0.949    -.3550852    .3326102 
               | 
   region_code | 
            2  |    -.03735   .0449245    -0.83   0.406    -.1254004    .0507003 
            3  |   .0510812   .0429555     1.19   0.234    -.0331101    .1352724 
            4  |   .0043464   .0457118     0.10   0.924    -.0852471    .0939399 
            5  |  -.0003743   .0499037    -0.01   0.994    -.0981838    .0974351 
            6  |   .0432373   .0531841     0.81   0.416    -.0610016    .1474762 
            7  |   .0341254   .0319403     1.07   0.285    -.0284766    .0967273 
            8  |   .0086012   .0382425     0.22   0.822    -.0663527    .0835551 
            9  |   .0055493   .0510811     0.11   0.913    -.0945678    .1056664 
           10  |   .0215676   .0404825     0.53   0.594    -.0577766    .1009118 
           11  |   .0705909   .0511029     1.38   0.167     -.029569    .1707508 
           12  |  -.0276763   .0734336    -0.38   0.706    -.1716036     .116251 
               | 
          year | 
         2003  |   .2927939   .1641043     1.78   0.074    -.0288446    .6144324 
         2004  |   .2586395    .124197     2.08   0.037     .0152178    .5020611 
         2005  |    .219554   .1118121     1.96   0.050     .0004064    .4387017 
         2006  |   .2595771   .1124658     2.31   0.021     .0391483     .480006 
         2007  |     .18306   .1053143     1.74   0.082    -.0233523    .3894722 
         2008  |   .1458267   .1007876     1.45   0.148    -.0517133    .3433667 
         2009  |  -.2852688   .0692061    -4.12   0.000    -.4209102   -.1496274 
               | 
         _cons |   .7260992   .6326576     1.15   0.251    -.5138869    1.966085 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -8.12  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.95  Pr > z =  0.343 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -1.06  Pr > z =  0.289 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =   0.85  Pr > z =  0.394 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(35)   =  83.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(35)   =  37.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.353 
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  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =  23.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.123 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =  13.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.750 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(21)   =  23.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.303 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  13.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.469 
  gmm(hor_tot, collapse lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(32)   =  31.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.472 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   5.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.130 
  gmm(man_link_back, collapse lag(2 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(30)   =  31.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.406 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   6.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.273 
  gmm(man_link_for, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(33)   =  37.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.287 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
  gmm(serv_link_back, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(33)   =  36.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.302 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.646 
  gmm(serv_link_for, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(20)   =  29.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.085 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(15)   =   8.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.906 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(27)   =  32.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.219 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   5.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.737 
  iv(19b.nace_short 20.nace_short 23.nace_short 24.nace_short 25.nace_short 
26.nace_short 29.nace_short 45.nace_short 50.nace_short 51.nace_short 52.nace_short 
55.nace_short 60.nace_short 61.nace_short 62.nace_short 63.nace_short 64.nace_short 
70.nace_short 1516.nace_short 1718.nace_short 2122.nace_short 2728.nace_short 
3033.nace_short 3435.nace_short 3637.nace_short 4041.nace_short 6567.nace_short 
7174.nace_short 1b.region_code 2.region_code 3.region_code 4.region_code 
5.region_code 6.region_code 7.region_code 8.region_code 9.region_code 10.region_code 
11.region_code 12.region_code 2002b.year 2003.year 2004.year 2 
> 005.year 2006.year 2007.year 2008.year 2009.year 2010.year) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =  16.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.003 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(31)   =  21.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.901 
 
LONG RUN EFFECTS 
nlcom(LR_hor:_b[hor_tot]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_man_back:_b[man_link_back]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_man_for:_b[man_link_for]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_serv_back:_b[serv_link_back]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) (LR_serv_for:_b[serv_link_for]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP])) (LR_human_capital:_b[humcap1]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_intangibles:_b[RD]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) (LR_HHI:_b[hhi_sales]/(1-
_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_age:_b[age]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP]))(LR_agesq:_b[age2]/(1 _b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_size:_b[logta]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) (LR_sizesq:_b[logta2]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
(LR_demand:_b[demand]/(1-_b[l.WLP_TFP])) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          LR_hor |   .3619006   .6295545     0.57   0.565    -.8720036    1.595805 
     LR_man_back |   3.237524    1.66667     1.94   0.052    -.0290895    6.504138 
      LR_man_for |  -.5848363   2.521749    -0.23   0.817    -5.527373    4.357701 
    LR_serv_back |  -17.08723   8.304868    -2.06   0.040    -33.36447   -.8099892 
     LR_serv_for |   23.90925   8.985304     2.66   0.008     6.298374    41.52012 
LR_human_capital |   .9249799     .06595    14.03   0.000     .7957203    1.054239 
  LR_intangibles |   .0507786    .008617     5.89   0.000     .0338897    .0676676 
          LR_HHI |  -.3322122   .2350177    -1.41   0.157    -.7928384    .1284139 
          LR_age |  -.0181159   .0047512    -3.81   0.000    -.0274282   -.0088037 
        LR_agesq |   .0001106   .0001087     1.02   0.309    -.0001024    .0003236 
         LR_size |  -.0465321   .1039083    -0.45   0.654    -.2501886    .1571244 
       LR_sizesq |   .0185317   .0081894     2.26   0.024     .0024808    .0345826 
       LR_demand |   .0515842   .1779965     0.29   0.772    -.2972824    .4004509 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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4.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE MODERATING EFFECTS OF 
INTANGIBLE ASSETS ON PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVERS FROM 
FDI IN MANUFACTURING SECTOR PRESENTED IN SECTION 6.4.3 
TABLE IV.16 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
THE CZECH REPUBLIC FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR – ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY MODEL, 2002-
2009 (DEP. VARIABLE LN TFP) 
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP l2.WLP_TFP c.hor_tot##c.RD  c.man_link_back##c.RD 
c.man_link_for##c.RD c.serv_link_back##c.RD c.serv_link_for##c.RD  humcap1 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if 
man==1, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)coll) gmm(l2.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)coll) gmm(hor_tot 
hormanRD , lag(2 4)coll) gmm(man_link_back backmanRD, lag(3 5)coll) 
gmm(man_link_for formanRD , lag(3 3)coll) gmm(serv_link_back backservRD , lag(2 
3)coll) gmm(serv_link_for forservRD , lag(4 5)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age 
age2 logta logta2 demand) iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     29263 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      9712 
Number of instruments = 73                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(48) =  44790.84                                      avg =      3.01 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         6 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      |              Corrected 
              WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
              WLP_TFP | 
                  L1. |    .381133   .0224778    16.96   0.000     .3370772    .4251887 
                  L2. |    .060466   .0133951     4.51   0.000      .034212      .08672 
                      | 
              hor_tot |  -.9133034   .2223489    -4.11   0.000    -1.349099   -.4775077 
                   RD |   .0685183   .0172824     3.96   0.000     .0346453    .1023912 
                      | 
       c.hor_tot#c.RD |  -.1409316    .040073    -3.52   0.000    -.2194732   -.0623899 
                      | 
        man_link_back |   2.752012   1.041148     2.64   0.008     .7113991    4.792625 
                      | 
 c.man_link_back#c.RD |   .3506086   .1670295     2.10   0.036     .0232367    .6779804 
                      | 
         man_link_for |   -4.95165   1.196496    -4.14   0.000    -7.296739   -2.606561 
                      | 
  c.man_link_for#c.RD |  -.4428124   .1961466    -2.26   0.024    -.8272528   -.0583721 
                      | 
       serv_link_back |  -14.63326   6.627533    -2.21   0.027    -27.62298   -1.643531 
                      | 
c.serv_link_back#c.RD |  -1.712993   1.096509    -1.56   0.118    -3.862111     .436126 
                      | 
        serv_link_for |   15.01653   3.985677     3.77   0.000     7.204743    22.82831 
                      | 
 c.serv_link_for#c.RD |   2.464149   .7102275     3.47   0.001     1.072129     3.85617 
                      | 
              humcap1 |   .4836789   .0143887    33.62   0.000     .4554775    .5118803 
            hhi_sales |  -.2035272   .0655205    -3.11   0.002    -.3319449   -.0751095 
                  age |  -.0079344   .0017068    -4.65   0.000    -.0112797   -.0045892 
                 age2 |   .0000594   .0000493     1.20   0.228    -.0000372    .0001559 
                logta |   .2401153   .0215514    11.14   0.000     .1978753    .2823554 
               logta2 |  -.0059177   .0011428    -5.18   0.000    -.0081574   -.0036779 
               demand |  -.0066628   .0188379    -0.35   0.724    -.0435844    .0302588 
                      | 
           nace_short | 
                  20  |   1.018073     .13738     7.41   0.000     .7488133    1.287333 
                  23  |   1.969049   .2700803     7.29   0.000     1.439701    2.498396 
                  24  |   1.842761   .1563647    11.79   0.000     1.536292    2.149231 
                  25  |   1.820752   .1582884    11.50   0.000     1.510512    2.130991 
                  26  |   1.596468   .1788892     8.92   0.000     1.245852    1.947085 
                  29  |   1.277805   .1333719     9.58   0.000     1.016401    1.539209 
                1516  |   1.076403   .1190722     9.04   0.000     .8430254     1.30978 
                1718  |   1.318454     .11544    11.42   0.000     1.092196    1.544712 
                2122  |   .8705336   .1377812     6.32   0.000     .6004875     1.14058 
                2728  |   1.028181   .1520325     6.76   0.000     .7302025    1.326159 
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                3033  |   1.176872    .122324     9.62   0.000     .9371215    1.416623 
                3435  |   1.327649   .1383925     9.59   0.000     1.056405    1.598893 
                3637  |   1.259026   .1229568    10.24   0.000     1.018036    1.500017 
                      | 
          region_code | 
                   4  |  -.0696748   .0265765    -2.62   0.009    -.1217638   -.0175858 
                   5  |  -.1019574   .0269126    -3.79   0.000    -.1547052   -.0492096 
                   6  |  -.0770349   .0269969    -2.85   0.004    -.1299479    -.024122 
                   7  |  -.0259888   .0250963    -1.04   0.300    -.0751767    .0231991 
                   8  |   -.068321   .0261955    -2.61   0.009    -.1196632   -.0169787 
                   9  |   -.054391    .025969    -2.09   0.036    -.1052893   -.0034927 
                  10  |  -.0336439   .0269117    -1.25   0.211    -.0863898     .019102 
                  11  |  -.0478856   .0260586    -1.84   0.066    -.0989594    .0031883 
                  13  |  -.0516565   .0233845    -2.21   0.027    -.0974893   -.0058236 
                  14  |  -.0918554   .0259105    -3.55   0.000    -.1426389   -.0410718 
                      | 
                 year | 
                2004  |  -.0535682   .0447539    -1.20   0.231    -.1412842    .0341477 
                2005  |   .0519799   .0429018     1.21   0.226    -.0321062    .1360659 
                2006  |   .1026373   .0479951     2.14   0.032     .0085686     .196706 
                2007  |   .0562245   .0455557     1.23   0.217    -.0330631    .1455121 
                2008  |   .1206998   .0167963     7.19   0.000     .0877796      .15362 
                      | 
                _cons |  -.7326205   .1805775    -4.06   0.000    -1.086546    -.378695 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -15.37  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.75  Pr > z =  0.452 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.32  Pr > z =  0.748 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.39  Pr > z =  0.699 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(24)   =  42.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.011 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(24)   =  25.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.369 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =  16.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.179 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =   9.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.667 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  21.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.479 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   4.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.135 
  gmm(L2.WLP_TFP, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  22.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.415 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.233 
  gmm(hor_tot hormanRD, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =  15.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.509 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  10.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.233 
  gmm(man_link_back backmanRD, collapse lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =  16.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.444 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   9.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.298 
  gmm(man_link_for formanRD, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(20)   =  22.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.311 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   3.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.537 
  gmm(serv_link_back backservRD, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(18)   =  19.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.347 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   5.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.431 
  gmm(serv_link_for forservRD, collapse lag(4 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(18)   =  20.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.323 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   5.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.480 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =  15.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.475 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  10.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.265 
 
 
 
MARGINAL EFFECTS 
 
margins, dydx(hor_tot serv_link_for serv_link_back man_link_back man_link_for ) at((p1) 
RD) at((p10) RD) at((p20) RD) at((p30) RD)  at((p40) RD) at((p50) RD) at((p60) RD) 
at((p70) RD) at((p80) RD) at((p90) RD) at((p99) RD) vsquish force level(90) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      29263 
Model VCE    : Corrected 
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Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : hor_tot man_link_back man_link_for serv_link_back serv_link_for 
1._at        : RD              =   -8.889859 (p1) 
2._at        : RD              =   -7.338238 (p10) 
3._at        : RD              =    -6.57368 (p20) 
4._at        : RD              =   -6.001415 (p30) 
5._at        : RD              =   -5.480639 (p40) 
6._at        : RD              =   -4.965173 (p50) 
7._at        : RD              =   -4.454347 (p60) 
8._at        : RD              =   -3.899951 (p70) 
9._at        : RD              =   -3.271986 (p80) 
10._at       : RD              =   -2.325058 (p90) 
11._at       : RD              =   -.1931912 (p99) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |            Delta-method 
               |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [90% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
hor_tot        | 
           _at | 
            1  |   .3395583   .1694794     2.00   0.045     .0607895    .6183272 
            2  |    .120886   .1185519     1.02   0.308    -.0741146    .3158865 
            3  |   .0131356   .0983376     0.13   0.894    -.1486154    .1748867 
            4  |  -.0675147   .0872766    -0.77   0.439    -.2110719    .0760426 
            5  |  -.1409084   .0816268    -1.73   0.084    -.2751725   -.0066443 
            6  |  -.2135539   .0810935    -2.63   0.008    -.3469408   -.0801669 
            7  |  -.2855453   .0856273    -3.33   0.001    -.4263897    -.144701 
            8  |  -.3636773   .0953977    -3.81   0.000    -.5205925   -.2067621 
            9  |  -.4521774   .1108892    -4.08   0.000    -.6345739   -.2697808 
           10  |  -.5856294   .1396787    -4.19   0.000    -.8153803   -.3558784 
           11  |  -.8860767    .215153    -4.12   0.000    -1.239972   -.5321815 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
man_link_back  | 
           _at | 
            1  |  -.3648488   .6985935    -0.52   0.601    -1.513933    .7842352 
            2  |   .1791628   .5238216     0.34   0.732    -.6824471    1.040773 
            3  |   .4472233   .4674626     0.96   0.339    -.3216843    1.216131 
            4  |   .6478645   .4450257     1.46   0.145    -.0841376    1.379867 
            5  |    .830453   .4419247     1.88   0.060     .1035516    1.557354 
            6  |    1.01118   .4554965     2.22   0.026     .2619547    1.760405 
            7  |    1.19028   .4839145     2.46   0.014     .3943111    1.986248 
            8  |   1.384656   .5287933     2.62   0.009     .5148683    2.254443 
            9  |   1.604826   .5931415     2.71   0.007     .6291947    2.580457 
           10  |   1.936827   .7087222     2.73   0.006     .7710824    3.102571 
           11  |   2.684277    1.01201     2.65   0.008     1.019669    4.348886 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
man_link_for   | 
           _at | 
            1  |   -1.01511     .79163    -1.28   0.200    -2.317226    .2870053 
            2  |  -1.702187   .5736747    -2.97   0.003    -2.645798   -.7585764 
            3  |  -2.040743   .5006035    -4.08   0.000    -2.864163   -1.217323 
            4  |  -2.294149   .4704053    -4.88   0.000    -3.067897   -1.520402 
            5  |  -2.524755   .4652923    -5.43   0.000    -3.290093   -1.759418 
            6  |   -2.75301   .4819876    -5.71   0.000    -3.545809   -1.960211 
            7  |   -2.97921   .5178366    -5.75   0.000    -3.830975   -2.127445 
            8  |  -3.224704   .5742607    -5.62   0.000    -4.169279   -2.280129 
            9  |  -3.502774   .6543232    -5.35   0.000     -4.57904   -2.426508 
           10  |  -3.922086   .7961409    -4.93   0.000    -5.231621   -2.612551 
           11  |  -4.866103   1.161667    -4.19   0.000    -6.776875   -2.955331 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
serv_link_back | 
           _at | 
            1  |   .5950059    3.98946     0.15   0.881    -5.967072    7.157084 
            2  |  -2.062909   2.667278    -0.77   0.439    -6.450192    2.324373 
            3  |  -3.372592   2.215096    -1.52   0.128      -7.0161     .270917 
            4  |  -4.352878   2.043035    -2.13   0.033    -7.713372   -.9923852 
            5  |  -5.244963   2.047354    -2.56   0.010    -8.612561   -1.877366 
            6  |  -6.127953   2.202582    -2.78   0.005    -9.750878   -2.505029 
            7  |  -7.002994   2.476987    -2.83   0.005    -11.07728   -2.928712 
            8  |  -7.952671    2.87039    -2.77   0.006    -12.67404     -3.2313 
            9  |   -9.02837   3.393328    -2.66   0.008     -14.6099   -3.446842 
           10  |  -10.65045   4.271652    -2.49   0.013    -17.67669   -3.624208 
           11  |  -14.30232   6.426155    -2.23   0.026    -24.87241   -3.732239 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
serv_link_for  | 
           _at | 
            1  |  -6.889415   2.871784    -2.40   0.016    -11.61308    -2.16575 
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            2  |  -3.065989   1.958803    -1.57   0.118    -6.287933    .1559556 
            3  |  -1.182004   1.599073    -0.74   0.460    -3.812244    1.448237 
            4  |   .2281442   1.408882     0.16   0.871    -2.089261    2.545549 
            5  |   1.511414   1.323432     1.14   0.253    -.6654377    3.688265 
            6  |   2.781599   1.337838     2.08   0.038     .5810521    4.982147 
            7  |    4.04035   1.446461     2.79   0.005     1.661133    6.419567 
            8  |   5.406466    1.64875     3.28   0.001     2.694513    8.118419 
            9  |   6.953865   1.949901     3.57   0.000     3.746563    10.16117 
           10  |   9.287237   2.487684     3.73   0.000     5.195361    13.37911 
           11  |   14.54047   3.856441     3.77   0.000     8.197194    20.88376 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
TABLE IV.17 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
ESTONIA FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR – ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY MODEL, 2002-2010 (DEP. 
VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP c.hor_tot##c.RD  c.man_link_back##c.RD 
c.man_link_for##c.RD c.serv_link_back##c.RD c.serv_link_for##c.RD  humcap1 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if 
man==1, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(2 3)) gmm(hor_tot hormanRD, lag(4 4)coll) 
gmm(man_link_back backmanRD , lag(2 2)coll) gmm(man_link_for formanRD , lag(3 
3)coll) gmm(serv_link_back backservRD , lag(2 2)coll) gmm(serv_link_for forservRD 
, lag(3 3)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =     11451 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      2870 
Number of instruments = 70                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(43) =  12430.41                                      avg =      3.99 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      |              Corrected 
              WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
              WLP_TFP | 
                  L1. |   .3149631   .1022585     3.08   0.002     .1145401     .515386 
                      | 
              hor_tot |   .4835999    .863674     0.56   0.576     -1.20917     2.17637 
                   RD |   .0754844   .0407831     1.85   0.064    -.0044489    .1554178 
                      | 
       c.hor_tot#c.RD |   .4426563   .1512112     2.93   0.003     .1462879    .7390248 
                      | 
        man_link_back |  -1.101716   .9171142    -1.20   0.230    -2.899227    .6957946 
                      | 
 c.man_link_back#c.RD |   .2718237   .1300037     2.09   0.037     .0170211    .5266263 
                      | 
         man_link_for |  -3.426276   1.414267    -2.42   0.015    -6.198189   -.6543632 
                      | 
  c.man_link_for#c.RD |  -.8213433   .2790018    -2.94   0.003    -1.368177   -.2745099 
                      | 
       serv_link_back |   -7.11964   2.900438    -2.45   0.014    -12.80439   -1.434885 
                      | 
c.serv_link_back#c.RD |  -1.394383   .5897412    -2.36   0.018    -2.550255   -.2385117 
                      | 
        serv_link_for |  -3.913665   2.087001    -1.88   0.061    -8.004111    .1767816 
                      | 
 c.serv_link_for#c.RD |    -.82663   .4231969    -1.95   0.051    -1.656081    .0028207 
                      | 
              humcap1 |   .4629926   .0365259    12.68   0.000     .3914032     .534582 
            hhi_sales |   .2654641   .4216983     0.63   0.529    -.5610494    1.091978 
                  age |  -.0155424    .001925    -8.07   0.000    -.0193153   -.0117695 
                 age2 |   .0001607   .0000305     5.26   0.000     .0001009    .0002205 
                logta |   .2713445   .0648397     4.18   0.000     .1442611     .398428 
               logta2 |  -.0078032    .004408    -1.77   0.077    -.0164428    .0008364 
               demand |   .1532136   .0664451     2.31   0.021     .0229837    .2834436 
                      | 
           nace_short | 
                  20  |   -.942584   .2628651    -3.59   0.000     -1.45779   -.4273778 
                  23  |  -2.841413   8.672924    -0.33   0.743    -19.84003    14.15721 
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                  24  |  -.1209853   .3168069    -0.38   0.703    -.7419154    .4999448 
                  25  |  -.8130639   .2151539    -3.78   0.000    -1.234758     -.39137 
                  26  |  -.7983774   .2124086    -3.76   0.000    -1.214691   -.3820643 
                  29  |  -.5801436   .1791538    -3.24   0.001    -.9312786   -.2290087 
                1516  |  -.4257499   .2311734    -1.84   0.066    -.8788414    .0273417 
                1718  |  -.4654798   .1798501    -2.59   0.010    -.8179794   -.1129801 
                2122  |   -.613885   .2445828    -2.51   0.012    -1.093259   -.1345114 
                2728  |  -.6989031   .2006752    -3.48   0.000    -1.092219   -.3055869 
                3033  |  -.3468324   .2962421    -1.17   0.242    -.9274561    .2337914 
                3435  |  -.7817603   .2470072    -3.16   0.002    -1.265886    -.297635 
                3637  |  -.7707947   .2291061    -3.36   0.001    -1.219834    -.321755 
                      | 
          region_code | 
                   2  |  -.0437265   .0213177    -2.05   0.040    -.0855084   -.0019445 
                   3  |  -.0592552   .0244047    -2.43   0.015    -.1070875   -.0114228 
                   4  |   -.072051   .0431371    -1.67   0.095    -.1565981    .0124962 
                   5  |  -.0544477   .0214772    -2.54   0.011    -.0965421   -.0123532 
                      | 
                 year | 
                2003  |  -.1923038     .19301    -1.00   0.319    -.5705965    .1859889 
                2004  |  -.1310405   .1518736    -0.86   0.388    -.4287073    .1666263 
                2005  |  -.1367793    .151084    -0.91   0.365    -.4328984    .1593399 
                2006  |  -.0916673   .1237325    -0.74   0.459    -.3341785    .1508439 
                2007  |  -.1412802   .0997108    -1.42   0.157    -.3367097    .0541494 
                2008  |  -.1322625   .0503425    -2.63   0.009     -.230932   -.0335929 
                2009  |  -.2270384   .0384994    -5.90   0.000    -.3024958   -.1515811 
                      | 
                _cons |   1.066566   .3795855     2.81   0.005     .3225923     1.81054 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(19b.nace_short 20.nace_short 23.nace_short 24.nace_short 25.nace_short 
    26.nace_short 29.nace_short 45.nace_short 50.nace_short 51.nace_short 
    52.nace_short 55.nace_short 60.nace_short 61.nace_short 62.nace_short 
    63.nace_short 64.nace_short 70.nace_short 1516.nace_short 1718.nace_short 
    2122.nace_short 2728.nace_short 3033.nace_short 3435.nace_short 
    3637.nace_short 4041.nace_short 6567.nace_short 7174.nace_short 
    1b.region_code 2.region_code 3.region_code 4.region_code 5.region_code 
    2002b.year 2003.year 2004.year 2005.year 2006.year 2007.year 2008.year 
    2009.year 2010.year) 
    D.(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L3.(serv_link_for forservRD) collapsed 
    L2.(serv_link_back backservRD) collapsed 
    L3.(man_link_for formanRD) collapsed 
    L2.(man_link_back backmanRD) collapsed 
    L4.(hor_tot hormanRD) collapsed 
    L(2/3).L.WLP_TFP 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    19b.nace_short 20.nace_short 23.nace_short 24.nace_short 25.nace_short 
    26.nace_short 29.nace_short 45.nace_short 50.nace_short 51.nace_short 
    52.nace_short 55.nace_short 60.nace_short 61.nace_short 62.nace_short 
    63.nace_short 64.nace_short 70.nace_short 1516.nace_short 1718.nace_short 
    2122.nace_short 2728.nace_short 3033.nace_short 3435.nace_short 
    3637.nace_short 4041.nace_short 6567.nace_short 7174.nace_short 
    1b.region_code 2.region_code 3.region_code 4.region_code 5.region_code 
    2002b.year 2003.year 2004.year 2005.year 2006.year 2007.year 2008.year 
    2009.year 2010.year 
    humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL2.(serv_link_for forservRD) collapsed 
    DL.(serv_link_back backservRD) collapsed 
    DL2.(man_link_for formanRD) collapsed 
    DL.(man_link_back backmanRD) collapsed 
    DL3.(hor_tot hormanRD) collapsed 
    DL.L.WLP_TFP 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -5.42  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.35  Pr > z =  0.730 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.34  Pr > z =  0.732 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.10  Pr > z =  0.923 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(26)   =  48.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.005 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(26)   =  32.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.189 
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  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =  10.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.388 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(16)   =  21.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.160 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =  14.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.116 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(17)   =  17.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.393 
  gmm(hor_tot hormanRD, collapse lag(4 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  28.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.160 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   3.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.457 
  gmm(man_link_back backmanRD, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  25.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.252 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   6.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.189 
  gmm(man_link_for formanRD, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  29.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.121 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   2.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.693 
  gmm(serv_link_back backservRD, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  26.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.222 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   5.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.249 
  gmm(serv_link_for forservRD, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  24.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.313 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   7.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.113 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(18)   =  21.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.275 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  11.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.199 
  iv(19b.nace_short 20.nace_short 23.nace_short 24.nace_short 25.nace_short 26.nace_short 
29.nace_short 45.nace_short 50.nace_short 51.nace_short 52.nace_short 55.nace_short 
60.nace_short 61.nace_short 62.nace_short 63.nace_short 64.nace_short 70.nace_short 
1516.nace_short 1718.nace_short 2122.nace_short 2728.nace_short 3033.nace_short 
3435.nace_short 3637.nace_short 4041.nace_short 6567.nace_short 7174.nace_short 
1b.region_code 2.region_code 3.region_code 4.region_code 5.region_code 2002b.year 
2003.year 2004.year 2005.year 2006.year 2007.year 2008.year 2009.year 2010.year) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.189 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(25)   =  30.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.210 
 
MARGINAL EFFECTS 
 
margins, dydx(hor_tot serv_link_for serv_link_back man_link_back man_link_for ) at((p1) 
RD) at((p10) RD) at((p20) RD) at((p30) RD)  at((p40) RD) at((p50) RD) at((p60) RD) 
at((p70) RD) at((p80) RD) at((p90) RD) at((p99) RD) vsquish force level(90) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      11451 
Model VCE    : Corrected 
 
Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : hor_tot man_link_back man_link_for serv_link_back serv_link_for 
1._at        : RD              =   -8.481566 (p1) 
2._at        : RD              =   -6.723833 (p10) 
3._at        : RD              =   -5.891644 (p20) 
4._at        : RD              =   -5.267858 (p30) 
5._at        : RD              =   -4.736198 (p40) 
6._at        : RD              =   -4.219508 (p50) 
7._at        : RD              =   -3.688879 (p60) 
8._at        : RD              =   -3.178054 (p70) 
9._at        : RD              =   -2.639057 (p80) 
10._at       : RD              =   -1.791759 (p90) 
11._at       : RD              =   -.4658742 (p99) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |            Delta-method 
               |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [90% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
hor_tot        | 
           _at | 
            1  |  -3.270819    1.09829    -2.98   0.003    -5.077346   -1.464293 
            2  |  -2.492747   .9168498    -2.72   0.007    -4.000831   -.9846635 
            3  |  -2.124374   .8466345    -2.51   0.012    -3.516964   -.7317838 
            4  |  -1.848251   .8029579    -2.30   0.021    -3.168999   -.5275027 
            5  |  -1.612908   .7729033    -2.09   0.037    -2.884221   -.3415956 
            6  |  -1.384192   .7508238    -1.84   0.065    -2.619187   -.1491967 
            7  |  -1.149306   .7361335    -1.56   0.118    -2.360138    .0615258 
            8  |  -.9231858   .7300876    -1.26   0.206    -2.124073    .2777015 
            9  |  -.6845956   .7325385    -0.93   0.350    -1.889514     .520323 
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           10  |  -.3095338   .7543904    -0.41   0.682    -1.550396    .9313279 
           11  |   .2773777     .82815     0.33   0.738    -1.084808    1.639563 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
man_link_back  | 
           _at | 
            1  |  -3.407207   .9715652    -3.51   0.000     -5.00529   -1.809124 
            2  |  -2.929413   .8502226    -3.45   0.001    -4.327905   -1.530922 
            3  |  -2.703205   .8091016    -3.34   0.001    -4.034058   -1.372351 
            4  |  -2.533645   .7866699    -3.22   0.001    -3.827602   -1.239688 
            5  |  -2.389127   .7737717    -3.09   0.002    -3.661868   -1.116386 
            6  |  -2.248678   .7670184    -2.93   0.003    -3.510311   -.9870453 
            7  |  -2.104441   .7661747    -2.75   0.006    -3.364686   -.8441958 
            8  |  -1.965587   .7712131    -2.55   0.011    -3.234119   -.6970539 
            9  |  -1.819075   .7826278    -2.32   0.020    -3.106383   -.5317664 
           10  |  -1.588759   .8125515    -1.96   0.051    -2.925287   -.2522306 
           11  |  -1.228352    .885231    -1.39   0.165    -2.684427    .2277236 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
man_link_for   | 
           _at | 
            1  |   3.540002   1.392587     2.54   0.011       1.2494    5.830604 
            2  |   2.096299   1.015834     2.06   0.039     .4254006    3.767197 
            3  |   1.412786   .8775522     1.61   0.107    -.0306588    2.856231 
            4  |   .9004438   .8028335     1.12   0.262    -.4200998    2.220987 
            5  |   .4637687   .7650799     0.61   0.544    -.7946757    1.722213 
            6  |   .0393882   .7549731     0.05   0.958    -1.202432    1.281208 
            7  |  -.3964397   .7729597    -0.51   0.608    -1.667845    .8749659 
            8  |   -.816003    .815681    -1.00   0.317    -2.157679    .5256729 
            9  |  -1.258704   .8837387    -1.42   0.154    -2.712325    .1949167 
           10  |  -1.954627   1.026763    -1.90   0.057    -3.643501   -.2657521 
           11  |  -3.043634   1.306187    -2.33   0.020     -5.19212   -.8951475 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
serv_link_back | 
           _at | 
            1  |   4.706913   2.829085     1.66   0.096      .053483    9.360344 
            2  |   2.255959   1.994483     1.13   0.258    -1.024674    5.536591 
            3  |   1.095569    1.67976     0.65   0.514     -1.66739    3.858529 
            4  |   .2257726   1.506879     0.15   0.881    -2.252823    2.704368 
            5  |  -.5155646   1.419433    -0.36   0.716    -2.850324    1.819195 
            6  |  -1.236029   1.398031    -0.88   0.377    -3.535586    1.063527 
            7  |  -1.975929   1.444247    -1.37   0.171    -4.351503    .3996456 
            8  |  -2.688215   1.548331    -1.74   0.083    -5.234994   -.1414367 
            9  |  -3.439783   1.709617    -2.01   0.044    -6.251852   -.6277135 
           10  |  -4.621241   2.038953    -2.27   0.023    -7.975019   -1.267462 
           11  |  -6.470033   2.662952    -2.43   0.015     -10.8502   -2.089866 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
serv_link_for  | 
           _at | 
            1  |   3.097453   2.699474     1.15   0.251    -1.342786    7.537692 
            2  |   1.644457   2.136102     0.77   0.441    -1.869118    5.158033 
            3  |   .9565451   1.912896     0.50   0.617    -2.189888    4.102978 
            4  |   .4409049   1.773243     0.25   0.804     -2.47582     3.35763 
            5  |   .0014191   1.677992     0.00   0.999    -2.758633    2.761471 
            6  |   -.425693   1.610339    -0.26   0.792    -3.074466     2.22308 
            7  |  -.8643262   1.569795    -0.55   0.582    -3.446409    1.717757 
            8  |   -1.28659    1.56058    -0.82   0.410    -3.853516    1.280336 
            9  |  -1.732141   1.583135    -1.09   0.274    -4.336166    .8718847 
           10  |  -2.432543   1.681709    -1.45   0.148    -5.198708    .3336227 
           11  |  -3.528559   1.961581    -1.80   0.072    -6.755073   -.3020454 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
TABLE IV.18 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
HUNGARY FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR – ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY MODEL, 2002-2010 (DEP. 
VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP c.hor_tot##c.RD  c.man_link_back##c.RD 
c.man_link_for##c.RD c.serv_link_back##c.RD c.serv_link_for##c.RD  humcap1 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if 
man==1, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 3)) gmm(hor_tot hormanRD, lag(2 2)coll) 
gmm(man_link_back backmanRD , lag(2 3)coll) gmm(man_link_for formanRD , lag(2 
2)coll) gmm(serv_link_back backservRD , lag(2 2)coll) gmm(serv_link_for forservRD 
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, lag(2 4)) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) iv(i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      2499 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      1278 
Number of instruments = 128                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(58) =  19152.69                                      avg =      1.96 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      |              Corrected 
              WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
              WLP_TFP | 
                  L1. |   .5745605   .0810842     7.09   0.000     .4156384    .7334827 
                      | 
              hor_tot |  -.6289621   .6232888    -1.01   0.313    -1.850586    .5926615 
                   RD |    -.01408   .0605508    -0.23   0.816    -.1327574    .1045975 
                      | 
       c.hor_tot#c.RD |   .0145166    .098065     0.15   0.882    -.1776872    .2067204 
                      | 
        man_link_back |   1.795839   2.146526     0.84   0.403    -2.411274    6.002953 
                      | 
 c.man_link_back#c.RD |  -.1803468   .3979364    -0.45   0.650    -.9602878    .5995942 
                      | 
         man_link_for |  -3.065781   2.134384    -1.44   0.151    -7.249098    1.117535 
                      | 
  c.man_link_for#c.RD |   .0140046   .3186146     0.04   0.965    -.6104686    .6384778 
                      | 
       serv_link_back |  -17.73987   10.36367    -1.71   0.087    -38.05229    2.572544 
                      | 
c.serv_link_back#c.RD |   .9008084   1.723257     0.52   0.601    -2.476714    4.278331 
                      | 
        serv_link_for |   10.29962   7.559472     1.36   0.173    -4.516675    25.11591 
                      | 
 c.serv_link_for#c.RD |   .3642633   1.340153     0.27   0.786    -2.262388    2.990915 
                      | 
              humcap1 |   .3008745   .0459647     6.55   0.000     .2107853    .3909637 
            hhi_sales |  -.2132452   .1071474    -1.99   0.047    -.4232503   -.0032401 
                  age |  -.0061616   .0044765    -1.38   0.169    -.0149354    .0026122 
                 age2 |  -.0000428   .0001572    -0.27   0.786     -.000351    .0002654 
                logta |   .0815283   .0519056     1.57   0.116    -.0202048    .1832615 
               logta2 |   .0006602   .0029507     0.22   0.823    -.0051231    .0064435 
               demand |   .0902238   .0457397     1.97   0.049     .0005756    .1798719 
                      | 
           nace_short | 
                  20  |  -.2008278   .2469471    -0.81   0.416    -.6848351    .2831796 
                  23  |   1.677692   .4380265     3.83   0.000      .819176    2.536208 
                  24  |   .2365959   .2481469     0.95   0.340     -.249763    .7229547 
                  25  |  -.2155929   .2054557    -1.05   0.294    -.6182786    .1870928 
                  26  |  -.2397541   .2154342    -1.11   0.266    -.6619974    .1824891 
                  29  |   .1903253   .2750833     0.69   0.489     -.348828    .7294786 
                1516  |   .0106967    .252007     0.04   0.966    -.4832279    .5046214 
                1718  |  -.5705129   .1873296    -3.05   0.002    -.9376721   -.2033537 
                2122  |  -.3191945   .2649098    -1.20   0.228    -.8384082    .2000191 
                2728  |   -.650857   .2332421    -2.79   0.005    -1.108003    -.193711 
                3033  |  -.3549736    .227416    -1.56   0.119    -.8007008    .0907535 
                3435  |  -.7349014    .251444    -2.92   0.003    -1.227723   -.2420803 
                3637  |  -.0196045   .1837197    -0.11   0.915    -.3796886    .3404795 
                      | 
          region_code | 
                   2  |   .0114528   .0484596     0.24   0.813    -.0835262    .1064319 
                   3  |  -.0555667   .0463588    -1.20   0.231    -.1464282    .0352948 
                   4  |  -.0787941   .0463133    -1.70   0.089    -.1695665    .0119782 
                   5  |   .0013209   .0303495     0.04   0.965     -.058163    .0608049 
                   6  |   .0364381   .0501754     0.73   0.468     -.061904    .1347801 
                   7  |  -.0489318   .0416601    -1.17   0.240    -.1305841    .0327205 
                   8  |  -.0386328   .0361746    -1.07   0.286    -.1095337    .0322681 
                   9  |  -.0133649   .0412003    -0.32   0.746    -.0941161    .0673863 
                  10  |  -.0063415   .0559163    -0.11   0.910    -.1159354    .1032524 
                  11  |  -.0387499   .0470915    -0.82   0.411    -.1310475    .0535477 
                  12  |   .0126997   .0444913     0.29   0.775    -.0745016    .0999011 
                  13  |  -.0548527   .0649042    -0.85   0.398    -.1820626    .0723572 
                  14  |  -.0104587   .0372264    -0.28   0.779     -.083421    .0625036 
                  15  |  -.0201271   .0492713    -0.41   0.683    -.1166971    .0764428 
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                  16  |  -.0350971   .0525557    -0.67   0.504    -.1381044    .0679102 
                  17  |  -.0372186   .0727308    -0.51   0.609    -.1797683    .1053311 
                  18  |  -.0494037   .0604681    -0.82   0.414     -.167919    .0691116 
                  19  |  -.0132848   .0517498    -0.26   0.797    -.1147125    .0881428 
                  20  |  -.0635834   .0510931    -1.24   0.213    -.1637241    .0365573 
                      | 
                 year | 
                2004  |   -.293952   .2966098    -0.99   0.322    -.8752965    .2873924 
                2005  |  -.4365163   .3051257    -1.43   0.153    -1.034552    .1615191 
                2006  |  -.4099029   .3095513    -1.32   0.185    -1.016612    .1968065 
                2007  |  -.4472685   .3105319    -1.44   0.150      -1.0559    .1613629 
                2008  |  -.4690899   .3169312    -1.48   0.139    -1.090264    .1520839 
                2009  |  -.5873773   .3135883    -1.87   0.061    -1.201999    .0272445 
                2010  |  -.4408848   .3078028    -1.43   0.152    -1.044167    .1623976 
                      | 
                _cons |   .7251025   .6283147     1.15   0.248    -.5063718    1.956577 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.68  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.63  Pr > z =  0.530 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.90  Pr > z =  0.368 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.66  Pr > z =  0.508 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(69)   =  77.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.237 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(69)   =  59.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.778 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(41)   =  40.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.473 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(28)   =  18.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.903 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, lag(1 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(47)   =  46.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.474 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(22)   =  12.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.939 
  gmm(hor_tot hormanRD, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(66)   =  56.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.799 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.316 
  gmm(man_link_back backmanRD, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(63)   =  57.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.657 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   1.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.934 
  gmm(man_link_for formanRD, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(65)   =  58.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.711 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.823 
  gmm(serv_link_back backservRD, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(65)   =  58.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.690 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   0.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.928 
  gmm(serv_link_for forservRD, lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(28)   =  25.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.621 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(41)   =  34.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.748 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(61)   =  49.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.864 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  10.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.219 
  iv(19b.nace_short 20.nace_short 23.nace_short 24.nace_short 25.nace_short 26.nace_short 
29.nace_short 45.nace_short 50.nace_short 51.nace_short 52.nace_short 55.nace_short 
60.nace_short 61.nace_short 62.nace_short 63.nace_short 64.nace_short 70.nace_short 
1516.nace_short 1718.nace_short 2122.nace_short 2728.nace_short 3033.nace_short 
3435.nace_short 3637.nace_short 4041.nace_short 6567.nace_short 7174.nace_short 
1b.region_code 2.region_code 3.region_code 4.region_code 5.region_code 6.region_code 
7.region_code 8.region_code 9.region_code 10.region_code 11.region_code 12.region_code 
13.region_code 14.region_code 15.region_code 16.region_code 17.region_code 18.region_code 
19.region_code 20.region_code 2002b.year 2003.year 2004.year 2005.year 2006.year 
2007.year 2008.year 2009.year 2010.year) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(29)   =  19.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.894 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(40)   =  39.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.480 
 
MARGINAL EFFECTS 
 
margins, dydx(hor_tot serv_link_for serv_link_back man_link_back man_link_for ) at((p1) 
RD) at((p10) RD) at((p20) RD) at((p30) RD)  at((p40) RD) at((p50) RD) at((p60) RD) 
at((p70) RD) at((p80) RD) at((p90) RD) at((p99) RD) vsquish force level(90) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =       2499 
Model VCE    : Corrected 
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Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : hor_tot man_link_back man_link_for serv_link_back serv_link_for 
1._at        : RD              =   -8.927978 (p1) 
2._at        : RD              =   -7.338179 (p10) 
3._at        : RD              =   -6.519147 (p20) 
4._at        : RD              =   -5.945421 (p30) 
5._at        : RD              =   -5.398604 (p40) 
6._at        : RD              =   -4.912655 (p50) 
7._at        : RD              =   -4.423348 (p60) 
8._at        : RD              =   -3.850761 (p70) 
9._at        : RD              =   -3.175261 (p80) 
10._at       : RD              =   -2.240247 (p90) 
11._at       : RD              =     .709922 (p99) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |            Delta-method 
               |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [90% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
hor_tot        | 
           _at | 
            1  |  -.7585662   .5122836    -1.48   0.139    -1.601198    .0840654 
            2  |  -.7354877   .4155598    -1.77   0.077    -1.419023   -.0519527 
            3  |  -.7235981   .3813506    -1.90   0.058    -1.350864   -.0963322 
            4  |  -.7152695    .366082    -1.95   0.051    -1.317421   -.1131182 
            5  |  -.7073316   .3592096    -1.97   0.049    -1.298179   -.1164844 
            6  |  -.7002773   .3597614    -1.95   0.052    -1.292032   -.1085224 
            7  |  -.6931742    .366629    -1.89   0.059    -1.296225   -.0901231 
            8  |  -.6848621   .3822325    -1.79   0.073    -1.313579   -.0561457 
            9  |  -.6750562   .4098712    -1.65   0.100    -1.349234   -.0008781 
           10  |  -.6614829     .46128    -1.43   0.152    -1.420221    .0972552 
           11  |  -.6186564   .6814041    -0.91   0.364    -1.739466    .5021536 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
man_link_back  | 
           _at | 
            1  |   3.405971   2.344542     1.45   0.146     -.450457      7.2624 
            2  |   3.119256   1.868457     1.67   0.095     .0459172    6.192595 
            3  |   2.971547   1.664401     1.79   0.074       .23385    5.709243 
            4  |   2.868077   1.546538     1.85   0.064     .3242485    5.411905 
            5  |    2.76946   1.458803     1.90   0.058     .3699433    5.168977 
            6  |   2.681821   1.404726     1.91   0.056     .3712524    4.992389 
            7  |   2.593576   1.375827     1.89   0.059     .3305416     4.85661 
            8  |   2.490312   1.376645     1.81   0.070     .2259314    4.754692 
            9  |   2.368487   1.425242     1.66   0.097     .0241729    4.712802 
           10  |   2.199861   1.567879     1.40   0.161    -.3790711    4.778792 
           11  |   1.667807   2.370725     0.70   0.482    -2.231689    5.567303 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
man_link_for   | 
           _at | 
            1  |  -3.190814   2.133595    -1.50   0.135    -6.700267    .3186378 
            2  |   -3.16855   1.835355    -1.73   0.084    -6.187441   -.1496591 
            3  |   -3.15708   1.720172    -1.84   0.066     -5.98651   -.3276489 
            4  |  -3.149045   1.659286    -1.90   0.058    -5.878327   -.4197628 
            5  |  -3.141387   1.618431    -1.94   0.052    -5.803469   -.4793043 
            6  |  -3.134581   1.597268    -1.96   0.050    -5.761853   -.5073098 
            7  |  -3.127729   1.590969    -1.97   0.049    -5.744639   -.5108183 
            8  |   -3.11971   1.602936    -1.95   0.052    -5.756305   -.4831148 
            9  |   -3.11025   1.643193    -1.89   0.058    -5.813061   -.4074382 
           10  |  -3.097155    1.74179    -1.78   0.075    -5.962145   -.2321656 
           11  |  -3.055839   2.291385    -1.33   0.182    -6.824833    .7131545 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
serv_link_back | 
           _at | 
            1  |  -25.78227   9.592282    -2.69   0.007    -41.56017   -10.00437 
            2  |  -24.35016   7.752988    -3.14   0.002    -37.10269   -11.59763 
            3  |  -23.61237   7.037883    -3.36   0.001    -35.18866   -12.03609 
            4  |  -23.09556   6.670499    -3.46   0.001    -34.06755   -12.12356 
            5  |  -22.60298   6.443223    -3.51   0.000    -33.20114   -12.00482 
            6  |  -22.16523   6.352701    -3.49   0.000     -32.6145   -11.71597 
            7  |  -21.72446   6.372409    -3.41   0.001    -32.20614   -11.24278 
            8  |  -21.20867   6.535034    -3.25   0.001    -31.95784   -10.45949 
            9  |  -20.60017   6.905552    -2.98   0.003     -31.9588    -9.24155 
           10  |   -19.7579   7.684508    -2.57   0.010    -32.39779   -7.118014 
           11  |  -17.10037   11.35554    -1.51   0.132    -35.77856     1.57783 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
serv_link_for  | 
           _at | 
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            1  |   7.047483   7.161442     0.98   0.325    -4.732041    18.82701 
            2  |   7.626589   5.601515     1.36   0.173    -1.587084    16.84026 
            3  |   7.924932   4.966233     1.60   0.111    -.2437954    16.09366 
            4  |   8.133919   4.625563     1.76   0.079     .5255445    15.74229 
            5  |   8.333105   4.402492     1.89   0.058      1.09165    15.57456 
            6  |   8.510118   4.300416     1.98   0.048     1.436564    15.58367 
            7  |   8.688354    4.29606     2.02   0.043     1.621965    15.75474 
            8  |   8.896927   4.416371     2.01   0.044     1.632643    16.16121 
            9  |   9.142987   4.717533     1.94   0.053     1.383335    16.90264 
           10  |   9.483578   5.363509     1.77   0.077     .6613901    18.30577 
           11  |   10.55822   8.360629     1.26   0.207    -3.193794    24.31023 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
TABLE IV.19 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
SLOVAKIA FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR – ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY MODEL, 2002-2009 (DEP. 
VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP c.hor_tot##c.RD  c.man_link_back##c.RD 
c.man_link_for##c.RD c.serv_link_back##c.RD c.serv_link_for##c.RD  humcap1 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if 
man==1, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) gmm(hor_tot hormanRD, lag(3 5)coll) 
gmm(man_link_back backmanRD , lag(3 3)coll) gmm(man_link_for formanRD , lag(2 
2)coll) gmm(serv_link_back backservRD, lag(4 5)coll) gmm(serv_link_for forservRD 
, lag(3 3)coll) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
iv(i.nace_short i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      8140 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      3074 
Number of instruments = 73                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(45) =   9819.81                                      avg =      2.65 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      |              Corrected 
              WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
              WLP_TFP | 
                  L1. |   .3781589   .0430071     8.79   0.000     .2938665    .4624514 
                      | 
              hor_tot |  -.1759973   .4060463    -0.43   0.665    -.9718334    .6198389 
                   RD |   .0595949   .0177793     3.35   0.001     .0247482    .0944417 
                      | 
       c.hor_tot#c.RD |   .0401559   .0684296     0.59   0.557    -.0939636    .1742754 
                      | 
        man_link_back |   2.132375   2.130756     1.00   0.317    -2.043831    6.308581 
                      | 
 c.man_link_back#c.RD |   .0095497   .2938846     0.03   0.974    -.5664536     .585553 
                      | 
         man_link_for |   -1.96545   1.330002    -1.48   0.139    -4.572206    .6413051 
                      | 
  c.man_link_for#c.RD |  -.2941371    .220599    -1.33   0.182    -.7265032    .1382291 
                      | 
       serv_link_back |  -.1984027   10.13448    -0.02   0.984    -20.06161    19.66481 
                      | 
c.serv_link_back#c.RD |  -.7958473   1.735153    -0.46   0.646    -4.196684     2.60499 
                      | 
        serv_link_for |   12.15999   3.849272     3.16   0.002     4.615558    19.70443 
                      | 
 c.serv_link_for#c.RD |   1.001284   .5655917     1.77   0.077    -.1072554    2.109823 
                      | 
              humcap1 |   .3313668   .0143665    23.07   0.000      .303209    .3595246 
            hhi_sales |  -.1777632   .1132603    -1.57   0.117    -.3997493     .044223 
                  age |  -.0099069   .0026533    -3.73   0.000    -.0151073   -.0047065 
                 age2 |      .0001   .0000495     2.02   0.043     3.02e-06    .0001969 
                logta |   .1652801   .0355182     4.65   0.000     .0956657    .2348944 
               logta2 |  -.0037996   .0022068    -1.72   0.085    -.0081249    .0005258 
               demand |  -.0192314   .0163452    -1.18   0.239    -.0512674    .0128046 
                      | 
           nace_short | 
                  20  |  -.1007014   .1489164    -0.68   0.499    -.3925721    .1911693 
                  23  |   1.122005   .2183843     5.14   0.000     .6939798    1.550031 
                  24  |   .8713452   .1301722     6.69   0.000     .6162124    1.126478 
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                  25  |  -.0852599   .1081863    -0.79   0.431    -.2973013    .1267814 
                  26  |   -.912005   .1221423    -7.47   0.000    -1.151399   -.6726104 
                  29  |   .0080772   .0963196     0.08   0.933    -.1807056    .1968601 
                1516  |  -.1287667   .1366492    -0.94   0.346    -.3965943    .1390609 
                1718  |  -.1032686   .0915695    -1.13   0.259    -.2827416    .0762044 
                2122  |  -.2012167   .1241899    -1.62   0.105    -.4446244    .0421909 
                2728  |  -.6383419   .2184637    -2.92   0.003    -1.066523   -.2101608 
                3033  |   .3369342   .0995704     3.38   0.001     .1417798    .5320886 
                3435  |   .8160256   .1633082     5.00   0.000     .4959475    1.136104 
                3637  |  -.4622175   .1195064    -3.87   0.000    -.6964457   -.2279893 
                      | 
          region_code | 
                   2  |    .086346   .0375338     2.30   0.021     .0127811     .159911 
                   3  |  -.0141716   .0360884    -0.39   0.695    -.0849035    .0565603 
                   4  |    .038773   .0301033     1.29   0.198    -.0202283    .0977744 
                   5  |   .0274194   .0324935     0.84   0.399    -.0362667    .0911054 
                   6  |    .000877   .0276317     0.03   0.975    -.0532801    .0550341 
                   7  |   .0215392   .0284608     0.76   0.449    -.0342431    .0773214 
                   8  |   -.000599   .0298631    -0.02   0.984    -.0591295    .0579316 
                      | 
                 year | 
                2004  |  -.0412767   .0314346    -1.31   0.189    -.1028874     .020334 
                2005  |  -.1935091   .0548966    -3.52   0.000    -.3011044   -.0859137 
                2006  |  -.0126713   .0318182    -0.40   0.690    -.0750338    .0496912 
                2007  |  -.0786953   .0646857    -1.22   0.224    -.2054769    .0480863 
                2008  |  -.1027943   .0778372    -1.32   0.187    -.2553525    .0497638 
                2009  |  -.4696022   .1367837    -3.43   0.001    -.7376934    -.201511 
                      | 
                _cons |   .9735913   .2061696     4.72   0.000     .5695062    1.377676 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -10.55  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.58  Pr > z =  0.565 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =   1.78  Pr > z =  0.074 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =  -0.04  Pr > z =  0.969 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(27)   =  32.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.212 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(27)   =  19.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.850 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(11)   =   9.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.570 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(16)   =   9.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.868 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(15)   =  11.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.729 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =   8.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.769 
  gmm(hor_tot hormanRD, collapse lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(19)   =  11.50  Prob > chi2 =  0.906 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   8.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.430 
  gmm(man_link_back backmanRD, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(23)   =  16.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.841 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   3.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.524 
  gmm(man_link_for formanRD, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(23)   =  16.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.831 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   3.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.558 
  gmm(serv_link_back backservRD, collapse lag(4 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(21)   =  16.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.754 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   3.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.777 
  gmm(serv_link_for forservRD, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(23)   =  17.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.767 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.789 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(19)   =  10.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.945 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   9.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.325 
  iv(19b.nace_short 20.nace_short 23.nace_short 24.nace_short 25.nace_short 26.nace_short 
29.nace_short 45.nace_short 50.nace_short 51.nace_short 52.nace_short 55.nace_short 
60.nace_short 61.nace_short 62.nace_short 63.nace_short 64.nace_short 70.nace_short 15 
16.nace_short 1718.nace_short 2122.nace_short 2728.nace_short 3033.nace_short 
3435.nace_short 3637.nace_short 4041.nace_short 6567.nace_short 7174.nace_short 
1b.region_code 2.region_code 3.region_code 4.region_code 5.region_code 6.region_code 
7.region_code 8.region_code 2002b.year 2003.year 2004.year 2005.year 2006.year 2007.year 
2008.year 2009.year) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.80  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(27)   =  18.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.880 
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MARGINAL EFFECTS 
 
margins, dydx(hor_tot serv_link_for serv_link_back man_link_back man_link_for ) at((p1) 
RD) at((p10) RD) at((p20) RD) at((p30) RD)  at((p40) RD) at((p50) RD) at((p60) RD) 
at((p70) RD) at((p80) RD) at((p90) RD) at((p99) RD) vsquish force level(90) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =       8140 
Model VCE    : Corrected 
 
Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : hor_tot man_link_back man_link_for serv_link_back serv_link_for 
1._at        : RD              =   -9.225426 (p1) 
2._at        : RD              =   -7.632159 (p10) 
3._at        : RD              =   -6.860664 (p20) 
4._at        : RD              =   -6.328353 (p30) 
5._at        : RD              =   -5.844269 (p40) 
6._at        : RD              =   -5.375278 (p50) 
7._at        : RD              =    -4.87752 (p60) 
8._at        : RD              =   -4.361872 (p70) 
9._at        : RD              =    -3.78419 (p80) 
10._at       : RD              =   -2.890372 (p90) 
11._at       : RD              =   -.4519851 (p99) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |            Delta-method 
               |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [90% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
hor_tot        | 
           _at | 
            1  |  -.5464526   .3416075    -1.60   0.110    -1.108347    .0154418 
            2  |  -.4824735   .2609126    -1.85   0.064    -.9116366   -.0533105 
            3  |  -.4514934   .2303808    -1.96   0.050    -.8304362   -.0725507 
            4  |   -.430118   .2144191    -2.01   0.045     -.782806     -.07743 
            5  |  -.4106792   .2045066    -2.01   0.045    -.7470625   -.0742958 
            6  |  -.3918465   .1997319    -1.96   0.050    -.7203763   -.0633166 
            7  |  -.3718585   .2002441    -1.86   0.063    -.7012307   -.0424863 
            8  |  -.3511522   .2067772    -1.70   0.089    -.6912705   -.0110339 
            9  |  -.3279548   .2206658    -1.49   0.137    -.6909178    .0350081 
           10  |  -.2920628   .2530565    -1.15   0.248    -.7083036     .124178 
           11  |  -.1941472   .3794002    -0.51   0.609    -.8182049    .4299106 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
man_link_back  | 
           _at | 
            1  |   2.044275   1.437386     1.42   0.155    -.3200143    4.408563 
            2  |    2.05949   1.201296     1.71   0.086     .0835339    4.035446 
            3  |   2.066857   1.139749     1.81   0.070     .1921366    3.941578 
            4  |   2.071941     1.1223     1.85   0.065     .2259218     3.91796 
            5  |   2.076564   1.125236     1.85   0.065     .2257149    3.927412 
            6  |   2.081042   1.145057     1.82   0.069     .1975915    3.964493 
            7  |   2.085796   1.183417     1.76   0.078     .1392485    4.032343 
            8  |    2.09072   1.240217     1.69   0.092     .0507448    4.130695 
            9  |   2.096237   1.321708     1.59   0.113    -.0777795    4.270253 
           10  |   2.104773   1.477679     1.42   0.154    -.3257923    4.535337 
           11  |   2.128058   2.019015     1.05   0.292    -1.192926    5.449042 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
man_link_for   | 
           _at | 
            1  |   .7480893   .9470389     0.79   0.430    -.8096511     2.30583 
            2  |   .2794504   .6750759     0.41   0.679    -.8309507    1.389852 
            3  |   .0525252   .5752331     0.09   0.927     -.893649    .9986994 
            4  |  -.1040472    .527764    -0.20   0.844    -.9721417    .7640474 
            5  |  -.2464343   .5048405    -0.49   0.625    -1.076823    .5839544 
            6  |  -.3843817   .5036695    -0.76   0.445    -1.212844    .4440809 
            7  |  -.5307909   .5252114    -1.01   0.312    -1.394687     .333105 
            8  |   -.682462   .5694186    -1.20   0.231    -1.619072    .2541482 
            9  |  -.8523798   .6396762    -1.33   0.183    -1.904554    .1997938 
           10  |  -1.115285   .7775775    -1.43   0.151    -2.394286    .1637164 
           11  |  -1.832505   1.238227    -1.48   0.139    -3.869207    .2041974 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
serv_link_back | 
           _at | 
            1  |   7.143628   6.888741     1.04   0.300    -4.187344     18.4746 
            2  |    5.87563   4.515103     1.30   0.193    -1.551054    13.30231 
            3  |   5.261638   3.573762     1.47   0.141    -.6166771    11.13995 
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            4  |      4.838   3.099614     1.56   0.119    -.2604112    9.936411 
            5  |   4.452743   2.865565     1.55   0.120    -.2606921    9.166178 
            6  |   4.079498   2.864369     1.42   0.154    -.6319686    8.790965 
            7  |   3.683359   3.105822     1.19   0.236    -1.425263     8.79198 
            8  |   3.272982   3.565496     0.92   0.359    -2.591737      9.1377 
            9  |   2.813235   4.248518     0.66   0.508    -4.174956    9.801425 
           10  |   2.101892   5.501609     0.38   0.702    -6.947449    11.15123 
           11  |   .1613085   9.384111     0.02   0.986    -15.27418     15.5968 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
serv_link_for  | 
           _at | 
            1  |   2.922722   2.544012     1.15   0.251    -1.261804    7.107249 
            2  |   4.518035   2.005807     2.25   0.024     1.218776    7.817293 
            3  |    5.29052   1.849633     2.86   0.004     2.248144    8.332896 
            4  |   5.823514   1.796585     3.24   0.001     2.868396    8.778633 
            5  |    6.30822   1.791426     3.52   0.000     3.361587    9.254853 
            6  |   6.777813   1.825996     3.71   0.000     3.774316    9.781309 
            7  |    7.27621   1.902872     3.82   0.000     4.146264    10.40616 
            8  |    7.79252   2.021151     3.86   0.000     4.468023    11.11702 
            9  |   8.370944   2.192501     3.82   0.000     4.764601    11.97729 
           10  |   9.265909   2.518914     3.68   0.000     5.122665    13.40915 
           11  |   11.70743   3.624848     3.23   0.001     5.745083    17.66977 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
TABLE IV.20 PRINTOUT OF DYNAMIC PANEL SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION OF FDI SPILLOVERS IN 
SLOVENIA FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR – ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY MODEL, 2002-2010 (DEP. 
VARIABLE LN TFP)  
xtabond2 WLP_TFP l.WLP_TFP c.hor_tot##c.RD  c.man_link_back##c.RD 
c.man_link_for##c.RD c.serv_link_back##c.RD c.serv_link_for##c.RD  humcap1 
hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand i.nace_short i.region_code i.year if 
man==1, gmm(l.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) gmm(hor_tot hormanRD , lag(3 3)coll) 
gmm(man_link_back backmanRD , lag(3 5)coll) gmm(man_link_for formanRD , lag(3 
3)coll) gmm(serv_link_back backservRD , lag(2 2)coll) gmm(serv_link_for forservRD 
, lag(2 2)) iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) iv(i.nace_short 
i.region_code i.year) two robust ar(4) 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      3584 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =      1136 
Number of instruments = 102                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(50) =    367.73                                      avg =      3.15 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      |              Corrected 
              WLP_TFP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
              WLP_TFP | 
                  L1. |   .3972237   .0567211     7.00   0.000     .2860523    .5083951 
                      | 
              hor_tot |   1.377847   .7072927     1.95   0.051     -.008421    2.764115 
                   RD |   .0377506   .0095976     3.93   0.000     .0189396    .0565616 
                      | 
       c.hor_tot#c.RD |   .1284106   .1222533     1.05   0.294    -.1112016    .3680227 
                      | 
        man_link_back |   2.099292   1.642157     1.28   0.201    -1.119277    5.317861 
                      | 
 c.man_link_back#c.RD |   .0279572    .279473     0.10   0.920    -.5197998    .5757142 
                      | 
         man_link_for |  -1.284115   2.372006    -0.54   0.588    -5.933161     3.36493 
                      | 
  c.man_link_for#c.RD |  -.0389077   .3582143    -0.11   0.914    -.7409949    .6631794 
                      | 
       serv_link_back |   .6076674   8.003704     0.08   0.939     -15.0793    16.29464 
                      | 
c.serv_link_back#c.RD |   1.079906   1.257287     0.86   0.390    -1.384331    3.544143 
                      | 
        serv_link_for |   1.801489   8.055203     0.22   0.823    -13.98642     17.5894 
                      | 
 c.serv_link_for#c.RD |  -1.290486   1.214221    -1.06   0.288    -3.670315    1.089344 
                      | 
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              humcap1 |    .545768   .0447665    12.19   0.000     .4580273    .6335088 
            hhi_sales |  -.1827222   .1220889    -1.50   0.134     -.422012    .0565677 
                  age |   -.009463   .0024618    -3.84   0.000     -.014288    -.004638 
                 age2 |   .0000257   .0000596     0.43   0.667    -.0000912    .0001425 
                logta |  -.0480626   .0564154    -0.85   0.394    -.1586347    .0625094 
               logta2 |   .0128485   .0044796     2.87   0.004     .0040687    .0216283 
               demand |   -.056645   .0860594    -0.66   0.510    -.2253184    .1120283 
                      | 
           nace_short | 
                  20  |  -.4400376   .1933846    -2.28   0.023    -.8190645   -.0610108 
                  23  |  -.1628087   .9974973    -0.16   0.870    -2.117868     1.79225 
                  24  |   .3471232   .2696863     1.29   0.198    -.1814522    .8756986 
                  25  |  -.5605932   .2343969    -2.39   0.017    -1.020003   -.1011837 
                  26  |  -.1148298   .2101698    -0.55   0.585    -.5267551    .2970954 
                  29  |  -.7044336   .1748238    -4.03   0.000    -1.047082   -.3617852 
                1516  |  -.3623842   .2151877    -1.68   0.092    -.7841443    .0593759 
                1718  |  -.0127246   .2024219    -0.06   0.950    -.4094644    .3840151 
                2122  |  -.8818658   .2165087    -4.07   0.000    -1.306215   -.4575165 
                2728  |  -.9466117   .2748321    -3.44   0.001    -1.485273   -.4079506 
                3033  |  -.3340293   .1941771    -1.72   0.085    -.7146095    .0465509 
                3435  |  -1.621597   .2795683    -5.80   0.000    -2.169541   -1.073653 
                3637  |  -.2104038   .1969809    -1.07   0.285    -.5964793    .1756718 
                      | 
          region_code | 
                   2  |  -.0375572   .0443447    -0.85   0.397    -.1244713    .0493569 
                   3  |   .0586848   .0427177     1.37   0.170    -.0250403      .14241 
                   4  |   .0111696   .0464927     0.24   0.810    -.0799545    .1022938 
                   5  |  -.0105783   .0521907    -0.20   0.839    -.1128702    .0917136 
                   6  |   .0429094   .0513691     0.84   0.404    -.0577722     .143591 
                   7  |    .028513   .0311957     0.91   0.361    -.0326294    .0896554 
                   8  |   .0003072   .0374251     0.01   0.993    -.0730447    .0736591 
                   9  |   .0153242   .0519724     0.29   0.768    -.0865399    .1171882 
                  10  |   .0164727   .0394208     0.42   0.676    -.0607908    .0937361 
                  11  |   .0718651    .052246     1.38   0.169    -.0305352    .1742655 
                  12  |  -.0349699   .0760657    -0.46   0.646    -.1840559    .1141161 
                      | 
                 year | 
                2003  |     .31681   .1635154     1.94   0.053    -.0036744    .6372943 
                2004  |   .2581862   .1263414     2.04   0.041     .0105617    .5058108 
                2005  |   .2109058   .1164404     1.81   0.070    -.0173132    .4391247 
                2006  |   .2437581    .119448     2.04   0.041     .0096442     .477872 
                2007  |   .1828785   .1111465     1.65   0.100    -.0349647    .4007216 
                2008  |   .1410368   .1071229     1.32   0.188    -.0689202    .3509938 
                2009  |  -.2464785   .0703335    -3.50   0.000    -.3843296   -.1086275 
                      | 
                _cons |   1.630692   .5832907     2.80   0.005     .4874632    2.773921 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -7.87  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.92  Pr > z =  0.359 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first differences: z =  -0.82  Pr > z =  0.411 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(4) in first differences: z =   0.78  Pr > z =  0.434 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(51)   =  98.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(51)   =  44.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.733 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(21)   =  20.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.493 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(30)   =  23.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.776 
  gmm(L.WLP_TFP, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(38)   =  32.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.737 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(13)   =  12.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.508 
  gmm(hor_tot hormanRD, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(48)   =  42.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.683 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.681 
  gmm(man_link_back backmanRD, collapse lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(43)   =  34.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.826 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =  10.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.260 
  gmm(man_link_for formanRD, collapse lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(47)   =  43.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.617 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   0.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.935 
  gmm(serv_link_back backservRD, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(47)   =  42.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.655 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.779 
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  gmm(serv_link_for forservRD, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(21)   =  18.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.609 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(30)   =  25.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.688 
  iv(humcap1 RD hhi_sales age age2 logta logta2 demand) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(43)   =  39.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.611 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   4.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.803 
  iv(19b.nace_short 20.nace_short 23.nace_short 24.nace_short 25.nace_short 26.nace_short 
29.nace_short 45.nace_short 50.nace_short 51.nace_short 52.nace_short 55.nace_short 
60.nace_short 61.nace_short 62.nace_short 63.nace_short 64.nace_short 70.nace_short 
1516.nace_short 1718.nace_short 2122.nace_short 2728.nace_short 3033.nace_short 
3435.nace_short 3637.nace_short 4041.nace_short 6567.nace_short 7174.nace_short 
1b.region_code 2.region_code 3.region_code 4.region_code 5.region_code 6.region_code 
7.region_code 8.region_code 9.region_code 10.region_code 11.region_code 12.region_code 
2002b.year 2003.year 2004.year 2005.year 2006.year 2007.year 2008.year 2009.year 
2010.year) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(20)   =  23.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.287 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(31)   =  21.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.903 
 
MARGINAL EFFECTS 
 
margins, dydx(hor_tot serv_link_for serv_link_back man_link_back man_link_for ) at((p1) 
RD) at((p10) RD) at((p20) RD) at((p30) RD)  at((p40) RD) at((p50) RD) at((p60) RD) 
at((p70) RD) at((p80) RD) at((p90) RD) at((p99) RD) vsquish force level(90) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =       3584 
Model VCE    : Corrected 
 
Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : hor_tot man_link_back man_link_for serv_link_back serv_link_for 
1._at        : RD              =   -8.480529 (p1) 
2._at        : RD              =   -6.977282 (p10) 
3._at        : RD              =    -6.24442 (p20) 
4._at        : RD              =   -5.762052 (p30) 
5._at        : RD              =   -5.327876 (p40) 
6._at        : RD              =   -4.901028 (p50) 
7._at        : RD              =   -4.392498 (p60) 
8._at        : RD              =   -3.740737 (p70) 
9._at        : RD              =   -2.995732 (p80) 
10._at       : RD              =   -1.994884 (p90) 
11._at       : RD              =    .5103831 (p99) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |            Delta-method 
               |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [90% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
hor_tot        | 
           _at | 
            1  |   .2888577   .6318338     0.46   0.648    -.7504164    1.328132 
            2  |   .4818905   .5102595     0.94   0.345    -.3574116    1.321193 
            3  |   .5759977   .4660105     1.24   0.216    -.1905214    1.342517 
            4  |   .6379389   .4444023     1.44   0.151    -.0930378    1.368916 
            5  |   .6936916   .4309687     1.61   0.107    -.0151889    1.402572 
            6  |   .7485034   .4238704     1.77   0.077     .0512986    1.445708 
            7  |    .813804   .4237291     1.92   0.055     .1168317    1.510776 
            8  |    .897497   .4366868     2.06   0.040     .1792111    1.615783 
            9  |   .9931635   .4679659     2.12   0.034     .2234281    1.762899 
           10  |   1.121683   .5320918     2.11   0.035     .2464699    1.996896 
           11  |   1.443386   .7582402     1.90   0.057     .1961917     2.69058 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
man_link_back  | 
           _at | 
            1  |     1.8622   1.286085     1.45   0.148    -.2532219    3.977622 
            2  |   1.904227   1.009765     1.89   0.059     .2433117    3.565142 
            3  |   1.924715   .9156104     2.10   0.036     .4186702     3.43076 
            4  |   1.938201   .8745326     2.22   0.027     .4997229    3.376679 
            5  |   1.950339   .8542248     2.28   0.022     .5452645    3.355414 
            6  |   1.962273   .8508179     2.31   0.021      .562802    3.361744 
            7  |    1.97649   .8684023     2.28   0.023     .5480952    3.404885 
            8  |   1.994711    .923003     2.16   0.031     .4765065    3.512916 
            9  |    2.01554    1.02226     1.97   0.049     .3340711    3.697008 
           10  |   2.043521   1.200367     1.70   0.089     .0690933    4.017948 
           11  |   2.113561   1.765741     1.20   0.231    -.7908241    5.017946 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
man_link_for   | 
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           _at | 
            1  |  -.9541569   1.824894    -0.52   0.601     -3.95584    2.047527 
            2  |  -1.012645   1.546411    -0.65   0.513    -3.556264    1.530974 
            3  |  -1.041159   1.464227    -0.71   0.477    -3.449597     1.36728 
            4  |  -1.059927   1.433988    -0.74   0.460    -3.418627    1.298774 
            5  |   -1.07682   1.424255    -0.76   0.450    -3.419511    1.265872 
            6  |  -1.093427   1.431193    -0.76   0.445     -3.44753    1.260676 
            7  |  -1.113213   1.460463    -0.76   0.446     -3.51546    1.289034 
            8  |  -1.138572   1.529204    -0.74   0.457    -3.653889    1.376746 
            9  |  -1.167558   1.645269    -0.71   0.478    -3.873784    1.538668 
           10  |  -1.206499   1.850971    -0.65   0.515    -4.251075    1.838078 
           11  |  -1.303973     2.5206    -0.52   0.605    -5.449991    2.842045 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
serv_link_back | 
           _at | 
            1  |  -8.550506   6.578866    -1.30   0.194    -19.37178    2.270766 
            2  |   -6.92714   5.512212    -1.26   0.209    -15.99392    2.139643 
            3  |  -6.135719   5.165991    -1.19   0.235    -14.63302     2.36158 
            4  |  -5.614806   5.018038    -1.12   0.263    -13.86874    2.639133 
            5  |  -5.145937   4.945053    -1.04   0.298    -13.27983    2.987951 
            6  |  -4.684981   4.931495    -0.95   0.342    -12.79657    3.426606 
            7  |  -4.135817   4.991195    -0.83   0.407     -12.3456    4.073968 
            8  |  -3.431977   5.183309    -0.66   0.508    -11.95776    5.093807 
            9  |  -2.627442   5.544902    -0.47   0.636    -11.74799    6.493111 
           10  |   -1.54662     6.2225    -0.25   0.804    -11.78172    8.688482 
           11  |   1.158833   8.518427     0.14   0.892    -12.85273     15.1704 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
serv_link_for  | 
           _at | 
            1  |   12.74549   7.182025     1.77   0.076      .932109    24.55887 
            2  |   10.80557   6.202921     1.74   0.082     .6026736    21.00847 
            3  |   9.859823   5.873946     1.68   0.093     .1980423     19.5216 
            4  |   9.237333   5.722976     1.61   0.107    -.1761249    18.65079 
            5  |   8.677036   5.635893     1.54   0.124    -.5931835    17.94726 
            6  |   8.126195    5.59756     1.45   0.147    -1.080973    17.33336 
            7  |   7.469944   5.614353     1.33   0.183    -1.764844    16.70473 
            8  |   6.628856   5.733864     1.16   0.248    -2.802511    16.06022 
            9  |   5.667438   5.996804     0.95   0.345    -4.196427     15.5313 
           10  |   4.375858   6.533109     0.67   0.503     -6.37015    15.12187 
           11  |   1.142847     8.5119     0.13   0.893    -12.85798    15.14368 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
  
